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1
China’s dilemmas in the 21st Century
Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo
Thirty years of reform (1978–2008) have turned China into one of the largest and 
most dynamic economies in the world. China, however, faces three significant 
and profound challenges towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-
first century: First, to maintain continued high growth amid global financial 
turbulence, the slow-down of the major economies abroad, and some rising 
socially destabilising tensions such as growing income inequality; second, 
to bring its growth path in line with environmental sustainability; and third to 
manage the rising demand for energy to moderate oil price increases and to 
placate heightening domestic and international concerns about global warming. 
This book, in three parts, offers some analyses as to how China could confront 
these challenges and discusses some of the key implications for China and 
the world. 
Part I of the book deals with the first challenge of maintaining rapid and 
sustainable growth. It covers issues such as whether it is likely that China will 
fall into stagflation amid the slow-down of the US economy and rising costs of 
production. What are the likely implications of American and European financial 
shocks for Chinese economic performance? Why is it important to look at 
the US–China bilateral trade imbalances in the context of global production 
fragmentation? What are the conditions for achieving equitable and sustainable 
growth in China; and what are the key lessons that can be learned from China’s 
experience of 30 years of reform?
2
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According to Yiping Huang in Chapter 2, China faces an enormous challenge 
in sustaining its rapid growth and maintaining macroeconomic stability; but 
stagflation is not likely to materialise in China any time soon. He attributes this 
precarious future situation to three factors: deceleration of the US economy, 
elevated international oil prices and gradual cost normalisation in China. His 
model does not support the recent claim of some China experts that the Asian 
economies, and China in particular, have decoupled themselves from the US 
economy. Huang’s model estimates that a 1 percentage-point slow-down in 
the US economy could lower Asian economic growth by 1.1 percentage points 
and Chinese growth by 1.3 percentage points. 
Huang emphasises that, apart from the increase in demand for energy 
and rising marginal costs of oil production, financial investment demand 
(which outweighs physical investment demand by a large margin) could have 
contributed significantly to the oil-price jump that slowed growth and raised 
inflation. Subsidies for fuel are not advisable because they cause distortion 
and inefficiency without relieving demand pressure. China already suffers 
from too many price distortions—notably those in the factor markets (that 
is, in the labour, capital and land markets)—that reduce production costs 
and ensure high profits, and hence sustain high investment growth. Because 
the reduction of these distortions through cost normalisation is an inevitable 
structural adjustment, China from now on will face stronger than ever inflation 
pressure.
Since exports make up more than 40 per cent of China’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) and most of its exports are directed to European and North 
American markets, negative financial shocks in those regions might be expected 
to hamper China’s economic growth. Rod Tyers and Iain Bain in Chapter 3 use 
a dynamic model of the global economy to analyse this issue. They find that 
a rise in North American and European financial intermediation costs retards 
neither China’s GDP nor its import growth in the short run because these 
shocks set in train some mitigating factors. Specifically, the temporary flight of 
savings from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries into investments in China raises China’s domestic aggregate demand 
to offset export decline, therefore maintaining output level. This capital inflow 
also forces China’s central bank to choose between appreciating the renminbi 
(RMB) more quickly and allowing faster inflation: the choice so far has been 
RMB appreciation, which has boosted imports. 
The widening bilateral trade imbalances between the United States and 
China have become a contentious political issue in the United States. Prema-
chandra Athukorala and Nobuaki Yamashita argue in Chapter 4 that the 
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policy debate about US–China trade relations has been based wrongly on the 
conventional notion of horizontal specialisation, in which trade takes place in the 
form of final goods. This assumption ignores the continuing process of global 
production sharing in which both countries are increasingly engaged. The share 
of parts and components in US exports to the other East Asian countries is much 
higher than US exports to China; and their share in US imports from China are 
remarkably low compared with the figures for the other East Asian economies, 
as well as the global average. When components are netted out, it becomes 
evident that China is specialising in labour-intensive niches within otherwise 
skill-intensive sectors. Furthermore, the continuing process of production 
fragmentation has increasingly blurred the difference between merchandise 
trade and services trade. Athukorala and Yamashita’s conclusion is that any 
analysis that overlooks the exports of new production-related services relating 
to the process of global production sharing could overstate the magnitude of 
the US–China trade imbalance by a wide margin. Therefore, the widely held 
view that China’s rapid market penetration of the US economy is driven by 
unfair trade practices needs to be re-examined in the light of the fact that the 
two economies are deeply interconnected and interdependent within global 
production networks.
Increasingly excessive income inequality is one of the most undesired 
outcomes of China’s 30-year-long reform. The key question one could ask is 
whether China should let efficiency be the focus of primary distribution, and 
then redistribute income through the fiscal system and other government 
measures. Justin Lin in Chapter 5 argues that this course of action would be 
unproductive, if not counterproductive. In his opinion, equality and efficiency 
can be achieved simultaneously by adopting a strategy for development that 
follows underlying comparative advantage. This strategy leads to a high rate 
of capital accumulation, which, in turn, automatically upgrades production 
technologies. The outcome is a spontaneous shift from labour-intensive 
industries to relatively capital and technology-intensive industries. Lin believes 
that this production shift will always move income distribution in favour of 
labour. Because this strategy requires a competitive market system to work, 
China must deepen the reform of its financial sector, unwind the distortion of 
resource prices, reduce state monopolies, emphasise education, improve the 
quality of Chinese institutions and maintain macroeconomic stability.
China experienced a historically unprecedented scale of rural-to-urban 
migration in the past 30 years. More than 126 million rural workers have moved 
from the low-productivity agricultural sector to high-productivity urban sectors, 
contributing significantly to China’s productivity improvement and increases in 
4
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total output. Current knowledge about China’s migration is, however, grossly 
inadequate primarily because of a lack of comprehensive data for how the 
conditions of the migrants and their families have changed over time. In Chapter 
6, Xiaodong Gong, Sherry Tao Kong, Shi Li and Xin Meng make an important 
attempt to fill this knowledge gap by using the data from the first comprehensive 
survey of rural–urban migration in China collected in 2007. The study results 
provide information on the individual and family characteristics of migrants, their 
jobs and job-related welfare, income and poverty dynamics, living conditions and 
the broader well-being measures of migrants such as physical and mental health 
conditions, and the health and education of migrants’ children. 
Xiaolu Wang in Chapter 7 undertakes a rethinking of Chinese economic trans- 
formation in the past 30 years. He looks at the reform approaches in Russia and 
China, and questions whether the conditions of reform could lead to a process 
of Pareto improvement—namely, to make one person better off without making 
someone else worse off. Wang argues that most of the reforms in China have 
led to improvement in all social groups—at least for the majority of people—
and therefore Chinese reforms have generally achieved a process of Pareto 
improvement. In his opinion, a key factor in determining this outcome is that 
the reform policy must take the public interest into consideration, which can be 
accomplished through policy debates and practical experiments. Agricultural 
reform, price-system reform and ownership reform are cited as examples to 
showcase why the Chinese approach has been successful. 
It is important, however, to be cognisant of the fact that the structural condi-
tions in China in 1978 were vastly different from those in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, and hence that most of the Pareto-improvement outcomes 
in China that Wang identified were not replicable in transitional economies 
that were highly urbanised and over-industrialised. In China, marketisation of 
its economy enabled the movement of underemployed rural labour into more 
productive industrial jobs in the new non-state sector. In Russia, however, 
marketisation by Russia’s fiscally strapped government meant substantial 
reduction in subsidies to heavy industry and the movement of workers from 
these into light industries and services in the newly legalised private sector. 
In short, economic reform in China meant unleashing the economic develop-
ment process and, in Russia, it meant implementing economic restructuring; 
the former process is much more likely to produce more Pareto-improvement 
outcomes than the latter process. 
Just as Premier Zhou Enlai famously said that it was still too early to judge 
the success of the French Revolution of 1789, it would certainly be premature 
to trumpet the superiority of China’s reform policies. After all, as Wang notes, 
5
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the task of reform is not yet accomplished. The success of future reform for 
China’s long-run growth and development will depend crucially on whether 
China is capable of building governmental institutions that are transparent, 
efficient and accountable, and supported by an effective legal system.
Part II of this book seeks to address the following key questions: how much 
does China’s economic growth contribute to global greenhouse gas emissions? 
How can China escape from the dilemma of achieving high growth and envi-
ronmental protection? What is the political economy of emissions reduction in 
China? What are the environmental consequences of foreign direct investment 
in China? What are the impacts of climate change on the Chinese economy, 
particularly on sectors such as agriculture? Will water shortages impose con-
straints on economic growth in China? How much does air pollution increase 
mortality in China?
The world has entered a period of exceptionally fast economic growth—
with rapid economic development especially in China, followed by India and 
many other low-income countries—which could be called the ‘Platinum Age’ 
(Garnaut and Huang 2007). ‘There are reasonable prospects for growth rates in 
the vicinity of 10 per cent per annum—or even higher for a while—to continue 
for a considerable period and for growth rates to remain high until average 
Chinese productivity levels and living standards are approaching the range of 
industrialised countries in the late 2020s’ (Garnaut 2008:3). This rapid economic 
growth goes hand in hand with increasing resource use and pressure on the 
environment, including the build-up of greenhouse gases and the resulting 
climate change. The combination of China’s large, rapidly growing economy 
and its carbon intensity means that in the coming years China will have an 
influence on greenhouse gas emissions unmatched by any other country.
Ross Garnaut, Stephen Howes and Frank Jotzo in Chapter 8 provide 
‘business-as-usual’ projections for China’s and the world’s carbon dioxide 
emissions to 2030, by which time China will be responsible for 37 per cent of 
global emissions. Fortunately, China has recently announced goals of reducing 
the energy intensity of the economy and increasing the share of low-emissions 
energy, and is starting to put a range of ambitious climate change policies in 
place. If implemented, these policies will limit emissions growth to well below 
the business-as-usual trajectory. China’s goal of limiting the growth in energy 
use to half the growth rate of the economy could become the basis for a near-
term emissions target that will allow it to play a leading role in international 
discussions. The authors argue, however, that strong domestic policy action in 
China is likely to happen only if there is strong action in other major countries, 
especially the United States. They also believe that a global mechanism that 
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ensures comprehensive emissions pricing (through a carbon tax or an emissions 
trading scheme) would be the most economically efficient way of achieving 
the projected emissions growth targets.
Warwick McKibbin, Peter Wilcoxen and Wing Thye Woo point out that under 
‘Platinum Age’ growth rates, GDP per capita in China could catch up with that 
in Western Europe, Japan and the United States by 2100. This outcome could 
be undermined, however, by a possible fallacy of composition created by envi-
ronmental constraints. The present atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration 
level is 380 parts per million (ppm), and it is increasing by 2 ppm annually. If, as 
commonly believed, significant irreversible environmental damage occurs with 
carbon dioxide concentrations above 560 ppm, there is the terrible possibility 
that either China will not catch up or it will catch up with the rich countries 
in 2100 only because of environmentally induced income declines occurring 
in these countries. For the world, the challenge is how to slow carbon dioxide 
emissions adequately to provide the breathing space required in which to de-
velop alternative fuels that are greenhouse gas-free. For China, a key challenge 
is how to minimise the negative growth impact from limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
McKibbin, Wilcoxen and Woo use the G-cubed model to compare the merits 
of three market-based carbon dioxide reduction mechanisms: a domestic 
carbon tax, an international cap-and-trade scheme and the McKibbin–Wilcoxen 
hybrid (MWH) approach. They find the MWH approach to lower GDP growth 
the least  in the short and middle term; however, as the only long-term solution 
is likely to be shifting to non-fossil fuel energy, the authors stress that the 
market-based carbon dioxide reduction mechanism must be combined with 
an ambitious program to accelerate the development of green technology. In 
their opinion, such a program would probably have a higher chance of success 
if some important parts of it were based on international collaboration. 
Cai Fang and Du Yang in Chapter 10 attribute China’s environmental prob-
lems to its growth pattern, which is characterised by: 1) a reliance on large 
amounts of factor inputs (for example, capital) rather than on productivity; 
2) a concentration on those heavy industries (for example, steel) that are en-
ergy and pollution intensive; and 3) rapid economic growth driven by strong 
pro-growth central and local governments. Taking these characteristics into 
account, Cai and Du make two points about effective ways to reduce pollu-
tion. First, if foreign pressure is the sole factor pressing China to deal with 
its environmental problems, emissions reductions will be small because of 
the lack of incentives to carry out emissions reduction policies. Second, the 
political economy of emissions reduction relates to the different reactions of 
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the affected parties, including the central government, local governments, 
enterprises and households. The key is to make relevant regulations incentive 
compatible among all stakeholders. For example, different policy packages for 
different regions in terms of emissions reduction would be needed given the 
existence of a considerable heterogeneity of sulphur dioxide emissions among 
different regions.
Cai and Du believe that the effectiveness of any emissions reduction policy 
lies eventually in the endogenous demands for change in growth patterns and 
for a cleaner environment because ‘there is now a great deal of evidence sup-
porting the view that rising incomes affect environmental quality in a positive 
way’ (Copeland and Taylor 2004:66). They think that anti-emissions policy pack-
ages could be incentive compatible with the motivation of local governments 
for development and the behaviour of enterprises only after China has moved 
to the stage at which economic growth is generated mainly by productivity 
growth.
China has been the largest destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the world and the environmental consequences of FDI in China have attracted 
increasing attention, with growing concerns about the deterioration of China’s 
environment. Qun Bao, Yuanyuan Chen and Ligang Song in Chapter 11 find that 
there is an inverted-U curve relationship between FDI and pollution, suggest-
ing that the continued flow of FDI will eventually reduce pollution emissions. 
It also implies, however, that FDI inflows into the richer regions will reduce 
pollution while FDI flows into the poorer (mostly inland) regions will worsen 
their environment. Bao, Chen and Song propose that the poorer provinces 
should be treated in the same manner as developing countries in fulfilling their 
global obligations to reduce emissions. These poorer provinces can be given 
financial means and technological support to enable them to comply with the 
toughened governmental emissions regulations. The authors conclude that it is 
also in the interest of inland regions to reduce emissions even though pollution 
abatement efforts will involve additional costs because much environmental 
damage is irreversible.
China is growing food to feed 1.3 billion people and there is increasing concern 
about whether climate change will attenuate Chinese food security. This issue 
is particularly acute because the amount of arable land has been declining due 
to rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. Liangzhi You, Mark W. Rosegrant, 
Cheng Fang and Stanley Wood in Chapter 12 investigate the climate’s contri- 
bution to Chinese wheat-yield growth (after controlling for physical inputs). 
They find that the gradual increase in growing-season temperatures in the past 
few decades has had a measurable effect on wheat productivity. A 1 per cent 
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increase in wheat growing-season temperature reduces yield by about 0.3 per 
cent. Overall, the rising temperatures from 1979 to 2000 cut wheat-yield growth 
by 2.4 per cent. They conclude that this negative impact will probably become 
worse with accelerating climate change in the future.
Water shortages appear to pose an immediate environmental threat to 
China’s continued high economic growth. The present water situation is already 
fairly critical because of the uneven distribution of water and lower than normal 
rainfall in the past 15 years. Right now, about ‘400 of China’s 660 cities face 
water shortages, with 110 of them severely short’ (The Straits Times 2004). 
Jinxia Wang, Jikun Huang, Scott Rozelle, Qiuqiong Huang and Lijuan Zhang 
in Chapter 13 report that there is a water crisis in northern China because 70 
per cent of the villages they surveyed are facing increasing water shortages. 
Agricultural production in 16 per cent of these villages is severely constrained 
by a shortage of water. Their survey also shows that 10 per cent of the villages 
using ground water in the past decade have seen their water tables falling at an 
alarming rate of about 1.5 metres annually. The chapter identifies two problems 
in responses to the looming water crisis. First, the measures adopted by the 
government, such as better water management, are not being implemented 
effectively. Second, farmers do not always respond in ways in which they save 
water. The common cause of the two problems is that governments have not 
created the incentives for farmers to save water. The authors believe that the 
institutionalisation of water pricing and water-use rights policies would be more 
effective and much cheaper than the South to North Water Transfer Project 
being undertaken by the government.
Rapid economic growth and expansion of urban areas have led to consider-
able changes in the living environment for an increasing proportion of the popu-
lation in China, which in turn could greatly influence improvements in public 
health and socioeconomic development. The Health and Mortality Transition 
in Shanghai Project Research Team has conducted a detailed study of health 
and mortality transition in Shanghai from the late 1950s to the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. Their findings in Chapter 14 show that air pollution in 
Shanghai has had a notably negative impact on population health and mortality, 
particularly in the case of sulphur dioxide emissions. The study also finds that 
the health impacts of air pollution are more observable in cold months when 
the level of pollution concentration is markedly higher than in warm months. 
The encouraging sign is that the Shanghai municipal government has made 
some progress in controlling air pollution in recent years. The concentration of 
particulate matter reached its peak in 2003 and has been declining since. The 
level of nitrogen dioxide has also displayed a trend of slow decrease despite a 
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rapid increase in the number of motor vehicles in the city. The level of sulphur 
dioxide has, however, increased slightly in recent years. 
Part III of the book focuses on energy use and the environment. It addresses 
issues such as: what is the relationship between China’s energy consumption 
and the environment? How much does household energy consumption 
contribute to carbon dioxide emissions? Can China’s coal industry be reconciled 
with environmental protection? Must China choose between rapid growth and 
acceptable environmental outcomes?
Kejun Jiang and Xiulian Hu in Chapter 15 detail China’s position and policies 
for dealing with environmental challenges. In the short run, emission-mitigation 
policies will be implemented, mainly increasing energy efficiency through 
technological progress and the development of renewable and nuclear energy. 
In the long run, China’s policies will focus increasingly on reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions (through measures such as a carbon tax) and adapting to climate 
change. Given China’s heavy dependence on the use of coal, it will work closely 
with other countries to develop a new generation of clean-coal technologies. 
China will also readjust its economic structure towards producing goods that 
are less energy and resource intensive.
Much of the Chinese literature on energy consumption focuses on the indus-
trial sector, with household energy consumption a less researched area. Using 
urban household survey data, Jane Golley, Dominic Meagher and Xin Meng in 
Chapter 16 find that the total energy requirements of households in China are 
substantially higher when their indirect energy requirements are added to their 
direct energy consumption. Poor households are more emissions intensive 
than better-off households because of their heavy dependence on coal, sug-
gesting that policies aimed at raising the income growth of poor households 
would also reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The study identifies a linear 
relationship between per capita income and energy demand, highlighting the 
need for the government to promote ways to reduce the emissions intensities 
of the goods consumed by households.
Coal provides nearly 70 per cent of China’s primary energy consumption 
and is the single most important source of pollution in China. Xunpeng Shi in 
Chapter 17 reports that it is estimated that 85 per cent of the sulphur dioxide 
and 60 per cent of the nitrogen oxides emitted into the atmosphere in China 
come from the combustion of coal. The expectation is that the share of coal 
in China’s primary energy consumption will remain unchanged in the next 20 
years. Shi provides some positive answers to the question of whether China’s 
coal industry can be reconciled with environmental protection. There is a declin-
ing trend in waste-gas emissions because of the fall of the overall emissions 
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intensity, which has been helped by the application of clean-coal technologies 
such as coal washing and dust precipitation. Furthermore, increases in energy 
and carbon prices will accelerate the pace of adopting clean-coal technologies, 
making it possible for the coal industry to develop together with improvements 
in the environment.
Despite its low per capita emissions, China has now passed the United 
States as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, and these emissions continue 
to rise rapidly (International Herald Tribune 2008). Peter Sheehan and Fiona Sun 
in Chapter 18 examine two questions: 1) whether China has to choose between 
rapid economic growth and stabilising emissions; and 2) whether there are im-
plementation paths within the current approach by the government that could 
enable China to realise the twin objectives of maintaining economic growth 
and stabilising emissions within 25–30 years. Their model simulations show 
that there could be some realistic options in which China can reduce energy 
use and emissions with continued rapid development. Success in achieving 
this objective depends on whether China can effectively shift the pattern of 
economic activity from energy-intensive areas (for example, specific forms of 
heavy industry) to industry and service sectors that are knowledge intensive 
and rely less on energy and other resource inputs; and stimulate the adoption 
of advanced technologies, processes and practices that are energy efficient 
and more environmentally benign. Achieving such an outcome is in the inter-
ests of China and the international community, and it is therefore important 
for industrialised countries to adopt strong measures to support this policy 
implementation process in China. 
It is therefore encouraging to learn that ‘prices have already reached levels at 
which investments in many alternative energy sources are profitable’ (Garnaut 
and Song 2006:393). ‘Seeking new sources of energy through technological 
innovations and international economic and technological cooperation 
would…be an important long-term solution to the dilemma of maintaining the 
sustainability of economic growth while protecting the environment’ (Song 
and Sheng 2007:245).
It is too early, however, to be confident that such optimism is justified. The 
uncomfortable reality remains for China that unless ecological balance is 
restored within the medium term, environmental limitations could choke off 
further economic growth.1 The uncomfortable reality for the rest of the world is 
that the negative consequences of large-scale environmental damage within a 
geographically large country are seldom confined within that country’s borders. 
The continued march of China’s desertification initially brought more frequent 
sand storms to Beijing and then, beginning in April 2001, sent yellow dust clouds 
11
China’s dilemmas in the 21st Century
not only across the sea to Japan and Korea but across the ocean to the United 
States. China’s environmental management is a concern not only for China’s 
welfare, but for global welfare.
Proper management of the environment has now become critical if China is 
to continue its industrialisation process. The expurgated version of a 2007 World 
Bank report said that ‘about 750,000 people die prematurely in China each year, 
mainly from air pollution in large cities’ (Financial Times 2007a);2 and a 2007 
OECD study estimated that ‘China’s air pollution will cause 20 million people 
a year to fall ill with respiratory diseases’ (Financial Times 2007b). Pan Yue, the 
deputy head of China’s State Environmental Protection Agency, summed up 
the present situation in China very well.
If we continue on this path of traditional industrial civilization, there is no 
chance that we will have sustainable development. China’s population, 
resources [and] environment have already reached the limits of their capacity 
to cope. Sustainable development and new sources of energy are the only 
road that we can take (Kynge 2004).
The environment is an important area in which China could help to build a 
harmonious global system. Specifically, China should be mobilising international 
consensus to form an international research consortium to develop ways to 
burn coal cleanly because China is now building a power station a week and 
is hence able to facilitate extensive experimentation on such prototype plants. 
If successful, this global cooperation on clean-energy research will unleash 
sustainable development in China as well as in the rest of the world.
Notes
1 The environment is of course not the only serious obstacle to continued high growth in 
China. Two other serious obstacles that have a high probability of appearing are its outmoded 
governance structure, which exacerbates social tensions, and its trade friction with the 
United States and the European Union, which threaten a breakdown of the post-World War 
II multilateral free-trade system. See Woo (2007) for a discussion of these two challenges to 
China’s growth.
2 Some 350,000 to 400,000 people died prematurely from air pollution in Chinese cities—300,000 
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Yiping Huang
The new policy challenge
The growing risk of stagflation has perhaps been one of the most important 
macroeconomic surprises around the world since the beginning of the year. 
China is not excluded from the risk. According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), real gross domestic product (GDP) growth moderated from 
11.9 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2007 to 10.6 per cent in the first quarter of 
2008. Between mid 2006 and late 2007, the growth of export volumes fluctuated 
largely within the 20–30 per cent range. After that, however, export growth 
tanked (Figure 2.1). The growth of industrial production showed a similar trend, 
especially when adjustments were made for changed producer prices.
Meanwhile, inflation rates continued to reach new highs. During much of 
2005 and 2006, the headline consumer price index (CPI) stayed well below 2 
per cent. From the beginning of 2007, however, it began to rise steadily (Figure 
2.2). In February 2008, the CPI reached a new 11-year high of 8.7 per cent. Rising 
inflation was a result initially of spikes in pork prices, but soon it spread to 
other food markets, with the overall food CPI exceeding the 20 per cent level 
in early 2008. The non-food CPI has been largely stable so far; however, non-
food CPI could be underestimated as the government controls domestic fuel 
prices. Producer prices accelerated to 8.2 per cent in May 2008 from below 3 
per cent a year ago.
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Figure 2.1 Growth of volumes of Chinese exports and imports, 
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The combination of slowing growth and rising inflation poses serious chall-
enges for Chinese macroeconomic policymaking. Deterioration of the US econ-
omy, the continuing surge of oil prices, liberalisation of domestic factor markets, 
the upcoming Olympic Games and unexpected events such as the recent snow-
storm and earthquake further complicate policymakers’ decisions. 
In fact, the Chinese government’s macroeconomic policy stance has already 
swung notably during the past months. At the beginning of December 2007, the 
Central Economic Work Conference identified two top policy priorities for 2008: 
fighting overheating and controlling inflation. As the economic conditions in 
the United States deteriorated sharply in early 2008, however, the State Council 
added an additional goal for its macroeconomic policies: preventing a slide of 
the economy. From May 2008, the environment shifted again. The near-term 
outlook for the United States improved steadily, with many investors believ-
ing that the worst might be over. In the meantime, inflation rates continued to 
ratchet up. The Chinese authorities again toughened their stance for battling 
inflation problems. 
The heated policy debate has not ended. The ‘hawks’ advocate aggressive 
policy tightening, including sharp appreciation of the currency. They argue that 
inflation, regardless of its composition, is a monetary phenomenon; therefore, 
only aggressive monetary tightening can tame inflation. The ‘doves’, on the 
other hand, warn about the downside risks to the economy and call for some 
tolerance of higher inflation. They point, in particular, to already declining 
corporate profits and collapsed equity prices. It follows, then, that continuous 
aggressive tightening will not only kill the growth engine, it could escalate 
social and financial risks.
In this chapter, I argue that the scenario of stagflation is unlikely to mat-
erialise in China any time soon. Development in three areas could, however, 
reinforce the challenge of slowing growth and rising inflation in the coming year: 
deceleration of the US economy, elevated international oil prices and gradual 
cost normalisation in China. We are likely to see growth shifting to a slightly 
slower gear—about 10 per cent—while inflation will ratchet up to higher levels, 
of about 5–7 per cent, in the coming year or two. 
In this environment, policy decisions will likely continue to be difficult. With 
elevated inflation pressure, however, the central bank will probably maintain 
its tightening bias, with a focus on direct liquidity management. Steady 
appreciation of the renminbi should also continue. In the meantime, fiscal policy 
could turn more expansionary to support post-disaster reconstruction and to 
facilitate industrial upgrading. If an expansionary fiscal policy successfully 
boosts domestic demand and reduces the external surplus, it could in the end 
help ease pressures on the currency and inflation.
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US growth and the decoupling thesis
Since the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis, US economic activity has slowed 
steadily. The annualised quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate fell from close 
to 5 per cent during the third quarter of 2007 to below 1 per cent in the next 
two quarters. Economists are still divided about whether the US economy will 
fall into deep recession, but most agree that US economic growth is likely to 
stay well below the trend level for at least several quarters. This should have 
important implications for the outlook for the Chinese economy in the coming 
year.
To some economists, slowing growth in the United States but steady 
expansion of the Chinese economy in 2007 provided convincing evidence of 
the decoupling thesis. The decoupling proposition suggests that as Asian 
economies grow and economic interactions between them deepen, the relative 
importance of the US economy for Asia will decline.
The decoupling thesis is an exaggeration of real economic relations, to 
say the least. If anything, Asia and China’s economic linkages with the United 
States strengthened, rather than weakened, during the past 10 years. China, 
in particular, became a much more open economy. The export share of GDP 
rose from 18.6 per cent in 1997 to 36.1 per cent in 2007, while the share of United 
States-bound GDP increased from 3.3 per cent to 6.9 per cent in the same 
period (Figure 2.3).
The fact that Chinese growth did not soften alongside slowing US growth 
in 2007 was probably more of a special situation than a general rule. First, 
the slow-down in the United States in 2007 was concentrated in the housing 
sector; non-housing activities continued to grow at 2.5 per cent. The situation 
has now changed and the growth slow-down in the United States in 2008 is 
occurring mainly in the non-housing sector, especially in consumer spending 
and business investment. Second, softening of United States-bound exports 
was offset by European Union-bound exports, when the euro strengthened 
significantly. This will, however, be difficult to repeat; the European economy 
already shows increasing weakness and the euro is under pressure to weaken, 
at least in the coming quarters.
It is probably also premature to count on growing intra-regional trade 
to support Asian economic growth. Although intra-regional trade grew 
exponentially after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 
the majority of this—at least 70 per cent—was trade in intermediate goods. 
The key destinations for Asia’s finished-goods exports are the G3 economies 
(the United States, the European Union and Japan, 61 per cent), Asia (21 per 
cent) and the rest of the world (18 per cent). This implies that Asian domestic 
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demand is still not significant enough to support regional economic growth, 
should the US economy slow sharply. Asia and China could become decoupled 
from the United States and other industrial economies when regional domestic 
demand is large enough, but that is at least 10 years away.
I examine the likely impacts of a US slow-down on Asian economies through 
model simulations applying the Oxford Economic Forecasting (OEF) model. 
The results suggest that a 1 percentage-point slow-down in the US economy 
could lower Asian economic growth on average by 1.1 percentage points and 
reduce Chinese growth by 1.3 percentage points (Figure 2.4). The real changes 
are likely to be smaller as the model cannot endogenously generate a policy 
response to support growth. In China, for instance, the government will most 
likely employ fiscal stimuli if external demand weakens significantly.
Another mechanism that could offset growth moderation in China is the 
likely change in capital flows. In a world faced with slowing US growth and 
rising US financial risk, capital inflows to China could accelerate, as evidenced 
by changes during the first two quarters of 2008. Unfortunately, however, China’s 
economic constraint is not a lack of capital; rather, too much capital inflow 
could further increase domestic liquidity and therefore add further pressure 
to domestic inflation. 
Figure 2.3  Shares of total exports and United States-bound exports in 
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Figure 2.4  Model simulation: impacts of a 1 per cent slow-down of the 
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The new oil price shock
One of the biggest macroeconomic surprises during the past year was the 
combination of moderating global economic growth and rising oil prices. The 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price rose from less than US$67.50 per 
barrel in June 2007 to US$135/barrel in June 2008 (Figure 2.5). Even in real 
terms, the current WTI price already exceeded the previous peak during the 
1980 oil crisis. 
There are a number of hypotheses for why oil prices increased rapidly 
although the global economy showed softness. The first hypothesis highlights 
the growing importance of the emerging market economies in international 
oil markets. In 2008, for instance, the emerging market economies are likely 
to account for all net increases in global oil demand. The second hypothesis 
points to rising marginal costs of oil production. As it becomes more costly 
to produce oil, prices have to go up regardless of the conditions of demand. A 
third hypothesis reveals a new contribution from financial investment demand, 
compared with real economic demand, in an environment with a depreciating 
US dollar. Financial investment usually accounted for about 16 per cent of 
global oil demand; today, this share is already 60 per cent.
The first two hypotheses explain why oil prices have been on a long-term 
upward trend, but they fail to account for the doubling of oil prices during 
the past year. The third hypothesis—that is, financial demand outweighing 
physical demand—probably plays a dominant role in the latest episode of 
oil price increases. If that is the case, however, oil prices could correct in the 
coming year, especially if the US dollar rebounds steadily. Even if corrections 
do happen, prices could stay at elevated levels. The good old days of oil prices 
of $20/barrel are probably long gone. Oil prices averaged $72/barrel in 2007 
and $110/barrel during the first six months of 2008.
High oil prices could have significant impacts on the Chinese economy. 
According to simulation results applying the OEF model, a $10/barrel increase 
in the oil price could lower China’s real GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points 
and lift its CPI by 0.2 percentage points. The real observed effects, especially 
the growth effect, were, however, smaller than the model’s predictions.
One important reason for the smaller than predicted oil price impacts is the 
declining share of oil in production over time. Falling oil intensity of GDP is a 
global trend as technologies improve. In China, efficiency gain through reform 
efforts further reinforces this trend. During the 30 years of economic reform, 
China’s oil intensity improved by about 70 per cent (Figure 2.6). As a result, 
current oil expenditure’s share of nominal GDP is still significantly lower than 
the peak in 1980, despite the recent surge in oil prices. This means that GDP 
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growth elasticity of oil prices changes over time, while model predictions are 
based on historical correlations.
Another important reason for the smaller than expected oil price impacts 
is the domestic fuel price subsidy; therefore, changes in international oil 
prices do not necessarily affect domestic prices for end users. This effectively 
lessens impacts on GDP and inflation. The domestic economy is not, however, 
entirely insulated. Oil and electricity shortages are a common and growing 
phenomenon. In 2007, when international oil prices averaged US$72/barrel, 
China’s fiscal subsidy to oil prices was about US$8.2 billion, or equivalent to 
0.2 per cent of that year’s GDP. The uncompensated losses of oil refiners could 
be even greater. 
China is not the only economy in Asia that subsidises domestic fuel prices. 
In India, Indonesia and Malaysia, fiscal subsidy to oil prices accounted for 1–1.5 
per cent of GDP in 2007. All these countries adjusted domestic prices in May 
or June in order to reduce the fiscal burden and to improve energy efficiency. 
The rising oil prices already generated serious consequences for the Chinese 
economy. Fiscal burdens grew significantly. If oil prices are sustained at the 
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US$130/barrel level, the explicit and implicit subsidies could amount to 1-2 per 
cent of GDP. The government is, however, already stretching its expenditure 
on disaster relief and reconstruction. More importantly, price controls also 
cause serious inefficiency problems and distortions to economic structure. 
Lower energy costs already attract lots of energy-intensive industries to China, 
such as steel mills and aluminium smelters—industries in which China does 
not have a comparative advantage. China is therefore really subsidising the 
global industry. Lack of demand response in China, in turn, added further 
pressures to international oil markets, especially as China was already a key 
player. Between 2003 and 2007, China accounted for about one-third of the net 
increase in global oil demand.
In mid June, the government finally announced to lift gasoline prices by 16.8 
per cent, diesel prices by 18.1 per cent and electricity tariff by 4.5 per cent. The 
upward adjustment of domestic fuel prices will probably add 0.3 percentage 
point to inflation in the coming months.
These moves were relatively modest compared with the doubling of the 
international prices during the past months. In particular, as the policy change 
does not establish new mechanism linking domestic prices to international 
prices, distortions remain and likely will grow again if international oil prices 
continue to rise. But they were important first steps in reducing domestic 
distortions. It’s possible that the authorities may adjust domestic oil prices in 
the coming year.
The process of cost normalisation
Fuel price increases are only a small part of the broad cost adjustment currently 
under way in China. The average wage, for instance, has been growing at close 
to 20 per cent year on year during the past year (Figure 2.7). Average land 
prices also rose by more than 15 per cent. The base lending rate is at 7.47 per 
cent—nearly 1 percentage point higher than a year ago. The real average bank 
lending rate is already above 9 per cent. Many companies are already feeling 
the rising cost pressures and some have been forced to close.
Cost distortion has been one important feature of Chinese economic 
institutions during the reform period. After 1978, the authorities proceeded to 
rapidly liberalise the goods market. The factor markets, however, remain highly 
distorted. For instance, policies on labour mobility are still highly restrictive. 
Land belongs to the public and the government controls its allocation. State-
owned entities dominate the allocation of capital. In other words, there are not 
yet well-developed free markets for production factors. As a result, prices for 
labour, capital and land are still significantly depressed. According to my rough 
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Table 2.1  Estimation of China’s cost distortion (RMB billion)
Item Cost Key assumption
1. Labour 203 Assuming the new labour law is fully enforced
2. Land 154 Assuming 20 per cent of land sales revenue in 2006
3. Energy 1,632 RMB1,572 billion price difference; RMB60 billion in 
  resource taxes
4. Capital 337 Assuming a 2 percentage-point hike in policy rates after  
  financial liberalisation
5. Environment 1,080 Without considering the RMB287.4 billion per annum   
  maintenance fee
6. Others 429 Equivalent to the amount of export tax rebates in 2006
Total 3,835 15.5 per cent of 2007 GDP
Source: Citi.
Figure 2.7  Growth of land prices and average wages in China, 
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estimation, cost distortions probably totalled RMB3,835 billion in 2007—or 15.5 
per cent of GDP (Table 2.1).
While cost distortions were not all the result of deliberate policy decisions, 
they were consistent with the policymakers’ clear objective of promoting 
production and economic growth. By depressing opportunity costs for most 
factors, distortions in factor markets reduce production costs and ensure high 
profits in production. This supports continuation of unusual investment growth. 
Distortions in factor markets, therefore, are like subsidies to producers and 
investors, which fuel extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy.
The broad production subsidy regime also caused a few problems and risks. 
First, economic growth becomes increasingly investment dependent because 
of high profits from production and strong incentives for investment. Second, 
depressed production costs boost exports and attract foreign direct investment. 
Third, income distribution deteriorates quickly. Owners of enterprises capture 
vast production profits. In fact, these have developed into serious risks in China, 
threatening the sustainability of its rapid growth. This suggests that such a 
regime of cost distortion cannot continue forever. 
In fact, important changes have already begun to take place. The recently 
introduced Labour Contract Law provides better protection of workers’ rights, 
including their job security and social welfare benefits. Labour costs could rise 
sharply once the new law is rigorously implemented. Energy prices are still 
controlled by the State, but the government now intends to grant greater roles 
for the market mechanisms. Capital costs have also started to rise, as a result 
of the tightening of domestic liquidity and appreciation of the currency. Finally, 
the authorities have stepped up efforts to protect the environment, responding 
to the recent sharp deterioration of water, land and air quality.
This is what I describe as cost normalisation. The whole process could take 
decades to complete, but rises in production costs could again add pressure 
to growth and inflation. 
Policy considerations
Policy outlooks could be very uncertain in an economic environment in which 
growth slows but inflation rises. Policymakers might become more hawkish when 
inflation becomes a prominent risk but might turn more dovish when there is 
significant pressure on growth. We need to have a good understanding of several 
critical questions in order to gauge the likely policy trend in the coming year.
First, is China’s inflation a temporary price adjustment or more structural 
in nature? Policy actions should be more restrained if it’s the former but can 
be more aggressive if it’s the latter. The official documents so far still use the 
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phrase ‘structural price increases’. I am sympathetic to the view that this round 
of inflation was triggered initially by food prices, but almost every major episode 
of high inflation during the reform period began with rising food prices. With 
loose monetary conditions, the effects of increases in food prices could spread 
quickly to other sectors. Tightening of monetary policy should therefore continue 
in order to control inflation.
Second, is the Chinese economy overheating? Many economists attribute 
rising inflation to such a problem. Real GDP growth averaged more than 10 per 
cent during the past five years and reached 11.9 per cent in 2007. High growth 
does not, however, necessarily equate with overheating. Overheating occurs 
only when the economy grows at a pace faster than domestic resources can 
support. China recorded current account surpluses for 14 consecutive years. 
In 2007, the current account surplus reached 10.8 per cent of GDP. This means 
that China saved domestic resources for investment overseas; therefore, China’s 
inflation risk probably stems mainly from the liquidity condition instead of the 
overheating problem.
Third, will the US slow-down drag down the Chinese economy significantly? 
In the case of a deep and protracted US recession, China’s exports could 
suffer badly. This might not only slow economic growth, it could create serious 
overcapacity problems in China, which would, in turn, ease China’s inflationary 
pressure. Although the US economy still faces significant uncertainty, its near-
term outlook has improved compared with two months ago. This should help 
limit the downside risks for the Chinese economy.
Finally, will the Olympic Games be an obstacle to the tightening policy? 
Economists have come to agree that the boom and bust cycle associated with 
the Olympic Games, often observed in many countries, might not materialise in 
China. The games could, however, still serve as an important psychological factor 
for investors and policymakers. While it is unlikely to stop the tightening policies 
if inflation remains a major macroeconomic risk, policymakers will probably be 
cautious in determining the timing of such policies. Decisive policies are therefore 
more likely to be implemented after the games than before them.
China began its current round of tightening policy in early 2007, when the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) first raised its base policy rates by 27 basis 
points. In subsequent months, the PBC hiked its policy rates another five times 
(Figure 2.8). Meanwhile, the central bank also adopted a series of measures to 
directly manage the liquidity conditions, including reserve requirements, open 
market operations and credit control. 
The focus of the tightening policies probably shifted recently. The PBC has 
not hiked its policy rate since the beginning of 2008; it has, however, stepped 
up efforts to control liquidity. By the end of June 2008, the commercial banks’ 
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reserve requirement had reached 17.5 per cent. Direct credit control also began 
to affect commercial banks’ loan growth (Figure 2.9). According to the PBC, the 
real average lending rate rose to more than 9 per cent in the second quarter 
of 2008, compared with about 8 per cent at the end of the year and the base 
lending rate of 7.47 per cent.
The effects of the tightening measures on broad liquidity conditions have 
been less than clear. The simple excess liquidity indicator—subtracting the 
growth of industrial production from the growth of broad money (M2)—suggests 
that the liquidity conditions probably loosened again from the beginning of 
2008 (Figure 2.9). This probably confirms that the central bank is still lagging 
behind the market. More importantly, it likely reflects the burdens created by 
massive capital inflows. 
Unfortunately, no one can satisfactorily explain the nature and composition 
of capital inflows. Between January and April 2008, foreign exchange reserves 
rose by US$228 billion, while the sum of the trade surplus and utilised foreign 
direct investment explained only US$93 billion (Figure 2.10). Some economists 
attribute the gap between the two to ‘hot money’. Hot money is, however, 
probably not the proper term to describe recent increases in capital inflow, 
Figure 2.8  Central bank benchmark lending rate and commercial bank 
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Figure 2.10  Monthly increase in foreign reserves, the trade surplus and 
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Figure 2.9  Excess liquidity and bank credit, January 1998–May 2008 
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Figure 2.11  The renminbi’s nominal effective exchange rate and bilateral 
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as much of it will likely stay within China for relatively long periods. There is, 
however, no denying that capital inflows surged in recent months.
There were probably many reasons why capital inflows increased dram-
atically during the past months. One reason could be the financial crisis in 
the United States. In a volatile international capital market, China becomes a 
safe heaven. Another reason might be the rapid appreciation of the renminbi, 
which encouraged expectations of more currency gains in the near future. 
During the first quarter of 2008, the annualised monthly pace of the renminbi’s 
appreciation against the US dollar averaged 15–20 per cent—the fastest pace 
since the exchange rate policy reform in July 2005 (Figure 2.11). In April, this 
pace decelerated sharply to about zero, before picking up again to about 10 
per cent in early June.
Concluding remarks
Like most other economies in the world, China currently faces the extraordinary 
challenge of slowing growth and rising inflation. Some continuing changes, 
especially the slow-down of the US economy, elevated oil prices and the 
normalisation of domestic costs, are likely to reinforce this challenge in the 
coming months. The probability of stagflation, however, remains extremely 
remote. Real GDP growth will likely moderate slightly; however, barring major 
surprises, China should be able to comfortably maintain growth of about 10 
per cent in the next five years. The earthquake in early May in Sichuan was a 
human tragedy, but its direct economic cost should be limited.
Inflation rates, however, could move up, although the food-driven CPI 
should moderate further in the coming months. The low-inflation phase of the 
past 10 years, supported by relocation of factories and labour and associated 
productivity gain, is probably over. The anticipated broad-based increases in 
costs of factors including labour, land, capital, energy and the environment 
imply that the economy should face inflationary pressures that are stronger 
than ever. More and more policymakers will also adopt the idea of the need 
to tolerate high inflation. Given that China is still a developing country and a 
transitional economy, it is reasonable to expect it to maintain 5 per cent inflation. 
This could open the door to major inflation problems, as the central bank is 
always behind the curve.
Tight monetary policy is likely to continue, as long as inflation remains a 
key risk. The central bank will, however, probably continue to focus on liquidity 
management. It stopped hiking its policy rates for fear of attracting more capital 
inflows. Currency appreciation will probably maintain an annual pace of 5–10 
per cent in the coming year or two, despite recent dramatic fluctuations in 
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market expectations. At the end of the day, policymakers will have to strike a 
balance between the need to rebalance the economy and the need for smooth 
structural adjustments. Job losses remain the top concern for the government. 
For the same reason, the probability of one-off revaluation or devaluation looks 
extremely low. If, however, the global financial risks recede quickly in the coming 
months, the reform of the exchange rate policy and liberalisation of the capital 
account could accelerate significantly.
Currently, the Chinese authorities employ a combination of tight monetary 
policy and neutral fiscal policy. While the purpose of tight monetary policy is 
to control inflation, the intention of neutral fiscal policy is to prevent downside 
risks to the economy. Fiscal policies could turn more expansionary in the 
second half of 2008 or in 2009. First, the government will probably need to spend 
at least RMB250 billion—or 1 per cent of GDP—every year in the next three 
years for post-earthquake reconstruction. Second, the government needs to 
play a more active role in facilitating structural adjustment, including helping 
technological upgrading and re-employment. Finally, active fiscal spending 
could boost domestic demand, lower the external account surplus, reduce 
capital inflow and ease inflationary pressure.
There is a misunderstanding among many economists and policymakers that 
China needs to reduce investment. One important reason for this is the risk of 
over capacity. While overcapacity risks existed in certain industries at certain 
times, there is no evidence of an economy-wide overcapacity problem. There 
is still huge investment potential in areas of urban development, the resources 
sector and environmental protection. In fact, a large current account surplus 
means China needs to expand its domestic demand in order to rebalance the 
economy. China needs less but better quality investment.
Finally, 2008 could be the first year since 2001 in which the Chinese economy 
sees a major downturn in growth. This could point to significant increases in 
financial risks. The stock index has already declined by 50 per cent from its 
peak in late 2007. Housing prices are also becoming less stable. The banking 
sector has already experienced major reform steps during the past six years, 
but the new institutions have not had any stress tests. A 1998 East Asian-type 
financial crisis is unlikely; however, any significant increases in financial risks 




American and European  
financial shocks
Implications for Chinese economic performance
Rod Tyers and Iain Bain
China’s exports amount to almost half of its gross domestic product (GDP), with 
most of these directed to Europe and North America, so China can expect that 
negative financial shocks in these regions might retard its growth. Mitigating 
factors, however, include the temporary flight of North American and European 
savings into Chinese investment and some associated real exchange rate 
realignments. These issues are explored using a dynamic model of the global 
economy. A rise in North American and European financial intermediation 
costs is shown to retard neither China’s GDP nor its import growth in the 
short term. Should the Chinese government act to prevent the effects of the 
investment surge, through tighter inward capital controls or increased reserve 
accumulation, the associated losses would be compensated for by a trade 
advantage since its real exchange rate would appreciate less against North 
America than against the rates of other trading partners. The results therefore 
suggest that, as long as the financial shocks are restricted to North America 
and Western Europe, China’s growth and the imports on which its trading 
partners rely are unlikely to be hindered significantly.
During the past decade, reference to China in the financial and academic 
press has lauded its growth performance but tended to emphasise its exchange 
rate regime and its controversial current account surpluses with the United 
States and the European Union (see, for example, Tung and Baker 2004; 
Bernanke 2006; Lardy 2006; McKinnon 2006; Xiao 2006; Callan 2007; Woo and 
Xiao 2007; Tyers et al. 2008). After the downturn in the US housing market in 2007, 
however, and the associated credit squeeze in the United States and Europe, 
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attention shifted to the ‘decoupling’ issue: whether China’s comparatively 
rapid expansion could be sustained in the face of slow-downs in Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.1 It appeared 
that the credit squeeze would bring the oft-anticipated ‘hard correction’ to the 
imbalance constituted by the extraordinarily large US current account deficit 
and that the US dollar would sink, even relative to the renminbi (RMB) (Edwards 
2005; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005; Roubini and Setser 2005; Eichengreen 2006; 
Krugman 2007). How would this affect China’s economic performance?
With exports amounting to almost half of its GDP and most of these directed 
to Europe and North America, China can expect that negative financial shocks 
in those regions might retard its growth.2 Since China assembles manufactured 
components from elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific,3 the extent of its ‘decoupling’ 
is the key to wider regional performance. In the short term, one mitigating factor 
is the transitory flight of increased amounts of the world’s savings into Chinese 
investment (McKibbin and Stoeckel 2007b). The Chinese government might, 
however, oppose this on volatility grounds, via the strengthening of inward 
capital controls; yet even if the additional financial capital is kept out of China, 
mitigation remains possible since substantial real exchange rate realignments 
are likely and these could advantage China in the short term. In the long run, 
a rising consumption share (Lardy 2006; Kuijs 2006; Kuijs and He 2007; Azziz 
and Cui 2007) and the redirection of investment within China to its services 
sector, where considerable potential remains for a productivity catch-up (Ma 
2006), will underpin China’s growth.
In this chapter, these issues are explored collectively using a dynamic model 
of the global economy. The model simulates the real effects of shocks that take 
the form of transitory rises in region-specific interest premiums in North America 
and Western Europe, combined with increases in investment financing costs in 
both regions. The key effects of these shocks are for the real net rates of return 
on North American and Western European investment to fall while the yields 
demanded by financiers increase. Investment falls in those regions and real wage 
rigidity ensure that unemployment rises, GDP growth slows and import demand 
falls in both regions—at least temporarily. The focus of the analysis is, then, on 
factors influencing China’s growth performance in the face of these shocks. 
The genesis of the North American and European slow-down
The story of the slow-down is frequently told with a focus on US monetary policy, 
starting with the succession of monetary expansions by the US Federal Reserve 
after the stock-market corrections of 2000 and the demand contraction of late 
2001 (Figure 3.1).4 The federal funds rate fell 5 percentage points by 2002 and a 
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further percentage point by 2003–04 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors). So 
the story goes, this unilateral easing inspired a housing bubble, which burst in 
2007, unravelling packaged mortgage investments that had, apparently, been 
priced in a manner that relied on continued housing price inflation (BIS 2007). 
Linked with this story is the extraordinary blow-out of the US current account 
deficit since 2000, via the effects of the housing bubble on the US private 
saving rate. The growth of private wealth, combined with low borrowing rates, 
tended to boost consumption during this period, requiring that US investment 
be financed from foreign, rather than US, savings (Edwards 2005; Eichengreen 
2006). It stands to reason, then, that the raising of short-term rates by the 
Federal Reserve during 2004–06 by at least 4 percentage points (Figure 3.1) 
would eventually prick the housing bubble and that the US economy would 
have a hard or soft landing, with either outcome redressing the current account 
imbalance (Krugman 2007).
Figure 3.1 US short and long Treasury bond rates, 





































































Note: Market yield in per cent per annum on US Treasury securities, quoted on an investment 
basis. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
Washington DC. Available from wwwfederalreserve.gov..
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These linked stories ignore, however, the considerable role of the surge 
in the growth of the ‘emerging economies’, and particularly China, since the 
late 1990s, and the simultaneous yet independent information technology (IT) 
related boom in US productivity. The growth surge in emerging economies 
improved the US terms of trade in this period, raising US imports and increasing 
domestic price competition.5 Its effect on the US price level can be inferred 
from the decline in the Chinese bilateral real exchange rate with the United 
States, shown in Figure 3.2. While US producer prices showed a rising trend 
during 2000–05, the US dollar prices of an ever-expanding supply of Chinese 
goods were falling. The deflationary force yielded was bolstered by the IT-
related US productivity boom, which began in the early 1990s and continued 
through to 2006 (Table 3.1).6 Along with the negative shocks associated with 
the US stock-market correction and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, 
the collective deflationary force was considerable, justifying the observed 
monetary easing on inflation targeting grounds alone. Even with this monetary 
expansion, a temporary deflationary effect is seen clearly in Figure 3.2 from 
the decline in the US producer price during 2001. Of course, the coincidence 
of US asset price inflation with product price deflation was bound to create a 
crisis of priority in 2000–03. With asset price targeting always controversial, it 
is not surprising that the Federal Reserve gave priority to the control of product 
price deflation, thus keeping annual consumer price index (CPI) changes in 
the positive range (Figure 3.3).
Later in the period, the transitional economies’ growth surge caused a 
global commodity price boom, with oil prices reaching unprecedented highs 
(Figure 3.4), followed not long after by price spikes in other commodities 
(Figure 3.5).7 This tended to reverse the product price deflationary pressure 
in the United States and to justify the restoration of the US federal fund rate 
to more normal levels during 2004–06 (Figure 3.1). At the same time, however, 
it exacerbated US asset price inflation as oil-exporting countries joined the 
other transitional economies in building up US dollar-denominated reserve 
assets.8 The financial contraction in 2007 was therefore a consequence of more 
complex forces to which the relative expansion of the Chinese economy was 
a contributor. Nonetheless, the contraction originated in the United States 
and spread to varying degrees to other OECD countries and, particularly, to 
Western Europe. While Figure 3.1 shows that the easing by the Federal Reserve 
during 2007–08, in response to the credit contraction, reduced long and short 
government borrowing rates, anecdotal evidence confirms that refinancing 
rates for private firms increased substantially as risk was repriced (see, for 
example, Browning and Silver 2008). Our purpose is to examine the direct and 
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Table 3.1 Growth of US labour productivity in the non-farm 
business sector




Source: Oliner, S.D., Sichel, D.E. and Stiroh, K.J., 2008. Explaining a productive decade, Staff 
Working Paper 2008-01, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, 
Washington, DC.






















































Real rate on producer prices
Note: Here the home prices are, for the United States, the Producer Price Index and, for China, 
the Corporate Goods Price Index. The Chinese index has more coverage of commodities and 
services than the US one, so this is a less than perfect comparison. The nominal exchange rate 
is in red, expressed as US$/RMB, so that nominal appreciations are upward movements. The 
implied real exchange rate is in black, expressed as the value of the Chinese product bundle 
in terms of the corresponding US bundle. A Chinese real appreciation is therefore an upward 
movement. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007. International Financial Statistics, April, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Available from www.imfstatistics.org; National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2007. China Statistical Abstract 2006, China Statistics Press, 
Beijing.
o inal exchange rate
eal rate on producer prices
35
American and European financial shocks: implications for Chinese economic performance





































































Note: Monthly data, average traded price in US$/barrel.
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007. International Financial Statistics, April, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Available from www.imfstatistics.org.

































































Note: Monthly data percentage change in the CPI during the previous 12 months.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
Washington DC. Available from wwwfederalreserve.gov.
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indirect effects of this contraction on China, and thereby on those countries 
dependent on trade with China. To do this, a dynamic numerical model of the 
global economy is required.
The model
We use a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world 
economy, which is an adaptation of the model constructed by Tyers and Shi 
(2007) and extended for macroeconomic applications by Tyers and Bain (2007) 
and Tyers and Golley (2008a, 2008b).9 Only real shocks and their effects are 
represented.10 In the version used, the world is subdivided into 14 regions 
(Table 3.2). Industries are aggregated into three sectors: agriculture (including 
processed foods), industry (mining, energy and manufacturing) and services 
(including construction)—the last being little traded in comparison with the 
other two. Failures of the law of one price for traded goods are represented 
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Sources: For wheat, Chicago Board of Trade daily wheat price in US$/bushel, from the 
Bloomberg Database; iron ore, Hamersley fines, quoted in US cents/dry iron units (dmtu). If 
the ore shipped is 62 per cent iron (the typical Hamersley grade), the price per tonne of ore is 
the dmtu price (for 2007, that would be US$0.82) multiplied by 62, which means US$50.84 per 
tonne, from the IRL Database.
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by product differentiation, so that consumers substitute imperfectly between 
products from dif ferent regions. There are two endogenous sources of 
simulated economic growth—namely, physical capital accumulation and 
the transformation of labour from unskilled to skilled. Technical change is 
introduced in the form of exogenous productivity growth that is sector and 
factor specific, allowing productivity performance to differ between factors 
and between tradable and non-tradable sectors.11
Regional capital accounts are open so that regional households hold 
portfolios of assets that are claims over home and foreign capital. Investors 
in region i have adaptive expectations about real net rates of return, ri
c, the 
determinants of which might be summarised simply as
Table 3.2 Regional composition in the global model
Region Composition of aggregates
Australia 
North America Canada, Mexico and the United States
Western Europe European Union, including Switzerland and Scandinavia but  
 excluding the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union Central Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and  
 Poland
Japan 
China Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan
Indonesia 
Other East Asia Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
 Thailand and Vietnam
India 
Other South Asia Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,  
 Venezuela and Uruguay
Middle East and North Africa Includes Morocco through to the Islamic Republic of Iran
Sub-Saharan Africa The rest of Africa
Rest of World Includes the rest of Central America, the rest of Indo-China,  
 the small island states of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian  
 Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea, Myanmar and Mongolia,  
 New Zealand and the former Yugoslavia
Source: The GTAP 5 Global Database; Dimaranan, B.V. and McDougall, R.A., 2002. Global 












Y is the region’s GDP price,  Pi
K is the price of capital goods (a separate 
industry defined in the model) and δi is the depreciation rate. Given this rate of 
return, the determination of investment in each region is complex, but for our 
purpose it can be characterised simply as follows.12 It is driven positively by 
the real net rate of return, ri
c, and negatively by the rate that must be returned 
to savers, or the financing cost, ri . Therefore
(),ci i iI I r r=   (2)
To arrive at ri , a global interest rate, r
w, is first defined such that ri=r
w + πi, 
in which πi is a usually exogenous regional interest premium, which captures 
the effects of capital controls on the one hand (market segmentation) and 
differential regional risk on the other. The global rate, rw, and indirectly ri , is 
then derived to clear the global capital market.
()(), ,ci i i i i i
i i
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in which Yi is regional income.
Lagged adjustment processes embedded in the I(ri
c, ri) ensure that financial 
capital is not sufficiently mobile internationally to equate ri
c and ri  in the short 
term, but that their paths converge in the long term unless exogenous shocks 
prevent this. General financial reform is represented by a diminution of the 
interest premium, πi , which in China’s case tends to raise its share of global 
funds for investment through time.13 China’s average saving rate is high initially, 
declining through time as its population ages. The baseline simulation therefore 
maintains a Chinese current account surplus that diminishes after 2010.
A demographic component of the model tracks populations in four age 
groups, both genders and two skill categories: a total of 16 population groups 
in each of the 14 regions. The skill subdivision is between production labour 
(unskilled) and professional labour (skilled).14 Each age–gender–skill group 
is represented as a homogeneous sub-population with a group-specific birth 
and death rate, labour force participation rate and rates of immigration and 
emigration. Because the non-traded services sector is relatively skill intensive 
in all regions, trends in skill composition prove to be particularly important for 
the alignment of real exchange rates. These depend on the rate at which each 
δi
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region’s education and social development institutions transform unskilled 
(production-worker) families into skilled (professional-worker) families. 
Each year, a particular proportion of the population in production-worker 
age–gender groups is transferred to professional status. The initial values of 
these proportions depend on the regions’ levels of development, the associated 
capacities of their education systems and the relative sizes of their production 
and professional labour forces. Rates of transformation change through time 
in response to corresponding changes in real per capita income and the skilled 
wage premium.15
The 16 age–gender–skill groups differ in their shares of regional disposable 
income, consumption preferences, saving rates and labour force participation 
behaviour. While the consumption–savings choice is parameterised differently 
between groups, it is dependent for all on group-specific real per capita 
disposable income and the regional real lending rate. Governments are assumed 
to balance their budgets while saving and borrowing are undertaken by the 
private sector. The baseline scenario is a ‘business-as-usual’ projection of the 
global economy to 2030, with 1997 as the base year. For validation experiments 
through 1997–2006, see Tyers and Golley (2008a).
Simulating the North American and Western European slow-down
We compare a baseline business-as-usual simulation to 2030, in which the 
Chinese economy continues to grow strongly,16 with one in which a financial 
contraction retards performance in North America and the European Union. 
We focus in this section on the characterisation of the downturn in those 
regions. The analysis is in no way a forecasting exercise; rather, it is to 
establish a representative pathway for the international economy on which we 
can superimpose some alternative Chinese policy responses. Recalling that 
investors in our model are represented as having adaptive expectations, we have 
not attempted to use it to construct a precise repetition of the events leading 
up to the US housing bubble and the bubble itself, since the latter arose from 
ill-formed expectations about future market performance, at least by some 
investors. Rather, we impose exogenous shocks that combine to represent the 
real effects of the resulting credit squeeze.
The shocks we use are all transitory, peaking in 2008 with a recovery in 
the subsequent five years. They apply to the two regions, ‘North America’ 
and ‘Western Europe’, and are weaker in the latter. The first is a rise in the 
investment interest premiums, πi , over other regions of the world. This reflects 
the recent increase in gross returns required by investors in these regions to 
compensate for perceived increases in risk. The effect of this shock is to raise 
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the financing cost of investment in North America and Western Europe. Second, 
the productivity of investment in these regions is reduced through shocks to 
the technologies used in their capital-goods sectors. This is an indirect means 
of reflecting the recent declines in rates of return on installed capital, ri
c, in 
both regions.17 In effect, this serves to widen the intermediation wedge between 
marginal investor earnings and financing costs.
Since the pathway to be simulated has only to be ‘representative’, and 
since clear data on OECD investment credit costs through 2007 are not yet 
available, the scale of these shocks is arbitrary. For North America, we raise 
the investment interest premium by 2 percentage points and capital-goods 
productivity is reduced by 5 per cent. The corresponding shocks for Western 
Europe are half the size of those for North America. All shocked variables 
then return to baseline benchmarks linearly during a recovery period of five 
years. The effects these shocks have on investment financing rates on the 
one hand and real rates of return on the other are illustrated in Figures 3.6 
and 3.7, which show percentage departures from a baseline simulation in 
which all regions grow smoothly. Note that the global capital market clearing 
interest rate, rw, reduces by 0.9 percentage points because of the contraction 
in investment demand in North America and Europe. The short-run effect 
on the domestic financing rate in North America is therefore a rise of 1.1 
percentage points, while the corresponding net rise in Western Europe is 
just 0.1 percentage points.
The wedge between financing costs and the real rate of return is clear 
from the figures, which also show that the model’s investment dynamics 
lead to some overshooting of rates late in the recovery period for North 
America and Western Europe.18 This occurs because the shocks curtail North 
American and European investment sharply in 2008 but raise investment 
in other regions, as shown in Figure 3.8. During the recovery, however, 
investment in North America and Western Europe expands quickly towards 
their benchmark levels. The 2008 collapse in North American and European 
investment, however, leaves these regions with capital stocks below baseline 
levels for many years, the pace of their recoveries notwithstanding. For this 
reason, real rates of return in these regions rise above baseline levels on 
the point of recovery and for some years beyond. For Western Europe, the 
initial shocks are smaller and their effects are muted by the larger North 
American shocks, which tend to lower financing costs for the rest of the 
world, including Western Europe.
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Figure 3.6 Simulated effects of the financial contraction on real rates 
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Note: Percentage point departures from the baseline simulation.
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
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Figure 3.7 Simulated effects of the financial contraction on real rates 
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Effects on economic performance
The effects on economic activity in North America, Western Europe and China 
are indicated in Figure 3.9, which shows percentage departures from baseline 
GDP levels. The loss of output in North America and Western Europe is quite 
significant, though it must be clear that the chart measures the extent of their 
falling behind the baseline. There is no full year of negative growth in either 
North America or Western Europe, just a slow-down in both.19 The extent of their 
falling behind is made larger by the adoption of labour market closures in both 
shocked regions that maintain the path of real production wages at the baseline 
level and so cause unemployment. At its peak, 6 per cent of North America’s and 
2 per cent of Europe’s production labour force are rendered unemployed.20 Due 
to the flight of investment from North America and Western Europe, indicated in 
Figure 3.8, there is a surge in investment in China, leading to yet higher growth 
there in the short run. Since China already invests almost half of its GDP, its 
capacity to absorb these additional funds could be questioned. For this reason, 
we explore alternative Chinese scenarios in the next section.
Turning to effects on balances of payment, the North American current 
account deficit is large by industrial-country standards, although the baseline 













Note: Percentage point departures from the baseline simulation.
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scenario has it following a declining trend.21 Western Europe as a whole 
exhibits a current account surplus that is smaller in magnitude than the North 
American deficit, while China’s current account surplus is of extraordinary 
magnitude, exceeding one-tenth of its GDP, driven by its very high saving rate 
and the resulting surplus of saving over investment.22 In the baseline projection, 
this surplus is projected to decline as China’s average saving rate falls due to 
the ageing of its population. After the financial shocks in North America and 
Western Europe and the resulting flight of investment from those regions, there 
are very large changes in the balances of payment in these regions. As simulated 
at least, the US current account deficit is temporarily reversed.
The surge in China’s investment after the flight from North America and 
Western Europe greatly diminishes its current account surplus—however, 
again temporarily. This change in financial capital movements cushions the 
effects on China of declining imports in North America and Western Europe. 
While China’s exports take a hit, the closing financial capital imbalance and 
the associated boost in China’s GDP (Figure 3.9) ensures that import growth is 
more than sustained (Figure 3.10). For China’s other trading partners, therefore, 
and particularly for those supplying it with raw materials and manufacturing 
components, the loss of markets in North America and Europe is cushioned 
by a Chinese market that is expanding rather than contracting.23
The short-run substitution of investment for exports in contributing to China’s 
GDP requires some difficult structural adjustment in response to relative price 
changes. The investment generates a surge in domestic demand that raises 
the prices of Chinese products and services relative to those in North America. 
It therefore appreciates China’s real exchange rate relative to North America.24 
The simulated extent of this is shown in Figure 3.11 to be 10 per cent during 
2008. If monetary policy is to emphasise the control of inflation in China, this 
foreshadows a further 10 per cent appreciation of the renminbi relative to the 
US dollar in just one year.25 Otherwise, the rate of inflation must be allowed to 
accelerate. After four years, however, the path of China’s real exchange rate 
against North America falls below the baseline path. This is because capital 
accumulation accelerates in China in the early years after the shock and 
decelerates in North America. Capital costs, and therefore prices, are lower in 
China in the long run relative to North America. The same pattern is followed 
by China’s real effective exchange rate, except that in the short run China 
depreciates against some of its other trading partners, so that its short-run real 
effective appreciation is only small, as shown in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.11 Simulated effects of the financial contraction on bilateral 
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Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
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Figure 3.12 Simulated effects of the financial contraction on real 
















Note: Ratios of the GDP prices of each region with those of all trading partners, weighted by 
trade shares, percentage departures from the baseline. 






Alternative Chinese policy scenarios
Our standard financial shock scenario might be thought to be optimistic from 
the perspective of the Chinese economy and its regional trading partners. This 
is for two reasons. First, it assumes that China is available to absorb additional 
investment, when it is already investing 45 per cent of its GDP annually and it 
is arguably already capital heavy.26 Moreover, the Chinese government might 
regard the surge of financial inflows as footloose and therefore risky. Second, 
as seen in the previous section, the surge of funds leaving North America and 
Western Europe must inevitably drive up China’s real exchange rate, causing 
either faster inflation or more rapid nominal appreciation. Neither of these 
developments will be palatable to the Chinese government. It might therefore 
choose a policy response that either retards the inflow of new investment 
(tighter controls on incoming financial capital) or matches the inflow with 
increased outflows in the form of reserve accumulation, for which the saving 
rate would need to be, albeit temporarily, further increased. These alternative 
policy responses foreshadow two new scenarios to be modelled.
Tighter capital controls that prevent the investment surge
China already maintains effective controls over the inflow and the outflow of 
financial capital (see Ma and McCauley 2007). Legal inflows are primarily foreign 
direct investment (FDI), but they include some purchases of domestic assets, 
including ‘B’ shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Illegal inflows 
have evidently increased in recent years as yields have risen in China relative to 
the United States and as the renminbi has been allowed to appreciate against 
the US dollar.27 Illegal inflows notwithstanding, outflows of financial capital are 
substantially larger in China than inflows and they have mainly taken the form 
of official foreign reserve accumulation. The surplus of China’s saving over its 
investment is, by definition, equivalent to the surplus of its exports, generally 
defined, over its imports. Denominated in foreign currencies, this surplus ends 
up in the hands of the People’s Bank of China (PBC), since outward capital 
controls do not permit substantial foreign asset holdings by private individuals. 
In recent years, there has been some relaxation of controls in both directions 
but the PBC still finds it necessary to acquire foreign reserves in very large 
volumes each year. The recent surge of illegal inflows has, however, tended to 
restrain the magnitude of China’s net capital account position, appreciating the 
real exchange rate. The result has been both accelerated inflation and upward 
flexibility of the renminbi during 2006–07 (Tyers and Bain 2007).
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Here we assume that the Chinese government opposes the inflow of 
additional financial capital on the grounds that it is volatile and therefore risky 
and that it accelerates inflation.28 The policy response is to tighten its inward 
capital controls so as to prevent any surge—maintaining the baseline path of 
China’s capital account flows. Compared with the original (reference) financial 
shock scenario, this causes the domestic real interest rate to rise by almost 1 
percentage point, though it eventually rejoins the baseline path. The simulated 
consequences of this are summarised for China in Figure 3.13; most important 
among them are the absence of a significant surge in Chinese investment (5 
per cent compared with the 27 per cent indicated in Figure 3.8) and hence 
a much reduced increase in China’s GDP (which peaks at about 1 per cent, 
compared with the 4 per cent in Figure 3.9) and imports (which peak at 1 per 
cent but fall below the baseline path thereafter, compared with the peak of 10 
per cent in Figure 3.10).
Gross national product falls temporarily, mostly because China holds 
a substantial stock of foreign assets, the rate of return on which falls, as 
indicated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.29 This fall aside, in this experiment, we 
deny the Chinese economy the positive aspect of the shock: the increased 
investment. The prevailing logic would suggest that there would therefore be 
no compensation for the loss of exports to North America and Western Europe 
and hence that China’s growth rate would fall measurably. The simulation 
shows, however, little impairment of China’s economic performance. Nor is 
there any significant reduction in China’s imports, which support many of its 
neighbouring economies. The resolution of this puzzle requires a return to 
the effects on the global capital market. There is a flight of saving from North 
America and Western Europe. In this experiment, it cannot go to China, so it 
raises investment in other (mostly developing) regions. In the short run, these 
investment surges cause real appreciations relative to North America and 
Western Europe,30 and, significantly, since China does not participate, real 
appreciations against China.
Australia, for example—a key supplier of raw materials to China—suffers 
a short-run real appreciation of 15 per cent against North America and 9 per 
cent against China. As shown in Figure 3.14, even though China has a real 
appreciation against North America in the short run, its real effective exchange 
rate depreciates. This means that China becomes more competitive in other 
markets as a consequence of the financial shocks and that this is sufficient to 




Figure 3.13 Simulated effects of the financial contraction with tighter 
















Note: Percentage departures of volume indices from the baseline.
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
Figure 3.14 Simulated effects of the financial contraction with tighter 
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Overall, then, apart from a dip in foreign-sourced income, this scenario is 
neutral from China’s standpoint. It maintains China’s baseline growth path while 
insulating against any volatility that would stem from the temporary influx of 
global saving. Also, from the viewpoint of China’s neighbours supplying it with 
raw materials and components, this scenario is neutral, with no disturbance to 
the path of China’s imports. Its downside risk lies in the comparative tightness 
that is required in its domestic capital market. Aside from the problems of 
overcoming the resulting increased incentive for illegal financial inflows, 
this could place at increased risk debt-financed investments within China 
and therefore raise the potential for the global financial meltdown to migrate 
there.
Accelerated reserve accumulation (increased saving)
In this scenario, the Chinese government’s inward capital controls are assumed 
to be ineffective in preventing the investment surge. The government is, 
however, able to raise the overall saving rate sufficiently to offset any net effect 
on the balance of payments. One possible mechanism could be through tighter 
fiscal policy, yielding increased fiscal surpluses that supplement gross saving. 
As in the past, the thus-expanded surplus of saving over investment would be 
mopped up by the PBC through the sale of ‘sterilisation bonds’. The increased 
stock of these liabilities would then balance the additional foreign reserves that 
stem from the corresponding surplus of broadly defined export earnings over 
import costs, denominated in foreign currency.31 The particular assumption 
we make is that the path of China’s capital account balance remains exactly 
as in the baseline scenario. The investment shock is balanced precisely by 
an increase in total Chinese saving, so that external flows increase in both 
directions during 2008, netting out at baseline levels.
The results tell us, first, that this scenario would be impossible to achieve 
in practice if the financial shock is as large as that simulated, since a sudden 
and prodigious increase in the gross national saving rate—from 50 per cent to 
72 per cent—would be required to completely neutralise the investment surge. 
Nonetheless, some blend of this scenario with the previous one is possible, 
so we persist with our description of its consequences. The key effects on the 
Chinese economy, measured as departures from the original baseline scenario, 
are indicated in Figure 3.15. The increases in investment and in saving in this 
scenario make the economic implications larger than the capital controls 
scenario considered previously, in which the principal effects were external, due 
to real exchange rate realignments. Because the rise in the saving rate robs the 
economy of consumption expenditure, however, the additional investment does 
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Figure 3.15 Simulated effects of the financial contraction with compen-
sating reserve accumulation (temporarily increased saving) 
















Note: Percentage departures from the baseline.





Figure 3.16 Simulated effects of the financial contraction with 
compensating reserve accumulation (temporarily increased 
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not raise GDP any further. The short-run fall in GNP, due to reduced returns on 
foreign assets, is also of a similar order. What is different about this scenario 
is that China’s exports rise temporarily (by one-fifth, compared with no change 
under tighter capital controls) and its imports fall, by about one-tenth (again, 
compared with no change under tighter capital controls).32
Again, real exchange rate realignments are decisive here, as suggested 
by Figure 3.16. Comparing this f igure with Figure 3.14, the short-run real 
appreciation against North America is a mere 2 per cent (compared with almost 
7 per cent in the capital controls scenario) and the real effective depreciation 
is much larger (6 per cent compared with 2 per cent). Imports are very much 
more expensive in China under this scenario and so decline in the short run. 
As before, other regions absorb new investment after the flight of saving from 
the OECD countries and this appreciates their real exchange rates relative 
to North America. In China’s case, however, while the new investment is 
also accommodated, the real exchange rate appreciates much less because 
domestic aggregate demand is sapped by the temporary increase in saving 
and the accelerated accumulation of foreign reserves. Overall, a temporary 
dip in foreign-sourced income and a substantial contraction in consumption 
should make this scenario unpalatable to the Chinese government. As for the 
mainly Asian and Pacific suppliers of China’s raw materials and manufactured 
components, a temporary fall in the size of China’s market is offset by increased 
investment.
Conclusion
Considering that exports make up almost half of China’s GDP and most of 
these are directed to Europe and North America, negative financial shocks 
in those regions might be expected to retard China’s growth. To confirm this 
quantitatively, shocks that widen the financial intermediation wedge are applied 
to North America and Western Europe in the context of a dynamic model of 
the global economy. Contrary to expectation, mitigating factors are also set in 
train by these shocks that lead to compensating benefits for China that insulate 
its economy, preserving its comparatively rapid growth path. These mitigating 
factors take the form of the temporary flight of savings from OECD countries 
into Chinese investment and real exchange rate realignments.
The mitigating factors are so strong that, as long as China receives a fair 
share of incremental investment due to the flight of OECD saving, it will be a 
net beneficiary of financial shocks in North America and Western Europe—at 
least as measured by its GDP. There are, however, good reasons why the 
Chinese government might seek to moderate the effects of this investment 
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surge, through tighter inward capital controls, or offset them with increased 
reserve accumulation. It might, for example, view these additional funds as 
footloose portfolio capital that could be withdrawn suddenly in the future and 
therefore increase financial risk at the national level. And whatever form the 
inflow were to take, it would raise China’s domestic aggregate demand and 
therefore appreciate its real exchange rate, placing pressure on its central bank 
to either appreciate the renminbi more quickly or allow faster inflation.
The results show that tighter capital controls could eliminate the investment 
surge but that this would cause other regions’ real exchange rates to appreciate 
relative to China, making exports more competitive and trade diversification 
easier. If the Chinese government were, instead, to allow the investment 
boom to take place but to raise the home saving rate so as to offset it with yet 
faster reserve accumulation, the real depreciation of China relative to its other 
trading partners would be even larger. Although its import growth would slow 
temporarily, its GDP would maintain its original growth path, and, while its 
suppliers of raw materials and manufacturing components would temporarily 
export less to China, they would also enjoy increased investment sufficient to 
maintain their own levels of economic activity. The results therefore suggest 
that, as long as the financial shocks are restricted to North America and Western 
Europe, China’s growth and the imports on which its trading partners rely are 
unlikely to be hindered significantly.
A key proviso is that the financial shocks do not spread beyond North 
America and Western Europe. We regard such a spread as unlikely, so do 
not consider it here. Clearly, if the crisis of financial confidence goes global, 
financial wealth will diminish in all regions, leading to declines in consumption 
and employment that could take many years to resolve. The potential for 
global growth remains considerable, however, and it is difficult to believe that 
pessimism about the future could become so widespread as to permanently 
under-price assets essential to that growth.
Finally, while we show that China’s continued growth might not depend 
as closely as had previously been thought on markets for exports in North 
America and Western Europe, we would do well to remind ourselves on what 
that growth must depend. The key is continued accumulation and renewal of 
physical capital. Of course, the transformation of the labour force into skilled 
workers and professionals is also essential but this occurs in response to wage 
incentives that depend on capital accumulation. Productivity growth is also 
important, but this depends on capital accumulation and renewal. So what are 
the threats to capital accumulation and renewal in China? The main one is a rise 
in political risk. Should the Chinese government be destabilised, FDI would be 
53
American and European financial shocks: implications for Chinese economic performance
repelled and there would be illegal capital flight. Output growth and imports 
from other regions would slow. The lesson is that continued Chinese growth 
is not primarily about export markets. It requires that China’s government is 
stable and charts a steady and sensible policy course.
Notes
1 The short-term financial literature on this point is vast: see, for example, Wolf (2007), McKibbin 
and Stoekel (2007a, 2007b).
2 More so since it appears that these financial shocks have caused a speculative retreat to 
commodities, which has, at least temporarily, shifted the international terms of trade against 
China.
3 For evidence supporting the prominence of the components trade in other Asian economies, 
see Athukorala (2005).
4 It might well be considered to have begun with the US tech boom of the 1990s, however, 
and its subsequent bust, nonetheless leaving in its wake continued strong US productivity 
growth, which retarded domestic inflation and made the monetary expansions possible; see 
Pennings and Tyers (forthcoming) and Oliner et al. (2008).
5 The import surge did not raise US unemployment, although low-skilled workers were less 
favourably affected (Woo and Xiao 2007).
6 See Oliner et al. (2008). Significantly, they conclude that IT innovations were the strongest 
contributor to US productivity growth in both periods, but mostly before 2000, when the IT 
production sectors played key roles. Thereafter, however, while IT continued to be important, 
the gains came largely from services and were bolstered by one-off industry restructuring, 
which was unlikely to offer sustained productivity growth in the future.
7 The prices of wheat and iron ore showed extreme behaviour in 2007. Although the growth 
in demand in the economies in transition was supporting the rising trend in both, the 
extreme spikes were most likely caused by speculation after falls in OECD equity prices. The 
consequence was to exacerbate the adverse shift in China’s terms of trade.
8 China’s current account surplus in that period, and its associated accumulation of US assets, 
has been the subject of an already large range of literature. The authors’ perspectives on this 
are detailed in Tyers and Bain (2007).
9 The model has its origins in GTAP-Dynamic, the standard version of which is a derivative of 
its comparative static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel 1997). The dynamics embodied in the original 
are described in Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000). Tyers et al. (2008) describe extensions 
to these dynamics, which emphasise endogenous skill levels.
10 Money is not represented explicitly, necessitating our focus on real effects. Although no focus 
on China is offered, a similar application using a more complete representation of the global 
macro-economy is provided by McKibbin and Stoekel (2007).
11 Baseline productivity in the agricultural sectors of developing regions grows more rapidly 
than that in services. This allows continued shedding of labour by agriculture. In the case of 
China, Wang and Ding (2006) estimated that there were 40 million surplus workers in China’s 
agricultural sector. While underemployment is not explicit in our model, the assumption of 
high labour productivity growth in agriculture implies that agriculture is capable of shedding 
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labour without consequences for its output, as workers are drawn away by urban capital 
accumulation.
12 See Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000) for details.
13 For further details on the implementation and calibration of the investment interest premium, 
see Tyers and Golley (2008b).
14 The subdivision between production workers and professionals and para-professionals 
accords with the International Labour Organisation’s occupation-based classification and is 
consistent with the labour division adopted in the GTAP Database; see Liu et al. (1998).
15 China’s skill share is projected to rise through time while that in North America remains static. 
The contrast is due to North America’s higher initial skill share, its high rate of unskilled 
immigration and the higher fertility rate of its low-skilled families.
16 It grows at a rate that is declining through time, mainly because low fertility causes China’s 
labour force to fall after about a decade; see Tyers and Golley (2008b).
17 It acts to raise the region-specific price of capital goods, KiP , in Equation 1. Both shocks 
offer indirect means of representing events in financial markets in the past year. The rises 
in interest premiums and the declines in expected (and ultimately real) returns are due to 
weakening optimism about the future, most particularly in the United States, and therefore 
declining asset prices.
18 Consumption/savings choices by regional collective households are adaptive, responding 
to changes in real per capita incomes and real returns on saving. We experimented with 
alternative behavioural assumptions for North America, in one case forcing all the income 
adjustment on saving and in the other on consumption in that region. The effects of these 
differences on the global economy were small, so for simplicity we discuss results only from 
the model’s standard specification.
19 This is not the case for gross national product (GNP), which does fall in the short run due to the 
loss of returns from home and foreign-sourced capital income in North America and Western 
Europe. In China, in contrast with its GDP, GNP slows (though does not fall absolutely), again 
due to the loss of foreign-sourced income.
20 The corresponding increments to unemployment rates in both regions are much smaller given 
their large shares of professional labour, the wages of which remain flexible.
21 The model is not constrained to approach any particular steady state, although all global capital 
market imbalances do tend to moderate over three decades in the baseline projection.
22 The role of China’s very high saving rate in its broad economic behaviour is discussed by Kuijs 
(2006).
23 This point has already been made by McKibbin and Stoeckel (2007b) and more forcefully by 
McKibbin (2008).
24 See Tyers et al. (2008) and Tyers and Golley (2008b) for a discussion of China’s real exchange 
rate, its measurement and its determinants.
25 This is a crude interpretation of the results since the simulated appreciation is relative to 
North America as a whole.
26 That China is arguably already capital-heavy emerges from the discussions in Kuijs and He 
(2007), Azziz and Cui (2007) and Rosen and Hauser (2007).
27 Illegal inflows enter through legal loopholes, acquisitions in Hong Kong and Macau and via 
transfer pricing; see Walter and Howie (2006).
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28 Or, alternatively, if inflation is to be controlled it requires a politically inexpedient appreciation 
of the renminbi.
29 As modelled, these assets are held in a global trust that delivers an average global rate of 
return. Bilateral holdings are not identified. Nonetheless, given the size of the North American 
and Western European economies, the financial shocks cause a substantial reduction in the 
rate of return earned.
30 These real appreciations stem from the associated rise in aggregate demand, which tends to 
raise the prices of home goods more than comparatively elastically supplied foreign goods; 
see Tyers et al. (2008).
31 During 2007, a portion of the PBC’s foreign assets was swapped for renminbi-denominated 
government debt and placed with China’s sovereign wealth fund, the CIC. This was to reduce 
the currency mismatch on the PBC’s balance sheet, a problem that would be exacerbated by 
a sudden and substantial fiscal surplus; see Tyers and Bain (2007).
32 Imports recover, however, to be larger than the baseline in the long run, once the saving rate 
is restored to its original declining path.
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Prema-chandra Athukorala and Nobuaki Yamashita
In the past decade, the widening bilateral trade deficit has been the focal 
point of US–China economic relations. This is often portrayed as a cause of 
the overall US current account imbalance. Real public concerns in the United 
States surrounding the debate about the ‘China deficit’ are, however, rooted in 
the perceived economic threat of import competition. In the late 1990s, when 
imports from China were dominated by traditional labour-intensive manufactures 
such as clothing and footwear, unskilled workers’ employment losses and wage 
suppression were the prime focus of the debate. More recently, the apparent 
rising sophistication of imports from China—in particular, the sharp rise in 
imports of computers and electronic products—has fuelled concerns that the 
rise of China poses a direct threat to the United States’ position as a technology 
superpower, a concern reminiscent of the economic fears about Japan that 
pervaded the US policy scene in the 1970s and 1980s.
‘Unfair’ Chinese import competition is perceived to take a number of forms, 
including illegal export subsidies, lax enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, restrictions on imports to and foreign investment in China, and the 
national currency being kept undervalued through massive intervention in 
the foreign exchange market (Hufbauer et al. 2006; Mankiw and Swagel 2005; 
Weisman 2007). These concerns have fuelled calls for new legislation to prevent 
unfair practices. In February 2005, the US Senate passed the Byrd Amendment, 
a provision that encouraged American companies to file anti-dumping lawsuits 
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by awarding revenue collected from the resultant tariffs to litigating companies. 
Other China-specific legislation has been proposed in the past two years, 
including a bill that stipulates declaring exchange rate protection as a form of 
illegal subsidisation for which US firms can seek compensation. The economic 
Sinophobia has also begun to spill over to other arenas of US–China relations, 
including international food-safety standards and US policy postures relating 
to the entry of Chinese firms in the corporate arena (Shirk 2007:267). The China 
threat—in particular, the loss of American jobs to China—was a hot issue in 
the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, and indications are that it is likely to 
figure even more prominently in the upcoming (2008) presidential campaign 
(Easton 2008; Steinbock 2008).
The policy debate about US–China trade relations has so far been based 
on the conventional notion of horizontal specialisation, in which trade takes 
place in the form of final goods (goods that are produced from start to finish 
in a given country). It has largely ignored the continuing process of global 
production sharing—the break-up of the production process into geographically 
separated stages1—and the resulting trade complementarities between the two 
countries as dominant players of this new form of international exchange. Global 
production sharing opens up opportunities for countries to specialise in different 
slices (different tasks) of the production process depending on their relative 
cost advantage and other relevant economic fundamentals. Consequently, parts 
and components are now exchanged across borders at a faster rate than final 
goods. In this context, decisions about how much to produce and for which 
market have to be combined with decisions about whether to produce and 
with what degree of intra-product specialisation. The upshot is that trade-flow 
analysis based on data coming from a reporting system designed at a time when 
countries were trading only in final goods naturally distorts values of exports 
and imports, leading to a falsification of the current account imbalances. The 
degree of falsification is likely to increase over time as more complex production 
networks are created with an ever-increasing number of interacting countries 
(Jones and Kierzkowski 2001a, 2001b). The spread of international production 
sharing can also diminish the efficacy of exchange rate and tariff policies in 
influencing trade flows by opening up opportunities for firms to acquire inputs 
from, and relocate final assembly to, different countries within global production 
networks, with a view to cushioning their profit margins in the face of such 
policy changes (Ghosh and Rajan 2007).  
Given the current state of data, it is not possible to quantify the effect of 
international production sharing on bilateral trade imbalances: this would 
require a major overhaul of the international system of collecting trade data 
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to record domestic value-added content at different stages of production. The 
COMTRADE database of the United Nations (UN various years) does, however, 
now provide disaggregated data that permit the separation of parts and 
components from final goods with a satisfactory coverage of trade in machinery 
and transport equipment, a commodity class in which most of the global 
production sharing is concentrated. Data extracted from this source, when 
combined with the available case study-based evidence of global operations of 
multinational enterprises, permit us to paint a broad-bush picture of the nature 
of the continuing process of global production sharing and its implications for 
US–China trade relations in order to better inform the current policy debate. 
That is what we aim to do in this chapter. A number of recent studies have 
alluded to the importance of paying attention to global production sharing in 
analysing the drivers of the US–China trade deficit (Bergsten et al. 2006; Lardy 
2005; Fung et al. 2006; Krugman 2008). To our knowledge, however, this is the 
first attempt to examine this issue systematically to the extent permitted by 
the available data. 
The remainder of this chapter is presented in four parts. The next section 
offers an overview of trends and patterns of Chinese trade in order to set the 
stage for the ensuing analysis. The third section surveys US–China trade 
patterns with emphasis on emerging patterns in the two countries’ involvement 
in global production networks and their implications for the bilateral trade flows 
using some fresh datum tabulations separating trade in parts and components 
and final goods in machinery trade. This is followed by an econometric analysis 
of the determinants of trade flows. The final section presents concluding 
remarks. 
China’s trade performance: an overview
The rise of China as a major trading nation was one of the most momentous 
developments of the post-World War II era, surpassing even the stunning rise 
of Germany and Japan. Total merchandise exports from China increased from 
US$8 billion (about 1 per cent of global exports) in 1978–79, when the process of 
liberalisation reforms started, to US$1,442 billion (13.4 per cent) in 2005–06.2 In 
2006, China was the second largest exporting nation in the world after Germany 
and, assuming the current growth rates continue, it will become the largest 
in about 10 years. During the reform era, until about the mid 1980s, imports 
followed exports closely with periodic minor trade surpluses or deficits. From 
then on, exports have persistently outpaced imports, yielding a mild annual 
surplus averaging about 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and 
exceeding 3 per cent only briefly, in 1997–98.
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China’s phenomenal export expansion has been underpinned by a shift 
in the commodity composition of exports away from primary products and 
towards manufacturing (Table 4.1). The share of manufactures in China’s total 
merchandise exports increased from less than 40 per cent in the late 1970s 
to nearly 80 per cent in the early 1990s, and to 92 per cent in 2005–06. Until 
about the late 1990s, traditional labour-intensive manufactures—in particular, 
apparel, footwear, toys and sporting goods—were the prime movers of export 
expansion. Since then, there has been a notable shift in the export composition 
away from conventional labour-intensive product lines and towards more 
sophisticated product lines—in particular, those within the broader Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) category of machinery and transport 
equipment (SITC 7; henceforth referred to as ‘machinery’). Between 1992–93 
and 2005–06, the share of miscellaneous manufactures (SITC 8)—a catch-
all commodity group encompassing most of the traditional labour-intensive 
products—declined from 49 per cent to 31 per cent and the share of machinery 
increased from 17 per cent to 44 per cent.
The expansion of machinery exports has been brought about by China’s 
highly publicised export success in a wide range of ‘information and 
communication technology’ (ICT) products (which fall under SITC categories 
75, 76 and 77). China’s world market share of ICT products recorded a fivefold 
increase from 5 per cent in 1992–93 to 24.1 per cent in 2005–06. Among them, 
the share of office machines increased from less than 2 per cent in 1992–93 to 
more than 28 per cent in 2005–06. Today, China is the world’s largest global 
producer as well as the single largest exporter of personal computers falling in 
this commodity group. China’s world market share of telecommunications and 
sound-recording equipment (dominated by mobile phones, DVD players and 
CD players) was 26.2 per cent in 2005–06—up from 7.9 per cent in 1992–93.
Trade data showing this phenomenal structural shift have been used 
widely—not only in the popular press and policy reports of agencies involved 
in promoting research and development activities, but in some scholarly 
writing—to argue that China is rapidly becoming an advanced-technology 
superpower and the sophistication of its export basket is rapidly approaching 
the levels of those of most advanced industrial nations (for example, Rodrik 
2006; Yusuf et al. 2007). A closer examination of the data, however, suggests 
that such an inference is fundamentally flawed. In reality, what we observe is 
the rapid consolidation in China of the final-assembly stages of East Asian-
centred global production networks for these products. Ample supplies of 
relatively cheap and trainable labour and the scales of economy arising from 
China’s vast domestic market (which enables firms to achieve low unit costs) 
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are contributing factors to China’s attractiveness as a global assembly centre. 
As already noted, China’s so-called ‘high-tech’ exports are concentrated heavily 
in a single product category: ICT products. The bulk of these products (such as 
notebook computers, display units, mobile phones and DVD and CD players) 
are simply ‘mass-market commodities’ produced in huge quantities and at 
relatively low unit costs using imported high-tech parts and components; they 
are not leading-edge technology products. 
The share of components in total machinery imports to China increased 
from 32.5 per cent in 1992–93 to 63.4 per cent in 2004–05, with the import shares 
of the three ICT products (SITC 75, 76 and 77) recording much faster growth 
(Table 4.2). In contrast, final goods (total exports minus components) have 
continued to dominate the export composition. In the past decade, the share 
of final goods in total machinery exports has remained about 75 per cent, with 
only minor year-to-year changes. Given the fact that the production of parts 
and components is generally more capital and technology intensive than final 
assembly, these figures clearly suggest that China’s export success has so 
far been underpinned largely by its comparative advantage in international 
production arising from its labour abundance. When components are netted 
out, more than 80 per cent of total Chinese manufacturing exports can still be 
treated as labour-intensive products.
The bulk of assembly activities in China are carried out by affiliates of 
multinational enterprises (‘foreign-invested enterprises’, FIEs) from imported 
components within their global production networks (Dean and Tam 2005; 
Naughton 2007; Sung 2007). The share of FIEs in total exports from China 
Table 4.2 Share of parts and components in China’s manufacturing 
trade, 1992–93, 2000–01 and 2005–06 
Product Exports Imports
 1992–93 2000–01 2005–06 1992–93 2000–01 2005–06
Total manufacturing 17.93 32.56 40.77 6.86 14.98 18.39
Machinery and transport 36.51 58.98 67.65 33.95 38.50 36.32
 equipment (7) 
ICT products (75, 76, 77) 59.90 72.70 79.20 32.53 37.91 34.83
Miscellaneous manufacturing (8) 20.66 15.49 10.89 1.47 1.69 2.35
Note: Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) codes are given in parentheses.
Source: Compiled from United Nations (UN), various years. Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (COMTRADE), Statistics Division, United Nations, New York. Available from http://
comtrade.un.org/bd.
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increased from less than 2 per cent in 1980 to more than 58 per cent by 2005. 
They accounted for 88 per cent of total information-technology products 
exported from China in 2005. The FIEs are mostly wholly foreign owned, and 
their activities in China are concentrated overwhelmingly in the final-assembly 
stage of production, which is the most labour-intensive layer of a production 
process spread across many countries. Basic research and product design 
and capital and human capital-intensive stages of the production process are 
carried out in the home countries of the multinational enterprises or in other 
Asian countries that are in a more advanced stage of industrial development 
than China. Affiliates of US multinationals account directly for only a small 
share of total exports by FIEs (about 10 per cent),4 with affiliated Taiwanese, 
Hong Kong and Korean firms accounting for the lion’s share (of more than 
80 per cent). US multinationals seem, however, to play a major role in parts 
and components supplies for all export-oriented assembly firms from their 
production bases in China and other countries—in particular, those located 
in Southeast Asia.5 
US–China trade patterns
Bilateral trade between the United States and China has grown persistently 
since the early 1980s, with the rate of growth accelerating from about the mid 
1990s and again after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001 (Figure 4.1). The value of US imports from China rose from US$16 billion 
in 1990 to US$307 billion in 2006. Since 2003, China has been the second largest 
source of US imports, after Canada but ahead of Mexico and Japan. US exports 
to China have also grown persistently during this period, but from a low base 
and at a slower rate. Total exports in 2006 amounted to a mere US$55 billion, 
up from US$5 billion in 1990. Bilateral economic ties between the two countries 
have therefore been characterised by a steadily growing trade imbalance: the 
trade deficit increased from US$11 billion to US$205 billion in 2006—the largest 
deficit the United States has ever had with any country. The bilateral trade deficit 
as a percentage of US GDP increased from 0.2 per cent in 1990 to 0.9 per cent 
in 2000, and then to 1.9 per cent in 2007. The deficit with China has been the 
United States’ single largest bilateral trade deficit since 1999. As part of its WTO 
accession, China substantially reduced barriers to import trade, becoming the 
fastest growing market for US exports. China’s WTO accession also gave foreign 
companies confidence to move their assembly plants within global production 
networks to China. As a result, China’s exports kept growing. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the US–China trade deficit in the context of the United 
States’ growing overall trade deficit. At the same time that the US deficit with 
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China increased, the overall US deficit with all other countries has expanded. 
In 2006, the US–China bilateral deficit amounted to 28 per cent of the total US 
trade deficit—in other words, almost three-quarters of the total US trade deficit 
with the rest of the world. This comparison suggests that current US policy 
concerns about Chinese trade have been driven primarily by the perceived 
threat of import competition from China rather than by the broader economic 
issue of a widening overall trade imbalance. 
Figure 4.2 also shows that, from about 1999, the widening US–China deficit 
has been significantly counterbalanced by a sharp decline in the relative 
importance of US bilateral trade deficits with Japan and other East Asian 
countries. Between 1999 and 2006, the increase in China’s share in the total US 
trade deficit from 20.4 per cent to 28.4 per cent was accompanied by a decline 
in the respective figure for Japan—from 21.1 per cent to 10.5 per cent. The 
share of the other East Asian countries also declined—from 16 per cent to 10.3 
per cent—between these two years. These contrasting patterns point to the 
fragility of any analysis of trade imbalances based only on ‘reported’ bilateral 
trade figures in an era of global production sharing—a point to be investigated 
using disaggregated trade data in the next section. 
Figure 4.3 tells the Chinese side of the story.6 The widening China–US trade 
surplus in the past 10 years has been accompanied by widening bilateral deficits 
with Japan and the other East Asian countries. From 2004 to 2006, the combined 
deficit with Japan and the other East Asian countries amounted to 85 per cent 
of the China–US trade surplus. In fact, China has had an overall trade deficit 
with the world, excluding the United States, for several years now. There is 
evidence that China’s widening trade deficits with its regional trading partners 
are closely associated with China’s increasingly important role as the main 
centre of final assembly within regional production networks. At the beginning 
of the reform era, export-oriented firms in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea that 
were involved in the production of conventional labour-intensive products 
such as clothing, footwear, toys and travel goods relocated their production 
to China. This was followed, from about the early 1990s, by rapid relocation to 
China of the final-assembly stages of ‘high-tech’ industries—in particular, ICT 
industries from these countries and also from Japan, the United States and 
other industrial countries. During this period, the major member countries of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN; Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines) also began to participate in the production 
networks in a big way as suppliers of parts and components for final-assembly 
activities in China (Athukorala 2008). This massive restructuring of production 
processes within global production networks naturally set the stage for a shift 
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in China’s growing bilateral trade surplus with the United States (and some 
other industrial countries), which provided markets for final (assembled) goods 
in its regional trading partners in the form of narrowing trade deficits and/or 
growing trade surpluses. 
The discussion so far in this section suggests that the US–China trade 
imbalance could be largely a structural phenomenon, quite distinct from 
the overall trade imbalance of the United States, and related largely to the 
continuing process of global production sharing and the pivotal role played by 
China in this new form of international exchange. We now turn to disaggregated 
analysis of US–China trade flows in order to broaden our understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
In the reform era, until about the early 1990s, traditional conventional 
labour-intensive manufactured goods (miscellaneous manufactures) dominated 
Chinese exports to the US, ref lecting China’s general pattern of export 
specialisation at the time. Since then there has been a palpable shift in the 
commodity composition of imports away from these products and towards 
machinery and transport equipment—in particular, ICT products. Between 
1995–96 and 2005–06, the share of miscellaneous manufactures in total imports 
from China declined from 58.8 per cent to 38.5 per cent, accompanied by an 
increase in the share of machinery from 26.3 per cent to 44.1 per cent (Table 
4.3). The share of ICT products increased from 22.4 per cent to 37.6 per cent, 
and this commodity group contributed to more than 40 per cent of the total 
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increment in imports from China between these two periods. China’s share in 
total US ICT-product imports increased from 6.5 per cent in 1995–96 to 33 per 
cent in 2005–06 (Table 4.4). This was underpinned by a sharp decline in the 
combined share of the other East Asian countries—from 63.5 per cent to 36.6 
per cent. China’s share in US ICT imports in 2005–06 was almost two times 
that of Mexico (15.7 per cent). 
To gain further insights into the growing importance of overseas assembly 
as a source of imports for the United States and the pivotal role played by China 
in this international division of labour, we disaggregated data for machinery 
trade into parts and components and final goods (reported trade: parts and 
components). The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 4.4 and 
Table 4.5. Table 4.5 gives data for the share of parts and components in total 
US imports and exports of machinery and the subcategory of ICT products 
therein. Data for ICT products disaggregated into final goods and parts and 
components are plotted in Figure 4.4.
The share of components in US machinery exports is generally much higher 
across all partner countries compared with that of imports (Table 4.5). Moreover, 
on the import side, the shares have recorded a notable decline across all import-
trading partners. This decline is much sharper for the ICT products subcategory 
within the broader category of machinery and transport equipment. These 
patterns are generally consistent with the United States’ comparative advantage 
in skill and capital-intensive activities in production processes within global 
production networks in vertically integrated industries. Within this broader 
context, one can observe two peculiarities relating to China’s role in international 
production sharing in relation to its trade with the United States. 
First, the share of parts and components in US exports to other East Asian 
countries (in particular, to the countries in ASEAN) is much higher compared 
with that of exports to China. This pattern is consistent with the case study-
based findings that US firms located in East Asian countries undertake further 
processing/assembly of parts and components originally designed and/or 
produced in the United States as part of their engagement in China-centred 
regional production networks. United States-based multinational enterprises 
have a long history of engagement in parts and components assembly and 
testing in Southeast Asia, dating back to the setting up of processing plants by 
National Semiconductors and Hewlett Packard in Singapore in the early 1970s. 
Many more US firms entered this arena and their production locations expanded 
to Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines in subsequent years and, more 
recently, to Vietnam. At the formative stage, the activities of US multinational 
enterprise affiliates involved assembly/testing of simple components and the re-
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importing of the assembled components to the United States to be incorporated 
in the final products. Over time, more and more sophisticated stages of the 
production process were relocated in Southeast Asia, resulting in multiple 
border crossings of parts and components before they were incorporated in 
final production not only in the United States, but in other countries covered 
Table 4.5 Share of parts and components in US machinery trade
(per cent)
 Imports Exports 
 Share   
 1995–96 2005–06 1995–96 2005–06
(a) Machinery and transport equipment*    
China and Hong Kong 32.1 24.4 45.6 56.0
China 25.0 24.2 36.1 50.8
East Asia 45.6 36.8 57.5 62.1
Japan 42.2 33.3 51.1 49.4
Korea 60.3 31.0 51.2 58.2
Taiwan 54.9 52.6 55.4 58.4
ASEAN 43.6 40.9 67.7 73.2
NAFTA 35.7 34.6 58.8 52.7
Mexico 42.7 37.7 68.9 61.9
European Union 15  43.7 38.9 54.3 52.4
World 42.1 34.9 54.4 52.4
    
ICT products    
China and Hong Kong 31.9 20.9 59.2 72.7
China 23.5 20.7 51.2 72.8
East Asia 51.8 44.6 71.3 77.4
Japan 51.8 51.3 60.7 53.6
Korea 70.4 38.6 64.4 78.3
Taiwan 57.6 52.9 78.6 81.1
ASEAN 43.5 40.4 79.8 85.7
NAFTA 55.6 39.0 63.2 57.3
Mexico 50.5 36.2 70.4 65.9
European Union 15  54.9 48.9 54.9 51.1
World 51.2 36.1 60.9 61.0
* including ICT products 
Source: Compiled from United Nations (UN), various years. Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (COMTRADE), Statistics Division, United Nations. Available from http://comtrade.
un.org/bd/
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by the US multinationals’ networks (through their own affiliated firms and 
arm’s-length trade relations) (Lipsey 1998; Athukorala 2007). US multinational 
affiliates in Southeast Asia have, in fact, expanded assembly activities in the 
region since the emergence of China as the global assembly centre for ICT 
products and other machinery, and these firms supply parts and components 
to their own affiliates and other firms involved in assembly operations in China 
(Athukorala 2007). 
Second, the share of parts and components in US imports from China is 
remarkably low compared with the figures for the other East Asian countries, 
as well as with the global average. In years for which data are reported, parts 
and components account for about 20 per cent of total ICT imports to the 
United States—that is, final goods accounted for nearly four-fifths of total 
imports. Consequently, the increasing trend of China’s penetration in the US 
ICT markets is much sharper (Figure 4.4) in terms of data for final goods than 
for figures based on the standard (gross) trade data. Third—and related to 
the two previous points—two-way trade in parts and components seems to 
account for a much larger share of trade between the United States and other 
East Asian countries (in particular, ASEAN countries) compared with trade 
with China. It seems that China’s comparative advantage in global production 
sharing is still concentrated disproportionately in final assembly.
Determinants of trade flows 
It is clear from the discussion so far that Chain’s emergence as an important 
player in global production networks is an important structural factor behind 
the widening trade deficit between the United States and China. We now turn 
to a more formal examination of the determinants of US trade, distinguishing 
between imports and exports, and focusing on the behaviour of the trade 
flows of final goods and parts and components within machinery exports. 
The purpose is to examine whether trade with China has a specific effect on 
the overall international trade patterns of the United States beyond what can 
be expected in terms of the standard determinants of bilateral trade flows. 
The analytical tool used for this purpose is the gravity equation, which has 
become a standard tool for analysing bilateral trade flows. For the purpose of 
our analysis, we augmented the basic gravity model in a number of ways to 
yield the following specification 
Ln TRDi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2 lnGDPj + β3 lnPGDPi +β4 lnPGDPj  
+ β5lnDSTi,j  + β6 ADJi,j +β7 lnRULCi,j + β8 lnRERi,j + β9 DCH
+ β10 DJP + β11 DTW + β12 DAS + γT + εij (1)
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in which i and j refer to the reporting country (the United States) and the partner 
country, and Ln denotes natural logarithms. The variables are listed and defined 
below, with the postulated sign of the regression coefficient for the explanatory 
variables in brackets.
TRD trade (imports [MP] or exports [EX]) between i and j
GDP real GDP (+)
PGDP real GDP per capita (+)
DST the distance between the economic centres of i and j (–)
ADJ a binary variable assuming the value of 1 if i and j share a  
  common land border and 0 otherwise (+)
RULC relative unit labour costs of manufacturing between j and i 
 (EX +; MP –)
RER an index of bilateral real exchange rates, which measure the 
 international competitiveness between j and i (EX +; MP –)
DCH intercept dummy variable for China (+ or –)
DJP  intercept dummy variable for Japan (+ or –)
DTW intercept dummy variable for Taiwan and Korea (+ or –)
DAS intercept dummy variable for the five major member countries 
 of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
 Thailand) 
T  a set of time dummy variables to capture year-specific ‘fixed’ 
 effects
α  a constant term
ε  a stochastic error term, representing the omitted other influences 
 on bilateral trade.
The first four explanatory variables (GDP, GDPP, DST and ADJ) are the 
standard gravity-model arguments that do not require further discussion. 
Among the remaining variables, the relative unit labour cost (RULC, relative 
manufacturing wages adjusted for labour productivity) is presumably a major 
factor impacting on the global spread of fragmentation-based specialisation 
(Jones and Kierzkowski 2001a, 2001b). In a context in which capital and 
components have become increasingly mobile, the relative cost of production 
naturally becomes an important consideration in cross-border production. 
The inclusion of the real exchange rate, RER, which captures the international 
competitiveness of traded-goods production, is based on a similar reasoning. 
Another important determinant of trade flows suggested by the theory of 
production fragmentation is the cost of ‘service links’ connecting ‘production 
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blocks’ in different countries. There is no unique measure of the cost of service 
links; however, in our model, distance (DST), adjacency (ADJ) and per capita 
income (PGDP) capture certain aspects such as costs. Technological advances 
during the post-World War II era have certainly contributed to a remarkable 
reduction in international communication costs. There is, however, evidence 
that geographical ‘distance’ is still a key factor in determining international 
transport costs—in particular, shipping costs—and delivery time (Evans and 
Harrigan 2003). Timely delivery can in fact be a more important influence on 
vertical trade than final trade because of multiple border crossings involved in 
the value-adding chain. The common border dummy (ADJ) captures possible 
additional advantages of proximity that are not captured by the standard 
distance measure (the greater cycle distance between capital cities). The 
inclusion of PGDP as an explanatory variable allows for the fact that more 
industrialised countries have better ports and communication systems and 
other trade-related infrastructure than developing countries as well as better 
institutional arrangements for contract enforcement that facilitate trade by 
reducing the cost of maintaining ‘service links’. 
The China dummy (DCH) is expected to capture the ‘China effect’ over 
and above the other variables. Dummy variables are also included for Japan 
(DJP), Taiwan and Korea (DTW), ASEAN (ASN) and Mexico (DMX), guided by 
the empirical regularities in trade patterns observed in the previous section. 
We observed that China’s rapid export expansion in standard labour-intensive 
manufactures and ICT products has been in direct competition with these 
countries. It is therefore important to control for any unobserved fixed effects 
relating to these countries for precise estimation of the ‘China effect’. Finally, the 
time-specific fixed effects (T) are included to control for general technological 
change and other time-varying factors.
The model was estimated using annual data for machinery trade in the 
period 1992–2005 for all countries, each of which accounted for 0.1 per cent or 
more of total manufacturing trade in 2000–01. There were 41 US trading partner 
countries, which satisfied this criterion. Of these, Hong Kong was combined 
with China because of its peculiar trade links with the latter.8 Our data set 
therefore relates to 40 countries. Data for bilateral exports are compiled from 
the importers’ records (CIF) of the UN COMTRADE database (UN various years). 
The data were disaggregated into components and final products following the 
procedures detailed in Athukorala (2006). The data sources for other variables 
and methods of variable construction are explained in the appendix.
We use the random-effect estimator as our preferred estimation technique. 
The alternative fixed-effect estimator is not appropriate because our model 
contains a number of time-invariant variables. Note that our panel data set 
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relates to bilateral trade (imports and exports) for the United States (not 
bilateral trade flows of all countries under study). This means that the reporting 
country’s (the United States) GDP and PGDP have only ‘within variation’ in the 
data panel. It is not possible therefore to retain one or both of these variables 
and time dummies in the same regression because of multiple co-linearity. 
After undertaking experimental estimations to see the senility of the results 
to alternative specifications (with income variables only and time dummies 
only while keeping all other variables the same), we opted for the version with 
time dummies. It turned out to be superior to the alternative in terms of the 
overall fit, and in the economic plausibility and statistical significance of the 
coefficient estimates of the other variables. This specification choice means 
that the estimated coefficients of time dummies capture the reporting country’s 
(the United States) income effect and other time-specific factors impacting 
on trade flows. Relating to the latter, the most noteworthy developments are 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and the subsequent tariff reductions, 
and the abolition of Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) with effect from 2005. The 
common border dummy (BRD) could not be retained in the final estimation 
because of its high correlation with the distance variable. This is not surprising 
given the United States’ high intensity of trade with its two neighbours, 
Mexico and Canada. We also tested additional dummy variables for Canada 
and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) membership (in place 
of the Mexico dummy) in experimental runs. Both variables turned out to be 
statistically insignificant over and above the other variables, and they had no 
significant effect on the size/statistical significance of the other coefficients in 
the regressions. The regression results are reported in Table 4.6. 
The results for the distance variable (DST) provide strong support for the 
hypothesis that transportation and other distance-related costs are important 
determinants of trade flows. For total manufacturing, there is evidence of a 
symmetrical effect of distance on trade: the distance coefficient of import and 
export equations is remarkably similar in magnitude (1.18 and 1.12, respectively). 
Interestingly, at the disaggregated level, the distance coefficient for components 
and final goods of machinery imports are much larger than the coefficients of 
other manufacturing and total manufacturing.9 This difference is consistent with 
the hypothesis that vertical specialisation, given the multiple border crossings 
involved in the production process, is much more sensitive to transport costs. 
The distance coefficients on exports of parts and components and final 
goods are smaller in magnitude than the respective coefficients on the import 
side. This asymmetry in the distance effect is consistent with the increased 
concentration over time of US machinery exports, in particular ICT exports, 
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in ‘high value-to-weight’ segments of the production process within global 
production networks—a process that seems to have helped US exporting firms 
to overcome trade barriers associated with distance. The distance coefficient 
of machinery parts and components exports is, however, much larger (1.26) 
than that of final machinery (0.91), presumably because speedy delivery is 
a relatively more important determinant of success in components exports 
trade than in trade in final goods. This inference is consistent with the recent 
tendency (observed in the previous section) of US multinationals to expand 
components assembly and testing in Southeast Asia for supply to the final 
assembler in China (and other countries in the region). The coefficient of per 
capita GDP is highly significant and similar in magnitude (about 0.3) in the 
four export equations. This perhaps reflects the heavy industrial-country bias 
in the geographic patterns of US exports. On the import side, the coefficient 
is significant only in the two machinery equations. Moreover, the coefficient 
of the final goods equation is almost twice that of parts and components. It 
seems that inter-country differences in the stage of economic development are 
important to imports to the United States taking place within global production 
networks, in particular final goods. 
The coefficient of the relative unit labour cost variable (RULC) is statistically 
significant with the expected (negative) sign only in the equation for final 
machinery imports. It suggests that, other things being equal, a 1 percentage-
point difference among exporting countries is associated with 0.35 per cent 
difference in growth of exports of this product category to the US market. This 
unique result is consistent with the important role played by relatively low unit 
labour costs in the rapid penetration of ICT products and other assembled 
goods from China in the US market.
Turning to results for the real exchange rate (RER), on the import side, 
its coefficient is barely significant with the unexpected (positive) sign in the 
equation for final machinery and is not different from zero in the other three 
equations. On the export side, the coefficient carries the expected (positive) sign 
in all four equations and it fails to achieve significance only in the machinery 
parts and components equation. The coefficients are, however, rather small—
less than 0.1 in all cases. Overall, there is no evidence here to suggest that the 
exchange rate plays a significant role in determining the United States’ widening 
trade gap.10 These results are generally consistent with the available evidence 
that global production sharing considerably weakens the link between the 
degree of exchange and trade performance, particularly when it comes to the 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The coefficient of the China dummy (DCH) is positive and statistically 
significant in all equations.11 It is much larger in the import equations, indicating 
that, after controlling for the standard determinants of trade flows, exports from 
China have penetrated the United States at a rate much higher rate (on average, 
16 times) than those from other countries. The coefficient of DCH in the final 
machinery export equation is strikingly large (4.25) and is almost twice that in 
the equation for parts and components (and total manufacturing). This result 
is consistent with the dominant ‘assembly bias’ in the emerging patterns of 
China’s export specialisation, which we observed in the previous section. The 
differences in magnitude among the coefficients of DCH, DAS, DKT and DMX 
in each of the four import equations are also consistent with the observed 
differences in relative export performance. The much larger coefficient of the 
ASEAN dummy in the component equation (3.61) is particularly noteworthy. As 
discussed, the explanation seems to lie in economic history: the early choice of 
the region by multinational companies as a location for components assembly 
and testing in their global production networks. 
On the export side, there is no evidence to suggest that US firms perform 
relatively poorly in exporting to China compared with exports to other countries. 
The coefficient of DCH is greater than unity and is statistically significant 
in all cases, suggesting that, once other determinants are controlled for, on 
average, exports to China have grown almost three times faster than exports 
to other destinations. The results for the dummy variables also do not reveal 
any notable difference in the rates of expansion of exports to the United States 
from China and Mexico when other relevant variables are controlled for—in 
particular, the specific adjacency/distance advantage of Mexico. A comparison 
of the results for China and ASEAN corroborate our earlier observation of the 
growing complementarity among these countries in their trade links with the 
United States within global production networks. 
Concluding remarks
The evidence harnessed in this chapter supports the view that, in a context in 
which international fragmentation of production is becoming the symbol of 
economic globalisation, the standard trade-flow analysis leads to misleading 
inferences about the sophistication of China’s emerging export patterns. 
Although China has displayed a rapid increase in exports of high-tech products 
in recent years, the real value added in China is generally not in high-tech 
activities. When components are netted out, it becomes clear that China 
is specialising in labour-intensive niches within otherwise skill-intensive 
sectors. China’s general patterns of trade are much in line with its underlying 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive production.
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In the contemporary international economy, in which global production 
sharing is expanding rapidly, the real story behind the US–China trade gap 
is much more complicated than what is revealed by the standard trade-flow 
analysis undertaken with data coming from a data-reporting system developed 
at a time when countries were trading predominantly (if not solely) in final goods. 
The widely held view that China’s rapid market penetration of the US economy is 
driven by unfair trade practices needs to be re-examined in light of the fact that 
the two economies are deeply interconnected and interdependent within global 
production networks. The growing trade deficit between the two countries has 
been underpinned by China’s emergence as the main point of final assembly in 
Asian production networks based on its ample supply of labour and moves by 
US firms to supply high-end parts and components from their Asian bases. In 
sum, the deficit is to a large extent a structural deficit driven by the process of 
global production sharing. It is akin to the substantial structural surplus in the 
oil-exporting countries (based on their specific resource endowment), which 
the rest of the world has become accustomed to living with. 
Given the current state of China’s factor-market conditions (as surveyed 
in a number of recent studies, including Cooper 2006; Meng and Bai 2007; 
Naughton 2007), one can speculate that China’s trade patterns are unlikely to 
change dramatically in the short to medium term. China still has about half of 
its labour force employed in agriculture, where its productivity is, on average, 
barely one-eighth of that in industry and about one-quarter that in the service 
sector. Agriculture still accounts for more than 45 per cent of total employment 
in the country even though agriculture’s share in GDP is only 13 per cent. GDP 
per worker in the economy as a whole is three times the value added per worker 
in agriculture. The country still remains very rural, with an urbanisation rate of 
about 40 per cent of the total population—much lower than the ‘normal’ level 
of 60 per cent consistent with China’s income level. These features, coupled 
with the high skilled–unskilled wage differential (which, according to some 
estimates, has risen from 1.3 to 2.1 in the past decade), suggest that China 
still has much potential for moving unskilled workers out of agriculture and 
into manufacturing and other productive urban-sector activities. For this to 
happen, the global trading environment needs to remain accommodative and 
Chinese policies need to be receptive to gains from specialisation on the basis 
of comparative advantage.
Given the current state of data, in this chapter, we have focused solely on 
US–China trade in goods. The inferences therefore need to be qualified for 
the fact that the difference between merchandise trade and services trade has 
become increasingly blurred because of the continuing process of production 
fragmentation. US firms that have shifted components production/assembly 
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and final assembly activities and that manage ‘service links’ involved in the 
global production networks from their home bases undertake knowledge-based 
or information technology-enabled services (Brown and Linden 2005). In other 
words, as part of the continuing process of global production sharing, the related 
services—particularly knowledge-based or information technology-enabled 
services that are beyond the traditional notion of internationally traded services, 
such as transportation, travel and tourism—have become increasingly tradable. 
There is evidence that exports of these new production-related services (and the 
related employment opportunities) have significantly expanded in recent years 
(Mann 2006). The surplus in US services trade (which has persisted since the late 
1970s) has expanded rapidly in recent years, reaching US$75 billion in 2006. The 
largest subcategory—the export growth of which has far outpaced growth in all 
other services—in the services account is ‘other private services’ trade, which 
captures many of the information technology-related services, management 
and consultancy services and business, professional and technical services, all 
of which are central to the process of global production sharing.12 An analysis 
that overlooks these exports could overstate the magnitude of the US–China 
trade imbalance, presumably by a wide margin.
Notes
1  In the recent literature on international trade, an array of alternative terms has been used 
to describe this phenomenon, including ‘international production fragmentation’, ‘vertical 
specialisation’, ‘slicing the value chain’ and ‘outsourcing’. 
2 The data reported in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, come from the UN COMTRADE 
database. Throughout the chapter, inter-temporal comparison calculations are made for the 
two-year averages relating to the end points of the period under study so as to reduce the 
impact of year-to-year fluctuations of trade flows.
3 According to available estimates, 70 per cent or more of assembled products are sold 
domestically (Bergsten et al. 2006:90).
4 Exports by US multinational affiliates in China to the United States accounted for only 6 per 
cent of total US imports from China in 2004 (Bosworth and Collins 2008:Table 5) 
5 For instance, the typical notebook computer made in a Taiwanese-owned factory in China 
has processing chips made by Intel in Malaysia, an operating system made by Microsoft, a 
CD display screen sourced from Taiwan or Korea and hard-disk drives sourced from Japan. 
Domestic value added (the cost of labour, components sourced within China and the profit 
earned by foreign-owned companies in China) is only one-third of the value of output (Dean 
and Tam 2005).
6 It is important to note that Chinese estimates of the US trade deficit have always been lower 
than the United States’ own figures because of the different ways the United States treats 
products traded to and from China that pass through Hong Kong. According to estimates by 
Fung et al. (2006), the official US data tend to overstate the real deficit by about 17 per cent, 
while the degree of underestimation involved in the Chinese official estimate is as high as 33 
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per cent. This discrepancy does not, however, seem to create a serious problem in examining 
overall trends in the trade gap. 
7 For details on this decomposition procedure, see Athukorala (2006).
8 We also treated Hong Kong as a separate country in experimental runs and found that results 
were insensitive to this alternative specification.
9 The differences are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level or better.
10 In experimental regression runs, we also interacted RER with CHD and failed to detect any 
specific Chinese effect on the link between RER and trade flows.
11 Note that, as the model was estimated in natural logarithms, the percentage equivalent for 
any dummy coefficient is [(dummy coefficient) – 1]* 100).
12 From 1995 to 2005, US exports of ‘other services’ grew 143 per cent, compared with 44 per 
cent growth in all other services, and accounted for 90 per cent of the overall US services 
trade surplus in 2005—up from 38 per cent in 1995 (CEA 2007).
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Table A4.1 Data set used in regression analysis: definition of variables, 
source and variable construction, and the country coverage
Variable  Definition  Data source/variable construction
EXP Value of US bilateral trade in US$  Trade data (in current US$) compiled
 measured at constant (2000) price  from importer records of UN   
  (various years) 
  (http://www.bls.gov/ppi/home.htm),  
  deflated by the manufacturing sub- 
  index of the US producer price index 
GDP, Real GDP and real per capita GDP World Bank (various years)
PGDP (at 1995 price)
DIST Weighted distance measure of the  CEPII (various years)
 French Institute for Research on the 
 International Economy (CEPII), which 
 measures the bilateral great-circle 
 distance between major cities of 
 each country 
ADJ A binary dummy variable, which takes  CEPII (various years)
 the value of 1 for countries that share
 a common land border and 0 otherwise  
RULC The ratio of unit labour costs (ULC) in  Annual manufacturing wages
 country j and country i, where ULC is  data for the United States 
 measured as the ratio of the average  (USDC various years [a])
 manufacturing wage to manufacturing 
 value added per worker—both measured  All other countries: 
 in US$. In construct, an increase (a  (USDC various years [b])
 decrease) in RULC indicates a 
 deterioration (an improvement) in 
 country  j’s cost competitiveness relative 
 to i (the United States, in this case)   
RER  Real exchange rate:  Constructed using data obtained
 Equation A1 from World Bank (various years)





 in which NER is the nominal bilateral  Following Soloaga and Winters
 exchange rate index (US$ price of foreign  (2001), mean-adjusted RER is
 currency), PW is the price level of country  used in the model. This variable
  j measured by the producer price index  specification assumes that
 and PD is the domestic price index of  countries are in exchange-rate
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Rebalancing equity and efficiency for 
sustained growth
Justin Yifu Lin
Income distribution is currently one of the most conspicuous problems in China. 
Since the reforms of 1978, China has maintained rapid economic growth, with 
an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 9.7 per cent per annum 
and a yearly foreign trade growth rate of 17.4 per cent. Growth was particularly 
strong between 2003 and 2007, during which time China maintained a high 
GDP growth rate of more than 10 per cent and a foreign trade growth rate of 
28.5 per cent per annum. As a country in rapid transition, however, many social 
and economic problems have developed as the reform deepens. For example, 
through the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the reform of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) was one of the key talking points in the Chinese economy. It 
was acknowledged publicly that one-third of SOEs were in deficit, another one-
third were known to be in deficit (but this fact was not acknowledged), while only 
the remaining third were turning a profit. The profitability of SOEs is no longer 
the main problem in China, as many of the small SOEs have been privatised 
and the larger SOEs are earning healthy profits. The key issue now is how to 
improve the competitiveness of SOEs in the global market. A further example 
of the transition in China’s economy is its financial system, which was once 
very fragile, and which carried a high ratio of non-performing loans. This issue 
was particularly serious in the four state-owned banks. After several years of 
reform, however, the ratio of non-performing loans has decreased significantly 
in the four state-owned banks, and three of them have introduced strategic 
investors and are listed publicly. Moreover, the stock-market has experienced 
a full cycle, with a bull market emerging in 2006 and 2007.
91
Rebalancing equity and efficiency for sustained growth
While the old problems were solved, new ones have emerged. With the 
disappearance of the original chief concerns about the Chinese economy, 
those concerns that were traditionally of only secondary importance are now 
centre stage. First, investment is growing too quickly, leading to insufficient 
consumption. The growth rate of investment in fixed assets was 27.7 per cent in 
2003, 26.6 per cent in 2004, 25.7 per cent in 2005 and 24 per cent in 2006. More 
importantly, such high investment growth rates were reached with a very low 
inflation rate. In the national income account, too much investment leads to a 
level of consumption that is insufficient to sustain economic growth. In the past 
five years, China’s investment grew faster than its comparatively high increases 
in consumption of 10 per cent per annum, leading to a sharp accumulation of 
production capacity. In this case, consumption becomes insufficient when 
matched with this increase in productive capacity. China needs to export more 
in order to deal with its excessive production capacity. This is why China has 
experienced a high growth rate in exports and a rapid accumulation in its foreign 
trade surplus during recent years. This is a new problem for China.
Second, too many capital and resource-intensive industries have been 
developed. China’s growth is highly dependent on resources. According to 
Ma Kai (2007), chair of the National Development and Reform Commission 
of China, in 2006, China contributed 5.5 per cent of global GDP, but it used 15 
per cent of the world’s energy, 30 per cent of the world’s steel and 54 per cent 
of the world’s concrete. Unemployment is another problem for developing 
capital-intensive industries. Since 1980, although the Chinese growth rate has 
been very high, the ability of the Chinese economy to create employment has 
been continually decreasing. The main reason is that China has developed too 
much capital-intensive industry rather than building up those industries that 
are labour intensive.
Third, investment has been concentrated mainly in just a few industries. 
This situation was especially serious in 2003 and 2004. I call this the ‘wave 
phenomena’ (Lin 2007a), highlighting that investment tends to wash into certain 
industries like waves, often leaving the industry with an excess capacity to 
produce. Take the Chinese steel industry as an example: in 2007, the country’s 
productive ability reached 450 million tonnes, whereas it was only 190 million 
tonnes in 2002. While China needed to import a great deal of steel in the past, 
now it is essential for China to export it.
Moreover, there is excess liquidity in the Chinese economy. Large banks 
usually hold excess reserves. This reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Chinese experts usually argue about whether interest management or gross 
management should be the monetary tool. In some cases, interest management 
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is not as effective as gross management—for instance, when changing the 
reserve ratio. Because of the existence of excess reserves, raising the reserve 
ratio sometimes has little influence on credits.
Furthermore, a bubble plagues the real estate market. It is reasonable policy 
to make real estate the pillar of industry in China. On one hand, surplus labour 
in rural areas will move into urban areas as a continuation of urbanisation, 
which will lift the demand for housing; on the other hand, as income levels grow, 
larger, more expensive houses are demanded by those already living in cities. 
The demand for real estate is therefore, and will continue to be, high. Property 
developers in China tend, however, to contradict the normal experience of house 
construction patterns in industrialised economies. According to this experience, 
small houses are generally in demand at the first stage of development. When 
income levels rise, people begin to upgrade the size of their houses and, as a 
result, there is higher demand for larger properties. The current trend in the 
Chinese real estate market, however, is for the widespread construction of large 
houses with insufficient numbers of smaller abodes under construction. This 
trend must be reversed.
Apart from these, many new social problems have emerged. Among them, 
income disparity is one of the most notable (Lin and Chen 2007a, 2007b, 2008; 
Lin 1999, 2005; Lin and Liu 2003). In 1978, the ratio of urban disposable income 
to rural net income was 2.6:1; this ratio grew to 3.3:1 in 2006. China now has 
one of the biggest income gaps between urban and rural areas in the world. 
Simultaneously, a large group of low income-earning citizens has emerged in 
the larger cities because of widespread unemployment (Lin and Liu 2003). At 
present, China’s Gini coefficient exceeds 0.45, which means it has passed the 
‘safe line’ for social stability, according to many experts. There are, however, 
many other problems emerging in China, such as incomplete services in health 
care and the educational system, the prices of which are too high compared 
with income levels.
Living conditions have improved greatly thanks to the high economic growth 
rate during the past years. Basic shortages of food and clothing have been 
solved, even in provincial areas. Social discontent is, however, spreading, largely 
because of the social problems mentioned above. As the old adage suggests, 
‘shortage is not a problem, but inequality really matters’. When the income gap 
becomes more significant, many kinds of problems and contradictions arise. 
Many people even think that conditions in the past were better than those today. 
In the past, although they were very poor, people felt content because incomes 
were more equal; now, however, even though people are generally richer than 
previously, inequality is causing widespread discontent.
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There have been many appeals to cure the problem of income disparity, and 
redistribution is usually suggested as the tool. In a discussion about personal 
income tax in 2005 and 2006, for example, many people suggested that China 
should raise its tax rate for the rich as a way of subsidising low-income groups 
in the form of transfer payments. The highest personal income tax rate in China 
has, however, already reached 45 per cent—one of the highest tax rates in the 
world. Considering this, I would suggest that the main problem with China’s tax 
system is with enforcement, not the rate itself. Critics of this viewpoint express 
an important social sentiment—that is, many people are unhappy because they 
believe that some people in China are too rich. This is not, however, the case. 
Compared with other countries, the rich in China are not rich at all; therefore, 
we still need to activate the rich to create more social wealth—at least in the 
present. It is our task to ensure that in the course of development, the income 
of the poor grows faster than that of the rich, but it should not be accomplished 
by redistribution.
Under these conditions, it is very difficult to build a harmonious society. 
Based on the characteristics of the current stage of economic and social 
development, the Communist Party of China formulated a policy of ‘advancing 
with the times’, and put forward a ‘scientific concept of development’ at its 
sixteenth National Congress, the contents of which included two key points. On 
one hand, development should be the ultimate policy goal; on the other hand, in 
the course of development, we must try to achieve ‘five areas of coordination’: 
coordination between urban and rural areas, between regions, between society 
and the economy, between humans and nature, and between domestic and 
international markets. At the seventeenth National Congress in 2007, the party 
put forward a policy of building a harmonious society (Hu 2007), in order to 
resolve livelihood issues, including education and health-care difficulties, the 
gap between urban and rural areas, social security and so on. The government’s 
working reports from 2007 and 2008 have put forward many concrete policy 
measures to solve these livelihood issues.
Comparative advantage: realising equality and efficiency 
simultaneously
How does one carry out the scientific concept of development and simultan-
eously construct a harmonious society in China? The current guidelines for 
policymaking dictate that primary distribution emphasises efficiency, and 
redistribution solves equality. This statement suggests that since China aims to 
emphasise individual livelihoods and social harmony, the Chinese government 
should play a more active role in realising equality through distribution. 
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However, this course of action will be unproductive, if not counterproductive, if 
we fail to realise equality and efficiency simultaneously in primary distribution 
and, instead, resort only to redistribution. Equality and efficiency should be 
realised simultaneously in primary distribution, and redistribution, acting 
as a complementary tool, should solve the residual problems left by primary 
distribution. It is worth emphasising that in certain circumstances, redistribution 
can be helpful. In the current system, however, primary distribution emphasises 
efficiency and redistribution solves equality, which means simply that we should 
not take the equality problem into consideration in the process of primary 
distribution. This, it seems, is counterproductive.
Can China really achieve its aim of realising equality and efficiency simultan-
eously in primary distribution?
Such a policy has at least two meanings. First and foremost, China must 
maintain a high economic growth rate in order to ensure sustainable growth 
of average personal incomes. After 29 years of rapid growth, the average 
personal income in China reached US$2,400 in 2006. This is still very low, 
reflecting 4–5 per cent of the average personal income in the United States. 
This suggests that China should continue to emphasise efficiency to speed up 
economic growth. The second meaning of China’s policy is that the country 
must ensure that incomes for the poor grow faster than those for the rich in 
the course of economic development, in order to realise equality and efficiency 
simultaneously.
The question remains, is there a path to the realisation of equality and 
efficiency through initial distribution? The answer is yes. The imperative is 
to develop according to China’s comparative advantage. If China can choose 
the industries, products and technologies that are suitable to its comparative 
advantage, it will be able to improve the distribution conditions and realise the 
‘five areas of coordination’ put forward in its scientific development concept, 
while at the same time maintaining a high economic growth rate (Lin et al. 
1999; Lin 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2007b).
The discussion about comparative advantage has lasted for more than 20 
years, with some arguing that China should adopt a competitive advantage 
as opposed to the traditional comparative advantage. This is a mistaken view 
of the concepts. In fact, competitive advantage is based on the notion of 
comparative advantage. Failing to follow comparative advantage means that 
competitive advantage cannot be achieved. Mike Porter (1990), a professor at 
the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the United States, first put forward 
the concept of competitive advantage. He argued that four factors determined 
competitive advantage: first, whether the country had relatively lower prices of 
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a type of resource compared with the international price—that is, the country 
had a resource price advantage. In this case, the country should utilise its price 
advantage and develop industries intensively using the competitive resource 
instead of other resources. Second, did the developing industry have a large 
enough domestic market? Where a new industry can rely on high domestic 
demand, it will have a much better chance of being internationally competitive. 
Third, does the new industry enjoy a good clustering effect in the home 
country, which can improve its efficiency? Finally, can the new industry enjoy 
a competitive domestic market, instead of one that is monopolistic?
Among the four determining factors mentioned by Porter (1990), there are 
really only two independent factors: the scale of domestic markets and factor 
prices. The scale of the domestic market is largely fixed, being determined by 
population size and income levels. In the domain of factor prices, Porter (1990) 
argues that we must take full advantage of the resources with price advantage, 
where the price advantage really equates to comparative advantage. The 
remaining two factors are determined inherently by the price advantage. First, 
the industrial clustering effect cannot be achieved unless the industry has a 
comparative advantage. For example, the electronic-processing industry cannot 
be clustered in the United States as it is in Dong Wan, China, because this 
industry is highly labour intensive and wages in the United States are very high. 
Similarly, capital-intensive industries cannot be clustered in these countries, 
because interest rates in developing countries are high due to the shortage 
of capital. Second, only industries with comparative advantage can form a 
competitive domestic market. Without comparative advantage, government 
protection and subsidies are needed in order to build the industry—therefore, 
competitive markets cannot develop. All this leads to the conclusion that 
the competitive advantage theory, in nature, refers only to two basic factors: 
comparative advantage and the scale of the domestic market. 
This leads to the question of which of the two factors is more important? 
Doubtless, it is good to have a large domestic market; however, if a country 
follows its comparative advantage, its products can be sold on the international 
market. In this case, the scale of the domestic market matters little. For example, 
Finland, whose population is only a little more than five million, has companies 
that sell predominantly to the international market instead of to the relatively 
small domestic market (examples include Nokia). Therefore, we can see that 
competitive advantage is based on comparative advantage, and economies with 
a competitive advantage can grow rapidly and achieve ‘high efficiency’.
Generally speaking, China’s market advantage remains its abundance of low-
paid workers. Accordingly, many labour-intensive industries can be developed 
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easily, including manufacturing, services and the segments of capital-intensive 
industries that are relatively labour intensive. Further job opportunities can 
therefore still be created. On the other hand, competitive power and market share 
can be increased if China develops according to its comparative advantage, and 
more profits can be realised. With a surplus, the country can speed up capital 
accumulation and the capital can be deepened rapidly because the growth of 
the labour force is relatively steady because of China’s restrictions on population 
growth. The country will change its factor endowment gradually from being a 
labour-abundant country to one that is capital abundant. This transitional process 
is also typical in the development history of industrialised countries. When capital 
becomes abundant and labour becomes relatively scarce, the price system 
begins to function and wages grow, while interest rates decline. This results in 
depreciation of the assets of the rich (those with capital) and appreciation of the 
assets of the poor (low wage earners). As a result, income distribution begins 
to even out. For example, after World War II, some countries, including Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, continually improved their income distribution 
through rapid economic development (and they have since been dubbed the 
‘East Asian miracles’). Many empirical studies that demonstrate this effect (see, 
for example, Lin, Cai and Zi 1999b).
In the discussion about comparative advantage, some commentators worry 
that China might have difficulty developing if its focus remains on labour-
intensive industries whereas industrialised countries develop capital-intensive 
industries. This is, however, a misunderstanding of the situation. Development 
is achieved in stages. Leap-frogging a stage of development could result in a 
complete failure to develop; in contrast, moving step by step can lead to rapid 
development. Industries in industrialised countries are mostly capital and 
technology intensive, while industries in developing countries are mostly labour 
and resource intensive. Different industrial structures are, however, the result 
of natural endowments, not the causes. Industrialised countries are relatively 
rich in capital but short of labour, so the price of capital is low but the price of 
labour is high. In order to maintain competitive power, industrialised countries 
have no choice but to substitute labour for capital by developing capital and 
technologically intensive industries. The United States has protected its labour-
intensive industries such as textiles. If, however, China exports more in these 
industries, it will hurt the industrial-country markets. Why? Because wages 
in the United States are much higher than in China, which leads to relatively 
high production costs in labour-intensive industries in the United States. In 
contrast, wages in China are relatively low and the industries with competitive 
power are therefore the labour-intensive ones. It is said that Chinese industries 
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currently lack competitive power; this is not the case. If Chinese industries 
lack competitive power, why do other countries always raise ‘dumping’ 
complaints against China? The industries with comparative advantage are 
always competitive.
Since competitive advantage is based on comparative advantage, for China 
to catch up, it is important that it upgrades its endowment structure more 
quickly than its competitors. Generally, there are three components of factor 
endowment: capital, labour and natural resources. Because natural resources 
are relatively fixed, upgrading the factor endowment structure means that 
China must increase per capita capital rapidly. China can catch up with the 
industrialised countries over time if its per capita capital increases faster 
than in industrialised countries. If developing countries continue to grow 
according to their comparative advantage, their factor endowment structure 
can be upgraded rapidly and they will, as a result, reach the same level of 
development as industrialised countries. The logic employed here is simple, but 
powerful. Output can be used for either current consumption or accumulation 
of capital. The ratio of output used for accumulation is determined largely by 
the rate of return on capital. High rates of return on capital lead to high ratios 
of accumulation. At the early stage of development, the rate of return on capital 
is very high in developing countries because of the general shortage of capital, 
leading to a high capital accumulation rate.
A further advantage specific to developing countries is that they are less 
technologically advanced than industrialised countries (Lin 2003). On the surface, 
this seems to be a clear disadvantage; however, several gains are afforded from 
not being at the forefront of technological advancement. Using this advantage, 
developing countries can upgrade their industries continuously and the return 
rate on capital does not therefore decrease (or decreases only very slowly). 
Under these conditions, the capital accumulation rate in developing countries 
can remain continually higher than the rate in industrialised countries. The 
industries with the biggest potential for technological ‘catch-up’ are those that 
use existing technologies and produce products with established demand, and 
this means that developing counties can introduce new technologies, absorb 
them and re-innovate at very low cost. As a result, technology can be updated 
frequently, leading to a slow decrease or even stable rate of return on capital. 
The capital accumulation rate will also remain high in developing countries. 
In contrast, technology in industrialised countries is positioned at the frontier 
of the global technology chain, so invention and innovation drive development 
with high costs and high probability of failure. Although industrialised countries 
hold most of the world’s patents, their industries and technologies update more 
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slowly than in developing countries because the latter are less technologically 
advanced and can take advantage of the industrialised world’s technology. 
This is why industrialised countries typically have a lower rate of return on 
capital and a lower propensity to invest compared with developing countries. 
After 10–20 years, or at most two generations, the average levels of capital 
per capita in developing countries can catch up with those in industrialised 
countries. By making full use of comparative advantage and the technological 
gap, for example, East Asian countries successfully shortened the gap or even 
caught up with industrialised countries within only one generation during the 
1960s and 1970s.
Several years ago, I put forward a concept I called ‘run fast with small 
steps’. This means that a developing country needs to keep each step of its 
industrial and technological upgrading fairly small, but it must also ensure 
that the frequency of upgrades is high. The goal, in China at least, should 
be to catch up with industrialised countries within two to three decades, or 
even within one generation. Most people see high-technology industries only 
in industrialised countries and low-technology industries only in developing 
countries. The level of industry and technology certainly influences national 
power and the income levels of a country and, as a result, this leaves some 
hoping that the process of development can be achieved through shortcuts. 
This catch-up strategy, however, which aims to develop industries and 
technology as quickly as possible, cuts across the grain of comparative 
advantage. 
Industrialised and developing countries have distinct comparative advantages 
and therefore industries with comparative advantage in industrialised countries 
might not be suitable for developing countries, such as China. If developing 
countries adopt a catch-up strategy—that is, they set up capital-intensive 
industries across the board—these industries will lack competitive power in 
the international market. This leads to inefficient resource allocation across the 
whole economy, which in turn leads to low efficiency in economic development 
and a range of other problems, including over-concentration of capital and 
reductions in levels of employment. Moreover, a large number of low-income 
wage earners are shut out of the labour market and cannot share the fruits 
of economic development, which leads to an increase in explicit and implicit 
unemployment. Worse still, since industries under comparative advantage-
defying strategies have no competitive power in an open and competitive 
market, they can survive only if protection and subsidies shield the industries 
from competition. Governments invest in capital-intensive industries in centrally 
planned economies, but in market economies, only the rich can do this. 
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This begs the question, where are the subsidies coming from? They will 
come, directly or indirectly (through taxes, subsidy policies and so on), only from 
people who do not invest in the capital-intensive industries—namely, the poor. 
Providing subsidies to the rich by extracting from the poor will lead to a worsening 
of income and wealth distribution. Without the adoption of a permanent-residency 
registration policy, as used in some countries, the rural unemployed swarm into 
big cities and form slums because they cannot enter the formal employment 
market. Of course, developing countries can set up several high-level industries, 
large companies and brands, as can be found in industrialised countries, but the 
profits of these industries, by and large, come from government protection and 
subsidisation, which is a kind of wealth transfer rather than real value creation 
by the firms. The labour force would be better served by working in labour-
intensive industries that have comparative advantage, but they cannot do this 
because there is not enough capital to work with. Since wealth transfer and the 
uncompetitive capital-intensive industries create nothing, the remaining capital 
that can be funnelled into labour-intensive industries is meagre. Ironically, it is 
these industries that have the potential to create the highest levels of wealth 
for the developing country’s economy. Furthermore, this slows increases in the 
factor endowment as well as economic growth.
Developing countries that adopt this inappropriate catch-up strategy 
share the following common economic path: in the beginning, the economy 
grows rapidly through investment, which is protected and subsidised by the 
government. As time passes and investment slows, economic growth slows 
and the country begins to seek foreign capital, which is followed by a short 
period of rapid growth. The result is that the country is left with industries that 
cannot create wealth but which have drawn on large foreign loans that must be 
repaid. If they fail to repay these debts, financial and social crises are inevitable. 
Moreover, the potential exists for the so-called ‘bad market economy’ to rear its 
ugly head. Industries developed under this catch-up strategy need protection 
and subsidisation from the government; in market economies, however, people 
who invest in these industries prefer to seek more protection and subsidisation 
from the government rather than enhancing productive efficiency. This leads 
to a large number of rent-seeking activities in these economies.
After World War II, Latin America adopted the  ‘import substitution’ strategy, 
developing various capital-intensive industries, which amounted essentially 
to a catch-up strategy. This approach to development resulted in a lack of 
employment, unequal distribution of public finance and the emergence of 
slums in big cities. Under the resulting conditions of social disharmony and 
mass unemployment, Latin American governments moved towards ‘democratic 
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politics’, in which they put forward appealing, populist social welfare policies. 
This led to large fiscal deficits and financial crises. These issues have continued 
to plague the development of Latin American countries to this day. 
The current distribution system in China emphasises efficiency in primary 
distribution; however, China does not define efficiency by competitive market 
power without government protection and subsidisation. Firms that benefit 
from protection and subsidisation enjoy high profit levels. Essentially, however, 
these profits are a kind of wealth transfer that will inevitably lead to social 
instability. If China seeks to solve its equity problem through redistribution, it 
will risk slumping like Latin America. Therefore, I do not agree with the theory 
that ‘primary distribution emphasises efficiency, and redistribution solves 
equality’. Rather, I believe that equity and efficiency problems should be solved 
through the primary distribution of wealth and that redistribution should only 
complement this.
Equity and ef f iciency can be realised simultaneously by adopting a 
comparative advantage-following strategy for development. ‘Comparative 
advantage’ is a term used by economists, but which of China’s industries are 
really in accordance with its comparative advantage? China’s factor endowment 
structure is changing and improving. Labour-intensive and capital-intensive 
industries are relative concepts and there are large factor differences between 
the regions of China: coastal regions such as Shanghai and Shenzhen; inland 
regions such as Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan and Hubei; and western regions such 
as Xinjiang, Ningxia and Gansu. How can development best utilise comparative 
advantage, taking these vastly differing experiences into account? From the 
viewpoint of an entrepreneur, profits are more important than the concept 
of comparative advantage. Profits are determined by the prices of products 
and factors. Developing according to comparative advantage requires a 
perfect price system rather than the development of industries according 
to comparative advantage. The price system must sufficiently and flexibly 
reflect the relative scarcity of every factor in the factor endowment structure. 
If a factor is relatively rich, its price is relatively low and vice versa. If the 
velocity of a factor’s accumulation is relatively large, implying that it changes 
from being relatively scarce to relatively abundant, its price will decrease 
from relatively high to relatively low, and vice versa. If such a price system 
is established, entrepreneurs will use relatively cheap factors to minimise 
costs and maximise profits in competitive markets. Consequently, setting 
up a sufficiently competitive market system is vital. Development following 
comparative advantage leads to a high velocity of capital accumulation. Through 
this, an upgrade of products and technologies leads to an upgrade of industries 
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from labour intensive to relatively capital and technology intensive. In this 
development process, income distribution will be in labour’s favour.
The aim of the reforms in China is to set up a perfect socialist market 
economy. Because China has developed according to comparative advantage, 
it has been maintaining fast growth for more than two decades since the 
beginning of the reforms and the era of openness. In the era of the planned 
economy, the Chinese government ignored comparative advantage and 
developed various capital and technology-intensive industries. To set up these 
industries, the government depressed factor prices artificially, which led to a 
shortfall of capital. The government then allocated scarce capital to favoured 
industries through administrative measures. China adopted a gradual process 
of reform from 1978 onwards. The government now provides some protection 
and subsidisation for industries that have no comparative advantage while, 
at the same time, it places some constraints on those industries that have 
comparative advantage and that enjoyed preferential pricing in the past. 
Consequently, economic stability is obtained while the economy secures 
rapid growth. At present, China is the world’s third-largest trading country 
and exports predominantly labour-intensive goods; however, as the economy 
grows and capital accumulates, the capital and technological composition of 
export products is increasing. This is the necessary stage of development that 
follows on from comparative advantage.
The gradual process of reform also creates some issues. Thus far, China is yet 
to set up a sufficiently competitive market system. The government continues 
to intervene in the allocation of certain resources. This is a hangover from the 
era of protection and subsidisation provided to industries without comparative 
advantage. The distortions leading to these issues are discussed below.
Distortions of financial structures 
Before the reform period began, there were no banks or stock-markets in China. 
After the reform, the government began to develop and perfect the financial 
system; however, the main task of the financial system during that period was 
to serve large firms. The process of appropriating funds from government was 
replaced by bank loans in 1983, meaning that firms could no longer appropriate 
national public finance but instead had to secure loans from banks at low interest 
rates. The low-interest loans played the role of subsidisation. To meet the large 
firms’ needs, the government kept depressing interest rates. Meanwhile, the 
government set up large state-owned banks to provide subsidies for the large 
SOEs. The current financial system in China, which has inherited aspects of 
the previous system, comprises mainly the four large state-owned banks. The 
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amount of RMB held by these four banks as a proportion of total RMB used 
in the financial system is 75 per cent. These four banks provide loans to the 
large firms. In addition, the stock-market has begun to develop. Of course, the 
firms that had the capacity to enter the stock-market were the larger firms in 
the market. Labour-intensive firms utilising comparative advantage are mainly 
small and middle-sized. Under this highly concentrated financial system, small 
firms cannot access finance from banks through loans, which restricts their 
development, and this in turn reduces employment opportunities. All of these 
factors lead to the following four wage problems.
First, a large number of middle-sized and small firms in labour-intensive 
industries, such as manufacturing and services, cannot receive f inancial 
support. According to the results of an industry survey in 2004, there were 39.2 
million individual firms in China. Today, however, the number has fallen to 25.8 
million. The drop is due partly to the fact that some small and medium-sized 
firms experience normal closures, mergers and transfers. A large proportion 
of these f irms, however, disappear because they cannot access enough 
finance. Second, almost all rural households cannot obtain financial support. 
As a result, the problem highlighted above is equally prevalent in rural areas. 
Developing modern agriculture requires financial support. Setting up a plastic 
canopy costs 10–20,000 yuan and a modern henhouse costs more than 100,000 
yuan. Peasants do not have these sums of money and have great difficulty 
obtaining loans from banks. Therefore, industries that should be able to profit 
from comparative advantage cannot access the necessary financial support. 
Meanwhile, capital is over-abundant, which means that the allocation of capital 
is inefficient. Third, employment creation is relatively insufficient. On one 
hand, there are high rates of unemployment in rural areas; on the other, a large 
number of excess rural labourers cannot transfer out. This is the main reason 
for the growth in income inequality within cities, and between cities and rural 
areas. Fourth, capital is over-intensive. The firms able to borrow money from 
banks are generally the larger, former state-owned enterprises and large private 
businesses that emerged after the reforms began. These firms can borrow 
money at a fairly low cost (the current interest rate for loans in China is 6 per 
cent, which is lower than in industrialised countries). These firms will naturally 
invest capital into capital-intensive industries, which is also the main cause 
of the over-intensification of capital. Since sufficient employment cannot be 
realised and those with excess capital (the rich) invest with subsidies, income 
distribution suffers. Given this, since the marginal propensity of consumption 
(MPC) of the rich is low while the MPC of the poor is high, the economy will 
suffer from insufficient consumption due to poor income distribution.
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Many social phenomena are related to income distribution inequality. If 
the banks’ capital is over-concentrated, it is easy to see a ‘wave phenomenon’ 
in investment because in industrial economies, it is not easy to judge which 
industries will be profitable. As with the case of the Internet in the 1990s, 
everyone believed it would be profitable and capital flowed into all types of 
Internet businesses. This led to overblown prices and the bubble finally burst, 
with dramatic effects. This phenomenon occurs every one or two decades by 
accident in industrialised countries. Developing countries can, however, avoid 
these shocks to the system by learning from the experiences of industrialised 
economies, and using them as a guide. This means that large amounts of money 
are injected into particular industries and investment tends to concentrate in 
that industry. This continuing investment builds on itself within the industry, 
thus forming the wave phenomenon. Distortions in the financial structure can 
be a big problem and, if not adjusted, the problems of income distribution 
might also remain unresolved.
Distortion of prices of resources
In China’s formerly planned economy, the prices of capital and resources were 
depressed artificially. Once the reform process began, China set about adjusting 
these price distortions; however, only some distortions have been dealt with. 
During the 1990s, fees and taxes on resources, when taken together, accounted 
for 1.8 per cent of resource prices. This has led to two problems. First, the 
deregulation of resource prices, particularly for coal, petroleum, copper and iron 
ore, resulted in convergence with international price levels. These prices are 
therefore much higher than before. As the resource sector increased in value, 
the fees and taxes as a proportion of resource prices fell to 0.5 per cent. The 
second issue it that while mining firms were once state-owned, in the mid 1980s 
the sector was opened up to private and foreign-owned companies. As a result 
of high resource prices and relatively low taxes, the resource sector has become 
highly profitable. While the value of the exploitation of a resource can be upwards 
of 10 billion yuan, the cost of securing these rights from Chinese authorities is 
only tens of million yuan, which equates to about 1 per cent. Consequently, those 
who receive these rights can reap substantial profits. Several concerns arise from 
the disparity between the high private earnings of resource companies and the 
low incomes derived from them. First, income distribution is further skewed in 
the direction of inequality. Second, as local governments decide on resource 
exploitation rights, social values are damaged and adverse rent-seeking activities 
are common. Finally, corrupt practices and corner-cutting in the mining industry 




Market monopolisation poses some serious problems for the Chinese economy. 
Monopolisation tends to be exercised mainly by SOEs in sectors such as 
electricity services, telecommunications and, in some cases, education. Revenue 
derived from monopolistic activities is retained by firms and not passed on to the 
national treasury. This has a distortional effect and further contributes to income 
disparities. Where primary distribution does not solve the equity problem, the 
Chinese government lacks the incentive or ability to undertake redistribution 
to close income gaps. This has come about because reform is incomplete and 
because development strategies that defy comparative advantage have been 
followed. If China is able to improve its reform strategy, equity and efficiency 
can be realised through primary distribution. The remaining issues, such as 
incomplete markets, asymmetrical information, economies of scale and social 
security, can be solved through redistribution.
Specific measures
What are some of the ways in which China can achieve equity and efficiency 
simultaneously through primary distribution? First, reform of the market 
economy needs to be deepened and, most signif icantly, the f inancial 
structure must be improved. Market economies achieve productivity through 
a combination of capital and labour. China’s most competitive industries tend 
to be labour intensive, generally in manufacturing or services. The proportion of 
the tertiary, or services, industry as a part of China’s GDP decreased from 40 per 
cent in 2006 to 39.5 per cent in 2007, due mainly to insufficient capital support 
to the services industry. Moreover, the large number of rural households that 
cannot obtain financial support and thus modernise their agricultural practices 
contributes to the slowing of the tertiary sector.
From the experience of industrialised countries, it is clear that banks tend to 
begin small and, as development takes hold, increase in size. In the early stages 
of economic development, labour-intensive industries dominate the market and, 
as a result, small and medium-sized banks service small and medium-sized 
firms. As development progresses and capital in the economy increases, so 
does the scale of firms, as banks and stock-markets emerge. Chinese reform 
has, however, been predominantly top down, meaning that the State has set up 
large-scale SOEs, which are served by state-owned banks and stock-markets. 
The trouble is that there are no small or medium-sized financial institutions 
to service the loans of smaller enterprises. To overcome this problem, China 
must develop its small and medium-sized financial sector to encourage the 
growth of small firms. At present, the Chinese government has begun to allow 
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the establishment of small rural banks, which it is hoped will meet the needs 
of rural households. This represents a healthy step forward for the Chinese 
economy (Lin et al. 2006).
There are, however, issues arising from the design of this policy. First, 
the threshold conditions for setting up a small bank are too low—set at just 
RMB500,000. Moreover, one of the key articles of regulation states that any 
new bank must jointly operate with an existing commercial bank which must 
hold at least 20 per cent stock shares of the new bank. This is difficult to realise 
in practice. It is certainly prudent to ensure that new banks are well backed; 
however, it is still difficult for rural households to access loans because of the 
continued reluctance of the commercial lenders to provide rural loans. The 
regulations demand that commercial banks buy 20 per cent of the shares in the 
new bank, which means that these larger banks take on a considerable financial 
responsibility in the performance of the smaller, rural-focused banks. This 
erodes any incentive to lend to rural households. As a result of the legislation, 
the goal of setting up a small banking sector is compromised. For the sector 
to function properly, two things must change. First, the entry threshold must 
be raised by between RMB10 and 50 million. This could be coupled with a 
requirement that each loan be backed by greater collateral in the form of assets. 
Second, strict supervision should be imposed on the sector.
The second specif ic measure that China should undertake to achieve 
efficiency and equity through primary distribution is to impose a significant tax 
on resources. As mentioned above, the taxes and fees on resources amount 
to only 1.8 per cent. In the United States, however, such royalties account for 
12 per cent of resource prices and tax on petroleum drilled from US waters 
is set at 16 per cent. In addition, quantity imposition of tax must be replaced 
by an ad valorem system: when the price of a product rises above a certain 
level, a high rate of profit tax should be imposed to keep profits reasonable. 
There are, however, difficulties in designing an appropriate policy to achieve 
this because the former state-owned mining companies bear a heavy social 
burden, propped up by government subsidies provided through lower taxes and 
fees. In contrast, there is a range of private firms that have no social burden. 
The most effective solution to this imbalance is for the Chinese government 
to shed the social responsibilities from state-owned enterprises and impose 
resource taxes according to the law of the market economy.
Finally, the Chinese government should focus on cancelling administrative 
monopolies and should begin strengthening supervision of monopolistic 
industries into which competition cannot be introduced. Once competition is 
introduced into monopolistic industries, prices will go down and profits will 
be lower. In those industries in which competition is not suitable, such as the 
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electricity industry, the government must strengthen its supervision of prices, 
costs and revenue allocation.
If these three aspects can be achieved successfully, China will be able to 
realise equity and efficiency simultaneously in primary distribution. Income 
differences between urban and rural regions will decline once a complete 
market system is fully in place. The main reason for the superabundance of 
liquidity is that small firms are unable to secure loans and large firms have a 
great deal of unutilised capital due to restrictions on investment. Furthermore, 
as the number of middle-sized and small banks in China increases, the issue 
of superabundant liquidity will decline, income distribution will become more 
equitable, the marginal propensity of consumption will increase and incentives 
for investment will decrease.
Functions of the government under a development strategy that 
pursues comparative advantage
If China follows a strategy of comparative advantage, industries with comparative 
advantage can produce for export while the products of industries without 
comparative advantage can be imported. This will balance international and 
domestic markets. Under such a strategy, protection of industry will no longer 
be required because Chinese firms will be competitive in world markets. This 
will also reduce rent-seeking activities and reduce adverse effects on social 
values. The government will still have an important role to play. The Chinese 
government should focus on the activities that are generally undertaken by 
market economy governments, as well as attending to certain unique functions 
that are essential for developing-economy governments. 
First, the Chinese government should take responsibility for education 
services. If the economy develops through a policy of exploiting comparative 
advantage, the velocity of upgrades in the industrial and technical structures 
will be fairly high. This has been the case for certain East Asian economies that 
have transformed from poor agricultural economies to modernised economies 
within one or two generations. This has been coupled with an increase in per 
capita incomes, which now rival those in industrialised economies. To meet the 
needs of rapid upgrades to the industrial and technical structures, China must 
produce greater numbers of skilled workers and administrators who can adapt 
to changes in the market. To achieve this, it is essential that the government 
invests more in education.
Second, greater attention needs to be directed towards improving the 
quality of Chinese institutions. The relative backwardness of a developing 
country is not represented only by its level of economic development; it is 
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judged against the level of development of its institutions, particularly its legal 
and financial institutions. Improvements in institutional quality have explicit 
positive externalities. This implies that firms will apply sub-optimal quantities 
of resources to this objective; therefore, to achieve economic development, the 
government should seek to improve institutional structures and frameworks 
step by step. 
Third, China must develop a social security strategy of sorts. In every 
economy, there are those who represent a net cost to the economy, such as the 
aged, children and those individuals without families to support them. Given 
that these groups cannot always enter the workforce, their survival depends 
on government support. Through the process of rapid industrialisation, people 
are more prone to change jobs. During periods of transition from one form of 
employment to another, those without work will also depend on government 
support to survive, and this might come in the form of unemployment 
benefits.
In addition, market failures occur as a result of asymmetrical information, 
which requires proper government intervention. For example, one might ask the 
question: why does banking require supervision? The answer is that there is a 
problem of information asymmetry between the supplier and the purchaser of 
capital. Without supervision of the system, exploitation is inevitable. Looking 
further afield, externality issues in areas such as environmental protection will 
also require government supervision.
Finally, China’s government must focus on macroeconomic issues because 
of the volatility in domestic and overseas markets. This is a signif icant 
responsibility for government generally. The phenomenon of ‘waves’ of 
investment was discussed above—this happens occasionally in industrialised 
economies and frequently in developing economies. An important role for 
government could be to provide signals on the level of investment in particular 
industries, thus guiding further inflows of capital. This would reduce the severity 
of over or under-investment. Further areas of government guidance in the 
economy should be the setting of industry standards, supervision of sectors, 
such as banking, and setting thresholds for investment.
Conclusions
It is problematic to suggest that primary distribution emphasises efficiency, and 
redistribution solves equality, partly because there are problems with how we 
understand efficiency. It is unreasonable to define efficiency as China’s ability 
to compete in industries in which industrialised countries have an established 
market share. Furthermore, trying to achieve this type of efficiency fails to 
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recognise that China’s interests are best served by pursuing industries that 
make use of comparative advantage. Failing to follow comparative advantage 
principles will lead to insufficient employment and the widening of income gaps. 
Meanwhile, if China attempts to solve its equity problem through redistribution, 
it runs the risk of plunging into the ‘Latin America trap’. Consequently, China 
should realise equity and efficiency simultaneously in primary distribution 
to promote rapid and healthy economic development. The focus should also 
be on bridging the income gap within cities, and between cities and rural 
areas, by lifting employment rates. In doing so, China will be able to avoid 
the development pattern that concentrates on resources, avert damage to the 
natural environment and realise the ‘five balanced aspects’, including unification 
of markets at home and abroad, and creating a harmonious society.
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A driving force for growth
 
Xiaodong Gong, Sherry Tao Kong, Shi Li and Xin Meng
A spontaneous transfer of rural labour from agriculture to secondary and tertiary 
industries accompanies economic growth in most countries. It is often believed 
that this movement is pushed partly by the increase of surplus labour in the 
agricultural sector and, more importantly, pulled by higher returns to labour 
in urban manufacturing and service industries. Through this process, modern 
sectors with high productivity expand and engage more labour to move into 
modern sectors, leading to an improvement in overall productivity, which in 
turn gives an impetus to economic growth. 
The world has witnessed China’s extraordinary pace of economic change 
in the past three decades. Underlying China’s reforms are the economic incen-
tives and possibilities made available by a wide range of institutional changes 
that stimulated rapid economic growth. Since the 1990s, a most extraordinary 
phenomenon in China is the large-scale demographic movement induced by 
the relaxation of regulations that restricted labour mobility since the early years 
of the communist regime. While the exact size of the migrant population is 
debatable, official estimates suggest the number of rural migrant workers in 
2005 was about 126 million (NBS 2006)—amounting to the largest peace-time 
movement of people in world history.1
This massive reallocation of rural labour to modern urban sectors is, at a 
micro level, in response to the rapid rise in demand for labour in cities where 
growth has been concentrated and because the rewards for labour are signifi-
cantly higher in urban than in rural areas. At a macro level, the reallocation 
coincides with the restructuring process of the economy from an essentially 
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agrarian society to a predominantly industrial economy. At the beginning of 
the reform period, the agricultural sector occupied more than 70 per cent of the 
total labour force and accounted for 28.2 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). In stark contrast, secondary and tertiary industries engaged more than 
half of the total labour and contributed to nearly 95 per cent of GDP in 2006 
(NBS 2007). During the economic reform, the large population of low-cost rural 
workers in labour-intensive manufacturing industries contributed substantially 
to export-led growth. Figure 6.1 shows that the increase in migrant labour is 
correlated with the growth of GDP per capita income. Figure 6.2 demonstrates 
that the size of rural–urban migration is positively associated with the increased 
contribution to GDP of the secondary and tertiary sectors (NBS 1998–2003).2
Further investigation of the role of migration reveals that as an integral part 
of the reform experience, rural–urban migration has served as an important 
fuel for China’s economic growth. 
The established economic growth literature has reached a census that 
economic growth is determined largely by the accumulation of a number of 
proximate sources—that is, physical and human capital, labour and the en-
hancement in total factor productivity (TFP). Typically, a growth-accounting 
method is used to provide a first cut of an economy’s immediate sources of 
growth. Notwithstanding the continuing debate since Young’s (1995) seminal 
paper about the primary source of China’s growth—factor accumulation versus 
productivity growth—the increase in productivity has played a crucial role in 
China’s rapid development.3
Studies looking at the sources of China’s economic growth have documented 
that more than one-third of this growth can be attributed to productivity in-
creases (Islam and Dai 2007; Chow 2002; Fan et al. 1999; Woo 1997; Wang and 
Yao 2001; Borensztein and Ostry 1996; Hu and Khan 1997).4
In particular, after incorporating human capital, which was often absent from 
the early studies, Wang and Yao (2001) found that the contribution of produc- 
tivity growth during the reform period (1978–99) was about 24 per cent. Using 
a dual approach, Islam and Dai (2007) estimated an annual TFP growth rate of 
2.26 per cent for the period 1978–2002.
For analytical purposes, TFP growth can be decomposed further into at least: 
1) a shift of productive factors—that is, labour and capital from a lower produc-
tivity sector to a higher productivity sector; and 2) productivity improvement 
within each sector owing to technical efficiency gains, technological progress 
and improvements in institutional quality, incentive structures and so on. It 
is primarily through the first channel that rural–urban migration contributes 
to improvements in productivity. Modern economic theories elaborating the 
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linkage between migration and economic growth can be traced back to the 
two-sector Lewis–Fei–Ranis model of development, in which expansion of the 
high-productivity urban sector and the process of rural–urban labour transfer 
were considered (Lewis 1954; Fei and Ranis 1961). In the context of productivity, 
this labour transfer moves towards equalising marginal returns to labour input 
across sectors, and therefore provides a direct means to enhance allocated 
efficiency and hence productivity gain. 
In the case of China, despite the lack of consensus about the precise produc- 
tivity growth figure, it is recognised widely that much of the TFP growth has 
been driven by the reallocation of rural surplus labour from agriculture to secon- 
dary and tertiary industries, where labour productivity is significantly higher 
(Young 2003; Woo 1997; Fan et al. 1999; Zhang and Tan 2007). Empirically, Fan et 
al. (1999) develop an analytical framework to investigate the sources of China’s 
growth, taking into account the structural change featured in China’s reform 
period. They find that labour productivity differs considerably across various 
sectors. For example, average labour productivity in 1978 was 903 (indicated in 
1978 constant yuan per worker), while in the agricultural sector it was 362 yuan, 
and in urban industries and service sectors it was 3,335 yuan and 1,737 yuan, 
respectively.5 
By 1995, average labour productivity had improved by an annual growth rate 
of 6.54 per cent to 2,648 yuan per worker. Labour productivity in agriculture, 
urban industries and service sectors reached 1,026, 5,601 and 5,177 yuan per 
worker, respectively. Moreover, Fan et al. (1999) conclude that a significant 
improvement in the overall allocative efficiency gain for the reform period 
(1978–95) is due primarily to rural reforms and shifts of surplus labour to non-
farm activities—particularly to urban sectors.6
In addition, indirect channels of productivity enhancement through internal 
migration can be achieved through agricultural productivity gain due to 
increased endowment per unit of rural labour and the utilisation of remittances. 
A reduction in agricultural labour has the potential to increase the land/labour 
and capital/labour ratios, which in turn might have a positive impact on 
agricultural productivity. Meanwhile, the large amount of income generated 
by migrants sent back to rural communities has a substantial impact on rural 
development. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a consortium 
of 31 public and private development agencies housed within the World Bank, 
documented that in 2005 nearly US$30 billion worth of remittances were sent 
back to rural homes (CGAP 2006). A number of studies have investigated the 
impact of remittances and returning migrants on rural development (Taylor 
et al. 2003; Giles 2006; Du et al. 2005; Rozelle et al. 1999; Zhao 1999a, 1999b, 
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2002). Taylor et al. (2003) provide evidence that remittances help loosen capital 
constraints and stimulate crop production. Murphy (1999) and Zhao (2002) 
examined household investments and new productive projects developed 
by returned migrants in the rural economy. More generally, the productive 
investment made possible by remittances, new information and knowledge in 
employment and economic activities as well as further education or human 
capital investment are all indirect yet important channels through which 
internal migration can positively affect productivity growth and hence economic 
performance as a whole. Given the enormous scale of internal migration and 
its profound impacts, it is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable events 
associated with China’s rapid economic growth in the past 30 years.
What do we (not) know about migrants?
Despite its massive scale and important role in the process of economic growth, 
internal migration in China has been discussed in a relatively small body of 
the economics literature. A number of studies have looked at issues such as 
migration decisions (Zhao 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001; Hare 1999; Zhu 2002), the 
impact of migration on rural incomes and productivity (Rozelle et al. 1999; 
Taylor et al. 2003; Li 2001), the labour market performance of migrants (Meng 
2001; Meng and Zhang 2001) and migrants’ assimilation into urban society (Ma 
and Xiang 1998; Zhu 2001).
Using household-level data, a number of authors (for example, Zhao 1997, 
1999a, 1999b, 2001; Hare 1999; Zhu 2002) analyse the probability of migration. 
In general, they find that young, unmarried male workers are the most likely to 
migrate, and education does not play a significant role in migration decisions. 
Hare (1999) finds that the length of migration spells is determined primarily by 
the demands from home villages and the level of wages in cities; male workers 
in families with larger areas of land per capita or who earn less in cities tend 
to have shorter spells. Zhu (2002) employs data collected in urban areas of 
Hubei Province and investigates the impact of the rural–urban wage gap on 
migration decisions. Using a structural probability approach, the author finds 
that the income gap is important and has a non-linear effect on the probability 
of migration. Although these studies provide some information about the 
motivations for migration, a thorough investigation of migration choices requires 
comparison of the incomes and welfare of migrants in destination cities with 
what they would have achieved had they not migrated.7
This comparison is, however, not always feasible as existing surveys are 
often so limited in terms of the information collected that they cannot provide 
the data necessary for comparison.
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A second issue that has been addressed in the existing literature is the 
impact of migration on the incomes of migrant families and rural productivity. 
While Li (2001) and some other studies mentioned earlier find that remittances 
have a significantly positive effect on rural household income, the conclusion 
on this issue is less than unanimous. Using data from a survey of 787 farm 
households in Hebei and Liaoning Provinces, Rozelle et al. (1999) and Taylor et 
al. (2003) estimate a recursive model of yields, migration and remittances, and 
find a direct negative net effect of migration on household cropping income, 
but not on crop yields. Moreover, remittances compensate partially for this lost-
labour effect, as hypothesised by the ‘new economics of labour migration’ (NELM), 
by loosening constraints on production in the imperfect market environment. 
In conclusion, Taylor et al. (2003) find that participating in migration increases 
household per capita income, for those left behind, by between 16 per cent and 
43 per cent. These results potentially offer support for the general recognition 
of migration as an important path out of poverty. A recent study (Du et al. 2005) 
estimates that, controlling for household and area characteristics, having a 
migrant worker in the family increases household per capita income by a margin 
of 8.5–13.1 per cent. Empirically estimating the overall poverty-reduction effects of 
migration is, however, a challenging task, as these effects can take place through 
direct and indirect channels. Investigation into how migration affects poverty 
needs to be based on information of changes in income and any productive 
investment induced by migration, which includes the contribution to physical 
and human capital accumulation. Data limitations once again often become the 
biggest obstacle for further in-depth research in this area.
In terms of the performance of migrants in the urban labour market, 
existing studies highlight discrimination against migrants who are employed 
predominantly in low-income and ‘three-Ds’ (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) 
jobs, with longer working hours and much lower earnings than their urban 
counterparts (Zhao 1999; Meng and Zhang 2001). Using data from Shanghai, 
Meng (2001) studies employment choices and finds that individuals with 
more human capital choose to be self-employed rather than being employed 
by others. As important as it is for these studies to capture the situation at 
one particular point, the dynamics of migrants’ labour-market performance 
can reveal the evolution of their economic status and shed light on important 
questions of changes in migrants’ economic conditions and income mobility. 
Research in this area is, however, virtually non-existent due to the unavailability 
of longitudinal migration data.
Labour-market outcomes constitute only a partial view of what happens 
(or does not happen) as a result of migration. The impact of migration as a 
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socioeconomic process is extensive. Understanding migration requires going 
beyond analysis focused on the income effects per se. For instance, questions 
about the extent to which the health and general well-being of migrants are 
affected and how they integrate into the urban society are important but under-
researched topics. A summary of the initial contributions made by a number 
of descriptive studies finds that most migrants do not have health insurance 
(Xiang 2005) and they experience deteriorating health conditions (Zhang 
2005; Zheng 2005). The majority lives in crowded conditions and they have no 
private sanitation facilities (Shen 2002; Guo et al. 2005; Qi and He 2005). Their 
residential clusters are often based on common origins (Ma and Xiang 1998), 
which effectively segregate them from the local urban population. Additionally, 
there is prejudice (Zhu 2001) and discontent between the local urban population 
and the population of migrants (Li 1995). Apart from these basic descriptions, 
however, little is known about the extent of health effects of migration or the 
processes of and channels for rural migrants’ adjustment, assimilation and 
integration into cities.
The substantial and far-reaching impacts of migration also manifest in the 
lives of migrants’ children. While nearly 15 million children follow their migrating 
parents to cities, more than 20 million children are left behind in home villages 
(State Council Research Group 2006). What impact does the city have on those 
children who migrate with their parents? Do they receive better health and 
education as beneficiaries of the more developed urban infrastructure? Or, is 
the outcome the opposite due to the higher costs of living and the unfair policies 
in place in cities? Likewise, are those children left behind better off in terms of 
nutrition and schooling due to the extra income provided by remittances? Or, 
does the lack of parental care take its toll on these children’s development? 
Questions such as these are important not only for the understanding of the 
current situation, but to shape the future society. Unfortunately, except for a 
few studies looking at school enrolment and educational outcomes (Lu 2005; 
Giles and de Brauw 2005), little progress has been made in understanding the 
profound and multifaceted consequences of migration on children.
An overall assessment of the existing literature reveals that our knowledge 
about China’s migration is piecemeal and largely inadequate. Until now, little 
has been known about the overall impact of migration on migrants themselves, 
on their children—in the sending and receiving communities—and how these 
impacts evolve over time. Much of the limitation in the existing research is 
caused primarily by the scarcity of data. Researchers have long been plagued 
by a lack of well-designed longitudinal survey data for migrants and their appro- 
priate comparison groups. The RUMIC Project was established to respond to 
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this urgent need. The cornerstone of the project is a large-scale household 
survey, consisting of 5,000 migrant households in cities, 5,000 urban resident 
households and 8,000 rural households with and without migrant workers. 
The survey is intended to cover the 18,000 households for a five-year period 
(2008–12). The rest of this chapter provides a brief introduction to the survey 
before outlining some preliminary findings from the pilot and first-wave data.
RUMIC: sampling strategy and census results
The RUMIC survey is conducted in 15 cities across nine provinces or metropoli-
tan areas: Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hunbei, Sichuan, 
Chongqing and Henan.8 Whereas the first four locations are the largest migra-
tion destinations, the remaining five are among the largest migration sending 
areas.9
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) conducts the rural and urban 
households survey using existing random samples within its annual income and 
expenditure survey framework. There is, however, no existing sampling frame for 
migrant workers in cities, and the most fundamental challenges of developing 
an unbiased sampling frame involve randomly sampling the migrant population 
with little reliable advance information of its distribution. The reason for the lack 
of background information is due primarily to the largely incomplete official 
residential registration of migrants in cities. Most existing migrant surveys use 
administrative records of residential addresses as the basis for sampling; we 
believe, however, that at the very least a large number of migrant workers who 
live at their workplaces, such as factory dormitories and construction sites, are 
left out, and hence such a sampling framework is inescapably biased.
To address this issue, a unique sampling strategy has been developed and 
is employed in the RUMIC surveys. Essentially, the sampling frame is based 
on information collected in a census of migrant workers at their workplaces. 
More specifically, the census is conducted in a number of randomly selected 
city grids within the defined city’s boundary. A sampling frame is formed using 
the aggregate number of migrants. Based on this, a random sample of migrant 
workers is selected and interviewed by enumerators for survey data collection. 
Using Shanghai as an example, within the identified city boundary, the city is 
divided into more than 2,000 equal-sized grids (0.5 km by 0.5 km),10 of which 50 
are drawn randomly for census operation. Within each of the 50 grids, a census 
of workplaces (rather than residential addresses) is undertaken. During this 
process, information such as the number of migrant workers at every workplace, 
including formal and informal sectors, and basic descriptive information (size 
and industry categories of the businesses) is recorded. The total number of 
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migrant workers in Shanghai can be aggregated from these census data. As a 
final step of sampling, a simple random sample of 500 migrants is selected for 
questionnaire-based face-to-face interview. Following this approach, the RUMIC 
surveys are able to rectify the sample biases of most existing urban-based 
surveys in which residential addresses are used as a basis for sampling, and 
thereby can include most migrant workers within the defined city boundary.11
Table 6.1 presents some basic statistics for the migrant population from the 
census conducted in the 15 survey cities in December 2007. The first column 
shows the number of grids in which a census was conducted, while column 
two indicates the total number of migrants listed in these grids. Column three 
presents the migrant population density per census grid. Among the 15 cities, 
Donguan in Guangdong Province has the most densely populated migrant 
group (2,614 migrants per 0.25 sq km), followed by Shenzhen (2,295), Wuxi (1,691) 
and Guangzhou (1,171). Based on the per-census grid average migrant number 
(column three) and the total number of grids within the defined city boundary, 
the total number of migrants in each city is aggregated (column five). It ap-
pears that Dongguan, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Shenzhen are the 
top-five migration destination cities, which seems to coincide with anecdotal 
evidence. Based on our census results, the total number of migrants in the 15 
survey cities amounts to 12 million, which is slightly less than 10 per cent of 
the official figure of 126 million for 2005 (NBS 2006).
Additionally, six broad categories are aggregated from a 72-industry clas-
sification based on census information of the industry categories of businesses 
(Table A6.3 provides a detailed description of the 72 industries and the aggrega-
tion method). The industrial distribution of the migrants presented in Table 6.2 
indicates that among the 541,792 migrants listed in the RUMIC census: 8.4 per 
cent work in the construction industry; 18.3 per cent in manufacturing; 2 per 
cent in education and government organisations; 4.7 per cent in employment, 
real estate and other types of agencies, and consulting companies; 34 per cent 
in services, including public services, security, transportation, communication, 
hotels, restaurants, repairs and recycling; and the remaining 32.7 per cent 
work in wholesale and retail trade. It is worth noting that industry distributions 
vary considerably across cities. For example, 41 per cent of migrants work in 
the manufacturing industry in Wuxi, while more than half (55 per cent) of the 
migrants in Dongguan work in wholesale/retail trade.
For comparison purposes, the bottom four rows of Table 6.2 present the 
results for four previous migrant surveys, among which the first three are city-
based and the last is a rural household-based survey. The Institute of Economics 
(IE) at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) conducted two of the 
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urban-based migrant household surveys (hereafter referred to as ‘IE surveys’). 
The IE surveys covered 13 cities12 with 780 households (1,785 individuals) in 1999 
(hereafter referred to as ‘IE 1999’) and 12 provinces (27 cities) with a total of 
2,000 households (5,327 individuals) in 2002 (hereafter referred to as ‘IE 2002’). 
On average, the IE surveyed less than 100 households in each city. Another 
urban-migrants survey for comparison is the China Urban Labour Survey (CULS) 
(IPLE 2001) conducted by the Institute of Population and Labour Economics 
(IPLE) within CASS in 2001. It was undertaken in five large cities (Shanghai, 
Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou and Xian) with 340 migrant households and 2,365 
individuals. These three surveys were based on a random sample of residents. 
As noted earlier, this sampling approach effectively missed all the migrants 
who lived at their workplaces from the sampling frame.13
The last row of Table 6.2 shows official information published by the NBS 
(hereafter referred to as ‘NBS 2004’) drawn primarily from the 2004 national 
rural household survey (Sheng and Peng 2005).14
Relative to the three urban-based migrant surveys, the RUMIC census results 
indicate a much higher proportion of migrants working in manufacturing and 
construction sectors, and a lower proportion working in the wholesale/retail 
trade sector. These differences are likely caused by the exclusion of migrant 
workers living at business premises in the sampling frame of IE surveys and the 
CULS. There are other possible factors that might contribute to the differences, 
such as the locality differences between the RUMIC census and the other 
surveys, the sample size differences and timing differences. In contrast, the 
NBS results indicate a much higher proportion of migrants in the manufacturing 
sector (greater than 30 per cent) and a much lower proportion in wholesale/
retail trade (4.6 per cent). There are several potential explanations for such a 
large discrepancy: first, while the NBS survey was conducted in sending areas 
with information reported by household members who had remained behind, 
the RUMIC census was conducted in the destination cities and information was 
collected by enumerators. The completely different data-collection procedures 
employed could lead to different degrees of measurement errors. Second, 
the coverage of these surveys differs. Whereas the NBS undertook a national 
survey covering all 31 provinces, the RUMIC census covered only 15 cities. 
Third, as far as an individual city is concerned, the RUMIC census does not 
necessarily include all the districts that are considered to be administratively 
part of that city. In order to keep the census within a manageable scale, the 
census excludes some districts that are far from the city centre. It is possible that 
some manufacturing enterprises are located in these areas, and the exclusion 
of these enterprises could potentially explain the large differences between 
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the RUMIC and NBS surveys with regards to the proportion of migrants in 
the manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, within the defined city boundary, the 
RUMIC census results are well positioned to represent the industry distribution 
of employed migrants. Another, more general explanation for the differences 
in the surveys’ results is that the RUMIC census was conducted much later 
than the other surveys.
What have we learned from the survey?
As demonstrated in Table 6.2, after rectifying the sampling biases, the RUMIC 
survey presents a somewhat different portrait of migrant workers than the 
existing urban-based surveys. Furthermore, departing from the conventional 
focus on migration determinants and labour market discrimination, the RUMIC 
survey has collected much information concerning the broad welfare of 
migrants (their jobs, income, health and mental health status), their children’s 
education and health, and the extent to which migrants assimilate into the city 
communities. These data allow researchers to explore a number of important 
aspects of migration that have so far been under-researched because of data 
limitation.
Between May and July 2007, a large-scale (1,000 households) pilot survey 
was undertaken in Shanghai, Wuxi, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The first wave 
of the formal survey began in March 2008 and is currently under way. The 
following discussion is based on the pilot data and the first batch of data for 
approximately 2,000 migrant households from seven cities (Shanghai, Nanjing, 
Wuxi, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wuhan and Chengdu) from the first wave of the 
survey.
Basic family and individual characteristics of migrants
Table 6.3 presents some basic family and individual characteristics of migrants. 
The RUMIC surveys (Table 6.3, columns one to three)15 show that about 40 per 
cent of migrant households are not single-person households. While about 50–
70 per cent of the migrants are married, one-third of these live separately from 
their spouses. Further, close to 60 per cent of households have children, but up 
to three-quarters of these have left their children behind in the countryside. This 
general description of migrant-household structure coincides with anecdotal 
evidence that underscores the breakdown of migrant workers’ normal family 
relationships as a result of the physical distance between family members.16
This impression does not, however, concur with the results obtained from the 
previous urban-based migration surveys. For example, the IE surveys (columns 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































migrants (87–89 per cent in IE surveys versus 51–68 per cent in the RUMIC) and 
a much smaller incidence of family separations (9–22 per cent)—at least 50 
per cent lower than that observed in the RUMIC surveys. Similarly, the CULS 
survey (column six) indicates a much higher proportion of migrants who are 
married and/or have children, and a lower proportion of migrants with children 
left behind in the countryside. Different sampling strategies might hold the key 
for understanding these discrepancies. It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
migrant workers living at their workplace are more likely to be single, or living 
separately from their spouse. As these migrants are systematically excluded 
from the IE and CULS surveys, an under-representation of the singles and those 
who live apart from their spouses is a plausible conjecture.
The bottom half of Table 6.3 reports individual characteristics of migrants. 
The RUMIC and previous surveys show that, on average, about 55 per cent 
of the migrants are males, and their average age is 28–29 years, although the 
CULS has a higher proportion of males and their average age is older, which 
is related to the fact that the CULS surveys only those aged 16 and above. 
Notwithstanding the similar basic demographic characteristics at the mean, 
some important differences are revealed between the RUMIC and IE surveys 
when the age structure is examined. Figure 6.3 shows the age distribution by 
gender for the four different samples. In contrast with the RUMIC samples, in 
which the mode of migrant age is just more than 20 years, in the IE surveys it 
is about 35 years. Moreover, more than 85 per cent of migrants in the RUMIC 
sample are participants in the labour force—almost 20 percentage points 
higher than in the IE surveys. In terms of the duration from first migrating to the 
city to the time of the survey, the RUMIC survey records an average of seven 
to eight years—about one year longer than that suggested by the IE survey. 
Perhaps due to a younger sample, the average years of schooling in the RUMIC 
surveys is about 1.5 years more than in the IE surveys. Indeed, Figure 6.4 shows 
early birth years are associated with a shorter average number of schooling 
years in all samples. Even within a same age cohort, however, average years 
of schooling in the RUMIC survey are still longer than those of the IE survey 
samples—again, indicating a possible sampling bias in the previous urban-
based migrant surveys.
Job and job-related welfare
A crucial aspect of migration studies concerns the characteristics and 
conditions of migrants’ employment. Table 6.3 provides a summary of migrants’ 
job characteristics. The RUMIC survey data show that the unemployment rate of 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































workers are self-employed while the rest work in the wage/salary sector. This 
description is in stark contrast with what is revealed by the IE and CULS surveys, 
in which about 50–65 per cent of sample workers are self-employed. In terms 
of occupational distribution, 70 per cent of migrants in the RUMIC surveys are 
engaged in production, service or wholesale/retail trade, whereas about half of 
the migrants in the IE surveys are business owners in the private sector.17
That migrants work incredibly long hours is a long-established fact (for 
example, Du et al. 2006). The RUMIC survey confirms that, on average, migrants 
work 60–63 hours a week. Self-employed migrants work 10 hours longer than 
the average, which translates into 10–11 hours daily, seven days a week.
Migrant workers earn, on average, about 1,500 yuan a month, which is double 
the amount observed from the IE surveys and 60 per cent higher than that 
found in the CULS (Table 6.5). Their hourly earnings are about 6 yuan, which 
is also more than double that indicated in the previous surveys. Whether such 
a comparison of results directly implies improvement in migrants’ economic 
conditions is questionable. Fortunately, additional information is collected in 
the RUMIC surveys for the year respondents started their first job in the city 
and the wages they received in the first month. A series of averages for the first 
month’s wages for the first job is constructed for the past 15 years using these 
two instruments. This information can serve as a crude but useful indicator 
of the change in earnings of unskilled migrants. Compared with the earlier 
surveys, this measure standardises the sampling method and the structure 
of the questionnaire. This datum series is presented in Figure 6.5, showing 
a small but gradual increase in starting salaries for migrants. For the period 
1999–2006, the increase was 1.1 per cent per annum, whereas between 2002 
and 2006 the increase was 0.1 per cent per annum. Such slow growth in nominal 
terms implies that the real earnings of a newcomer to rural-to-urban migration 
have fallen over time. 
Earnings alone sometimes do not represent the full income of migrant 
workers. Work-related welfare often includes subsidies or the provision of a 
meal, accommodation, social insurance and so on. Much of the information in 
this respect has, however, never been collected in previous surveys. Table 6.5 
offers some basic information revealed from the RUMIC surveys. It shows that 
about 65–75 per cent of migrants receive meal subsidies, with an estimated value 
of about 200–230 yuan a month, and 50–65 per cent receive accommodation 
subsidies with an estimated value of 120–200 yuan a month. Relative to the 
CULS, the RUMIC surveys identify that the proportion receiving a subsidy and 
the amount of subsidy seem to have increased. Although the government has 
issued requirements for compulsory social insurance participation since the 
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Figure 6.3 Age distribution of migrants from different samples
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early 2000s, only a small number of migrants participate in any of four social 
insurance programs. For example, the share of migrants with work-related injury 
insurance or unemployment insurance is less than 25 per cent. Nevertheless, the 
share of migrants participating in insurance programs has increased compared 
with the IE survey data.18
Income and poverty dynamics, living conditions and the broader well-
being of migrants
It has long been known that rural–urban migrants under the ‘guest-worker’ 
system have very low ‘discount rates’. As they regard themselves as working 
in cities ‘temporarily’, with their future ultimately in their rural home villages, 
they work extremely hard, live a very modest life in cities and try to save as 
much as possible for the future (for example, Du et al. 2006). Existing surveys 
have not been able to provide adequate information for researchers to examine 
the well-being of migrant workers. The RUMIC survey, in contrast, pays special 
attention to issues related to the well-being of migrants. A number of indicators 
of migrants’ living standards, their health and mental health conditions are 
summarised below.
Table 6.6 presents information on income, expenditure, poverty and living 
conditions based on the RUMIC survey data. It shows that average per capita 
monthly income is about 1,700 yuan for the pilot survey and 1,400 yuan for the 
first wave of the survey. The difference might reflect only differentials across 
cities covered by the two surveys. Indeed, if Shanghai and Wuxi, the only two 
cities covered by both surveys, are compared, per capita income in the pilot 
survey is 1,418 yuan and in the first wave it is 1,668 yuan—translating into 
an increase in nominal income of about 17.6 per cent over two years. In the 
absence of consumer price index (CPI) data, the change in official minimum 
standards of living lines (the ‘Dibao line’; see Table A6.2) is used as a proxy 
to estimate the proportional change in the cost of living. Between 2007 and 
2008, Dibao lines in Shanghai and Wuxi increased by 14.3 and 16.7 per cent, 
respectively. Taking a simple average, therefore, the cost of living in the two 
cities increased by about 15.5 per cent, implying a 2.1 per cent increase in real 
per capita income in the two cities.
If, however, per capita expenditure is used as a measure, a much larger 
proportional increase can be observed. Per capita monthly expenditure 
increased from 744 yuan to 1,016 yuan in Shanghai and Wuxi, indicating growth 
of 36.6 per cent, or 21 percentage points, over and above the increase in the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reflection of increases in the cost of living from the change in Dibao lines over 
the two years; 2) the possible changes in migrants’ attitude (the discount rate) 
as reflected in improved living standards. Both factors could contribute to the 
significant increase in per capita expenditure. A simple decomposition analysis 
of changes in expenditure suggests that items including food, clothing, housing 
and health care all register large increases, ranging between 37 per cent (for food) 
and 54 per cent (for clothing). Strictly speaking, despite the fact that China has 
been experiencing a period of high inflation since 2007, particularly rising food 
prices,19 without controlling for the quality consumed, it is difficult to gauge the 
extent to which the increase in expenditure is due to price increases. Nevertheless, 
the RUMIC surveys provide some measures of housing quality, from which we 
observe the following: 1) the proportion of migrants living in suburban areas 
decreased by 5.5 percentage points; 2) the proportion of migrants living at their 
workplace decreased by 3.7 percentage points; 3) the proportion of migrants 
without private sanitation facilities remained essentially unchanged. In addition, 
living area per person has increased by 15 per cent. This observation suggests a 
small degree of improvement in housing conditions for migrant workers during 
2007 and 2008. The degree of such development does not, however, seem to 
account for the dramatic increase in the cost of living. In contrast with the 
Figure 6.5 Earnings growth, 1991 – 2007 (first job, first month)







































increase in other expenditure, education expenditure dropped by 20 per cent 
(the last column of Table 6.6), while the large increase in expenditure also drove 
down remittances significantly.
Even though relative to the pilot survey, per capita expenditure in the first 
wave of the survey increased much more than per capita income, migrants’ 
savings rate remains as high as 39–48 per cent. This is measured by the differ-
ence between average per capita income and expenditure as a proportion of per 
capita income. Figure 6.6 indicates that almost all households (80–90 per cent) 
save, including those who might end up living below the Dibao line. The share of 
migrant households falling below local Dibao lines is 1–1.8 per cent and 9–13 per 
cent, by income and expenditure measures, respectively. A 1.2 percentage point 
fall in the poverty rate (expenditure measure) between 2007 and 2008 is identified 
for Shanghai and Wuxi. This result is consistent with the abovementioned fact 
that average household expenditure increased 16 percentage points over and 
above the increase in the cost of living.  
In Table 6.6, poverty rates measured by two other poverty lines are also pre- 
sented. According to the China Development Report 2007 (CDRF 2007), China’s 
official poverty lines are systematically biased downwards; however, the degree 
of the underestimation varies by region because of the different financial capa- 
cities of local governments. It is suggested in the China Development Report 
2007 that in 2004 the official poverty lines in the Eastern region were 71 per cent 
of the real minimum cost of living (MCL), while this ratio in the Central region was 
64 per cent. The MCL lines are estimated using these ratios, together with the 
official Dibao lines in 2007 and 2008. The proportion of households in Shanghai 
and Wuxi living under this MCL line was 22.8 per cent in 2007 and 20.1 per cent 
in 2008 using expenditure measures, as opposed to 3.6 and 3 per cent for the 
two years using income measures. Additionally, information collected in the 
RUMIC surveys on the subjective cost of minimum living standards is used to 
formulate a ‘subjective poverty line’ for each city.20 The proportion of migrants 
living below this subjective poverty line is 21.1 per cent (using expenditure) and 
3.7 per cent (using income measures).
Migrants’ health and mental health conditions are another important reflec-
tion of the overall well-being of migrants. The RUMIC surveys have collected 
relevant information and Table 6.7 presents some summary statistics. Based 
on migrants’ self-assessment (row one), more than 85 per cent indicated excel-
lent or good health. To supplement the subjective health measure, a number 
of objective health measures are also generated. The first important health 
indicator is whether the individual is under or overweight—the former is often 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































heart disease. The average body mass index (BMI) of RUMIC survey samples is 
similar to that found in the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) for 1989 
and 1991, but the proportion of underweight migrants in the RUMIC surveys (15 
per cent in the pilot and 10 per cent in the first-wave surveys) is much higher 
than that found in the CHNS (8.3 of rural and 9.2 per cent of urban samples). 
Similarly, the overweight rates are higher in the RUMIC surveys (Doak et al. 
2002). While the proportion of underweight migrants is higher in the RUMIC 
surveys than in the CHNS 2004 data, the CHNS reports a higher proportion 
of overweight rural (25 per cent) and urban (30 per cent) samples. Part of the 
explanation for such differences could be the different measurement errors 
incurred when weight and height data are obtained in these surveys. Whereas 
the CHNS involved enumerators to measure respondents physically, the RUMIC 
surveys relied on self-reported information. Another objective measure of health 
is the proportion of migrants who were sick during the three months before 
the survey; 8.3 and 14 per cent of migrants reported being sick in the pilot and 
first-wave surveys, respectively. Among them, 20–24 per cent considered their 
illnesses serious. Seventy-five per cent of respondents in the first-wave survey 
did not see a doctor, of which 13 per cent had a serious illness. On average, 
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those who were sick spent 393 (pilot survey respondents) and 263 yuan (first-
wave respondents) during the three months to treat their illness, and only 5.2–6 
per cent of their total expenditure was reimbursed by insurance.
A unique contribution of the RUMIC surveys to the understanding of migrants’ 
well-being is the collection of information on mental health conditions, measured 
by the ‘General Health Question 12’ (GH12).21 The numbers reported in Table 6.7 
indicate the proportion of migrants in the RUMIC samples suffering from mental 
health issues. The existing literature for comparison with these results is scarce; 
however, the last question, about happiness, has an equivalence in the 2002 IE 
survey, in which 11.2 per cent of migrants considered themselves to be not very 
happy or not happy at all—slightly lower than the figure suggested in the RUMIC 
surveys. Furthermore, using British survey data, Erens et al. (2001) reported 
GH12 for different minority groups in England, including ethnic Chinese. In that 
study, GH12 was summarised into three categorical variables: the proportion 
of individuals who answered ‘no’ to all of the 12 questions; the proportion who 
answered ‘yes’ to one to three of the above questions; and the proportion who 
answered ‘yes’ to four or more of the 12 questions. Erens et al. (2001) found that 
69 per cent of the Chinese group reported ‘no’ to every one of the 12 questions, 28 
per cent reported ‘yes’ to one to three of the questions, while 3 per cent reported 
‘yes’ to four or more questions. Using the information for Chinese immigrants in 
the United Kingdom as an approximate benchmark, the RUMIC surveys’ sample 
of respondents seem to suffer more from mental distress than other issues. In 
particular, 6.5–7.8 per cent of RUMIC survey sample migrants reported ‘yes’ to 
four or more questions—double the proportion reported in Erens et al. (2001).
Children of migrants
The unique nature of the guest-worker system for rural–urban migration in China 
means that many migrant children grow up with only one or neither parent living 
with them. Lack of parental care could have a significant impact on their current 
and future development. The RUMIC surveys collect a substantial amount of 
information from migrants about their children, including whether they migrated 
with them of were left behind in home villages. To our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt by researchers to examine the impact of migration on migrants’ 
children with a relatively large sample survey. This subsection provides some 
first-cut summary statistics.
In the data for the first-wave RUMIC survey, there were 1,060 children recorded, 
including 893 children aged 16 years or younger.22 The current living arrangements 
of the full sample of children and sub-sample of children aged 16 and below are 
reported in Table 6.8. Among children aged 16 and below (column two), almost 
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60 per cent were left behind in the rural hometown—among whom, 42 per cent 
lived with only one parent, 50 per cent lived with grandparents, 4.5 per cent lived 
with other relatives, and the remainder lived by themselves.23
When migrant parents were asked the main reason why their children 
did not live in cities with them, more than 50 per cent pointed directly to cost 
factors—high costs of living (37.5 per cent) and high school/childcare fees (16.4 
per cent)—while 22 per cent indicated lack of a carer for the child, which, in 
turn, partly reflects the high cost of childcare.
Table 6.9 summarises characteristics of migrants’ children in cities and 
those left behind. Among the children aged 16 and below, the average age of 
those left behind (8.4 years) is about 1.3 years older than those who migrated 
with their parents (7.4 years). This is understandable, as young children need 
more parental attention, and parents are therefore more likely to bring them to 
cities. Using the total sample of children, Figure 6.7 presents the age distribution 
of children by their current living arrangements. Those currently living with 
parents in cities are concentrated in the under-10 age group, while those left 
behind are more likely to be older then 10 years. Further, parents bring to cities 
slightly more (6 percentage points) girls than boys. Among children aged 16 
and below in cities, 46 per cent were pre-school aged—10 percentage points 
higher than those children left behind. There are hardly any school drop-outs 
defined in the children above pre-school age and aged 16 or younger.24
Important research questions related to the impact of migration on children 
involve investigating the health, education and general development outcomes 
of migrants’ children. Moreover, to study these questions requires information 
about these children’s potential circumstances had their parents not migrated. 
While the collection of data to generate this information is currently under way, 
a simple comparison between children who migrated with their parents and 
those left behind is presented in Table 6.10, using parental-assessed indicators 
of outcomes of children’s health, education and general development. Relative 
to those children left behind, migrant children living with their parents in cities 
seem to better off in terms of their health conditions. About 93 per cent of parents 
who had their children living with them in cities considered their children to be 
healthy or very healthy—5 percentage points higher than those children left 
behind. To examine how this health assessment differs by age group, Figure 6.8 
plots the average proportion of children rated as healthy by age and current living 
arrangements. The figure shows that there is little difference in the proportion 
of children considered healthy for the very young age group and the over-16 age 
group. In the five-to-12 age group, however, the proportion of children rated healthy 
for those living in cities with their parents is almost 7–8 percentage points higher 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results for school performance, however, paint a quite different picture 
as to which group is doing better. A much higher proportion (14.4 per cent) of 
those children left behind enjoy excellent school performance compared with 
migrant children in cities (7.7 per cent). Figure 6.9 shows that the child’s age is 
positively associated with parental assessment of the child’s school performance, 
particularly for children older than 15. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that low 
performers are less likely to continue schooling after junior high school level. The 
large gap for school performance between those living in cities and those left 
behind is essentially constant across all age groups, except for the very young 
cohort (seven–eight years of age). Similarly, when parents are asked whether they 
are worried about their children’s school performance, those who had children 
living with them recorded a higher proportion of positive answers (‘yes’) than 
those whose children had been left behind in rural villages (43 per cent versus 
38 per cent). Figure 6.10 indicates that parents with children younger than nine 
worry most about their offspring, and especially those whose children have been 
left behind. For children aged 10 and above, parents appear to worry more about 
those who live with them in cities, compared with the ones left behind.
The RUMIC surveys, in addition to school performance, collect information 
from parents about other aspects of their children’s behaviour that might 
cause them to worry—for example, skipping school, not finishing homework, 
watching too much television or playing too many Internet/computer games, 
being bullied, having ‘bad’ friends, or dating too early. While, on average, only 
15–16 per cent of parents worry about these issues, the proportion is, again, 
higher for parents who are living with their children than for parents who left 
their children in rural villages.
There might be different reasons for why parents who live with their children 
do not consider their children to be doing very well, and to worry more about 
them. It is possible that pessimistic parents are more likely to take their children 
with them; or that parents are more likely to take children who are not doing well 
in the hope that parental supervision will help. The third possibility could be that 
the children who migrate with parents and those left behind are judged using 
different benchmarks. Parents with children living in cities tended to compare 
their children with city kids, whose education was often of a higher quality, 
whereas parents whose children were left behind were more likely to compare 
their children with other local rural children, whose general education quality 
was not as good as that offered in cities. Finding out exactly which explanation 
dominates is, however, beyond the scope of this preliminary study.
Finally, the RUMIC surveys also collect data for parental-assessed perform-
ance of pre-school-aged children. These data are presented in the bottom sec-
tion of Table 6.10. In this group, few noticeable differences are observed between 
children who live with their parents in cities and those who are left behind.
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Table 6.9 Basic characteristics of migrants’ children
 Total children Children aged 16 and below
 Total With Left Total With Left 
  parents behind  parents behind
Total number of children 1,060 379 681 893 338 555
Age 9.87 8.58 10.58 8.20 7.39 8.69
Males (%) 53.68 49.87 55.80 52.97 49.11 55.32
Education level (%)      
  Pre-school 33.58 40.9 29.52 39.87 45.86 36.22
  Primary 33.30 32.19 33.92 38.97 35.80 40.90
  Junior high 15.00 15.04 14.98 16.80 16.27 17.12
  Senior high 12.45 8.18 14.83 3.47 1.48 4.68
  Three-year college 1.70 1.85 1.62 n.a. n.a. n.a.
  University and above 2.83 0.26 4.26 n.a. n.a. n.a.
  Drop-out 1.13 1.58 0.88 0.90 0.59 1.08
n.a. not applicable
Figure 6.7 Age distribution of migrant children by current living 
arrangements















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A large body of research has focused on the sources of China’s rapid economic 
growth in the past three decades. A consensus emerging from the established 
literature indicates that the massive rural-to-urban migration has served as 
a crucial contributor to TFP growth by shifting labour from low-productivity 
rural sectors to modern industrial sectors in cities with significantly higher 
productivity. The main actors of this driving force—that is, the more than 120 
million rural–urban migrants—constitute a research area that has long been 
understudied. The existing migration-studies literature is confined largely to 
the investigation of migration decisions and the short-term income impacts of 
migration on migrants and rural households. This chapter has outlined a host 
of fundamental questions concerning the patterns, the scope and the processes 
of migration as well as its extensive impact—all of which deserve much further 
in-depth investigation. Given the sheer size of population directly involved and 
indirectly affected by the migration process and the extensive and far-reaching 
impacts of this extraordinary movement, a better understanding of migration 
issues is needed.
Figure 6.8 Children’s parent-assessed health status by age and current 
living arrangement
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Figure 6.9 Children’s parent-assessed performance at school by age 
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Admittedly, a major obstacle restricting the scope and depth of migration 
research is the extremely limited survey data for migrants and their compara-
tive groups. The wide range of issues that require urgent further research are 
plagued by the unavailability of data with sound sampling strategies, broad 
scope and longer coverage. The newly launched RUMIC project embarked on 
its painstaking data-collection task with a sample size of 18,000 households 
across nine provinces and metropolitan areas. The RUMIC surveys identify 
and rectify the sampling biases of earlier urban-based migrants surveys and 
have developed a unique census-based sampling frame. With this improved 
sampling strategy, the RUMIC surveys are well situated to provide the informa-
tion necessary for its ambitious research agenda. The RUMIC project intends 
to address questions concerning not just the impact of migration on migrants 
themselves, but the impact on their families and on the urban and rural com-
munities that are integral parts of the grand migration process. 
Using currently available data from the RUMIC surveys, this chapter offers a 
series of preliminary statistical analyses. The differences are noticeable when 
comparing the RUMIC census data for household structures and occupational 
industry distribution with a number of existing survey results. This outcome 
suggests that differences in sampling strategies and other aspects of survey 
arrangements can lead to major variations in survey results. In addition, using 
the RUMIC pilot-survey data and part of the first wave of survey data, we present 
a range of basic characteristics of migrants and their children. This exercise 
demonstrates the riches presented by the data and the possibility they bring for 
further in-depth migration studies. Information such as the health and education 
situation of migrants’ children and the general well-being (including mental 
health) of migrants is the first of its kind to be made available. Furthermore, 
the potential of the RUMIC survey data will continue to unfold. Given time, 
the surveys will be able to develop their longitudial dimensions and enable 
important studies looking at income dynamics, long-term migration impacts 
on the second generation’s health and development, as well as the processes 
of and channels for migrants’ assimilation into urban communities.
Notes
1 The exact scale of internal migration in China remains a subject of considerable debate. 
Estimates differ depending on the data source and how migrants are defined in terms of 
geographic scope, the duration of their stay outside the source area and whether their 
movement was accompanied by a change in hukou (household registration system) status. 
Alternative estimates of the size of the floating population—those who live for more than six 
months outside the township where they have their hukou—indicate that it constituted nearly 
150 million people in recent years, nearly 10 times the number in the late 1980s (NBS 2006).
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2 The estimates are likely to underestimate the size of the rural migrant labour force because 
of the partial exclusion of migrant families.
3 Young (1995) argued that the ‘East Asian miracle’ was driven essentially by capital 
accumulation. As TFP growth accounted for only a small fraction of the growth of East Asian 
economies, the so-called miracle was merely a myth, as input accumulation-led growth was 
hardly sustainable. Krugman (1994) asserted a similar point.
4 As Young (2003) rightly pointed out, the data for most economies were filled with apparently 
inconsistent series. Choosing among them, one can produce almost any estimate of 
productivity growth imaginable. Therefore, it is not our intention to investigate the precise 
magnitude of productivity growth in China during the reform period. Rather, it is to note that 
productivity enhancement is an important contributor to China’s economic miracle.
5 Similarly, Chow (1993) looked at a five-sector model of China’s economy between 1952 and 
1980. It was estimated that at the beginning of the reform period (1978), marginal products of 
labour (MPL) across agriculture, industry and commerce were 63 yuan, 1,027 yuan and 1,809 
yuan, respectively (figures expressed in 1953 output values).
6 The efficiency index was calculated as the ratio of real GDP to efficient GDP, simulated by 
allocating labour and capital inputs such that the marginal returns to each factor were equal 
across all productive sectors.
7 An equally valid approach would be to investigate the comparison of incomes and welfare of 
non-migrants in home villages with what they would have earned had they migrated.
8 The urban samples are drawn from 15 cities, including Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuxi, Hangzhou, 
Ningbo, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Shenzhen, Chongqing, Chengdu, Wuhan, Hefei, Bangbu, 
Zhengzhou and Luoyang.
9 Based on the 2000 census data, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang accommodated 
66 per cent of migrants, while 47 per cent of migrants were from Sichuan, Chongqing, Anhui, 
Hubei and Henan Provinces.
10 The identification of a city boundary is based on the following principles. First, it should 
include as many workplaces where migrants are employed as possible. Second, it should 
not have large empty spaces. The cities defined by these rules are often smaller than the size 
of their boundary areas. For example, there were 18 administrative districts in Shanghai in 
2005. Among them, nine districts are fully covered in the survey boundary and five are partly 
covered (Baoshang, Minhang, Jiading and New Pudong), while four districts (Songjiang, 
Jinshan, Qingpu and Fengxian), which are far from the city centre, are excluded. Similarly, 
Ningbo City comprises six districts and only two and half districts are included in our city 
boundary. For detailed information on the boundaries of the 15 cities, visit the RUMICI web 
site at http://rumici.anu.edu.au
11 Theoretically, this sampling strategy accounts for all working migrants who participate in any 
form of employment at the time of the census. While migrants who do not work at the time of 
the survey will be excluded from the sampling frame, we believe the number of non-working 
migrants is relatively small and does not constitute a bias significant enough to jeopardise 
the randomness of the sampling.
12 These include Beij ing, Shenyang, J inzhou, Nanjing, Xuzhou, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, 
Pingdingshan, Chengdu, Zigong, Nanchong, Lanzhou and Pingliang.
13 The authors have access to all three surveys indicated here. The data presented are therefore 
from our own calculations.
146
China’s Dilemma
14 The NBS survey asks rural households to report some basic information about their absent 
member(s) who have migrated to cities, such as the industry in which they work, their 
occupation and possible earnings.
15 We report unweighted and weighted means of the first wave of the RUMIC survey in all 
subsequent tables.
16 At first glance, there is some statistical evidence indicating an adverse effect on the relationship 
between husbands and wives due to living arrangements that separate them physically. 
Among those who live separately from their spouse, about one in every four consider there 
is some adverse effect, 2 per cent indicate a strong effect and the rest do not think there is 
any negative impact. Comprehensive evaluation of the impact of distant living arrangements, 
however, requires further analysis.
17 Once again, these differences could be related to the lack of randomness in the IE sample, 
which omits migrants who are not living in residential areas.
18 Part of this change might, however, reflect the sample bias inherent in the IE surveys, which 
include a much larger proportion of self-employed migrants who are less likely to have any 
insurance. Indeed, in the RUMIC survey, the proportion of self-employed workers without 
unemployment or work-injury compensation and pension insurance is almost 90 per cent for 
each category—much higher than for wage/salary earners.
19 China’s CPI, the main gauge of inflation, reached an 11-year monthly high with a 7.1 per cent 
rise in January 2008. Huge increases in food prices pushed up the CPI by 4.8 per cent in 
2007—the highest level since 1997.
20 Official poverty lines, Dibao lines, MCL lines and subjective poverty lines are described in 
Table A6.2.
21 GH12 covers a wide range of mental health issues, including lack of concentration, loss of sleep 
due to worry, feeling unable to play a useful role in things, feeling unable to make decisions, 
feeling under pressure all the time, feeling unable to overcome difficulties, feeling that life is 
meaningless, unable to face up to problems, depression, lack of self-confidence, feelings of 
worthlessness, and a general feeling of unhappiness.
22 The full sample of children includes all the children of respondent households who are aged 16 
years or younger and those older than 16 but still at school. Therefore, the difference between 
the full sample of children and the younger sub-sample is the sub-sample of older children 
still at school.
23 Further investigation reveals that children living by themselves are aged seven to 16 and all 
are at boarding school.
24 The total number of school drop-outs is 8.
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Table A6.1 Different poverty lines, 2007 and 2008 (yuan per month)
 Dibao line Poverty line Subjective poverty line
 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Shanghai 350 .. .. .. .. ..
400 493 563 536 565 .. ..
Nanjing 300 350 423 493 464 493
Wuxi  300 350 423 493 .. ..
521 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Hangzhou 320 355 451 500 .. 597
Ninbo 300 350 423 493 .. 536
Wuhan 248 300 388 469 .. 503
Chengdu 230 276 359 431 .. 565
Guangzhou  390 .. 549 .. 637 ..
Shenzhen 388 .. 546 .. 617 ..
Note: Dibao data are from the Internet; poverty lines are adjusted based on Youjuan Wang’s 
calculations of the ratio of the Dibao and poverty lines for the Eastern and Central regions.
Table A6.2 Different poverty lines 
    
 Dibao Poverty line Subjective poverty line
 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Shanghai 350 400 493 563 536 565
Nanjing 300 350 423 493 464 493
Wuxi  300 350 423 493 .. 521
Hangzhou 320 355 451 500 .. 597
Ninbo 300 350 423 493 .. 536
Wuhan 248 300 388 469 .. 503
Chengdu 230 276 359 431 .. 565
Guangzhou  390 .. 549 .. 637 ..
Shenzhen 388 .. 546 .. 617 ..
Note: Dibao data are from internet, poverty lines are adjusted based on Youjuan Wang’s 
calculation of the ratio of dibao and poverty line for the Easten and Central regions. 
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Table A6.3 Detailed and broad industry categories 
 
Code 72 industries 6 broad industry categories
1 Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing Construction
2 Mining 
3 Construction 
4 Food and drink manufacturing Manufacturing
5 Tobacco manufacturing 
6 Textile manufacturing 
7 Clothing manufacturing 
8 Leather and shoes manufacturing 
9 Timber and furniture manufacturing 
10 Paper and paper product manufacturing 
11 Publishing, printing and video production 
12 Coking and oil refinary 
13 Medicine and other chemical manufacturing 
14 Rubber and plastic manufacturing 
15 Non-metalic mineral product manufacturing 
16 Basic metal product manufacturing 
17 Metal product manufacturing 
18 Machinary and equipment manufacturing 
19 Office equipment manufacturing 
20 Electrical and electronic equipment manufacturing 
21 Radio, TV and other communication equipment manufacturing 
22 Medical, optical, and other special equipment manufacturing 
23 Transportation manufacturing 
24 Machinery rental 
25 Government organisation Education and government
26 Research orgnisation 
27 Education and training services 
28 Various type of agencies Various types of agencies
29 Real estate agencies 
30 Consultancy services Services
31 Security services 
32 Other public services 
33 Transportation services 
34 Post and communication services 
35 Bookshops  
36 Newspaper stands 
37 Financial service and insurance 
38 Hotels/motels 
39 Domestic services 
40 Entertainment/hairdressing/facial 
41 Childcare and care of old people 
42 Tourist centres 





44 Small repair outlets 
45 Medical services 
46 Taxi company 
47 Bicycle or car parks 
48 Tailor shops 
49 Advertisment and other printing operations 
50 Dry cleaning stores 
51 Domestic equipment repairs 
52 Car repairs 
53 Wedding, funeral, and other religious operations 
54 Photo shops 
55 Recycling  
56 Sales of industrial products and tools Wholesale and retail trade
57 Sales of metal products 
58 Street vendors  
59 Small shops 
60 Supermarket and department stores 
61 Chemists 
62 Shops to sell sports products 
63 Car sellers 
64 Bicycle and other domestic equipment stores 
65 Clothing, shoes, and bags stores 
66 Stationary stores 
67 Nursery and garden centres 
68 Construction material stores 
69 Home improvement stores 
70 Jewelry and other arts stores 
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reform in China
Implications for economic performance
Xiaolu Wang
Economic achievement after 30 years of reform
After three decades of economic reform, beginning in 1978, China has 
transformed itself from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
Prices for most commodities have been liberalised. The private sector, including 
private enterprises, shareholding companies and foreign-funded enterprises, 
has become the dominant part of the economy. Although the government is 
still playing an important role in the economy, the overall command system 
was abolished long ago. 
During this period (1978–2007), the gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
rate in China was maintained at an average of 9.8 per cent annually—3.7 
percentage points higher than that of the pre-reform period (1952–78) under the 
centrally planned regime. GDP in constant prices has increased by 14.8 times 
during the reform period, and achieved US$3,283 billion in 2007 by the yearly 
average exchange rate of CNY7.6 for US$1 (NBS various years; also below 
unless otherwise referenced). The size of the Chinese economy overtook Russia 
in 1992, Canada in 1993, Italy in 2000, France in 2005 and the United Kingdom 
in 2006, becoming the world’s fourth largest in 2006. It is likely to surpass 
Germany in 2008. According to the purchasing power parity (PPP) measure of 
the World Bank, the Chinese economy is already the second largest after the 
United States (World Bank various years). 
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Due to its huge population size, China’s GDP per capita is still low—only 
US$2,456 in 2007—although it is 10.8 times what is was in 1978. Using different 
PPP measures (for example, World Bank 2008), this per capita level could be 
expanded three to four times. 
One of the most significant improvements during the reform period was a 
dramatic reduction in poverty levels. In 1978, 250 million rural people were living 
in poverty, according to the national poverty standard using constant prices. 
This figure reduced to 15 million in 2007. By the World Bank’s higher standard 
of those living on ‘one dollar a day’, rural poverty in China reduced from 31.5 
per cent in 1990 to 8.9 per cent of the population in 2005 (Gill et al. 2007). 
China and Russia—two large countries and former centrally planned 
economies—shared many similarities before their reforms, but they adopted 
different reform methods and achieved very different results. In particular, 
there was a striking contrast in the economic performance of the two countries 
during their reform periods. 
China introduced a family-based Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
in its agricultural sector and decentralised its central planning system at the 
beginning of its reform. Price control was gradually released. The non-state 
enterprise sector was encouraged to develop, and market competition gradually 
became the dominant mechanism in the economy during a long period of 
transition. In the first decade of reform, from 1978 to 1988, the size of the Chinese 
economy in real terms expanded by 2.6 times. The annual GDP growth rate 
during this period was 10 per cent. Urban and rural household income per 
capita in constant prices increased by 1.82 and 2.11 times, respectively. The 
rural population living in poverty was reduced by 60 per cent. 
In Russia, some similar reform measures were adopted in the late 1980s, 
but were soon replaced by radical ‘shock therapy’ in the early 1990s. In 1992, 
price control was removed entirely and central planning was abolished. Most 
stated-owned enterprises were privatised in 1992 and subsequent years. If we 
regard the period 1990–2000 as the first decade of the reform period in Russia, 
GDP dropped by nearly 40 per cent—an annual decrease of 4.7 per cent. There 
was also hyperinflation and a dramatic reduction of people’s incomes during 
this period. 
Angus Maddison (2007) compared Chinese and Russian (initially, the Soviet 
Union) performance using a comparable PPP measure for a longer period. In 
1978, the first year of Chinese reform, per capita GDP in China accounted for 
only 13 per cent of that in the Soviet Union. After 25 years of reform, it achieved 
76 per cent of that in Russia in 2003. During this period, GDP per capita in China 
increased to 4.91 times its 1978 level, whereas GDP per capita in Russia shrank 
155
Rethinking thirty years of reform in China
to 85 per cent of its 1978 level. In the same period and by the same measure, 
total Chinese GDP expanded from 92 per cent to 677 per cent of that in Russia 
(Table 7.1). 
Russia experienced rapid economic growth in the post-Yeltsin period, 
although this was still a recovery towards its initial levels before the economic 
shock. In 2006, Russian GDP in constant prices was equal to only 97 per cent 
of its 1990 level, whereas the same ratio was 470 per cent for China (UN various 
years).
The next part of this chapter discusses the reasons for the different economic 
performances, and what lessons can be drawn from past reforms.
Chinese and Russian reforms: what made the difference?
Economists have offered various explanations for why the outcomes of the 
Chinese and Russian reforms were so different. It is commonly accepted 
that the speed and sequence of reforms are important. Unlike Russia’s shock 
therapy, China made a step-by-step movement towards a market economy. This 
evolutionary approach not only smoothes the shock, it allows macroeconomic 
stabilisation and institutional building to be achieved. While the old central-
control mechanism is gradually replaced by market mechanisms, rapid 
economic growth is achieved (for example, McKinnon 1993; Roland 2000; 
Maddison 2007). 
Table 7.1 Economic performance in China and Russia during the 
reform period
 China Russia (and USSR) China/Russia (%)
GDP (US$ billion 1990 PPP)   
1978 935 1,018 92
2003 6,188 914 677
Growth (2003/1978) 662% 90% 
Per capita GDP (US$ 1990 PPP)   
1978 978 7,420 13
2003 4,803 6,323 76
Growth (2003/1978) 491% 85% 
Source: Maddison, A., 2007. Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, second edition, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris:Tables 4.4–4.5, p.102.
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Justin Lin (1995) provides a convincing, although incomplete, explanation for 
the Chinese–Russian contrast. He indicates that China and Russia had heavy 
resource misallocation under the centrally planned system, but reallocation 
of resources among sectors takes time. A sudden correction of price signals 
leads to production decreases in the sectors with over allocation of resources, 
but not to corresponding increases in the sectors in which resources are under 
allocated. According to Lin’s explanation, the Chinese approach was to allow 
market-oriented growth in the under-allocated sectors first, so that misallocation 
was corrected in a relatively long period without drops in production (Lin 1995). 
Nevertheless, he did not explain why the real growth path in Russia in the reform 
period showed as an L-curve instead of a J-curve—that is, how can an expected 
temporary production decrease become a 10-year-long economic disaster?
Some other authors emphasise the different initial conditions in China and 
Russia. They argue that given these differences, the Chinese experience is not 
replicable, and the Russian recession is unavoidable. Among them, Popov (2000, 
forthcoming) shows, via a cross-country analysis, that the worse the economy 
distorted previously, or the higher the initial per capita GDP, the larger is the 
drop of output seen in liberalisation of a transitional economy. 
Popov also indicates that the speed of liberalisation has a negative impact 
on output, although he does not treat the speed of liberalisation as a policy 
variable, but as an ‘endogenously determined’ variable, which is determined 
by the political situation. In this sense, all the policy changes already in place 
could be classified as being endogenously determined, although some are 
really imported. In addition, it is hard to believe that the Chinese economy was 
previously less distorted than other transitional economies.
One dimension of the Chinese and Russian reforms was never sufficiently 
discussed—that is, did the reforms lead to a process of ‘Pareto improvement’? 
If not, who won and who lost? How were public interests affected in the 
reform? And how was economic performance related to the issue of interest 
redistribution during the reform and post-reform periods? 
In the remaining parts of this chapter, I will show three points via a comparison 
of some reforms in China and Russia: first, most of the reforms in China have led 
to improved conditions for all groups of people; therefore, the Chinese reform 
has generally been a process of Pareto improvement. This was not the case in 
Russia because the reforms led to improvements for certain interest groups, 
but the majority of people were worse off in the long term. Second, most of 
the reforms in China were indigenously and endogenously determined, often 
after many policy debates and empirical experiments; therefore, they were 
usually in the interest of all the people or at least the majority of the people. 
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This explains why the reforms could be in a path of Pareto improvement. In 
Russia, some major reform measures were determined externally and by a 
small group of élites, although they were undertaken in the name of public 
interest. Third, the reform outcomes in China and Russia indicate a strong link 
between economic performance and interest redistribution—that is, a reform 
benefiting all groups of people is usually a process of Pareto improvement, 
leading to better economic performance. This implies that whether the reform 
policy takes the public interest as its priority is crucial for the economy.
The following sections of the chapter comprise reviews of three major 
reforms in China compared with those in Russia. 
Agricultural reform
Agricultural reform in China, beginning in 1978, was the first step in the country’s 
economic reforms. As a replacement for the old and inefficient commune 
system, the rural HRS was not a government-designed reform measure. It 
was an innovation by farmers originating from the mid 1950s, and brought 
consistently better outcomes for increasing output and reducing rural poverty 
in pilot practices from the 1950s to the 1970s. It also incurred many political 
attacks, and was several times suppressed by top leaders for ideological 
reasons (RGCRD 1981). 
During 1978–80, farmers in different regions reintroduced this system and 
achieved remarkable success in increasing agricultural output and incomes; the 
system therefore spread automatically to broader areas. In Anhui and Sichuan 
Provinces, it was supported by provincial leaders Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang,1 but 
was attacked by conservative leaders at the central and local government level 
as a serious crime of ‘anti-socialism’. The following is an example of a typical 
debate from 1980 between Wan Li and an anonymous senior official, ‘A’, both 
of whom were responsible for the central government’s agricultural policy at 
the time (Zhao 2007):
A: HRS does not fit the socialist character, therefore, it should not be 
widely applied.
Wan: Why not? This is what people want; they only want to get enough 
food.
A: It deviates from the socialist direction; it is not a road towards 
‘common prosperity’.
Wan: Socialism and the people, which one would you choose?
A: I choose socialism!
Wan: I choose the people!
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The real outcome of the HRS was, however, more convincing than any 
ideology. After many conflicts, the HRS was accepted and promoted formally 
by the central government in 1982. Until 1984, more than 97 per cent of Chinese 
villages adopted the HRS. The commune system was abolished. 
The HRS is a household-based farming system that does not alter collective 
land ownership, but distributes farm land to households under long-term 
contracts. Unlike the old commune system, it provides adequate incentives and 
autonomy to farmers. In 2006, all land contract levies, together with agricultural 
taxes, were abolished; land use is now free for farmers.
With the introduction of the HRS, the pricing mechanism of agricultural 
products was also changed. The government f irst increased the State’s 
purchasing prices for grain by 20–50 per cent in 1979, and then gradually 
liberalised the grain market. Similar things happened to other agricultural 
products. The HRS reform, plus price increases, led to remarkable increases in 
agricultural output and farmers’ incomes in the early 1980s. The longstanding 
problem of food shortages was resolved. In real terms, farmers’ per capita 
incomes in 1984 increased by 2.5 times its 1978 level. The proportion of the rural 
population living in absolute poverty was reduced by half—from 250 million to 
128 million (Table 7.2). Urban–rural income disparity was also reduced.
Another important condition for the success of the agricultural reform was 
that, in the initial stage, reformers entered and dominated the core group of the 
Chinese leadership. They had rich working experiences and good knowledge of 
agricultural issues, they understood the needs of rural people and made rural 
development and the improvement of people’s lives a target for reform. 
Table 7.2 Farm output and income before and after agricultural reform 
in China
 1978 1984 1984/1978
 (before HRS) (after HRS) (%)
Grain (Mt*) 304.8 407.3 134
Cotton (Mt) 2.2 6.3 289
Oil-bearing crops (Mt) 5.2 11.9 229
Fruit (Mt) 23.8 47.8 201
Rural income per capita (yuan) 134 355 250a
Rural poverty (million people) 250 128 51
* Mt = mega-tonnes
a income levels in current prices, but the relative change is calculated in constant prices
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2005. China Compendium of Statistics 1949–2004, 
China Statistics Press, Beijing.
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Agricultural reform in Russia was very different. In the early 1990s, the 
leadership accepted the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
set a target for agricultural reform to follow the US agricultural model, and 
scheduled to develop one million private farms. To achieve this, they privatised 
agricultural land, disbanded state farms and collective granges and withdrew 
all state subsidies for agricultural production. This type of reform did not have 
the support of the majority of rural people. According to a survey (Qiao 2002), 
only 32.2 per cent of Russian farmers supported land privatisation without 
reservation, while 39.7 per cent opposed it. Only 18.1 per cent of farmers 
supported the free trade of land, while 60 per cent opposed it.
Prices for agricultural products were liberalised completely, together with 
all other products in 1992, and this immediately caused hyperinflation. Input 
prices for farming increased much faster than output prices, resulting in rapid 
decreases in farmers’ incomes. From 1990 to 1998, grain production dropped 
by 46 per cent, and the gross value of agricultural output dropped by 47 per 
cent. In 1999, 53 per cent of Russian rural residents lived below the official 
poverty line. Agriculture in Russia has improved in recent years, although it is 
still recovering from recession.
In general, the agricultural reforms in China were a ‘bottom-up’ process. 
It adopted a model preferred by most farmers, which led to quality-of-life 
improvements for nearly all the 790 million rural residents—who accounted for 
82 per cent of the total population in 1978. The urban population also benefited 
because the food-supply situation was much improved. The reforms also 
made significant contributions to overall economic performance. In contrast, 
agricultural reforms in Russia followed a ‘top-down’ approach: the leadership 
imposed an imported agricultural model on farmers without considering 
indigenous needs and local situations. The outcome of the reform was 
undesirable, and most people suffered because of it. 
Price reform
Price reform in China was a crucial part of its transition to a market economy. 
A ‘dual-price system’ was formed gradually in the early and mid 1980s. As a 
transitional measure towards a market economy, this system allows market 
prices to work while planning prices remain; this smoothes economic shocks 
and maintains economic growth in the early stages of reform.
During 1978–80, a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
brought into the experimental schedule of ‘expanding enterprise autonomy’. 
They were allowed to sell any excess above their state quota of products outside 
the state plan, at flexible prices, and were also allowed to purchase inputs 
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outside the plan at flexible prices, when the state supply was not available. 
This experiment was started in Sichuan Province in 1978 and achieved good 
outcomes, so it soon expanded to cover 6,600 SOEs across China in 1980, and 
then applied to all SOEs. This formed a market system that coexisted with the 
planned system. The market prices indicated the direction of demand, gave 
enterprises incentives and played a role in supply–demand adjustment at the 
margin. 
After the initial success, debates about price reform were still going on in 
the mid 1980s, focusing on a few questions: 1) should planning prices or market 
prices play the dominant role in the economy; 2) how could the imbalanced 
economy be brought into equilibrium—that is, first via administrative adjustment 
of controlled prices or by liberalising price controls; 3) should these adjustments 
or liberalisation be done as fast as possible or over a relatively long period (for 
example, Chinese Institute for Economic System Reform 1987)?
It became clear that controlled prices were not functioning well, and further 
market-oriented price reforms were needed. Price reforms that were too radical, 
however, would exceed the economy’s capability to bear the shock. As a result, 
the government persisted with a dual-price system in the 1980s. The scope 
of state planning and price control was gradually reduced or liberalised in 
some industries, where there was equilibrium or excess supply, but was kept 
essentially at the same level in other fields where there was a serious shortage 
of supply, such as in the steel industry.2
This was because, in these fields, the gaps between the controlled and 
market-determined prices were large (for example, by then, the market price 
for steel was three times higher than the controlled price); a sudden abolition 
of controlled prices would have led to violent changes in input prices and 
serious shocks to firms in downstream industries, and to consumers. Serious 
inflation, unemployment, enterprise bankruptcy and economic declines would 
be expected. 
Nevertheless, for basic inputs, even though price controls remained, prices 
for products were increasingly market oriented. The higher market prices 
provided incentives to firms to meet additional demand. In the 1980s, the 
output of steel increased from 37 to 66 mega-tonnes (Mt) (NBS 2005), most of 
which was produced by SOEs, but was promoted by market prices. Along with 
economic growth, the relative importance of market prices increased and that 
of controlled prices shrank. 
In 1988, top leaders attempted to launch a ‘price-reform storm’ to liberalise 
the remaining portion of controlled prices. This scheme resulted in massive 
panic purchasing of consumer goods and bank squeezes, so the leadership 
soon decided to abandon it. 
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Another important contributing factor to price reform was the rapid growth 
of market-oriented non-state enterprises. This substantially increased the 
scope for market prices to work. The non-state enterprises gradually became 
dominant in the economy, and finally led market prices to play the dominant 
role. Table 7.3 shows how the price mechanism transformed. 
While prices were gradually marketised, price levels during the transitional 
period were basically stable, and hyperinflation was avoided. The consumer 
price index (CPI) as an annual average for the three decades from 1978–2007 
was 5.5 per cent. During this period, the CPI exceeded 10 per cent in only five 
years: 1988–89 and 1993–95. The CPI reached its highest level—24.1 per cent—in 
1994. The annual CPI remained below 3 per cent in 16 of the 30 years.
A decade after the beginning of price reforms, China had essentially grown 
out of the ‘shortage economy’ of the early 1990s. Serious supply bottlenecks 
were eliminated. The economic structure became more balanced. Most 
importantly, most commodity prices were determined via market competition, 
which substantially promoted efficiency increases. 
In Russia, all prices were suddenly liberalised in January 1992 by the 
Yeltsin administration without sufficient discussion or preparation. The main 
‘theoretical’ base was an analogy: ‘You cannot leap over a ditch in two jumps.’ 
Radical price reforms led immediately to hyperinflation. Using 1991 as the base 
year (100 per cent), the CPI reached 1,629 per cent in 1992, 15,869 per cent in 
1993 and 64,688 per cent in 1994. The majority of people’s savings disappeared. 
The serious inflation forced the enterprise sector to increase nominal wages for 
workers to survive, the enterprise sector then forced the central bank to issue 
money to finance the unavoidable increases in nominal wages, and the rapid 
increases in monetary supply further fuelled hyperinflation. In 2000, the CPI 
Table 7.3 Proportion of products subject to market prices, 1978–2005 
(per cent)
 1978 1997 2005
Controlled price >90 11.9 
7.2
Guided price  
<10
  3.6 
Market price  84.4 92.8
Note: Calculated as weighted average of retail commodities, production inputs and 
agricultural products in gross value. 
Source: Fan, G., Wang, X. and Zhu, H., various years. NERI Index of Marketization of China’s 
Provinces, Economic Sciences Press, Beijing.
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reached 9,344 times the 1991 level (UN various years). The Russian experience 
of price reform presented a real challenge to the ‘Washington consensus’, 
because its radical price liberalisation did not allow macroeconomic stability 
to be achieved—although both were necessary, according to the Washington 
consensus.
Even though nominal wages increased dramatically, price increases were 
twice as high as wage increases. Most people suffered from income drops and 
the unemployment rate increased substantially during this period. Production 
collapsed, and GDP decreased year by year. Until 1998, GDP dropped to only 
57 per cent of its 1990 level in real terms. Sixteen years later, in 2006, GDP in 
Russia had not fully recovered to its 1990 level. 
Price reform is not itself an objective in former centrally planned economies; 
rather, the objectives are better incentives, improved efficiencies and optimised 
resource allocation. As indicated by their economic performance, these were 
achieved in China, but not in Russia. Table 7.4 compares inflation, unemployment 
and economic growth data for China and Russia during the first decade of their 
price reforms (1980–90 for China and 1990–2000 for Russia). 
To summarise the price reforms in China, the dominant position of market 
prices in the economy was finally established via a gradual process of evolution. 
This reform strategy was based mainly on the consideration of macroeconomic 
stability as well as protecting consumers, workers, enterprises and the State from 
the shocks of inflation, unemployment, production shrinkage and reductions 
in budgetary revenue. These goals were achieved. In Russia, all the negative 
impacts were considered to be a necessary cost to pay for the ultimate objective 
of liberalisation. Radical price liberalisation resulted in serious disadvantages 
for the majority of people, as well as heavy economic losses.
Ownership structure transformation
State-owned enterprises dominated the Chinese non-agricultural industries 
before the reforms. They shared 78 per cent of the gross output value of 
industry in 1978; the remaining 22 per cent was shared by collective enterprises. 
Transformation of the ownership structure of the economy began with 
development of Township and Village Enterprises (TVE) in rural areas, and 
foreign-funded enterprises (FEs) and enterprises with investment from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMTEs) in four special economic zones in the 1980s. 
After these enterprises achieved good results, the development of FEs, HMTEs, 
private enterprises and joint-stock companies was officially promoted.  
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There was a lot of debate about non-state enterprises in the 1980s. An 
influential opinion in the government was that these enterprises competed with 
SOEs for inputs and markets, ‘undermining the socialist economy’, and they 
should therefore be banned or restricted; others argued that these enterprises 
provided new employment opportunities, lifted people’s incomes, produced 
various consumer goods that were needed in the market and contributed to 
the State’s revenue, and should therefore be developed further. The latter view 
dominated central government policy after the mid 1980s, and became more 
and more convincing when non-state sector development performed better 
than the state sector. 
During 1980–90, TVE employment increased from 30 million to 93 million, 
and the share of TVEs in the value of gross industrial output (GIOV) increased 
from about 5 per cent to 20 per cent. Private enterprises, HMTEs, FEs and joint-
stock companies also grew rapidly; they shared only 0.75 per cent in GIOV in 
1980, but this increased to 9.8 per cent in 1990. They became the main engine of 
economic growth in the 1990s and shared 68 per cent of GIOV in 2007. In 2007, 
the entire non-state enterprise sector shared 70.5 per cent of industrial output. 
Urban non-state enterprises employed 229 million people in 2006—representing 
77.3 per cent of urban employment. The formerly state-dominated economy 
has basically transformed into a private sector-dominated economy. Table 7.5 
shows the changes in the industrial sector in the past three decades. 
Table 7.4 Price reform in the first decade: inflation, unemployment 
and GDP growth (per cent)
 China, 1980–90 Russia, 1990–2000
CPI (annual average) 7.0 276.2a
GDP growth (annual average) 9.3 –4.2
Unemployment rate 4.9, 2.5b 5.4, 13.4c
a 1991–2000
b urban unemployment rate for 1980 and 1990, respectively
c total unemployment rate for 1990 and 1998, respectively
Sources: United Nations (UN), various years. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, online database, 
United Nations; National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2005. China Compendium of Statistics 
1949–2004, China Statistics Press, Beijing; National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2007. China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007, China Statistics Press, Beijing. World Bank, 2007. 2007 World 
Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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The transposition of the state and non-state enterprises in the economy 
was due basically to two elements: continued robust growth of the private and 
foreign enterprises during the past three decades, which was much faster than 
the growth of the SOEs, and privatisation of SOEs, mainly from the late 1990s 
onwards.
Whether the SOEs should be privatised was a controversial issue. Although 
SOEs became market oriented to a certain extent, their performance was 
generally undesirable. From 1984 to 1996, the net value of fixed assets in SOEs in 
the industrial sector increased from CNY340 billion to CNY2,386 billion, whereas 
their total profits decreased from CNY71 billion to CNY41 billion (all in current 
prices). Their profit/assets ratio was only 0.8 per cent, and the profit margin (profit 
to total sales) was only 1.5 per cent in 1996—both significantly lower than the 
average (1.7 per cent and 2.6 per cent, respectively). During the same period, 
the SOEs’ total losses increased from CNY2.7 billion to CNY79 billion (in current 
prices), which led to a big deduction in their profits (NBS 1997, 1998). At the same 
time, non-performing bank loans built up to the trillion-yuan level, mainly due to 
SOEs. The 1997 East Asian financial crisis further sharpened the pain.
In 1997, the central government formally adopted a new policy called ‘seize 
the big and free the small’ (State Council 1997), allowing small SOEs to be 
sold. The policy for large and medium-sized SOEs emphasised improving their 
Table 7.5 Ownership structure of the industrial sector (share in gross 
output value) (per cent)
Year SOE Non-state enterprises 
   Collective Privatea
1978 77.6 22.4 22.4 .
1990 54.6 45.4 35.6 9.8
2000 47.3b 52.7c 13.9 38.8
2007 29.5b 70.5c 2.7 67.8
. insignificant 
a private sector, including private enterprises, foreign-funded enterprises and joint-stock 
companies 
b SOE data for 2000 and 2007, including joint-stock companies with a controlling state share
c data exclude small non-state enterprises with annual sales below RMB5 million 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2005. China Compendium of Statistics 
1949–2004, China Statistics Press, Beijing; National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2007. China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007, China Statistics Press, Beijing. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 
2008. 2007–2008 Collection of Statistics, China Economic Monitoring and Analysis Center of the 
National Bureau of Statistics, CEMAC Print, Beijing.
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management and transforming them into ‘modern enterprise systems’—that 
is, joint-stock corporations and limited-liability companies.
The number of SOEs in the industrial sector reduced from 113,800 in 1996 to 
24,961 in 2006 (the latter figure included pure SOEs and joint-stock corporations 
with a controlling state share; hereafter, called state-controlled enterprises, 
or SCEs). Their employment in industry reduced from 43 to 18 million people. 
Most small SOEs were fully privatised. 
The remaining SCEs in the industrial sector produced less then 30 per cent 
of the total industrial output in 2007. Their performance, however, was much 
improved. Their total profit increased from CNY41 billion to CNY849 billion 
during the period 1996–2006, and the profit/asset ratio increased from 0.8 per 
cent to 6.3 per cent, which was close to the industrial average of 6.7 per cent.3 
Non-performing loans reduced substantially; they accounted for 23.6 per 
cent of total loans in 2002, and reduced to 6.7 per cent in 2007. This implies 
that previous policies for improving SOE management and non-state share 
participation have been effective. 
While a large number of SOEs have been privatised, the general performance 
of the private sector has improved significantly, implying better achievement 
of the privatised former SOEs. 
Privatisation of the SOEs was not, however, a painless operation. Twenty 
million SOE workers were laid off in 1998, with another 26 million in later years 
until 2006. The lack of a social-security system in the first few years meant 
that laid-off workers received only limited financial support and some of them 
immediately experienced hardship. This was a real shock to a large part of 
the population, although it was less serious than what happened in Russia. 
The development of the non-state sector meant it was able to provide many 
job opportunities for the re-employment of laid-off workers, especially in the 
coastal areas where the non-state sector was better developed. 
Another negative outcome was low transparency and unfair distribution 
of the former state assets in some regions, where the process of privatisation 
was not well regulated or monitored and many under-the-table deals benefited 
mainly a small group of people. 
To rethink the process of SOE reform, the negative effects might have been 
reduced if the social-security systems had been built earlier and the process 
of reform had been better regulated, more transparent and introduced step 
by step.
Although there were some similarities between China and Russia in SOE 
privatisation, it was a more painful process in Russia than in China. Russia’s 
SOE privatisation began in 1992, when a large proportion of state assets was 
166
China’s Dilemma
distributed to all Russian residents in the form of warrant stocks worth 10,000 
rubles per person. The privatisation program was designed by a small group 
of élites, who regarded privatisation itself as being the supreme objective, 
even above the public interest, although such a design seemed fair because 
everyone had equal shares. Because of hyperinflation caused by the radical 
price reform, the value of the warrant stocks soon shrank to the price of a pair 
of shoes. This provided an opportunity for those who were astute enough to 
collect the warrants from the public at extremely low prices. The enterprise 
shares soon became highly concentrated and a small number of people became 
rich owners of the former SOEs (for example, Freeland 2000). 
The remaining state assets were sold later, usually at token prices to insiders 
and those who had relationships with government officials. The second phase of 
privatisation was even less fair, due to manoeuvring behind the scenes and so on. 
In a number of industries, privatisation did not bring about market competition; 
instead, the state monopoly was replaced by private monopolies or oligopolies. 
In particular, those state companies holding the most valuable natural resources, 
such as oil and natural gas, were privatised in a non-transparent and very unfair 
way. This allowed a small group of oligarchs to pay nothing to become the owners 
of half of Russia’s national wealth. This was why the Putin administration had to 
carry out a re-nationalisation program of oil companies. 
In the Forbes world-100 rich list for 2007, Russia had 13 of the world’s richest 
people, most of whom were oil oligarchs, and China had none. 
As well as being unfair, radical privatisation in Russia, together with radical 
price reform, caused heavy economic losses instead of real economic growth. 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, GDP in Russia in 1998 dropped to only 57 
per cent of its 1990 level. The only comparable scale of economic disaster in 
modern Russian history was during World War II. Up to 2006, GDP in Russia had 
recovered to 97 per cent of its 1990 level, but this recovery should be attributed 
partly to increasing world oil prices, as Russia is an important oil exporter. 
The experiences and lessons of privatisation in China and Russia are 
meaningful. They show that, when the public interest is taken as the first 
priority of reform objectives, the outcome is more likely a Pareto improvement 
and this fertilises economic growth and development. This is represented by 
the results of non-state sector development in China. On the contrary, when a 
certain ideological objective—whether a communist or a capitalist one—or the 
interests of a certain group of people are placed above the public interest, an 
inefficient redistribution of resources or wealth is likely to occur. This was the 
case in Russian privatisation, and to some extent in China’s SOE privatisation 
program in the late 1990s. 
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Implications for further reform
The theory of public choice shows that even a publicly elected government in a 
democratic country can make decisions contrary to the public interest, and an 
election can itself lead to a result not in accordance with the majority’s interests 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Arrow 1963). This explains what happened in 
Russia in the reform period. The theory also leads to the issue of ‘government 
failure’ against ‘market failure’, and therefore to a solution of ‘small government’. 
The reform experiences in China and Russia indicate, however, that the size 
of government should not be the only concern—or even the major concern. A 
more important issue is how to impel the government to behave in the public 
interest with a long-term perspective, and to play a role as an impartial arbitrator 
in social conflicts between interest groups. 
Although reform in the past three decades has achieved great success in 
China, the above issue remains unresolved in an institutional base. After the 
establishment of a basic market framework, a lot of new problems appeared—
relating mainly to the role of the government. 
Income inequality is widening. According to the World Bank (2006), the Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.32 to 0.45 during the period 1980–2001. It is likely to 
be even greater because unreported income (including illegal income) is huge, 
and is concentrated to a small proportion of high-income earners (Wang 2007). 
Rent-seeking behaviour and corruption in the public sector are increasing; there 
is evidence of unjustified distribution of returns from land, natural resources 
and financial resources. 
It is natural that income inequality increases to a certain extent when the 
economy is in a market-oriented transition. The continued income divergence 
indicates that other factors are also at work—due mainly to institutional defects 
or incompletion, which leads to distortions in income distribution, challenges 
for social justice, and creates uncertainty for social stability and growth 
sustainability in the long run. This is because the old central-planning framework 
is withering away, but a new institutional framework has not been completed. 
This indicates a need for further reform: mainly institutional innovations towards 
a more transparent, better monitored government system, including better 
regulated public resource management and better managed public services, 
and also an effective legal framework and better law enforcement. These are 
the necessary conditions for sustainable long-run growth and development 




1 At the time, Wan and Zhao were the provincial party secretaries of Anhui and Sichuan, 
respectively. Wan became a vice-prime minister and the director of the State Agriculture 
Committee in 1980, and the chairman of National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
between 1988 and 1993. Zhao became the prime minister (1980–87) and then the general 
secretary of the Communist Party (1987–89). 
2 Much of the information on the process of reform in China was based on the author’s personal 
experience while working for the State Committee for Economic Restructuring of China. This 
is the case below unless otherwise referenced.
3 This improvement should be discounted to some extent because 43 per cent of the SCE profit 
came from oil companies, which benefited mainly from increasing oil prices. Nevertheless, 
after deduction of this, the improvement is still significant.
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China’s rapid emissions growth 
and global climate change policy
Ross Garnaut, Frank Jotzo and Stephen Howes
The world has entered a period of exceptionally fast economic growth, with 
rapid economic development especially in China, followed by India and many other 
low-income countries. Early twenty-first century rates of economic growth have 
been even higher than the average in the ‘Golden Age’ of the 1950s and 1960s, 
so the current period could be called the ‘Platinum Age’ (Garnaut and Huang 
2007). This rapid economic growth goes hand in hand with increasing resource 
use and pressure on the environment, including the build-up of greenhouse 
gases and resulting climate change. 
In most of its first two centuries, modern economic growth was located in 
a small number of countries, in Western Europe, North America and Oceania, 
and in Japan (Maddison 2001). In the third quarter of the twentieth century, it 
extended into a number of relatively small economies in East Asia. A new era 
began in the fourth quarter of the past century, with the rapid extension of the 
beneficent processes of modern economic development into the heartland of 
the populous countries of Asia, including China, India and Indonesia. Incomes are 
now growing rapidly in a large proportion of the developing world. 
In the absence of a major dislocation of established trends, fast growth is 
likely to continue for a considerable period. The contemporary slow-down in 
the United States and some other industrialised countries will reduce average 
total global growth for a while, but is unlikely to break the momentum of strong 
Chinese, developing-country and global growth. The first two decades of the 
twenty-first century will see a greater absolute increase in annual human output 
and consumption than was generated in the whole previous history of our species, 
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and then almost that much again in the next decade to 2030 (Garnaut 2008b). 
This growth is heavily dependent on energy use. Rising global energy prices 
can be expected to reduce substantially the growth in petroleum consumption, 
but not necessarily the rate of expansion of total fossil-fuel emissions, given the 
widespread availability of coal—the most emissions-intensive fuel. This is true 
for most countries that do not have stringent greenhouse gas control policies 
in place, and certainly for China. 
China is poised to be the main engine of world growth in the next two decades. 
China is also one of the world’s countries most reliant on coal for energy use, 
and therefore one of the world’s most carbon-intensive countries—that is, it 
has one of the highest ratios of carbon dioxide emissions to energy use. China 
has already overtaken the United States as the largest global emitter (MNP 
2008). The combination of China’s large, rapidly growing economy and its carbon 
intensity means that in the coming years it will have an influence on greenhouse 
gas emissions unmatched by any other country.
Action will be needed by all major economies to limit and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to levels that limit the risk of climate change to acceptable levels. 
Given China’s unique position, its policies will be crucial for global climate change 
prospects. 
In this chapter, we analyse recent trends in China’s growth including for energy 
and carbon dioxide emissions and present business-as-usual projections to 2030 
for China and the world. Then we summarise recent policy developments in China 
and ask what kind of commitments China could and would need to undertake in 
a world of comprehensive climate change mitigation. 
Recent trends
Carbon dioxide emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels is the largest 
and fastest growing greenhouse gas; it is the focus of this chapter. Through 
the ‘Kaya identity’ (Kaya and Yokobori 1997),1 carbon dioxide emissions growth 
(Δ) can be decomposed (to a first-order approximation)  into economic growth, 
and growth in energy intensity (of gross domestic product, GDP) and carbon 
intensity (of energy)
ΔCO2  = ΔGDP + Δ(energy/GDP) + Δ(CO2 /energy)  
Summary data for these variables are presented in Table 8.1, for the world, for 
China and for the world excluding China. There has been a world-wide acceleration 
this decade in the growth of all three of GDP, energy and emissions (see also 
Raupach et al. 2007).2 Table 8.1 shows how of much of the recent acceleration 
in growth in global emissions is due to China. Global emissions fell in the 1990s 
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due largely to the collapse of the transitional economies. Apart from China, 
emissions growth this decade (2000–05) is lower than it was in the 1970s and 
1980s: 1.5 per cent compared with 1.8 per cent. With China, however, total global 
emissions growth this decade is 2.9 per cent—well up from the 1971–90 global 
average emissions growth rate of 2.1 per cent. China’s carbon dioxide emissions 
grew by 10.6 per cent on average between 2000 and 2005—more than three 
times the growth rate of the 1990s.3 Fifty-five per cent of the growth in global 
emissions between 2000 and 2005 occurred in China. 
Table 8.1 A comparison of GDP, energy and carbon dioxide emissions growth rates and 
elasticities for the world and China,  
1971–2005
World 1971-90 1990-2000 2000-05
Emissions growth (per cent) 2.1 1.1 2.9
GDP growth (per cent) 3.4 3.2 3.8
Energy growth (per cent) 2.4 1.4 2.7
Energy/GDP growth (per cent) -1.0 -1.8 -1.1
CO2/energy growth (per cent) -0.3 -0.2 0.3
Energy/GDP elasticity  0.71 0.43 0.69
Emissions/energy elasticity  0.87 0.82 1.10
China      
Emissions growth (per cent) 5.5 3.2 10.6
GDP growth (per cent) 7.8 10.2 9.4
Energy growth (per cent) 4.3 2.5 9.1
Energy/GDP growth (per cent) -3.3 -6.9 -0.2
CO2/energy growth (per cent) 1.2 0.7 1.4
Energy/GDP elasticity 0.55 0.25 0.97
Emissions/energy elasticity 1.29 1.27 1.16
World excluding China      
Emissions growth (per cent) 1.8 0.8 1.5
GDP growth (per cent) 3.2 2.6 3.0
Energy growth (per cent) 2.3 1.2 1.7
Energy/GDP growth (per cent) -0.9 -1.3 -1.3
CO2/energy growth (per cent) -0.4 -0.4 -0.2
Energy/GDP elasticity 0.70 0.48 0.56
Emissions/energy elasticity 0.81 0.68 0.90
Notes: Emissions growth is carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels (excluding industrial 
processes). Energy growth is total primary energy supply measured in million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(Mtoe). GDP growth is measured using 2000 US$ purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), 2007b. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 
International Energy Agency, Paris.
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Figure 8.1 uses the same data as Table 8.1 to explore the differences in 
carbon dioxide, energy and GDP relationships in China and globally. World-wide 
(excluding China), the ratios of carbon dioxide emitted to energy used and energy 
to GDP have fallen gradually and fairly smoothly. In China, in contrast, the ratio 
of carbon dioxide to energy has risen over time. The ratio of energy to GDP 
in China was stable until the late 1970s, fell sharply until about 2000, and has 
been roughly stable since. World-wide, carbon dioxide to GDP has fallen more 
sharply than either the carbon dioxide/energy or energy/GDP ratio (since both 
these have been in decline)—but not in China since carbon dioxide/energy has 
been increasing. Since 2000, GDP and energy have been growing at the same 
rate in China, and emissions slightly faster than both.
What has been driving the unusual trends observed in China? China’s energy 
intensity in the 1970s was very high. During the 1980s and 1990s, major 
improvements were achieved in the energy efficiency of the Chinese economy. 
This can be traced to strong improvements in industrial energy efficiency 
driven by government regulation, including the shut-down of small inefficient 
power plants (motivated in part by concerns about local air pollution), changes 
in ownership of state-owned enterprises, rising energy prices and structural 
Figure 8.1 Carbon dioxide emissions/GDP, energy/GDP and carbon dioxide emissions/



























Notes: Emissions growth is carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels (excluding industrial 
processes). Energy growth is total primary energy supply measured in million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(Mtoe). GDP growth is measured using 2000 US$ purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), 2007b. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 
International Energy Agency, Paris.
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change (Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004; Wu et al. 2005; Sinton and Fridley 2000). 
Many of the efficiency gains in the 1990s were, however, one-offs, and the move 
towards greater private-sector control of the economy weakened the emphasis 
on energy-saving measures. Quadrelli and Peterson (2007) report that investment 
in energy conservation as a share of total energy investment in China declined 
from 13 per cent in 1983 to 7 per cent in 1995 and to 4 per cent in 2003. China’s 
energy-intensive industries have boomed in recent years. Between 2000 and 
2006, crude steel production in China grew by an annual average of 22 per cent, 
pig iron grew by 21 per cent and cement grew by 13 per cent (NBS 2007a). All 
this has resulted in rapid energy growth in China in recent years (Figure 8.2). 
Between 2000 and 2005, total energy consumption grew by more than half in 
just five years. There has been a slight slow-down in energy growth in 2006 
and 2007, but rates are still close to 10 per cent. After remaining unchanged 
between 2000 and 2005, energy intensity fell in 2006 by 2 per cent.4 First-half 
figures for 2007 indicated a fall in energy intensity of 2.8 per cent.5
The average carbon intensity of China’s energy use has kept increasing. This is due largely 
to a changing energy mix, with growth concentrated in fossil fuels. From 1990 to 2005, coal 
energy demand doubled and the share of coal in total energy demand increased from 61 to 63 
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per cent (IEA 2007a). Increased coal use is predominantly for use in power generation, which 
is almost 80 per cent coal based and booming; in 2006, nearly 90 per cent of new electricity-
generation capacity was coal fired. Lower or zero-emissions sources (renewable sources 
including hydroelectricity, nuclear power and gas) have been growing fast but from low bases 
or, in the case of biomass, have stagnated in absolute terms. Oil use, especially for transport, 
almost trebled from 1990 to 2005, increasing its share in total energy use from 13 to 19 per cent.
A business-as-usual projection
This section projects fossil fuel-related carbon dioxide emissions to 2030 
under a business-as-usual, constant-policy approach.6 Policies already in place 
to reduce emissions are assumed to continue, but it is assumed no new ones 
are put in place, even if a government has committed to do so. We start with 
projections from the most recent International Energy Agency (IEA) 2007 
World Energy Outlook (IEA 2007a), which make use of extensive information on 
energy systems in a partial-equilibrium framework. Using an emissions-growth 
decomposition framework, we then make adjustments, based on the analysis 
presented in this chapter, to selected macroeconomic assumptions—namely, 
GDP growth in non-Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries and the intensity of energy use with regard to GDP in China. 
The strength of this approach is that it builds on the specialist knowledge of the 
IEA, and makes clear what assumptions might need rethinking. Its limitation is 
that it does not capture the general-equilibrium effects that would derive from 
the changes in assumptions.
GDP
We review and adjust IEA (2007a) growth rates for the three most-populous 
developing countries—China, India and Indonesia—and for other developing 
and transitional regions. 
Our growth forecasts for China draw on the growth-accounting framework of Perkins and 
Rawski (2008). As Table 8.2 shows, we accept the Perkins–Rawski projections for education-
enhanced labour, and assume a figure of 3.1 per cent total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
for the entire period, which is the rate of TFP growth in the past decade. Perkins and Rawski 
assume a slow-down in the rate of capital formation, but investment rates are rising, and Gar-
naut and Huang (2005) argue that these are in fact likely to rise even higher than current levels. 
We assume investment stays at 45 per cent of GDP until 2015 and then falls to 40 per cent by 
2025. Embedding these assumptions into the Perkins–Rawski framework results in projected 
growth of 9 per cent from 2005 to 2015 and 6.8 per cent for 2015–25 (Table 8.2).7 Considered 
against China’s recent performance, and its good prospects for continued double-digit growth 
(Garnaut and Huang 2005, 2007), we consider this projection to be relatively conservative. China 
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has averaged about 10 per cent GDP growth per annum since 1990. The latest figures for 2006 
and 2007 are for 11.6 per cent and 11.9 per cent growth, respectively (NBS 2008a). Our growth 
projections are, however, well above widely used international projections, including that of 
the IEA, which in its reference scenario has China’s GDP growth at 7.7 per cent for 2005–15 
and 4.9 per cent for 2015–30.
The recent acceleration of growth in the developing world has extended well beyond 
China. The growth acceleration is most evident from the period 2004–07, during which all 
developing-country regions as well as the group of transitional economies grew at 5 per cent 
per annum or more. We see this acceleration of growth in developing countries as owing much 
to better policy settings and to the spill-over effect of rapid Chinese growth—and therefore 
as sustainable. Based on growth accounting (Garnaut et al. 2008), we use, for India, 7.5 per 
cent for 2005–30 as a GDP growth projection, and for Indonesia 6.5 per cent. For developing 
countries other than China, India and Indonesia, we use a weighted average of IEA projections 
(two-thirds) and performance in the past four years (one-third).
Under the assumptions deployed, all developing and transitional countries are projected 
to be growing faster than they were in the latter decades of the past century, but slower than 
at rates observed in the past four years—with the exception of Indonesia. 
Energy intensity
The IEA (2007a) projects significant falls in the energy intensities of developing 
Table 8.2 Growth-accounting projections for China, 2005–25
Annual average  2005–2015 2015–2025
growth (%) Perkins–Rawski Platinum age Perkins–Rawski Platinum age
Labour growth (%) 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
Capital growth (%) 9.8 11.0 5.6 7.3
Capital share  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
TFP growth (%) 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.1
GDP growth (%) 9.0 9.0 6.0 6.8
Notes: All ‘Platinum Age’ (current chapter) assumptions are, unless otherwise stated, from Perkins, D. 
and Rawski, T., 2008. ‘Forecasting China’s economic growth over the next two decades’, in L. Brandt 
and T.G. Rawski (eds), China’s Great Economic Transformation, Cambridge University Press. Note that 
Perkins and Rawski’s 3.6 per cent total factor productivity growth figure for 2005–15 is not presented 
as a realistic estimate, but derived by the authors to show what it would take, given their projected 
capital and labour growth, to achieve 9 per cent GDP growth.  
Source: Garnaut, R., Howes, S., Jotzo, F. and Sheehan, P., 2008 (forthcoming). Emissions in the 
Platinum Age: the implications of rapid development for climate change mitigation, Background 
Working Paper for the Garnaut Climate Change Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
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countries from current levels.8 Although this is inconsistent with historical experience 
(Figure 8.3), we accept it on the grounds that high energy prices might induce greater 
efforts to improve energy efficiency. 
Future trends in energy intensity in China are a matter for debate. This is not surprising 
given the variability of past trends (Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3). Will the downward trend in energy 
intensity observed in the 1980s and 1990s resume, or is the recent cessation of that trend a 
permanent break? 
The IEA assumes that the downward trend will resume, and that China will reduce energy 
intensities by 2.5 per cent per annum until 2015, and then by 2.8 per cent to 2030. This projection 
is consistent with the position of some observers that China uses energy inefficiently and has 
plenty of room to improve (Cooper 2004). 
China’s energy intensity is high if market exchange rates are used to compare economies, 
but less so if purchasing power parities (PPPs) are used. Moreover, the international experi-
ence does not suggest that energy intensity falls in the course of development. As Figure 8.3 
shows, China has been the exception rather than the rule. In most developing countries, and 
as an average, the energy intensity of the economy has been remarkably constant in the past 
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three and a half decades. 
A closer examination of economies whose development path China might be thought 
to be following—Japan, Korea and Taiwan—similarly belies the notion that energy intensity 
falls as countries develop (Figure 8.4). Analysis of the historical experience of Japan, Taiwan 
and Korea shows only small decreases in energy intensity as per capita income increases, 
with energy intensity roughly flattening out at levels well above that assumed by the IEA for 
China in coming decades.
The IEA (2007a) argues that energy intensity will fall as the structure of the Chinese economy 
shifts from heavy to light industry. It is true that China has put in place a number of policies to 
slow the growth of energy-intensive sectors: for example, through taxes on energy-intensive 
exports (see the next section). The shift to heavy industry is, however, no more than would 
be expected as an economy develops with a high level of investment (extraordinarily high in 
China’s case) underpinning a shift in comparative advantage towards more capital-intensive 
manufacturing. Energy-intensive heavy industry has been growing so fast in China that its 
growth will have to fall very significantly for its share in the economy to fall. 
We assume that energy intensities decline at two-thirds the rate assumed by the IEA. This 
gives China a rate of energy-intensity reduction around the developing-country average. The 
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adjustment gives energy elasticities for China of 0.8 for 2005–15 and 0.7 for 2015–30, which 
is consistent with or below the work of Sheehan and Sun (2007), but well above the IEA’s 
projections for the two periods of 0.66 and 0.4, respectively. 
Carbon intensity
We assume that the carbon intensities of energy use (carbon dioxide/total pri- 
mary energy supply) stay broadly constant, in line with IEA projections. This 
is a conservative approach on two counts. First, in recent years, emission 
intensities have in fact been increasing in the developing world, due to the shift 
to coal, with a pronounced increase in carbon intensity in China. The tighter 
supply constraints on oil will continue to force substitution to other fuels. The 
prices for traded coal have increased in recent times also, but this reflects purely 
short-term supply constraints in mining and shipping rather than resource 
scarcity, and an expanded coal supply is expected to balance current excess 
demand. 
Second, if energy use does turn out to be higher than projected by the IEA (as we argue 
it will), a disproportionate amount of the extra demand will be met by (emissions-intensive) 
coal. In particular, our projections have emissions growing at about the same rate as energy 
in China. If, however, the growth of coal use continues to stay high, emissions will grow faster 
than energy. Between 2000 and 2005, coal use in China increased on average by 11.7 per cent. 
In 2006, China’s coal consumption grew by 11.9 per cent and, in 2007, according to preliminary 
estimates, it grew by 7.8 per cent (NBS 2007a, 2008b). 
Emissions
Putting these assumptions together results in annual average growth in China’s carbon 
dioxide emissions of 7.5 per cent from 2005–15, and 4.7 per cent from 2015–30. This 
is significantly above mainstream projections. IEA (2007a) projects emissions growth 
for China in these two periods of 5.4 per cent and 1.9 per cent. The IEA (2007a) ‘rapid 
growth’ scenario projects somewhat higher emissions growth for China of 6.4 per 
cent for 2005–15 and 2.7 per cent for 2015–30. On the other hand, the Platinum Age 
projections are not above the range of China-specific studies. Auffhammer and Carson 
(2008), in dynamic statistical models for China’s emissions based on regional data up 
to 2004, forecast annual average carbon dioxide emissions growth of 11–12 per cent 
for 2001–10 (see also Sheehan and Sun, this volume). 
Under business-as-usual, largely because of China’s rapid emissions growth, global 
emissions growth will stay high. The Platinum Age projections predict 3.1 per cent annual 
average growth in carbon dioxide emissions from 2005–30 (Garnaut et al. 2008:Table 9). These 
are again above the range of official global projections. For example, the IEA (2007a) projects 
2.1 per cent annual average growth in carbon dioxide emissions for this period. 
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Under the Platinum Age projections, China would almost double its share in global carbon 
dioxide emissions, from 19 per cent in 2005 to 37 per cent in 2030 (Figure 8.5). China’s emissions 
in this scenario would be about three times as large as the United States’ at the end of the period. 
The share of current non-OECD countries in global emissions would be more than 70 per cent. 
After 2030, China’s emissions growth will slow considerably, not least because its population 
growth will probably turn negative thus further slowing GDP growth. However, by 2030, it will 
be too late for the world to start acting on climate change. If the world does reach the levels of 
emissions projected in Figure 8.5 it will have locked in dangerous levels of temperature increase 
in subsequent decades. In any case, if the world is still not on a climate change mitigation path, 
other developing countries are set to take over from China after 2030 as the prime drivers of 
rapid emissions: first India (on its way to overtaking China as the world’s most populous country 
and, eventually, the largest economy), and then other regions including sub-Saharan Africa. 
Clearly, China’s growth path in the next two decades will be decisive for global climate 
change. Its policies and stance in international negotiations will be increasingly important 
influences on the global response to climate change. 
China’s climate change policies and goals
Recall that the projections in the previous section are constant-policy ones, assuming 
no further policy action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In reality, however, 
climate change is moving up the policy agenda in China.
China’s  National  Development and Reform Commission,  in i t s  National 
Climate Change Program (NDRC 2007), noted a range of observed and projected 
c l im at i c  ch an g e s  in  Chi n a ,  in c lu din g te m p e r at u re  in cre as e s ,  ch an g e s  in 
precipitation patterns, increases of arid areas and risks of desertification, sea-level 
rise, the possibility of more frequent extreme weather or climate events and the 
accelerated retreat of glaciers. The NDRC put forth a set of objectives, principles and policies 
to deal with climate change.
The principles include an emphasis on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, active participation in international 
cooperation, equal emphasis on the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change and 
integration with other policies such as those for energy conservation and agricultural 
productivity. 
Various policies and programs to reduce energy consumption have been 
launched or announced (NDRC 2007; Pew Center 2007). They include closing 
inefficient power plants to the tune of about 8 per cent of current generating capa- 
city, closing small or outdated industrial plants, agreements for incentives for the largest 1,000 
enterprises, improving end-use efficiency through standards and labelling and mandatory fuel-
economy standards for cars that are more stringent than those in the United States. Specific 
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advanced processes are to be used in energy-intensive industries.
Policies also aim to change the composition of the economy. The service sector’s share is to 
be increased, and the scale of energy-intensive industries reduced in favour of high technology 
and information industries. Export taxes are already levied on energy-intensive industries—at 
15 per cent for a range of metals and 10 per cent for primary steel products—while import 
tariffs are to be reduced to 0–3 per cent (Pew Center 2007). 
Reducing the energy intensity of the economy is motivated not predominantly 
by climate change objectives, but importantly by China’s concerns about energy 
security (Downs 2004), and by concerns about local environmental impacts such 
as air pollution. It is unclear to what extent comprehensive policies to limit green- 
house gas emissions will in fact be implemented—and, even if fully impleme- 
nted, they will fall a long way short of stopping the growth in China’s emissions. 
The NDRC (2007:19) cautions that ‘with [the] current level of technology develo- 
pment, to reach the development level of the industrialized countries, it is inevitable that per 
capita energy consumption and CO2 emissions will reach a fairly high level’.
On the energy-supply side, a range of policies is aimed towards lowering carbon intensity 
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(NDRC 2007). The share of renewable energy sources is to be increased under the Renewable 
Energy Law, predominantly through a doubling of hydropower capacity. Nuclear power 
capacity is to be quadrupled. Within thermal power generation, the development of high-
efficiency coal power plants is to be accelerated, and methane arising from coal-mining is to 
be utilised for power generation to a greater extent. China is also involved in initiatives with 
the United States, Europe and Australia on carbon capture and storage. 
Programs to reduce emissions are also planned or are under way beyond the energy 
sector, such as accelerated reforestation and the development of rice varieties that are low in 
methane emissions (NDRC 2007).
The target contained in China’s eleventh Five-Year Plan is to reduce the energy intensity 
of GDP by 20 per cent from 2005 to 2010. This is against the backdrop of a broader strategy 
of quadrupling GDP from 2000 to 2020, while doubling energy consumption (Development 
Research Center 2005, see also Sinton et al 2005), thus limiting the growth rate in energy use to 
approximately half the GDP growth rate. The 2005–10 target implies an average annual reduction 
in energy intensity of 4.4 per cent, starting from 2005 levels. Such reductions would be a drastic 
turn around from almost unchanged intensity in the previous five years, and modest reductions 
in 2006 and 2007 (see above). Analysis of energy-saving options (Lin et al. 2007) concludes that 
with vigorous policy action it could be possible to meet the 20 per cent energy intensity reduction 
target, but time clearly is running out for 2010.
Nevertheless, the target of constraining growth in energy use to half the rate of GDP growth 
could be a useful yardstick in years to come, and could underpin a possible international 
commitment on national emissions by China. 
Possible commitments by China in an effective global mitigation 
regime 
Strong domestic policy action in China is likely to eventuate only if there is strong 
action in other major countries, especially the United States. Political change is under 
way in the United States, with growing support in Congress for domestic policies to 
control greenhouse gas emissions. Both presidential candidates for the upcoming 
election are running on platforms that include goals of reducing US emissions by 
60 per cent (John McCain) and 80 per cent (Barack Obama) by 2050, compared with 
1990 levels. 
How far the negotiations under the UN ‘Bali road-map’—or indeed any alternative 
negotiating framework—can take the world towards effective climate change mitigation 
depends in large measure on the commitments that China and the United States are prepared 
to make. China’s dominance in global emissions and emerging importance as a global economic 
force mean that it is no longer credible to claim that mitigation has to be undertaken exclusively 
in industrialised countries. Effective mitigation of climate change will require global emissions 
to peak in the near future, and then decline to well below current levels (IPCC 2007). Given fast 
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emissions growth in China and other developing countries, and their rapidly rising share in 
global emissions, emissions need to be limited and then reduced in all countries.
As argued by the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut 2008a), broad international 
acceptance of national emissions limits will require a heavy emphasis on per capita measures, 
leading ultimately to equal per capita emissions rights across all countries. This would have to 
be implemented gradually, and fast-growing countries close to the world average per capita 
emissions would need to be given some headroom to allow their emissions to go above the 
global average for a limited time. China is in this situation, with emissions per person soon to 
reach the global average on a fast-rising curve. Headroom could take the form of the emission-
intensity target applying for a number of years, before shifting to a trajectory of reductions 
in per capita emissions. 
Consistent with this, a first and significant step for China would be to hold the growth in its 
carbon dioxide emissions to half the rate of its GDP growth, as shown by Trajectory A in Figure 
8.6. This would be consistent with China’s announced policy for halving its energy intensity 
by 2020, and increased use of renewable and other low-emissions energy to counterbalance 
increases in high-emissions coal. Over time, adherence to this trajectory would drive emission 
levels significantly below business-as-usual levels. In 2030, China’s fossil-fuel emissions would 
be almost one-third lower than in the business-as-usual case—and the same as they would be 
in 2021 without policy action (Figure 8.6).
At some point, China’s scope for headroom would come to an end, and China’s per capita 
emissions would need to start to fall. The second trajectory (B) in Figure 8.6 illustrates such 
a contraction scenario, which takes over from the ‘half GDP growth’ trajectory in 2020. The 
scenario shows China’s emissions for a linear reduction in per capita emissions—or emissions 
entitlements, if there were international trade in entitlements—towards 3 tonnes per person 
in 2050 (3 tonnes per person is mentioned as a 2050 global goal by Stern [2008] and is used 
here to illustrate the sort of long-term emissions reductions that will be required). Trajectory B 
implies an approximately 2 per cent reduction rate in annual absolute emissions entitlements 
in the 2020s. It would bring emissions (entitlements) back to 2012 levels by 2030—a 60 per 
cent reduction relative to business as usual. 
Even this level of mitigation by China might not suffice. Garnaut et al. (2008) 
analyse what would be required to adhere to a limited stabilisation path (aiming not 
to exceed an atmospheric concentration of 550 parts per million of carbon dioxide). 
Assume that industrialised and transition countries (the so-called 'Annex 1' countries 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) reduce emissions 
by 30 per cent by 2020 (the upper bound of the range of emissions reductions by 2020 
proposed by the European Union). This gives room for the emissions of devel- 
oping countries to increase by an annual average of only 1.4 per cent to 2020. The figure of 
1.4 per cent is not much more than the rate of population growth for the developing world, 
and well below the 4 per cent annual growth in emissions assumed for China to 2020, under 
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the intensity target. 
Trajectory C in Figure 8.6 shows the emissions path for China in a case in which 
per capita emissions contract from their current level towards the 3 tonnes of 
carbon dioxide target for 2050, starting in 2009. While it is not realistic to assume 
that China does not need any headroom and can start to cut emissions immed-iately, this 
trajectory provides a useful illustrative bound on its possible mitigation effort.
Whether and where China lies between its business-as-usual baseline and 
the most  s tr ingent mit igation trajec tor y (C )  wi l l  dep end on whether and 
to what extent it chooses to participate in the global mitigation regime. This in 
turn will be a function of industrial-country participation and pressure, China’s 
assessment of the political and economic benef its of participation and non- 
participation and the give and take of international negotiations. Most importantly, it will 
depend on China’s own assessment of the importance of avoiding high risks of dangerous 
climate change.
Realising any of mitigation Trajectories A, B or C would require strong policy action, 
including for fuel switching away from coal, expansion of renewable and/or nuclear power, 
geosequestration for carbon dioxide (carbon capture and storage) when and where available, 
and accelerated structural change and improvements in energy efficiency throughout the 
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emissions growth presents great opportunities, because much of China’s infrastructure is not 
yet in existence. The additional costs of building new power supply systems, manufacturing 
industries or transport infrastructure to a low-carbon standard are much lower than refurbishing 
or replacing existing stocks, which would be needed to achieve similar reductions in slower-
growing economies. 
Comprehensive emissions pricing, through a tax or an emissions trading scheme, would be 
the most economically efficient way of achieving this outcome. International harmonisation 
of marginal abatement costs would allow emissions reductions at least at cost. Linking to 
international emissions markets, which are emerging or expanding in the European Union, the 
United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and probably in other countries in future, could 
achieve this for China. Depending on the allocation of emissions entitlements, this could benefit 
China economically even without taking into account the benefits from lesser climate change 
impacts and risks. The International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (IMF 2008), for 
example, shows simulations in which China’s consumption increases significantly, if allocations 
are made on the basis of current emissions or population. China could sell excess emissions 
entitlements if remaining below its agreed trajectory of emissions entitlements, or dampen 
compliance costs by buying entitlements elsewhere—a realistic scenario once developing 
countries start coming into an international system. 
Emissions trading will be critical to providing incentives for China and other developing 
countries to participate in the international mitigation regime, but it is only one part of the story. 
Increased industrial-country financing of the research, development and commercialisation 
of low-emissions technology, as well as the financing of the transfer of this technology to 
developing countries, will be critical.
Conclusion
It is in China more than anywhere else that global climate change mitigation will be 
decided. If China does not participate in the global mitigation effort, its emissions will 
continue to grow rapidly and will account for a rising share of global emissions. Many 
‘mainstream’ analyses underestimate likely economic growth in years to come, and 
could be too optimistic about reductions in the energy intensity and carbon intensity 
of China’s energy system, unless there are strong and comprehensive policies to 
reduce emissions. Indeed, with high oil prices, there might be a strong shift to coal, 
which will further increase the rate of growth in emissions.9 
Moreover, if China does not participate, or only participates marginally, in the global 
mitigation effort, there will be an indirect effect that will see other countries reduce their 
levels of ambition and effort since they will know that, without China, their efforts cannot avert 
climate change risks. On the other hand, if China does participate fully in  global mitigation 
efforts, these two effects can be reversed. China’s own emissions will be much lower, and other 
countries—industrialised and developing—are likely to do more. 
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China is starting to put a range of ambitious climate change policies in place, and has 
announced goals of reducing the energy intensity of the economy and increasing the share 
of low-emissions energy. If implemented, these policies will limit emissions growth to well 
below the business-as-usual trajectory. China’s goal of limiting the growth in energy use to 
half the growth rate of the economy could become the basis for a near-term emissions target 
that will allow it to play a leading role in international discussions. Constraining the growth of 
China’s emissions in this way could be compatible with the start-up phase of an international 
system of per capita emissions converging to a common and lower level, with some headroom 
provided in the interim for fast-growing developing countries. 
Notes
1  The Kaya identity further decomposes economic growth into population growth and growth in 
income per capita. 
2 Since energy intensity and carbon intensity are declining, acceleration for them means that 
they are declining less rapidly.
3 Growth in other greenhouse gas emissions is thought to be much slower. Emissions of methane 
and nitrous oxide, which account for about one-sixth of China’s emissions in carbon dioxide 
equivalent terms, are reported to have grown by only 0.6 per cent per annum from 1994 to 
2004 (NDRC 2007). 
4 In 2006, energy consumption grew by 9.6 per cent, and GDP by 11.6 per cent (NBS 2007a, 
2008a).
5 See NBS (2007b). 
6 This section draws heavily on Garnaut et al. (2008). 
7 We extend the latter projection to 2030. 
8 The IEA projects an annual average decline of 1.8 per cent for energy intensity in the developing 
world excluding China in the next 25 years.
9 China is investing in coal-to-liquid plants and is expected to start operating the largest such 
facility outside South Africa later in 2008. See Nakanishi and Niu (2008).
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China can grow and still help 
prevent the tragedy of the CO2 
commons
Warwick J. McKibbin, Peter J. Wilcoxen and Wing Thye Woo
On the road to prosperity
China and India have finally embarked on the path of modern economic growth. 
China’s economy has grown at an average annual rate of almost 10 per cent 
for the past 30 years, and India’s has grown more than 8 per cent every year 
since 2004. Just like the experiences of post-1868 Japan and post-1960 South 
Korea and Taiwan, China and India are now on the trajectory of catch-up growth 
that will bring them in the long run to the same living standard as Western 
Europe, Japan and the United States. At that point, the share of global income 
produced by China and India will equal their share of global population (which 
is anticipated to be about 35 per cent).
This projected parity in living standards in the long run will represent a 
return to the global economic situation that persisted in the first 1,600 years 
of the Gregorian calendar (Table 9.1). In year zero, China and India had 58 per 
cent of the global population and 59 per cent of global gross domestic product 
(GDP); and the respective numbers in 1600 were 53 per cent and 52 per cent 
(despite the growing divergence in GDP per capita in Western Europe from 
1500 onwards). The relatively slow growth of China and India in the past 400 
years changed the situation dramatically. By 1973, China and India’s share of 
global GDP had fallen to only 7.7 per cent although the two countries accounted 
for 37 per cent of the world’s population. China’s economic deregulation and 
integration into the world trade and financial systems since 1978 and India’s 
since 1991 raised their share of world GDP to 20.6 per cent in 2003.1 Given the 
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still large gap between the average income in China and Western Europe in 
2003—$4,803 and $19,912, respectively (measured in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars)2—continued high growth in China could continue for the next 
two decades.
The very likely return of China to the centre stage of the global economy 
has given rise to immense optimism on some fronts, and intense pessimism 
on a number of other fronts. Optimistic analysts have predicted that China’s 
re-emergence as an independent growth pole will create a new web of syn-
ergistic relationships that will unleash greater global prosperity. On the other 
hand, pessimistic analysts have pointed out that the major new rising powers 
in the twentieth century came into conflict with the existing powers: Germany 
in World War I, the Japanese–German axis in World War II and the Soviet Union 
in the Cold War.
The important lesson from the history of the twentieth century is not, how-
ever, that conflict is inevitable but that rising powers and existing powers should 
work together to avoid past mistakes—to falsify Karl Marx’s quip that ‘history 
repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce’. It is really not naive to think that 
conflict is preventable because the most important power to rise and prevail 
in the twentieth century was the United States, and it has, in general, been a 
stabilising force in the international order. Averting the pessimistic outcome 
requires adherence to the multilateralist principle of the existing powers ac-
commodating rising powers, and the latter becoming responsible stakeholders 
in the international system.
The dialogue between the existing and rising powers must necessarily be 
comprehensive because the range of global public goods that must be supplied 
is very broad (ranging from the maintenance of the universal postal system to 
the peaceful use of outer space), and the nature of some of these global public 
goods is highly complicated (for example, a scheme to control the emission of 
greenhouse gases). In this chapter, we will confine discussion to an economic 
issue in which the need to engage China in constructive dialogue is important 
for sustainable global growth. The issue is the protection of the global environ-
mental commons by addressing China’s emissions of carbon dioxide.
The chapter is organised as follows: section two makes the case that climate 
change could be a key obstacle for China. It shows that even under conservative 
assumptions, the business-as-usual growth path might cause an environmental 
collapse before China achieves parity in living standards with the countries in the 
OECD. Section three reviews the history of energy production and consumption 
in China, and then uses a dynamic multi-country general-equilibrium model (the 
G-cubed model) to project a realistic business-as-usual trajectory for carbon 
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dioxide emissions. Section four proposes a novel hybrid policy as an alternative 
to the commonly discussed cap-and-trade mechanism to control carbon dioxide 
emissions. Section five employs the G-cubed model to examine the economic 
consequences of the different instruments to reduce carbon dioxide generation. 
Section six concludes with recommendations for the form of future inter- 
national climate agreements and how China can be encouraged to participate. 
The fallacy of composition in modern economic growth?
We began this chapter with the optimistic projection that China and India will 
achieve parity in living standards with Western Europe, which leads immediately 
to the question of when this convergence will occur. Between 1913 and 2003, 
when Japan was on its catch-up growth trajectory, the annual growth rate of 
average income was 3.1 per cent in Japan and 1.9 per cent in Western Europe 
and the United States. It is possible to use this information to undertake a very 
crude back-of-the-envelope calculation to see what stresses might begin to 
emerge over time. Suppose we assume that 
• Western Europe grows 1.5 per cent annually from 2003 onwards
• China and India grow 3.1 per cent annually from 2003 until reaching parity 
with Western Europe, and then 1.5 per cent annually.
Under these assumptions, China will achieve income parity with Western 
Europe by 2100, and India will achieve parity by 2150.3 The common GDP per 
capita in 2150 will be about $180,000.
This extrapolation might fail to be realised, however, not because of political 
reasons, as commonly feared, but because of environmental reasons. It will not 
be wars that will derail the catch-up growth; rather, the growth process could 
prove to be unsustainable because of the fallacy of composition. Specifically, it 
is possible that a continual improvement in living standards might be achievable 
for a small subset of large countries, but not for all large countries together. 
A global equilibrium with a common living standard, which existed in the first 
millennium, might not be replicable in 2150 because the earlier situation was an 
agriculture-dominated equilibrium in which the average income was stagnant at 
$440. In contrast, the envisaged global equilibrium will have an average income 
of $180,000, which will be growing at 1.5 per cent annually. 
The difference is between the vicious circle of Malthusian growth and the 
process of what Simon Kuznets (1966) has labelled ‘modern economic growth 
(MEG)’. In MEG, society is urbanised, the economy is industrialised and in-
creasingly service oriented, and human capital rivals physical capital in its 
contribution to economic growth. A key ingredient, so far, in this historically 
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unprecedented sustained growth in prosperity has been energy from fossil 
fuels. The result is that the concentration of carbon dioxide in the earth’s at-
mosphere has risen from 280 parts per million (ppm) in the pre-industrial age 
to 379 ppm in 2005 (IPCC 2007:37). 
Under existing energy technologies, the scale of growth in China and India 
will be associated with a very large increase in global carbon dioxide emissions 
and with rapidly rising carbon dioxide concentrations. There is now a substantial 
literature suggesting that the increase in carbon dioxide concentrations has 
contributed substantially to global warming and climate change.4 According to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), climate change 
has
• very likely contributed to sea-level rise during the latter half of the 
twentieth century
• likely contributed to changes in wind patterns, affecting extra-tropical 
storm tracks and temperature patterns
• likely increased temperatures of extremely hot nights, cold nights and 
cold days
• more likely than not increased the risk of heat waves, areas affected 
by drought since the 1970s and the frequency of heavy precipitation 
events
• led to the ocean becoming more acidic, with an average decrease in pH 
of 0.1 units.5 
There is serious concern expressed in IPCC reports that there could be 
severe and irreversible problems resulting from climate change.6 What is the 
level of the threshold carbon dioxide concentration that would unleash calamity 
on the world economy and human life? The truth is that we do not know. David 
King, the chief scientific advisor to the British government, suggested that ‘we 
should prevent atmospheric CO2 [concentrations] going beyond 500 ppm’ (Kirby 
2004),7 and Michael Raupach, an Australian atmospheric scientist, advocated a 
limit of 550 ppm (Beer 2007).8 It has become quite common to adopt the position 
that the threshold carbon dioxide concentration for dangerous consequences 
is 560 ppm—a doubling of the pre-industrial value of 280 ppm. Of course, the 
possibility that the threshold is 500 ppm or even 840 ppm cannot be ruled out 
definitively on a priori grounds.
At the present incremental rate of 2 ppm of atmospheric carbon dioxide 
annually, the 560 ppm mark would be breached by 2100, just when China is 
about to reach parity in living standards with Western Europe.9 If there were 
indeed a catastrophic threshold of carbon dioxide concentration of 560 ppm, 
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China and India could achieve income parity with Western Europe, Japan and 
the United States in 2150 only because the environmental collapse triggered by 
the growth of China and India brought down the incomes of Western Europe, 
Japan and the United States! This new equilibrium of income parity produced 
by the ‘fallacy of composition’ could well be characterised by global acrimony 
and strife.
The crucial point is that one does not have to accept the existence of a 
catastrophic threshold level of carbon dioxide concentration in order to conclude 
that unless there are future revolutionary breakthroughs in green technology 
or fundamental shifts in the nature of economic growth, China and India could 
achieve income parity with the rich countries only by creating serious global 
environmental problems. Clearly, China is one of the key countries that needs 
to be brought into the global framework with a clear commitment to take action 
on greenhouse gas emissions.
Figure 9.1 Comparison of projections of energy consumption in China, 
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Moreover, it is important to bring China quickly into an international agree-
ment because its dramatic recent rises in energy use and greenhouse gas emis-
sions have been unanticipated by most analysts, and the potential for further 
upside surprises on emissions remains as China’s strong growth could be more 
durable than anticipated. For example, the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) of the US Department of Energy provides projections of carbon dioxide 
emissions by major countries in its annual International Energy Outlook. The 
EIA makes projections for Chinese energy consumption for three scenarios: 
high economic growth, the reference case and low economic growth. 
Figure 9.1 reports projections from the 2002 International Energy Outlook (EIA 
2002) and the 2007 International Energy Outlook (EIA 2007). The shocking fact 
is that for the future years that overlap in both reports, in every case China’s 
projected energy consumption in the low-growth scenario in the 2007 report 
is above the projected energy consumption in the high-growth scenario in 
the 2002 report. The 2002 high-growth forecast for 2020 was 102.8 quadrillion 
British thermal units (BTU) and the 2007 low-growth forecast for 2020 was 
106.6 quadrillion BTU. The 2002 ‘reference-case’ forecast was 84.4 quadrillion 
BTU in 2020, and the 2007 reference-case forecast was 112.8 quadrillion BTU in 
2020—an upward revision of 33.6 per cent. Even more important, carbon dioxide 
emissions in 2005 were 50 per cent higher than the forecast made in 2002.
Past and future patterns of energy use and carbon dioxide 
emissions in China
China is now the second largest user of energy in the world after the United 
States, and the EIA (2007) projects China will become the largest by 2025 (Table 
9.2), when China will consume 19.6 per cent of the world’s supply of energy and 
the United States will consume 19 per cent. China will, however, become the 
world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide earlier than 2025. In 2015, China will 
account for 20.7 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions while using 17.4 
per cent of global energy, and the same figures for the United States will be 19.4 
per cent and 20.1 per cent, respectively. This is partly because it is anticipated 
that China will expand its use of fossil fuels.
The fuel composition of energy consumption in China is shown in Figure 9.2. 
Much of the recent rise in energy consumption took the form of an increased 
use of coal. Coal has been the major energy source in China throughout the 
period of growth since the reforms in the early 1990s. The surge in energy use 
since 2002 is obvious from the figure, and it results from a number of factors 
including rising GDP growth since 1998 (Figure 9.3) and a recent rise in the 
energy intensity of GDP (Figure 9.4). The shift in the energy intensity of the 
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Chinese economy was due to a number of factors driving structural change, 
including: increased electrification, greater energy demand from manufacturing, 
greater energy demand by households and greater use of cement and steel as 
infrastructure spending rose. 
Perhaps more interesting than the historical experience of Chinese energy 
use are future trends in energy and greenhouse gas emissions, particularly 
since an increasingly worrying picture of the global climate has emerged in the 
past half-decade. Projecting future energy use and greenhouse gas emissions 
in China, especially over horizons of more than a decade, is very difficult. It 
is tempting to construct future projections by simple extrapolation of recent 
trends. A somewhat more sophisticated approach is to apply the ‘Kaya identity’ 
(Kaya 1990), which decomposes emissions growth into four components: 
changes in emissions per unit of energy, changes in energy per unit of per capita 
GDP, growth of per capita GDP, and population growth. The four components 
are then projected separately. This is the approach taken, for example, in many 
of the studies cited by the IPCC (2007) and by Garnaut et al. (2008). 
The Kaya identity is a useful historical decomposition but it is not an ideal 
forecasting framework. Each of its components is really an endogenous out-
come resulting from a wide variety of individual decisions, and they cannot be 
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Figure 9.4 Energy (1,000 BTU) per unit of GDP (purchasing power 





































Source: Energy Information Agency (EIA), various years. International Energy Outlook, 
Department of Energy, Washington, DC.









































Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008. World Economic Outlook, April, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
200
China’s Dilemma
assumed to remain constant in the future. As shown by Bagnoli et al. (1996) 
and McKibbin et al. (2007), overall economic growth is not the only important 
determinant of energy use. Identifying and understanding the underlying 
sources of economic growth is critical, and it is particularly important to un-
derstand how the structure of an economy evolves in response to changes in 
energy prices. 
Figure 9.5 shows EIA projections for carbon dioxide emissions by energy 
source in China for the reference-case scenario. It is clear that coal is the 
overwhelming source of carbon dioxide emissions in China—historically 
and in these projections. It is expected to be the major source of energy, and 
therefore emissions, in the foreseeable future. This is not surprising given 
the large quantity of low-cost coal available in China and the assumptions of 
unchanging relative energy prices in these projections. Over time, the share 
of emissions from petroleum is projected to rise with greater use of motor 
vehicles and other transportation. These types of projections are dependent on 
assumptions about the relative price of energy to other goods and the relative 
price of alternative energy sources. 
Figure 9.5 Projections of carbon dioxide emissions by fuel type in 
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Figure 9.6 shows the global sources of carbon dioxide from burning fossil 
fuels, by region, in 1990 and those projected in the 2007 International Energy 
Outlook (EIA 2007) for 2030. Not only is China currently an important source 
of carbon dioxide emissions, it is expected to grow quickly. Its absolute size, 
shown in Figure 9.6, and its share in global emissions (shown in Table 9.1) 
emphasise that China is a critical country in the debate about policies to deal 
with climate change. 
We now present our own projections of carbon dioxide emissions from the 
G-cubed multi-country model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1998; gcubed.com). A 
summary of the approach is provided here but further details on the technique 
used in the G-cubed model can be found in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2007). In 
the following discussion, the sources of economic growth are labour-augmenting 
technical change at the industry level and population growth. The population 
growth assumptions are based on the 2006 UN population projections (mid-
scenario). In order to simplify the discussion, labour-augmenting technical change 
is referred to as ‘productivity growth’ throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
In the G-cubed model, a productivity catch-up model is assumed to be the 
driver for productivity growth by sector and by country. The United States is 
assumed to be the technological leader in each sector. Other countries are 
allocated an initial productivity gap by sector and a rate at which this gap is 
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closed. For industrial countries and China, this is assumed to be a time-varying 
rate, which on average is 2 per cent per annum from 2006. For other developing 
countries, it is assumed to range between 2 per cent per annum and 1 per cent 
per annum, depending on the region. In this chapter, initial Chinese productivity 
is assumed to vary across sectors, and averages about 20 per cent of the 
productivity in the equivalent sector in the United States in 2002. 
The results from the G-cubed model for Chinese carbon dioxide emissions 
are shown in Figure 9.7. This has a business-as-usual baseline as well as two 
other lines that will be discussed in section five below, which involve different 
assumptions about policy interventions. The business-as-usual projections 
from G-cubed are higher than the projections in EIA (2007). Carbon dioxide 
emissions in
• the EIA low-growth scenario rose from 6,400 mega-tonnes (Mt) in 2010 
to 10,143 Mt in 2030
• the EIA reference-case scenario rose from 6,497 Mt in 2010 to 11,239 Mt 
in 2030
• the EIA high-growth scenario rose from 6,615 Mt in 2010 to 12,500 Mt 
in 2030 
• the G-cubed model rose from 7,855 Mt in 2010 to 14,114 Mt in 2030.
The difference between the EIA’s projections and those of G-cubed is 
reminiscent of the difference between the EIA’s 2002 and 2007 projections. 
The higher projections by G-cubed come from it forecasting a higher economic 
growth rate in China than the EIA (2007) and a smaller change in the energy 
intensity of GDP in China (the latter being an endogenous result of the 
assumptions imposed for sectoral productivity growth in China). It must be 
stressed, however, that our G-cubed projections (like projections by others) 
are highly uncertain and change quite significantly if assumptions about the 
rate of catch-up are varied.
The principles to guide reduction in carbon dioxide emissions
There are many vexing, fundamental issues in deciding how to prevent catast- 
rophic climate change. These issues include the following.
• There is still much about the science of climate change that we do not fully 
understand. Is climate change a linear or an abrupt discontinuous function 
of carbon dioxide concentration?10 Is there are saturation point in the 
absorptive capacity of the earth’s sinks for atmospheric carbon dioxide?
• There are immense difficulties in computing the costs and benefits of 
climate change. How should we value irreversible events such as species 
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extinction? How should we value the benefits to the present generation 
and the costs to the unborn future generations?
• There are serious challenges to designing effective implementation and 
oversight mechanisms for the carbon dioxide reduction process. How can 
national carbon dioxide caps be enforced? How can we build in incentives 
for mutual policing among the polluters dispersed around the world?
• The reduction of carbon dioxide emissions will only delay, not stop, the 
increase in carbon dioxide concentrations towards the danger level. The 
only long-term solution is likely to be shifting to non-fossil fuel energy. 
It is, however, impossible to know when these alternative fuels will be 
available at commercially viable costs, and at the vast scales that will 
ultimately be required. If the carbon dioxide reduction mechanism is 
designed to buy time for this development, how long will we need?
• There is unlikely to be an amicable way to distribute the burden of re- 
ducing carbon dioxide. Should the existing polluters be ‘grandfathered’ 
into the international treaty? What should be the relative burden for the 
rich, middle-income and poor nations? Alternatively, should the cap be 
based on carbon dioxide allowances per person?
The world, obviously, cannot afford to continue on the business-as-usual 
path until there is broad consensus about most of the above issues. Rates 
of carbon dioxide emissions are increasing, the tangible consequences of 
climate change are already evident and there is the real possibility that 
‘projections from climate models have been too conservative’ (Gulledge 
2008:56).11 The sense of urgency is real, and this is why many countries signed 
the Kyoto Protocol on 11 December 1997 as a pragmatic way to effect at least 
a temporary improvement on the business-as-usual situation. The signatories 
from industrial countries agreed to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions 
in the period 2008–12 to 95 per cent of their 1990 levels, on average (that is, 
5 per cent below their 1990 emissions), and to allow the permits for carbon 
dioxide emissions to be tradable internationally. China was not required to 
undertake any reduction because it was a developing country. The United 
States signed the treaty but never ratif ied it because it exempted large 
developing countries, particularly China and India. Since the United States 
and China are the world’s two largest carbon dioxide emitters,12 the Kyoto 
Protocol was rendered grossly inadequate as a carbon dioxide reduction 
mechanism. Nordhaus (2008:92) has estimated that global emissions in 




To be effective, any carbon dioxide reduction scheme must include as many 
of the large emitters as possible and it should move them towards substantial 
long-term reductions in emissions. There are three classes of market-based 
mechanisms that could put the world on this agreed global carbon dioxide 
emissions path
• mechanisms that do not specify the carbon dioxide emissions path for 
each country: for example, a global carbon tax
• mechanisms that specify an immediately binding carbon dioxide emis-
sions path for each country: for example, a domestic cap-and-trade 
scheme or an international cap-and-trade scheme 
• mechanisms that specify a carbon dioxide emissions path that is not im-
mediately binding: for example, a domestic carbon tax or the McKibbin–
Wilcoxen hybrid (MWH) approach.
In practice, actual emissions are unlikely to hit target emissions at every 
point in time. We label the quantity target ‘immediately binding’ if the emissions 
above the target are explicitly penalised. The quantity target is labelled ‘not 
immediately binding’ when the above-target emissions pay the same carbon 
tax as the below-target emissions, and the carbon tax is later adjusted to bring 
anticipated emissions to the target path. Naturally, the global and national 
target paths, and the level of international and domestic carbon taxes are 
modified over time to take into account how close the actual emissions have 
been to target emissions, revelations in abatement costs and developments 
(and anticipated developments) in areas such as technology.
The global carbon tax
Given a desired time path of global carbon dioxide emissions, it could be 
possible to identify a time-varying common carbon tax that would motivate 
the private sector in each country to hold collective carbon dioxide emissions 
to the target amount in the absence of unexpected developments. A global 
carbon tax would have to be revised at fixed periods in light of its performance, 
improvements in technology, advances in scientif ic knowledge and new 
information and ideas. A global carbon tax has the virtue of not distorting the 
comparative advantage of the different countries.
Since much of the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations 
since the Industrial Revolution has been due to industrialised countries, perhaps 
developing countries could be exempted from the global carbon tax for a period 
or until they have reached a certain level of income.
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The domestic carbon tax
A carbon tax could also be applied at the domestic level. Given a time profile of 
desired carbon dioxide emissions for a country, it would be possible to identify 
the carbon tax required to achieve this. This approach is, however, likely to be 
inefficient in the global sense because it will not guarantee that the marginal cost 
of emissions reductions will be the same across countries. The probable outcome 
would be a distortion of comparative advantage. Again, developing countries might 
be exempted temporarily from having to impose this domestic carbon tax.
Domestic cap and trade
A country could issue emissions permits to match a national target emissions 
path. The permits could be given free to existing carbon dioxide emitters or 
auctioned to the general public, and would be tradable within the country but 
not across borders. This approach, like the domestic carbon tax, is unlikely to 
produce a globally efficient pattern of abatement. Developing countries might 
be given ceilings on carbon dioxide emissions that are binding only when they 
attain a particular income level.
International cap and trade
An international treaty that establishes a global carbon dioxide emissions path 
and allocates carbon dioxide emissions among countries could also allocate 
internationally tradable emissions permits to those countries; the Kyoto 
Protocol falls under this category. Developing countries could be given more 
permits than they would need for their current emissions, and they could then 
sell the excess and use the revenue to accelerate development and buy green 
technology. This approach would equate the costs of abatement at the margin 
and would not distort comparative advantage.
The McKibbin–Wilcoxen hybrid (MWH) approach
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002a, 2002b) have proposed a hybrid approach that 
combines
• an internationally determined path for emissions reductions for each 
country, which is translated into a limited supply of long-term national 
permits
• sales of annual national permits (in order to accommodate deviations 
from a national path) sold at a price that is determined by international 
negotiations: say, every five years.
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Both types of permits would be valid only in the country of issue: there 
would be no trade across borders.13 Every year, firms would be required to hold 
a portfolio of permits equal to the amount of carbon they emit.14 The portfolio 
could include any mix of long-term and annual permits. The long-term permits 
could be owned outright by firms, or they could be leased from other permit 
owners. Except for the case of developing countries, which we will discuss in 
detail later, the amount of long-term permits for each country would intentionally 
be set lower than the anticipated amount of emissions (for example, set below 
the target emissions path). If the target turns out to be sufficiently tight, there 
will be demand for the annual permits, which will impose an internationally 
fixed upper bound on the short-term price of carbon emissions. 
Each country would manage its own domestic hybrid policy using its own 
existing legal system and financial and regulatory institutions. There would be no 
need for complex international trading rules, for the creation of a powerful new 
international institution or for participating governments to cede a significant 
degree of sovereignty to an outside authority. The international dimension 
of the MWH consists of two actions: 1) setting a notional (or ‘aspirational’) 
greenhouse gas emissions trajectory for each country; and 2) harmonising the 
price of annual permits across participating countries.15 
The number of long-term permits would be guided by the international 
negotiations over the target emissions path for the country. For example, the 
international treaty establishing the MWH mechanism could suggest that 
signatories distribute no more long-term permits than their allotments under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The number of long-term permits would be set when a country 
joined the scheme, but the country’s government would have considerable 
flexibility in how the permits were used. A government that wished to tackle 
climate change more aggressively could choose to distribute few long-term 
permits;16 and a government that preferred a carbon tax could distribute no 
long-term permits at all.17 The treaty would not need to specify rigid allocations 
of long-term permits because emissions would generally be controlled at 
the margin by the price of annual permits. The number of long-term permits 
affects only the distribution of permit revenue between the private sector and 
the government; it does not affect the country’s total emissions. Distributing 
a small number of long-term permits means the government will earn a lot of 
revenue from annual permit sales, but it might also lead to significant political 
opposition. Distributing a larger number means less government revenue but 
the permits would be very valuable to the private sector and permit owners 
could be expected to form a powerful lobby in support of the policy. In either 
case, one country’s decision has little effect on other signatories. 
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Long-term permits 
A 100-year permit would be akin to a book of 100 coupons, with each coupon 
corresponding to a particular year and stating the amount of greenhouse 
gas emissions the holder is entitled to emit. In line with a declining level of 
target emissions, the coupon for each year would allow a smaller amount 
of greenhouse gas emissions than the previous year. Once distributed, the 
long-term permits could be traded among firms, or bought and retired by 
environmental groups. The permits would be very valuable because: 1) there 
would be fewer available than needed for current emissions; and 2) each permit 
would allow annual emissions over a long period. As a consequence, the owners 
of long-term permits would form a private-sector interest group that would 
greatly enhance the long-term credibility of the policy: permit owners would 
have a clear financial interest in keeping the policy in place. 
When initially distributed, the long-term permits could be given away, 
auctioned or distributed in any other way the government of the country saw 
fit. One option would be to distribute them for free to industry in proportion 
to each firm’s historical fuel use—for example, a firm might receive permits 
equal to 90 per cent of its 1990 carbon emissions. Such an approach would 
be relatively transparent and would limit the incentives for lobbying by firms. 
Although the allocation would be based on historical emissions, the tradability 
of the permits would mean that they were not tied in any way to the original 
recipient or any particular plant, and hence would not create differences in 
marginal costs across firms or plants. Moreover, the existence of annual permits 
limits the ability of incumbent firms to create entry barriers by keeping their 
long-term permits off the market: entrants could simply buy annual permits. 
Incumbent firms would benefit financially from the initial distribution of permits, 
but unless they were previously liquidity constrained, they would not be able 
to use their gains to reduce competition.18
Another alternative would be to auction the permits. Auctioned permits 
would be exactly like a carbon tax except that the industry would have to pay 
the entire present value of all future carbon taxes up front. As the number of 
long-term permits was intentionally kept below the target path of emissions, 
at least a few annual permits would be sold in every year. The price of a permit 





The government would sell annual permits for an internationally agreed 
price—say, for $20 per tonne of carbon. There would be no restriction on the 
number of annual permits sold, but each permit would be good only in the year 
it was issued. Annual permits give the policy the advantages of an emissions 
tax: they provide clear financial incentives for emissions reductions but do 
not require governments to agree to achieve any particular emissions target 
regardless of cost. The existence of the annual permits introduces a degree of 
flexibility in the target. Over time, the global carbon price would be readjusted 
if either the global target were not being met as well as desired or if the global 
target were changed because of new information about climate science or 
marginal abatement costs.
Treatment of developing countries
To be effective in the long run, the agreement will eventually need to include 
all countries with significant greenhouse gas emissions. It is unlikely, however, 
that all countries will choose to participate at the beginning. Developing coun-
tries, for example, have repeatedly pointed out that industrialised countries are 
overwhelmingly responsible for current greenhouse gas emissions, and that 
those countries should therefore take the lead in reducing emissions. As a re-
sult, an international climate policy will need to cope with gradual accessions 
taking place over many years. Its design, in other words, must be suitable for 
use by a small group of initial participants, a large group of participants many 
years in the future and all levels in between. One important role for the treaty’s 
long-term permit guidelines would be to distinguish between industrialised and 
developing countries. For example, a country such as China would be allowed 
to distribute more long-term permits than needed for its current carbon emis-
sions. In that case, it would be committing itself to slowing carbon emissions 
in the future, but would not need to reduce its emissions right away. As the 
country grows, its emissions will approach the number of long-term permits. 
The market price of long-term permits would gradually rise, and fuel users 
would face increasing incentives to reduce the growth of emissions. Once the 
long-term target becomes a constraint, annual permits would begin to be sold 
and would smooth out the evolution of annual carbon costs.
A generous allotment of long-term permits would reduce the disincentives 
to join faced by developing countries, but that alone might not be enough to 
induce widespread participation. If stronger incentives were needed, it would 
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be possible to augment the treaty with a system of foreign-aid payments or with 
programs for technology transfer to participating developing countries. 
The firewall of separate markets under MWH
Because the permit markets under this policy are separate between countries, 
shocks to one permit market do not propagate to others: for example, accession 
by a new participant has no effect on the permit markets operating in other 
countries.19 Likewise, the collapse of one or more national permit systems would 
be unfortunate in terms of emissions control, but it would not cause permit 
markets in other countries to collapse as well. In contrast, under the Kyoto 
Proto-col, shocks in one country—ineffective enforcement or withdrawal from 
the agreement, for example—would cause changes in permit prices around the 
world. For permit owners and permit users, investments in emissions reductions 
would be more risky under the Kyoto Protocol than other systems.
Compartmentalisation is especially important for a climate change agree- 
ment because of the uncertainties surrounding climate change: the agreement 
must survive through intervals in which warming seems to be proceeding 
more slowly than expected, which could create political pressure to abandon 
the agreement on the grounds that it is not necessary. Such intervals could 
arise because of random fluctuations in global temperatures from year to year, 
or because the policy is succeeding in reducing the problem. The latter point 
is worth emphasising: if a climate regime is successful at reducing warming 
and preventing significant damage, it will be easy for complacency to arise: 
many people might interpret the absence of disasters to mean that the risks 
of climate change were overstated. 
Another advantage of multiple national permit markets, rather than a single 
international one, is that the incentives for enforcement are stronger. Individual 
governments would have little incentive to monitor and enforce an international 
market within their borders—and it is easy to see why: monitoring polluters 
is expensive, and punishing violators imposes costs on domestic residents in 
exchange for benefits that accrue largely to foreigners. There would be a strong 
temptation for governments to look the other way when firms exceeded their 
emissions permits. For a treaty based on a single international market to be 
effective, therefore, it will need to include a strong international mechanism 
for monitoring compliance and penalising violations. National permit markets 
reduce the problem substantially because monitoring and enforcement become 
a matter of enforcing the property rights of a group of domestic residents—the 
owners of long-term permits—in domestic markets. 
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Incentives for investments in carbon dioxide reduction under MWH
Some commentators argue that the MWH mechanism is more complex than an 
emissions tax or conventional permit system, but it is more likely to encourage 
private-sector investment in capital and research that will be needed to address 
climate change. To see why, consider the incentives faced by a firm after the 
policy has been established. Suppose the firm has the opportunity to invest 
in a new production process that will reduce its carbon emissions by 1 tonne 
every year. If the firm is currently covering that tonne by buying annual permits, 
the new process will save it $20 per annum. If the firm can borrow at a 5 per 
cent real rate of interest, it will be profitable to adopt the process if the cost of 
the innovation is $400 or less. For example, if the cost of adoption were $300, 
the firm would be able to avoid buying a $20 annual permit every year for an 
interest cost of only $15; adopting the process, in other words, would eliminate 
1 tonne of emissions and raise profits by $5 per annum.
Firms owning long-term permits would face similar incentives to reduce 
emissions because doing so would allow them to sell their permits. Suppose 
a firm having exactly the number of long-term permits needed to cover its 
emissions faced the investment decision in the example above. Although the 
firm does not need to buy annual permits, the fact that it could sell or lease 
unneeded long-term permits provides it with a strong incentive to adopt the 
new process. To keep the calculation simple, suppose that the permits are 
perpetual and allow 1 tonne of emissions per annum. At a cost of adoption of 
$300, the firm could earn an extra $5 per annum by borrowing money to adopt 
the process, paying an interest cost of $15 per annum, and leasing the permit 
it would no longer need for $20 per annum.
The investment incentive created by MWH rises in proportion to the annual 
permit fee as long as the fee is low enough to be binding—that is, low enough 
that at least a few annual permits are sold. For example, raising the fee from 
$20 to $30 raises the investment incentive from $400 to $600. 
The upper limit on incentives created by the annual fee is the market-clearing 
rental price of a long-term permit in a pure tradable permit system. Above that 
price, there would be enough long-term permits in circulation to satisfy demand 
and no annual permits would be sold. For example, if long-term permits would 
rent for $90 a year under a pure permit system, the maximum price of an annual 
permit under the hybrid model would be $90.
The critical importance of credibility becomes apparent when considering 
what would happen to these incentives if firms were not sure the policy was 
going to remain in force. If the policy were to lapse at some point in the future, 
emissions permits would no longer be needed. At that point, any investments 
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made by a firm to reduce its emissions would no longer earn a return. The effect 
of uncertainty about the policy’s prospects is therefore to make the investments 
it seeks to encourage substantially more risky. 
Since the incentives created by the policy increase with the price of an annual 
permit, a government might try to compensate for low credibility by imposing 
higher annual fees. For example, suppose a government would like a climate 
policy to generate a $400 incentive for investment but firms believe that there 
is a 10 per cent chance the policy will be abandoned each year. For the policy 
to generate the desired incentive, the annual permit price would have to be $60 
rather than $20. That is, the stringency of the policy (as measured by the annual 
permit fee) must triple in order to offset the two-thirds decline in the incentives 
arising from the policy’s lack of credibility. In practice, the situation is probably 
even worse. Increasing the policy’s stringency is likely to reduce its credibility 
further, requiring even larger increases in the annual fee. For example, suppose 
that investors believe that the probability the government will abandon the 
policy rises by 1 per cent for each $20 increase in the annual fee. In that case, 
maintaining a $400 investment incentive would require an annual fee of $70 
rather than $60, which would be accompanied by an increase in the perceived 
likelihood of the policy being abandoned from 10 per cent to 12.5 per cent. 
The general lesson is that a low-cost but highly certain policy generates the 
same incentives for action as a policy that is much more expensive but less 
certain. A hybrid policy with a modest annual permit price would generate 
larger investment incentives than a more draconian, but less credible, emissions 
target imposed by a more conventional system of targets and timetables. The 
MWH proposal is more credible than a carbon tax because it builds a political 
constituency with a large financial stake in preventing backsliding by future 
governments. It is therefore likely to provide more incentive to the private sector 
to make investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Coping with new information
Over time, more information will become available about climate change, its 
effects and about the costs of reducing emissions. If it becomes clear that 
emissions should be reduced more aggressively, the price of annual permits 
can be raised. The political prospects for an increase would be helped by the 
fact that raising the price of annual permits would produce a windfall gain for 
owners of long-term permits, since the market value of long-term permit prices 
would rise as well.20
If new information indicates that emissions should drop below the number 
allowed by long-term permits, raising the price of annual permits would need 
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to be augmented by a reduction in the stock of long-term permits. One option 
would be for each government to buy and retire some of the long-term permits 
it issued. Other approaches would be possible as well: for example, accelerating 
the expiration date of the permits. 
Comparing methods for reducing China’s carbon dioxide emissions
Three market-based mechanisms
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol allows in-
dustrialised countries to use credits for emissions-reducing actions taken in 
China to help meet their obligations under the protocol. This approach cannot 
be scaled up sufficiently to have the required effect of significantly reducing 
China’s carbon emissions because it is project based and has proven very 
complex and costly to administer. 
In this section, we show some results for alternative policy regimes and 
discuss what they imply for emissions and economic growth in China. Figure 9.7 
contains various paths of greenhouse gas emissions from energy use in China 
under three different policy regimes
• a domestic carbon tax
• an international cap-and-trade scheme
• the MWH approach.
The business-as-usual line in Figure 9.7 is the projection of Chinese emis-
sions from energy use from the G-cubed model under the assumptions already 
discussed above. 
In order to compare the key aspects of the three policy regimes, we assume 
that all countries take on the emissions reduction path that is contained in 
the recent World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF 
2008). Emissions in each country, and for the world as a whole, rise along the 
business-as-usual path for a number of years, gradually peaking in 2028, falling 
back to 90 per cent of the 2002 emissions level about 2050 and then dropping 
to 40 per cent of the 2002 level by 2100. Along this business-as-usual trajectory, 
China and other developing countries would take on the same commitment as 
industrial countries but initially with a more gradual reduction target.21
In the first policy option, labelled ‘Country target’ in Figure 9.7, China rea- 
ches its target by implementing a domestic carbon tax. All other countries are 
assumed to follow a similar strategy and achieve their targets through domestic 
actions only. This country-by-country targeting achieves a common global 
outcome but with a wide variety of costs across countries. 
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The results indicated by the ‘International cap and trade’ (triangles) line in 
Figure 9.7 are the emissions outcomes when China is given a permit allocation 
based on its target emissions and is then allowed to buy or sell emissions 
permits on international markets. China can therefore change its emissions 
outcome by selling permits at the world price (which is common to all countries). 
In the G-cubed model, under this allocation of permits, China has among the 
lowest marginal abatement costs in the world—that is, it is much cheaper to 
reduce a unit of carbon in China than in most other countries, reflecting the 
energy infrastructure and sources of emissions in China. The outcome is that 
emissions fall more quickly in China as China cuts its emissions domestically 
to sell permits abroad. Eventually, the marginal cost of abatement in China 
rises enough to reach equilibrium with the rest of the world. 
The third policy option shown in Figure 9.7 is the MWH approach, in which 
China is allocated an amount of long-term permits equal to twice its 2008 
emissions (which is more than the real amount of emissions in the first few 
years of its accession to the international climate treaty) but declining over time 
at the same rate as other countries.22 These permits cannot be used outside 
China and therefore do not directly affect emissions in other countries. In this 
case, China’s short-term carbon price is zero for a number of years because 
there are more permits available than needed, and emissions in China continue 
to rise along the business-as-usual path. When China grows enough to reach 
its emissions constraint, it starts to sell annual permits at the price stipulated 
by international agreement. Eventually, the carbon emissions path begins to 
fall until it reaches the emissions outcome under the international cap-and-
trade system. This is not surprising since the uniform price under the MWH is 
designed to be almost the same as the price that would be delivered under the 
cap-and-trade policy.23 The results are the same because the model is run under 
conditions of complete certainty about future events. With uncertainty, it would 
be necessary to refine the carbon price iteratively over time to try to reach the 
desired global target in a ‘learning-by-doing’ fashion. Under the cap-and-trade 
system, however, the target would be reached but at the cost of potentially very 
high volatility in carbon prices, and therefore economic costs.
Figure 9.8 shows the GDP outcome for China under the three different 
policies. The results are expressed as a percentage deviation from the business-
as-usual path. Under the ‘country target’ and ‘cap-and-trade’ regimes, GDP 
begins to fall from the beginning of the regime in 2013. By 2025, the GDP loss to 
China from the carbon policy is about 1.8 per cent per annum. The international 
cap-and-trade policy leads to slightly lower GDP loss than the no-trading case 
because China is able to sell permits to raise income, which slightly offsets the 
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GDP loss for deeper cuts. The MWH model delays the significant GDP losses 
until China reaches the binding permit constraint, which begins about 2028. 
Advanced technology diffusion
Another policy approach that is often advocated as a means of enhancing 
emissions reductions world-wide is the deployment of advanced energy 
technology in China. In this section, we present some results from McKibbin 
and Wilcoxen (2008) in which this policy is explored. The business-as-usual path 
discussed above is based on the assumption that energy technologies in each 
economy gradually improve at rates similar to those seen in recent historical 
data. Many policies now under discussion are, however, explicitly intended to 
accelerate the development and deployment of advanced technologies that 
would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Some of these technologies, such as 
the integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) process to generate electricity 
from coal, reduce carbon dioxide emissions by substantially improving the 
efficiency of fossil-fuel combustion. Other technologies, such as carbon capture 
and sequestration, would reduce emissions by removing carbon dioxide from 
the exhaust stream after combustion. Yet other technologies, such as hybrid 
engines or carbon-fibre components for automobiles, would reduce emissions 
by lowering the fuel required per unit of service demanded (vehicle kilometres 
travelled, for example). Finally, advanced technology for non-fossil fuel sources 
of electricity, including nuclear power and renewable energy, would reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions by shifting the overall fuel mix. In this section, we 
examine the potential for accelerated deployment of advanced technology to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions associated with electric power generation. 
Since improved technology will allow more electricity to be produced from 
any given input of fossil fuel, we represent advanced technologies in the model 
via fuel-augmenting technical change. In essence, this approach captures 
the fact that new technology allows the same outcomes (output produced, 
distance travelled, and so on) to be produced with less physical energy. Factor-
augmenting technical change introduces a distinction between physical inputs 
of energy (kilowatt hours, for example) and the effective value of those inputs to 
energy users. For example, increasing the efficiency of a coal-fired power plant 
from 41 per cent to 49 per cent using ultra-supercritical boiler technology would 
allow 19.5 per cent more electricity to be produced from a given amount of coal 
(an 8 per cent gain on a base of 41 per cent). In effect, the technology allows a 
new plant using 1 tonne of coal to produce the same amount of electricity that 
would have required 1.195 tonnes of coal in an older plant. The technology, in 
effect, serves to augment the physical fuel used.
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Because the G-cubed model aggregates all electric power technologies into 
a single electric sector in each country, shifts of the fuel mix away from fossil 
fuels towards nuclear and renewable energy can also be modelled as fossil 
fuel-augmenting technical change. For example, a country increasing the share 
of non-fossil fuel generation in its fuel mix from 40 per cent to 55 per cent, and 
hence reducing its fossil fuel share from 60 per cent to 45 per cent, is effectively 
generating 33 per cent more electricity for any given input of fossil fuel. 
Using industry projections of the rate of diffusion of a range of innovations 
in electricity generation between 2008 and 2030, we produced the augmentation 
factors shown in Table 9.3. The values shown include both effects mentioned 
above: improvements in the efficiency of fossil-fuel combustion, and shifts in 
the fuel mix away from fossil fuels. By 2030, for example, the 1.66 shown for 
Japan indicates that advanced technology and fuel switching will mean that 
the ratio of total electricity produced to fossil-fuel input will be 1.66 times that 
ratio today. We assume that technology and fuel switching continue beyond 
2030, although at a diminishing rate. By 2045, for example, the augmentation 
factor for Japan increases to 2.09. The augmentation factors vary considerably 
by country. Improvements are very limited in developing countries other than 
China and India: the 2030 augmentation factor is only 1.13. India’s augmentation 
factors are quite high, reflecting the fact that India currently relies heavily on 
coal burned in boilers with very low efficiency. Better technology therefore 
improves India’s performance considerably. In contrast, Europe’s augmentation 
factors are relatively low: it currently relies least on fossil fuels of all of the 
regions, and its current technology is relatively efficient. It therefore has less 
room for improvement.
Figure 9.9 shows the effect of the advanced-technology scenario on carbon 
emissions in China. For comparison, the business-as-usual results are shown 
as well. The business-as-usual trajectories are indicated with diamonds and 
the advanced-technology trajectories are indicated with triangles and labelled 
‘high innovation’. By 2050, emissions are lowered by 500 Mt per annum. This 
is a significant reduction from focusing only on electricity generation, but 
interestingly it is not as large as might be expected given the substitution we 
have assumed. This result is seen because in a rapidly growing economy such 
as China, the introduction of enhanced technology results in greater wealth 
and this higher wealth is spent partly on greater energy consumption. When we 
reduce the amount of carbon per unit of electricity, therefore, we also raise the 
amount of electricity used. This rebound effect of technological deployment on 
income growth is sufficient in China to partly offset the reduction in emissions 
from the new technology. This suggests that a combination of policies to deploy 
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Table 9.3 Fossil-fuel augmentation factors i.e. productivity in 
electricity generation relative to business-as-usual
Region 2030 2045




Rest of OECD 1.67 2.09
China 1.67 2.1
India 1.8 2.31
Other developing countries 1.13 1.22
Former Soviet Union 1.71 2.16
OPEC 1.22 1.35
Note: Each number represents the ratio of electricity per unit of fossil fuel consumed in the 















Figure 9.9 China’s carbon dioxide emissions from energy under 












































Source: G-cubed model in McKibbin, W. and Wilcoxen, P., 2008. Building on Kyoto: towards a 
realistic climate change agreement, Paper presented to the Brookings Institution High-Level 
Workshop on Climate Change, Tokyo, 30 May 2008.
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technology as well as to price carbon to encourage substitution away from 
carbon-intensive inputs is required in a comprehensive approach to tackle the 
emission of greenhouse gases.
Future research will explore the interaction of alternative technology policies 
and the cost of carbon abatement under the MWH policy. Combining these 
approaches offers a potentially important way forward in cementing a global 
agreement based on economic incentives and technological innovation.
Conclusions
This chapter has summarised recent developments in energy use and carbon 
dioxide emissions in China. The increase in emissions since 2002 has taken 
most analysts by surprise and is a significant concern for global policymakers 
attempting to deal with climate change. As shown in McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(2002a), unexpected developments cause the different market-based carbon 
dioxide reduction mechanisms to create vastly different costs. The international 
carbon tax and the MWH approach are more economically efficient responses 
to uncertainty than the cap-and-trade of the Kyoto Protocol.
Because it is very difficult to forecast future energy and emissions paths, 
concerns about uncertainty could delay or prevent accession by countries 
(especially developing countries) to a global climate agreement based on rigid 
targets and timetables. The recent experience of energy use and carbon emis-
sions in China supports the arguments in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2008) that 
uncertainty about the economic costs of undertaking binding emission targets 
is an important problem for a rapidly developing country such as China. 
As an alternative, we have outlined the MWH approach, a set of internationally 
agreed actions that are based on long-term emissions targets and include an 
explicit compliance mechanism (annual permits) that allows the constraint to 
be exceeded at a stipulated international price. This approach would reduce 
emissions but without requiring participating countries to agree to achieve their 
emissions targets at any cost. Such an approach is not only very consistent 
with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, it is likely to be more 
viable than the current framework being negotiated under the Kyoto Protocol. 
China is a pivotal country in the global debate. The more its concerns can be 
taken into account in the design of a global post-Kyoto system, the more likely 
it is that the world will begin to take effective action on climate change.
We finish by emphasising the importance of combining a market-based carbon 
dioxide reduction mechanism with an ambitious program to accelerate the 
development of green technology. Such a program would probably have a 
higher chance of success if some important parts of it were based on inter-
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national collaboration. For example, since China is building a coal-fired power 
plant each week, there is considerable opportunity to make some of those 
plants prototypes that could be used to test the scaling up of experimental 
technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration. On its own, China 
would hesitate to incur the costs of such experiments because others could 
quickly learn any useful findings.24 Clearly, international scientific cooperation 
paid for by the international community could hasten the progress of a range 
of new technologies.
Notes
1 The Japanese growth experience since 1870 clearly suggests that the income disparity between 
China and Western Europe is not independent of Chinese economic policies. In 1870, the 
average Japanese income was 37 per cent of that of the average Western European income, 
but after a century of policy-induced convergence of economic institutions in Japan with 
those in Western Europe and the United States, average Japanese income in 1973 was equal 
to average income in Western Europe. The growth experiences of South Korea and Taiwan 
since the early 1960s confirmed that catching-up growth was not unique to Japan.
2 Unless otherwise specified, all dollar figures refer to 1990 dollars.
3 At these growth rates, GDP per capita in 2100 would be $84,400 in Western Europe and $92,800 
in China; and GDP per capita in 2150 would be $177,700 in Western Europe and $192,100 in 
India.
4 Possibly the most authoritative recent statement of this position is IPCC (2007).
5 The first four effects are from page 6, and the fifth is from page 9. On the last effect, the IPPC 
added that ‘while the effects of observed ocean acidification on the marine biosphere are 
as yet undocumented, the progressive acidification of oceans is expected to have negative 
impacts on marine shell-forming organisms (eg. corals) and their dependent species’.
6 ‘As global average temperature increase exceeds about 3.5°C, model projections suggest 
significant extinctions (40 to 70% of species assessed) around the globe’ (IPPC 2007:13–14).
7 The tipping point is def ined as when the melting of the Greenland ice-cap becomes 
irreversible.
8 Raupach is quoted as saying 
…if we manage to bring CO2 to equilibrium at 450ppm, we would be looking at 
a temperature rise of 1 to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels, some changes 
to rainfall patterns, some melting of the Arctic, significant acidification of the 
oceans through CO2 rise and so forth. But these are issues which would not cause 
widespread devastation…If we reach 550ppm, we’re getting into 2 to 2.5 degree 
temperature rise and the amount of climate damage that we would be looking at will 
in some cases…probably involve crossing thresholds that we can’t recover from. If 
we keep on the present growth projectory then we get there by about 2046 (cited in 
Beer 2007).
9 The increment was 2.08 ppm in 2002 and 2.54 ppm in 2003; see Kirby (2004). The concentration 
of atmospheric carbon dioxide is taken to be 380 ppm in 2008.
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10 Gulledge (2008:52) has described the proposition that ‘future climate change will be smooth 
and gradual’ as a myth: ‘The history of climate reveals that climate change occurs in fits and 
starts, with abrupt and sometimes dramatic changes rather than gradually over time.’ Figure 
3-1 in Gulledge (2008) makes this point dramatically in the time profile of the number of storms 
of tropical hurricane force in the North Atlantic in the period 1930–2007.
11 Gulledge (2008:56) points out that
…the models used to project future warnings either omit or do not account for 
uncertainty in potentially positive feedbacks that could amplify warming (for 
example, release of greenhouse gases from thawing permafrost, reduced ocean and 
terrestrial CO2 removal from the atmosphere), and there is some evidence that such 
feedbacks may already be occurring in response to the present warming trend.
12 Table 9.2 reports that the United States and China accounted for 35.2 per cent of global carbon 
dioxide emissions in 2004, and would account for 39.1 per cent in 2010.
13 Strictly speaking, the word ‘country’ is too narrow. The permits would be valid only within the 
political jurisdiction of issue. If the relevant jurisdiction is multinational—the European Union, 
for example—permits could be traded between countries within the broader jurisdiction.
14 This approach is known as a downstream policy because it applies to fuel users. It would also 
be possible to apply the policy upstream by imposing limits on the carbon embodied in fuels 
when they are produced—for example, at the mine mouth or well-head.
15 The negotiations, of course, would not be trivial: getting agreement on the annual price 
would require considerable diplomacy. It is interesting to note that a treaty of this form has a 
strong built-in incentive for countries to participate in the initial negotiations. Countries that 
participate will have a role in setting the annual price while those who remain on the sidelines 
will not. We are indebted to Jonathan Pershing for pointing this out.
16 Countries have different degrees of concern about climate change and different abilities to 
implement climate policies. A coordinated system of hybrid policies provides participants 
with the ability to tailor the policy to their own circumstances.
17 A government might prefer a carbon tax if it lacks the institutional and administrative 
mechanisms needed to operate a permit market.
18 In passing, it is worth noting that anti-competitive behaviour by the incumbents, while unlikely, 
would have an environmental benefit: it would reduce overall carbon emissions.
19 In contrast, a conventional international permit system could be particularly difficult to 
enforce because of the links it creates between countries. Restricting sales of permits by 
non-complying countries, as would be required under the Kyoto Protocol, would harm the 
interests of compliant countries by raising permit prices. The international links between 
permit markets therefore provide a strong incentive against enforcement of the agreement.
20 Although long-term permit owners would welcome an increase in the annual price, there 
is little risk that they would be able to drive prices up on their own. Given that other energy 
users provide countervailing pressure to keep energy prices low, it is hard to imagine that 
permit owners would be able to push a government into adopting an inefficiently high price 
and excessively stringent emissions policy.
21 The exact details of the target are not central to this paper because we will be comparing 
alternative policies for reaching a single set of targets; however, more rapid cuts in emissions 
would clearly give different results to those presented here.
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22 The excessive amount of long-term permits in the first few years of this policy option means 
that the global emissions of carbon dioxide in the third policy option exceed the amount of 
global carbon dioxide emissions in the first and second policy options (whose emissions equal 
each other’s). It is interesting that if China were given an excessive amount of carbon credits 
in the second policy option, its emissions path and GDP path would still be the same as that 
shown in Figures 9.7 and 9.8 as long as the extra amount of carbon credits given to China was 
small and hence had no effect on the world price of carbon credits. As production in China is 
guided by the world price of carbon credits, it would remain unchanged, and China would just 
sell off the extra carbon credits and cause the global emissions to be larger than under the 
first policy option (domestic carbon tax) and the original second policy option (international 
cap and trade) where the allocated carbon credits were binding from the beginning.
23 A difference arises because the transfer of income across countries with different spending 
patterns can change carbon dioxide emissions and therefore the price required for an 
equivalent global target path.
24 This dilemma exists in other forms as well, illustrated by the recent decision of the Virginian 
regulator of utilities in the United States
…to turn down an application by the Appalachian Power Company to build a plant 
that would have captured 90 per cent of its carbon and deposited it nearly two miles 
underground, at a well that it dug in 2003. The applicant’s parent was American 
Electric Power, one of the nation’s largest coal users, and perhaps the most 
technically able. But the company is a regulated utility and spends money only when 
it can be reimbursed (cited in Wald 2008). 
 The Virginia commission said that it was ‘neither reasonable nor prudent’ for the company 
to build the plant, and the risks for ratepayers were too great, because costs were uncertain, 
perhaps double that of a standard coal plant. And in a Catch-22 that plagues the whole effort, 
the commission said A.E.P. should not build a commercial-scale plant because no one had 
demonstrated the technology on a commercial scale (Wald 2008). 
25 Full details of the model, including a list of equations and parameters, can be found online at 
www.gcubed.com
26 These issues include: Reaganomics in the 1980s, German unification in the early 1990s, fiscal 
consolidation in Europe in the mid 1990s, the formation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the East Asian financial crisis and the productivity boom in the United 
States.
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Appendix 
The G-cubed model
The G-cubed model is an inter-temporal general-equilibrium model of the 
global economy. The theoretical structure is outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(1998).25 A number of studies show that the G-cubed modelling approach has 
been useful in assessing a range of issues across a number of countries since 
the mid 1980s.26 Some of the principal features of the model are as follows.
• The model is based on explicit inter-temporal optimisation by the agents 
(consumers and firms) in each economy (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). In 
contrast with static computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, in the 
G-cubed model, time and dynamics are of fundamental importance. The 
G-cubed model is known as a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model in the macroeconomics literature and as a dynamic inter-
temporal general equilibrium (DIGE) model in the CGE literature.
• In order to track the macro-time series, the behaviour of agents is 
modified to allow for short-run deviations from optimal behaviour due 
either to myopia or to restrictions on the ability of households and firms 
to borrow at the risk-free bond rate on government debt. For households 
and firms, deviations from inter-temporal optimising behaviour take the 
form of rules of thumb, which are consistent with an optimising agent 
that does not update predictions based on new information about future 
events. These rules of thumb are chosen to generate the same steady-
state behaviour as optimising agents so that in the long run there is only 
a single inter-temporal optimising equilibrium of the model. In the short 
run, real behaviour is assumed to be a weighted average of the optimising 
and the rule-of-thumb assumptions. Aggregate consumption is therefore 
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a weighted average of consumption based on wealth (current asset 
valuation and expected future after-tax labour income) and consumption 
based on current disposable income. Similarly, aggregate investment is a 
weighted average of investment based on Tobin’s ‘Q’ (a market valuation 
of the expected future change in the marginal product of capital relative to 
the cost) and investment based on a backward looking version of ‘Q’.
• There is an explicit treatment of the holding of financial assets, including 
money. Money is introduced into the model through a restriction that 
households require money to purchase goods. 
• The model also allows for short-run nominal wage rigidity (by different 
degrees in different countries) and therefore allows for significant 
periods of unemployment depending on the labour-market institutions 
in each country. This assumption, when taken with the explicit role for 
money, is what gives the model its ‘macroeconomic’ characteristics (here 
again, the model’s assumptions differ from the standard market-clearing 
assumption in most CGE models). 
• The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within 
sectors and within countries and the flexibility of financial capital, which 
immediately flows to where expected returns are highest. This important 
distinction leads to a critical difference between the quantity of physical 
capital that is available at any time to produce goods and services, and 
the valuation of that capital as a result of decisions about the allocation 
of financial capital.
As a result of this structure, the G-cubed model contains rich dynamic 
behaviour, driven on the one hand by asset accumulation and, on the other, 
by wage adjustment to a neoclassical steady state. It embodies a wide range 
of assumptions about individual behaviour and empirical regularities in a 
general-equilibrium framework. The interdependencies are solved using a 
computer algorithm that solves for the rational-expectations equilibrium of the 
global economy. It is important to stress that the term ‘general equilibrium’ is 
used to signify that as many interactions as possible are captured, not that 
all economies are in a full market-clearing equilibrium at each point in time. 
Although it is assumed that market forces eventually drive the world economy 
to a neoclassical steady-state growth equilibrium, unemployment does emerge 
for long periods due to wage stickiness—to an extent that differs between 
countries due to differences in labour-market institutions.
225
China can grow and help prevent the tragedy of the CO2 commons


















Crude oil and gas extraction
Non-Energy:
Mining











The political economy of 
emissions reduction in China 
Are incentives for low carbon growth 
compatible?
Cai Fang and Du Yang
There is growing, unassailable evidence of severe existing and potential 
consequences of global climate change and of the relationship between 
human economic activities and global warming (for example, Stern 2007). The 
Kyoto Protocol and the Bali climate conference road-map proposed either 
compulsory or moral requirements for action from all economies—including 
China, which has the largest population size, the fastest growth rate and the 
second-largest gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
terms. As research (Thomas 2007) estimates, assuming the ratio of carbon 
dioxide emissions to GDP remains at the 2001 level, total global emissions will 
reach as high as 25 billion metric tonnes by 2018. While this will represent an 
increase in global carbon dioxide emissions of 69 per cent, emissions in China 
will increase to 9 billion tonnes—a growth of 218 per cent, exceeding all other 
countries in terms of total emissions.1
It is seems to be the case that China’s emissions reduction efforts are 
motivated by international pressure, which the central government passes on 
to local governments and enterprises. If, however, external pressure is the sole 
motivating factor for the government to take the issue seriously—and it is not 
induced endogenously by China’s economic growth per se—China will face 
great difficulty reducing emissions because there will be a lack of incentives 
to carry out emissions reduction strategies. That is, the following questions 
should be answered before we can be confident about the realisation of the 
strategic goal. First, does the central government have persistent volition to 
carry out the policy, in financial and administrative terms? Second, are local 
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governments willing to sacrifice short-term growth for sustainable long-term 
development? Third, can an enterprise’s behaviour in dealing with emissions 
reduction incentives be compatible with the government’s intentions? As has 
been widely observed, China’s rapid economic growth during the transitional 
phase was stimulated largely by local governments pursuing GDP growth 
and the resulting enhancement of fiscal revenue. To guarantee an effective 
implementation of the strategy, any slow-down of economic growth supposedly 
caused by emissions reduction must be compensated.2
Those policy advocates for China’s emissions reduction who emphasise the 
issues of obligation and responsibility but pay no attention to issues relating to 
capability and incentive, are irrelevant in policy decisions and incomplete in the-
oretical consistency. The argument of this chapter is that the relative bargaining 
power and effectiveness of policy advocacy are determined by the dominant 
priorities and the particular stage of development. While conditions mature, 
incentives, behaviour and priorities change. The environmental Kuznets curve 
(EKC), which depicts the relationship between per capita income and envi-
ronmental quality, is a reflection of such political and economic logic (Dea-
con 2005). While the EKC is indicative of a simplified correlation of environ- 
mental appearance with environmental requirements associated with per capita 
income, there can be deeper implications behind it. In the case of China, the 
government’s behaviour, characterised so far by its developmental state, which 
consists of strong development impulses from the central and local govern-
ments, responds more sensitively to the demands from potential changes in 
growth patterns than to the demands from income increases.
In this chapter, we discuss the continuing fundamental changes in China’s 
development stage and the implications for growth patterns. Taking sulphur 
dioxide emissions as an example, we estimate a Chinese EKC and try to reveal 
incentive mechanisms and policy focuses for implementing emissions reduction 
strategies from the empirical findings. The following questions are expected to 
be answered: 1) can the orientation of growth policy be changed as a result of 
interaction between central and local governments; 2) are emissions reductions 
and low carbon growth financially feasible; and 3) can incentives be compatible 
between the central government, local governments, enterprises and the 
general population in implementing a strategy of emissions reduction?
Development stage and growth patterns
China’s environmental problems are the result of its economic growth pat-
tern, characterised by a reliance on labour and capital inputs rather than on 
productivity enhancement, although this growth pattern suits a particular 
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development stage. The Chinese stimulation of economic growth is unique in 
combining central and local governments to form a developmental state, which 
characterises the outstanding government function in economic development. 
Consequently, while individual enterprises inherently tend to respond to growth 
pattern changes—which emissions reduction is the result of—regulations and 
other government reactions are much more important in guaranteeing the 
realisation of the strategy. The impending new development stage will help 
the government shift its policy orientation by making the relevant regulations 
incentive-compatible among stakeholders.
The political economy of emissions reduction relates to the different reac- 
tions of all relevant parties. First, for the central government, decision-making 
has to do with the recognition of the importance of emissions reduction as 
required by the change in the development stage. Second, for local governments, 
incentives to shift growth patterns from input driven to productivity driven and a 
willingness to sacrifice short-term growth in GDP and fiscal revenue for sustain- 
able growth are more relevant in response to the central government’s mandate. 
Third, for enterprises, which are supposed to care more about profitability 
than externality, immanent irritants requiring transition from inputs-based to 
productivity-based expansion are generated by modification of the production 
factor endowment. Finally, for people, stronger demands for environmental quality 
come ultimately from the transition from a livelihood dominated by subsistence 
pressures to comprehensive human development that alters in accordance with 
development stages. In the final analysis, an environmental strategy can be 
implemented effectively only by combining the quartet of capacity, responsibility, 
obligation and incentive.
In his prominent paper on the relationship between economic growth and 
income inequality, Kuznets (1955) postulates that in the economic growth process, 
income inequality first increases then declines after reaching a turning point. 
Environmental economists later applied this inverted U-shape curve to depict 
a similar relationship between economic growth and environmental quality 
(Grossman and Krueger 1995). The EKC can also be a useful framework with 
which to examine whether the Chinese economy possesses inherent momentum 
to transform its growth pattern to a more environmentally friendly one and, in 
particular, to understand the political economy behind the transformation. 
In more concrete terms, we investigate the ways in which the changes in 
development stages impact on environmental policy decisions from two asp- 
ects. First, the change in development stage requires transformation of growth 
patterns. The economic growth pattern can be referred to in ways in which 
factors of production are allocated at micro and macro levels and it can usually 
be classified by what kinds of sources the economic growth is based on. Thanks 
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to the earlier than expected completion of demographic transition, the entire 
period of reform and opening-up in China has been characterised by adequate 
labour force supply and a high savings rate. This demographic dividend resulting 
from a productive population structure has been realised through marketised 
resource allocation mechanisms and participation in the global economy. The 
favourable population factor has provided China’s economic growth with a 
window of opportunity and, therefore, the phenomenon of diminishing return 
to capital has been deterred (Cai and Wang 2005). In the meantime, economic 
growth in transitional China has relied heavily on inputs of production factors 
rather than on productivity improvement. After a short rise in total factor 
productivity (TFP) and its contribution to growth in the early stages of reform, 
China’s TFP performance has been unsatisfactory since the 1990s (for example, 
Zheng and Hu 2004; Kuijs and Wang 2005). This was a major attribution of 
the growth pattern characterised by heavy pollution, high depletion and low 
efficiency (Kaneko and Managi 2004).
Similar stories were told about the early experiences of the ‘Four Tigers’ 
when they created the disputable ‘East Asian miracle’. At the time, Krugman 
(1994) noted that the economic growth in East Asia was fuelled merely by 
inputs of labour and capital, and the growth of TFP and its share of economic 
growth were insignificant. Krugman believed the miracle was doubtful; his 
judgement was based on the neoclassical theory of growth, which assumes 
diminishing returns to capital due to limited supplies of labour, which was not 
true in those economies. The facts subsequently showed that once the dual-
economy feature of an unlimited labour supply disappeared, those economies 
had to transform their economic growth patterns from inputs driven to TFP 
driven—and have since sustained their growth (Bhagwati 1996). After three 
decades of extraordinary economic growth, fuelled largely by demographic 
dividends, and as the population ages rapidly and the reservoir of surplus 
labour in rural areas runs dry, China’s labour supply and demand scenario 
has changed fundamentally since 2004. With the approach of a Lewis turning 
point, conditions under which economic growth becomes increasingly reliant 
on productivity improvement rather than on expansion of inputs are maturing 
(Cai 2008).
In addition, the increase in per capita income induces people’s desire for 
security and quality of life, and their calls for a better environment. A decade 
ago, the World Bank (1997) estimated that in 1995, financial losses resulting 
from air and water pollution were worth US$54 billion, accounting for 8 per 
cent of China’s total GDP. Since then—namely, during the period from 1995 
to 2006—the real per capita income of urban households increased by 131 
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per cent, and the real per capita income of rural households increased by 
74.8 per cent. As a result of a much faster rate of income growth for the upper 
group, the richest 20 per cent earned 4.6 times more than the poorest 20 per 
cent. Per capita income level is the decisive factor in both of the widely used 
approaches to estimating losses caused by environmental damage—namely, 
the human-cost and the willingness-to-pay approaches. The upper income 
group, especially, has stronger bargaining power to have an impact on policy 
decisions about environmental issues. Therefore, the outstanding performance 
of income enhancement for Chinese residents must play a role in increasing 
calls for environmental improvement. Frequent environmental incidents in 
recent years have shown how quickly and enthusiastically citizens and the 
press can respond to environmental disasters (Hayward 2005).
The concerns of Chinese residents, scholars, policymakers and, to a lesser 
extent, enterprises about environmental quality have been translated into the 
central documents and protocols of the eleventh Five-Year Plan. The documents 
make repeated calls for transformation of growth patterns and the eleventh Five-
Year Plan stipulates restrictive criteria for emissions reductions. As a response 
partly to those regulations and partly to the increase in prices of raw materials 
and wages, Chinese manufacturing enterprises successfully improved the 
efficiency of their usage of intermediate inputs and labour productivity (Kim 
and Kuijs 2007).
China’s environmental Kuznets curve
An effective way of understanding the relationship between economic 
development and emissions in China is to depict the EKC. As we have mentioned 
already, economic development and demand for environmental quality as a 
result of improved living conditions can be represented by per capita GDP. 
When discussing EKC therefore, we employ provincial panel data to explore 
the relationship between emissions and per capita GDP and observe when the 
Kuznets turning point appears. The two main emissions are those of carbon 
dioxide and sulphur dioxide; however, this chapter describes only the EKC of 
sulphur dioxide because the data for carbon dioxide emissions are not yet 
available officially.
Sulphur dioxide is one of the main air pollutants produced by the combustion 
of sulphur compounds and is of significant environmental concern. Since coal 
and petroleum, which are the main sources of energy in China, often contain 
sulphur compounds, their combustion generates sulphur dioxide. In 2005, 
total sulphur dioxide emissions in China were 25.49 million metric tonnes—the 
highest in the world. In the eleventh Five-Year Plan, limiting sulphur dioxide 
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emissions is one of the main goals for environmental protection. The plan 
requires a 10 per cent reduction in sulphur dioxide emissions by 2010—that is, 
total emissions of sulphur dioxide should not exceed 22.95 metric tonnes.
Data for our empirical analysis were collected from the China Statistical 
Yearbook (NBS, various issues). The variables we chose included sulphur dioxide 
emissions, per capita GDP, industrialisation levels and population by province 
from 1991 to 2006. Due to incomplete data for Tibet and Chongqing, we excluded 
these two provinces from the data sets. Table 10.1 displays the summary of 
statistics of the variables. Average sulphur dioxide emissions for all observations 
were 14.02 metric tonnes per 1,000 people; they reached 19.37 metric tonnes 
per 1,000 people in 2006. Grouping the averages of sulphur dioxide emission 
levels in the period 1991–2006 by region, we found slightly more emissions 
generated in the coastal areas than in the central and western areas, but the 
eastern provinces emitted much less sulphur dioxide (15.2 metric tonnes per 
1,000 people) than their central and western counterparts (21.6 metric tonnes 
per 1,000 people) in 2006 alone. In addition, it is worth noting that the disparities 
of per capita GDP in 2006 were greater than the time series average.
Table 10.1 Summary statistics of variables
Variable Mean (SD) Minimum Maximum Mean in 2006
All provinces    
SO2 emissions 
(metric tonnes/1,000 people) 14.02 (8.74) 1.48 57.95 19.37 (12.53)
Per capita income (1990 yuan) 4,954 (4,407) 860  34,200 9,743 (7,069)
Population (million) 41.2 (25.3) 45.4 97.2 43.5 (26.6)
Coastal    
SO2 emissions 
(metric tonnes/1,000 people) 14.29 (7.33) 14.8 33.19 15.23 (6.79)
Per capita income (1990=100) 8,516 (5,727) 1,794 34,200 1,712 (766.4)
Population (million) 39.85 (28.6) 67.4 93.1 44.3 (32.9)
Others    
SO2 emissions 
(metric tonnes/1,000 people) 13.88 (9.41) 3.55 57.95 21.55 (14.37)
Per capita income (1990=100) 3,080 (1,499) 860 8,518 5,861 (1,497)
Population (million) 42.0 (23.4) 45.4 97.2 43.0 (23.7)
Note: We define Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong and Hainan as coastal areas, and the remaining provinces as central and western 
areas. 




We now describe the time trend and regional characteristics in detail. Figure 
10.1 shows the changes in China’s per capita sulphur dioxide emissions as a 
whole over time. While there has been a general trend of increases in sulphur 
dioxide emissions in the past decade, emissions have accelerated since 2002. 
With rising public attention paid to environmental protection and improved 
capacity for implementation, the amount of sulphur dioxide limitation has 
increased more rapidly than emissions. In general, the growing pattern of 
sulphur dioxide generation can be characterised by a higher rate of removal 
and bigger increases in emissions in terms of absolute magnitude. This implies 
that, with enormous economic growth, current efforts of removal and recovery 
cannot adequately counter emissions. 
Figure 10.2 shows the changes in regional emissions of sulphur dioxide 
over time; the proportion of emissions generated in the central and western 
provinces of the total enhances over time. The ratio of emissions in 19 interior 
provinces to that in 10 coastal provinces was 1.57 in 1991, but it increased to 
2 in 2006. Given the increasing disparities in economic development between 
eastern provinces and central and western provinces in the same period, the 
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Statistics Press, Beijing.
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efficiency gains of emissions reduction in costal areas are much higher in real 
terms, whereas those in the interior provinces are dissatisfied. This rejects any 
attempt to take emissions in China as a homogenous issue and suggests a 
methodology that treats the two distinct regions differently while trying to do 
any meaningful analysis. 
The scattered observations in terms of sulphur dioxide emissions at certain 
times shown in Figure 10.3 further reveal the great heterogeneity between the 
coastal and interior regions. The horizontal axis represents the levels of per 
capita GDP in 1990 prices and the vertical axis the levels of per capita sulphur 
dioxide emissions. At a relatively low level of per capita income for coastal and 
interior regions, there was no significant difference in emissions between the 
two regions. As each of the economies grow, the levels of emissions grow, with 
an even larger divergence in emissions than in economic growth, implying that 
if there is a sign of EKC, it must be the case that the eastern provinces alone 
present the path of increase first and then decline in emissions.
To see whether an EKC in terms of a sulphur dioxide emissions pattern exists, 
we run a regression to examine the relationship between regional economic 
development and sulphur dioxide emissions based on the following empirical 
model. 
Si,t = α0 + β1yi,t + β2y
2
i,t + β3mi,t + ui + vt + εi,t (1)
in which Si,t  is per capita sulphur dioxide emissions of province i in year t, yi,t 
and y2i,t are per capita GDP at the 1990 constant price and its square term of 
province i in year t, and mi,t is the level of industrialisation of province i in year t measured by the ratio of value added in the industrial sector to total GDP. 
ui  is the province dummy reflecting the persistent provincial difference, such 
as different patterns of energy consumption, regulation of energy use and 
environmental protection, preferences for energy consumption and so on. 
vt  is the year dummy to control the factors that change with time, apart from 
economic development, such as commodity and energy prices, technology for 
sulphur dioxide removal and the like. εi,t  represents randomly disturbing factors 
apart from time and region. As in other studies on the EKC, the purpose of this 
estimation is to look at the significance and sign of β1 and β2 to decide if they 
present an inverted-U shape. 
Table 10.2 presents the regression results. The three columns list regression 
results for all 29 provinces, for coastal provinces and for central and western 
provinces, respectively. The fitness to model varies among regions: that for 
the model of coastal areas has the highest overall R2 in three equations, while 
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Figure 10.3 Sulphur dioxide emissions against per capita GDP by 
province, 1991–2006
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), various years. China Statistical Yearbook, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing.
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that for other areas is low. The model for coastal areas explains 58 per cent 
of variations of sulphur dioxide emissions, while that for others explains only 
5 per cent. 
What concerns us are the signs of the square term of per capita GDP in all 
three equations, because the negative signs indicate the existence of an EKC, 
though the coefficients are statistically insignificant for the regression for 
central and western provinces. For this reason, we can infer that the presence 
of an inverted-U shape for the pooled sample exists only because the general 
pattern of sulphur dioxide emissions in coastal areas shows a predictable 
Kuznets turning point. Based on the regression results in the first column, we 
can plot a graph that depicts the changing pattern of sulphur dioxide emissions 
in China as a whole, denoted by 29 provinces (Figure 10.4). Looking at Figures 
10.3 and 10.4, the plots of observations for the central and western areas scatter 
far left of the turning point, while those for the coastal areas stand around the 
turning point. The huge heterogeneity identifies a need to distinguish between 
the two regions when observing the EKC in China. 
We now use information from the second column in Table 10.2 to predict 
the EKC for coastal areas, and show the outcomes in Figure 10.5. According to 
the parameters estimated from the current sample, the turning point appears 
when per capita GDP reaches RMB18,963 at the 1990 constant price. Beyond 
this point, emissions are supposed to decrease. With this pattern, provinces 
that surpassed the turning point in 2007 included Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and 
Zhejing, while Guangdong and Jiangsu were very close to the point in terms of 
per capita GDP. In other words, in the current circumstances, many provinces 
in eastern China have already had the capacity and incentives to reduce their 
sulphur dioxide emissions—namely, to afford low carbon growth.
On the other hand, with accelerating economic growth, the central and 
western provinces continue their patterns of emissions. In the third column of 
Table 10.2, we see that coefficients of per capita GDP and its square term are 
statistically insignificant. If we use a different specification without inclusion of 
the square term, as shown in the last column of Table 10.2, we see a significant 
and positive coefficient for the variable of per capita income, which implies that 
the central and western regions stay at a phase of increasing emissions. As is 
expected, Figure 10.6 shows that, though diverging, most of the provinces in 
the region are scrambling in line with monotonously increasing sulphur dioxide 
emissions. In comparison with the predicted EKC of the eastern provinces, the 
picture here does not show any sign of an EKC.
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Table 10.2 Economic development and sulphur dioxide emissions: 
two-way fixed-effect model 
 All provinces Coastal areas Interior areas
GDP per capita in 1990 price .0033 .010 0.031 .015 
 (1.38) (3.10) (1.54) (2.93)
Square term of GDP per capita -2.09e–07  -2.68e–07 -1.21e–07 -
 (3.35) (4.06)  (0.8) 
Ratio of secondary industry in GDP  3.77  3.93 4.41 4.60
 (6.26) (5.99)  (4.63)  (4.99)
Fixed effect, provinces Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effect, years Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant  -44.1  -75.5 -104 -91.86
 (1.67)   (2.23)  (2.60)  (2.48)
R2    
within 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.52
between 0.06 0.61 0.002 0.0003
overall 0.15 0.58 0.051 0.064
No. of observations 464 160 304 304
Note: t value is in parenthesis.
Figure 10.4 Environmental Kuznets curve: 29 provinces
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Figure 10.6 Environmental Kuznets curve: central and western China
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Figure 10.5 Environmental Kuznets curve: coastal provinces
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Conclusion and policy implications
Exemplified by sulphur dioxide emissions, the Chinese EKC shows the existence of 
a relationship between income increases and environmental improvement. There 
are, however, issues to be considered apart from the general conclusion.
First, while one can expect a future turning point from increases to decline 
in emissions for China as a whole, most Chinese provinces are still far from 
reaching that point. The central and western provinces in particular still have a 
strong desire for economic growth at the cost of the environment in order to catch 
up with their eastern counterparts. If the previously outlined path is followed, 
China will have to suffer further environmental degradation before reaching 
its spontaneous turning point, because the experiences of a spatial transfer of 
industries show (and the EKC implies) that the latecomers in economic growth 
tend to receive the transferred industries from their advanced counterparts in 
accordance not only with their comparative advantage but with their acceptance 
of environmental degradation—that is, there will be a tendency for the central 
and western regions to welcome polluting industries transferring from eastern 
regions. Given the strong desire for growth in the less-developed provinces 
and the large income gap between Chinese provinces, single incentives such 
as per capita income are not sufficient to lead those regions to the Kuznets 
turning point. Genuine changes must rely on the introduction of incentives and 
regulations based on the need for transformation of growth patterns.
From the regression results, one can see a great heterogeneity of sulphur 
dioxide emissions among regions, which suggests distinct policy packages for 
different regions in terms of emissions reduction. For most coastal provinces, 
which either passed through or are moving towards the Kuznets turning 
point, the inertial path and intrinsic forces can lead them to reduce emissions 
spontaneously. As far as the central and western provinces are concerned, it 
is hard to predict when they will enter the Kuznets turning intervals since the 
emissions in these areas are accelerating. In this regard, it is essential to enforce 
regulations to limit their emissions behaviour as total emissions in China are 
already the highest in the world. 
Although we estimated a reasonably fitted EKC and its visible turning 
point for the eastern regions, observations differ substantially. Even for those 
observations whose positions are on the right interval of the turning point, they 
stand at different plots, implying significant heterogeneity among the eastern 
provinces. In general, the emissions in the east remain high and their decline 
will be slow.
Studies show that while a general relationship between per capita income 
and environmental quality has been observed, there are huge differentials 
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across pollutants. Greenhouse gas emissions, while concomitant with those 
such as sulphur dioxide that are directly harmful to people’s health, usually 
do not follow exactly the same path as other pollutants. As a greenhouse gas 
with no smell and no immediate harm to health, carbon dioxide emissions have 
not shown a significant path as the EKC suggests. For instance, the previous 
empirical studies rarely found an EKC between income levels and carbon 
dioxide emission patterns. If there are rare cases, they show that the turning 
point indicating carbon dioxide emissions tending to decline comes much 
later and requires several times higher income levels than do other pollutants 
(Webber and Allen 2004).
It is believed widely that because of China’s enormous population size, the 
dominance of manufacturing in its industrial structure and the low efficiency 
of energy usage, in international rankings, China is positioned high in terms of 
per capita emissions and low in terms of per GDP emissions. Starting with this 
feature, there is a tendency for China to converge with rest of the world—that 
is, its per capita emissions have been found to increase over time, reflecting the 
development emissions effect, and the per GDP emissions decline, reflecting 
the progress of technology and improvements in efficiency (Figure 10.7). As is 
expected, the overall performance of carbon dioxide has not been as good as 
that of sulphur dioxide.3
Even though the EKC is not a sufficient notion for revealing the complete 
determinants of the rise or fall of emissions, it is useful to justify the existence 
of the relationship between levels of development and pollution, because it 
shows that governments, enterprises and people are willing and able to respond 
positively to changing environmental requirements derived from changes in 
developmental stages and therefore growth patterns. The predictable EKC 
and turning point disclose the governmental cognition, determination and 
policy measures in respect of the environmental issues, and the incentive 
compatibility between stakeholders—although they by no means imply that the 
chronic environmental problems can be solved xenogenetically when the time 
comes. Activities conducted by governments at all levels, such as education 
and the provision of information, play a role in shortening the time of solving 
the problem (Deacon and Norman 2004).
Our empirical results show that there is high heterogeneity in sulphur dioxide 
emissions across provinces, which is also true for the emissions pattern of 
carbon dioxide; therefore, the policies regarding emissions should be specified 
regionally. In China’s case, given the strong motivations of the central and 
western provinces to catch up with their eastern counterparts, one of the 
challenging tasks for the central government is to design a well-functioning 
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mechanism to provide incentives that will translate the implications drawn from 
changing growth patterns into changes in the function and behaviour of local 
governments to spur regional economic development. Such policy measures 
include those that improve transfers between central and local governments 
and among regions, provide physical and financial incentives for less-developed 
regions to choose sustainability rather than exploitation of growth potential 
and to implement emissions reduction policies with incentive compatibility 
between agents.
The effectiveness of emissions reduction policy lies in the endogenous 
demands for change in growth patterns and requirements for a better 
environment. Only when economic development moves to the stage at which 
economic growth becomes productivity driven can the policy package aimed 
Figure 10.7 Changing trends of carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide 
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at significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions be incentive-compatible 
with the development motivations of local governments and the behaviour of 
enterprises. By estimating the EKC, this chapter examined the need for the 
Chinese economy to implement emissions reduction strategies. The results 
show that it is not enough to wait for the turning point to come; instead, policy 
implementation should be strengthened further in order to make incentives 
compatible between the central and local governments, enterprises and people 
in a joint effort to reduce emissions and improve the environment.
Notes
1 The figures for China’s carbon dioxide emissions are disputable. Apart from official Chinese 
denial of the figures estimated and published by Western scholars, there is a problem of 
emissions transfer—that is, in the past two decades, an increasing amount of the polluted, 
energy-consuming and emission-producing products have been manufactured in China, but 
consumption has taken place mainly outside China.
2 In his discussion at a workshop, Assar Lindbeck (2008) raised the issue of government 
incentives for emissions reduction as a sacrifice of growth. His concern was that the central 
government’s imposition of emissions duty on local governments could result in strong 
resistance from the latter and countermeasures against it, leading to policy failure.
3 Auffhammer and Carson (2008) forecast a likely scenario of a dramatic increase in carbon 
dioxide emissions in China in the future. As a consequence, China is expected to take the 
lead in global greenhouse gas emissions.
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The environmental 
consequences of foreign direct 
investment in China
Qun Bao, Yuanyuan Chen and Ligang Song
China has been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
developing world since 1990, and there has been a profound change in China’s 
foreign investment policy in the past decade. It is acknowledged generally that 
FDI has played a significant role in promoting China’s rapid economic growth 
through meeting the gaps of capital shortage, pushing technology spill-over 
towards local firms and improving the degree of China’s economic openness 
(Cheung and Lin 2004; Yao 2006). Foreign direct investment has, however, also 
had some negative impacts on China’s economy, which have increasingly 
aroused concern. Among them, the environmental consequences of the entry 
of foreign firms have attracted much attention: FDI could be a contributing 
factor to the serious environmental damage that has accompanied China’s rapid 
economic growth. Questions can be asked about whether further increases 
in FDI will intensify pressure for environmental protection in China. While 
foreign investments in pollution-intensive industries, including mining, have 
accounted for a large share of China’s total FDI,1 does foreign investment cause 
more pollution emissions and therefore environmental damage, as is the fear 
of most people in China?
One of the most popular viewpoints about the effect of economic openness 
on environmental quality is the ‘pollution haven hypothesis’ (PHH), which 
supposes that developing countries in general have comparative advantages 
in polluting sectors due to their relatively lax environmental regulation. As a 
result, by relocating pollution-intensive industries from richer countries to poor 
countries through either international trade or FDI, multinational firms can 
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achieve lower production costs in the host country. A corollary is the ‘race to 
the bottom’ phenomenon—that is, in order to attract more foreign investment, 
developing countries might deliberately undervalue their environmental 
damage, and lower their environmental standards. A number of empirical 
studies have examined the relationship between foreign investment and local 
environmental pollution in host countries; however, their estimation results are 
generally mixed. Two possible reasons could explain why tests on the pollution 
haven hypotheses have so far not been able to provide conclusive results. The 
first is that econometric results could suffer from omitted variables and model 
specification as well as from the pollution-emission indicators the authors 
have chosen. Second, while foreign firms might cause increased pollution 
emissions in host countries, they also help to reduce local pollution emissions 
by adopting cleaner technology and through the productivity spill-over effect. 
As a result, the effect of foreign investment on local environmental quality could 
be ambiguous, which implies that the relationship between FDI and pollution 
emissions could be non-linear. 
Since a linear relationship has generally been assumed in most previous 
studies, few researchers have examined the possible non-linear impact of 
foreign investment on local environmental pollution. In this chapter, we attempt 
to check empirically whether there is such a non-linear effect of FDI on pollution 
in host countries, by using China’s panel data of provinces. The remainder of 
this chapter is organised as follows: the next section provides a review of the 
literature and the motivation for our research. Section three introduces the 
model specification and data descriptions. Section four presents our empirical 
results, and section five provides the conclusion.
Literature review
A number of econometric studies have examined whether differences in 
environmental standards among host countries can act as determinants of the 
location of foreign investment, and three approaches have been used (Dean 
et al. 2004).2 The first approach is a cross-country data study. For example, in 
their study on the location choice of multinational firms across Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, Smarzynska and Wei (2001) consider the roles 
played by corruption and environmental regulation, and their estimation results 
do not support the idea that lower environmental standards lead to increased 
foreign investment. The second approach is an inter-state data study, which 
investigates mainly whether environmental stringency affects the location 
decisions of firms across the United States (for example, Levinson 1996; Keller 
and Levinson 2002; List et al. 2004; Henderson and Millimet 2007). The third 
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approach is an inter-industry data study. For example, Eskeland and Harrison 
(2003) examine the location decisions of foreign firms across different industries 
within countries, including Mexico and Morocco. Similar to Smarzynska and 
Wei (2001), the authors find that abatement costs are not a significant variable 
in determining the location of foreign firms among manufacturing industries 
within one country. Additionally, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) found that foreign 
ownership was related significantly to lower pollution intensity. 
What should be mentioned is that empirical work designed to test the 
pollution haven hypothesis has so far not been able to provide conclusive 
results,3 which could be explained by two factors. First, the econometric results 
could suffer from the problems of omitted variables, model specification 
and measurement errors (Letchumanan and Kodama 2000). As well as these 
problems, the estimated effects of foreign investment on environmental 
quality in a host country are likely to be influenced by the pollutant indicator 
proxies adopted. Second, it has also been proposed that foreign investment 
could help improve local environmental quality in host countries. For example, 
since multinational firms apply a universal environmental standard, they tend 
to diffuse their clean technology among their local counterparts in the host 
country, which generates the ‘pollution halo hypothesis’ (Birdsall and Wheeler 
1993; Chudnovsky and Lopez 1999). Additionally, foreign investment could 
cause technological spill-overs to the local firms, crowding out inefficient 
local firms and improving the efficiency of energy and resource usage, which 
helps to decrease local pollution emissions (Wayne and Shadbegian 2002; 
Liang 2006).
The impacts of the entry of foreign firms on China’s environmental quality 
and pollution emissions have also been studied. For example, by using the 
data from about 1,000 industrial firms in three Chinese provinces, Wang and 
Jin (2002) explore the differences in the pollution control performance of 
industries with different types of ownership. They find that foreign-owned and 
collectively owned enterprises have the best environmental performance in 
terms of water pollution discharge intensity, while state-owned enterprises and 
privately owned enterprises in China are the worst performers. To explain their 
findings, Wang and Jin suggest that foreign-owned enterprises might adopt 
more environmentally friendly technology in their production than other firms. 
Similarly, based on data from China’s 260 cities, Liang (2006) also shows that 
the entry of foreign investment doesn’t harm environmental quality in China, 
since a negative relationship is found between FDI and air pollution. Specifically, 
a 1 per cent increase in FDI will decrease sulphur dioxide emission intensity 
by 0.6–0.7 per cent, according to Liang (2006). A simultaneous estimation 
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technique has been applied in He (2002) to decompose the impact of FDI on 
sulphur dioxide emissions into the scale, technique and composition effects. 
By using China’s city-level panel data from 1993–99, He (2002) reached a similar 
conclusion: that the entry of FDI helped reduce sulphur dioxide emissions. 
Additionally, others considered the role of industrial composition and sources of 
foreign investment. For example, Dean et al. (2004) find that the environmental 
consequence of FDI varies with its sources. While FDI originating from Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Macao is attracted to provinces with weak environmental 
controls, FDI from non-Chinese sources is attracted to areas with higher levels 
of skilled labour and high pollution levies. 
Table 11.1 Selected literature on the relationship between FDI and 
pollution
Authors Sample data Pollutant proxies Conclusions
Eskeland and  US outward investment Various proxies,  + (compared
Harrison (2003) in four countries,   including air and  with local firms)
 including Mexico and  water pollution
 Morocco 
Smarzynska and  Foreign investments Inventory of toxins –
Wei (2001) across 25 transitional  released
 economies
Wang and Jin  Data from more than SO2, suspended + (compared
(2002) 1,000 firms in China particulate matter with state-owned  
   enterprises and   
   private enterprises)
Dean et al. (2004) 2,886 manufacturing  Water pollution Foreign investment
 joint-venture projects   sources do matter
 during 1993–96 in China
He (2002) China’s city-level panel  SO2 +
 data from 1993–99
Liang (2006) Data from China’s  SO2 +
 260 cities
Note: The ‘+’ sign denotes that foreign investments helped improve local environmental 
quality in host countries. 
Source: Authors’ own summary.
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Since a linear relationship between FDI and pollution emissions has 
generally been assumed in these studies, few have considered a non-linear 
possibility—as far as we know. Could the environmental impact of FDI be non-
linear? There are two main motivations for our research. First, the logic of the 
non-linear FDI–pollution nexus is very similar to the well-known environmental 
Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, which states that the relationship between 
economic growth and pollution emissions could follow an inverted-U curve—
namely, environmental degradation worsens in the early stages of growth, but 
eventually reaches a peak and starts declining as incomes exceed a certain 
threshold.4 The logic of an EKC relationship is intuitively appealing. In the first 
stage of industrialisation, pollution grows rapidly because high priority is given 
to increasing material output, and people are more interested in increasing jobs 
and incomes than having clean air and water (Dasgupta et al. 2002). The rapid 
growth results inevitably in greater use of natural resources and increased 
emissions of pollutants, which in turn put more pressure on the environment. 
People are too poor to pay for abatement and disregard the environmental 
consequences of growth. In the late stage of industrialisation, as incomes rise, 
people value the environment more, the regulatory institutions become more 
effective and, as a consequence, pollution levels decline. The EKC hypothesis 
therefore posits a well-defined relationship between the level of economic 
activity and environmental pressure (defined as the level of concentration 
of pollution or flow of emissions, depletion of resources and so on). Such an 
inverted-U curve relationship could naturally extend to the FDI–pollution nexus: 
in the initial stage of FDI utilisation, the entry of multinational firms leads to a 
higher scale of production activities in host countries. Meanwhile, people in the 
poor host country have low demands for a clean environment, as the pollution 
damage is trivial, so fewer resources will be allocated to abate environmental 
pollution. As a result, foreign investment causes pollution emissions in host 
countries to rise; however, as the income levels of the host country’s residents 
increase steadily with the accumulation of foreign investment, people become 
less tolerant of declining environmental quality, propelling the government to 
implement more stringent environmental regulations, and, therefore, more 
pollution abatement endeavours will be undertaken. Meanwhile, as foreign firms 
adopt more environmentally friendly techniques, the entry of FDI can cause 
a spill-over effect of clean technology to local firms, which eventually affects 
the industrial structure in host countries. As a result, once a certain threshold 




Second, concerning the relationship between FDI and pollution in China, 
it is hard to provide strong evidence to support the linear assumption. 
Although it has been found (Wang and Jin 2002; He 2002; Liang 2006) that 
foreign investment generally helps to reduce China’s pollution emissions, the 
environmental effect of FDI varies significantly between different regions in 
China, as shown in Table 11.2. While the eastern region has accounted for a 
much larger share of FDI than other regions in the past due to its geographical 
location and its infrastructure facility advantage, provinces in the eastern 
region have not performed much better than those in other regions in terms of 
environmental protection. For example, Guangdong ranks the highest in terms 
of attracting FDI, with the largest average share of 27.5 per cent. Its pollution 
behaviour is, however, very similar to Hubei, Hunan and Guizhou, all of which 
are in central or western China. Emission levels of four pollution indicators in 
Guangdong, including ‘water’, ‘cod’ (chemical oxygen demand), ‘smoke’ and 
‘solid’, have a mean value similar to those in Hubei; however, the mean value 
of FDI in Hubei is less than one-tenth of that in Guangdong. Additionally, even 
within the eastern region, the performance of individual provinces varies. For 
instance, during 1992–2004, the emission levels of three pollutants, excluding 
cod, showed an increasing trend in Guangdong, which implies that it emits more 
pollution to the local environment than other eastern provinces. In comparison, 
Shanghai behaves much better than Guangdong, as its emission levels of the 
four pollutants all decline, except solid. Such casual observation demonstrates 
that, in terms of local environmental quality, while some provinces benefit from 
the entry of foreign firms, others lose. In other words, the potential relationship 
between FDI and the local environment could be non-linear rather than the 
linear one assumed previously. 
Model specification and data description
To examine the non-linear impact of foreign investment on China’s pollution 
emissions, we use China’s panel data from 29 provinces during 1992–2004. 
Tibet is excluded from the sample due to the unavailability of data for certain 
indicators. Chongqing became a municipality only in 1997, so we integrate its 
data into that for Sichuan Province as a whole. Our estimation model is set 
as follows. 
Pit=ci+ γt+ α1 fdiit+ α2 fdiit
2+ α3scaleit+ α4compit+ α5techit+ βCVit+ εit  (1)
in which Pit denotes various pollutant emissions in province i for year t; fdiit 
denotes FDI in province i for year t; ci and γt denote regional and time-specific 
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Table 11.2 FDI and pollution emissions among different provinces
 FDI cod smoke gas water solid
 US$100  (10 (10 (10 (100 (100
 million million kg) million kg) million kg) billion kg) billion kg)
Guangdong 113.76 29.51 (-12) 23.63 (2.4) 72.96 (61.51) 12.89 (2.27) 0.17 (0.08)
Jiangsu 61.73 35.01 (-13.43) 46.03 (-14) 112.92 (-1.46) 22.38 (3.86) 0.31 (0.22)
Shanghai 37.77 10.02 (-15.84) 10.24 (-9.56) 38.82 (-16.41) 9.29 (-8.06) 0.13 (0.06)
Shandong 34.73 68.79 (-28.03) 55.13 (-6.6) 174.73 (-71.28) 10.42 (4.22) 0.53 (0.39)
Fujian 34.25 14.67 (-9.81) 8.24 (3.00) 18.55 (16.93) 6.79 (5.18) 0.19 (0.26)
Liaoning 22.44 29.66 (-23.82) 56.54 (-33.1) 81.38 (-42.48) 11.96 (-6.12) 0.75 (0.08)
Zhejiang 20.86 29.12 (-6.55) 20.27 (2.80) 56.80 (27.71) 12.45 (4.86) 0.13 (0.13)
Beijing 16.21 4.79 (-9.07) 7.65 (-7.7) 22.16 (-24.38) 2.90 (-2.70) 0.11 (0.04)
Tianjin 15.70 6.29 (-5.74) 8.12 (-0.40) 22.18 (-2.88) 2.04 (0.15) 0.05 (0.03)
Hubei 10.72 27.77 (-19.8) 24.86 (4.40) 49.38 (11.95) 11.95 (4.71) 0.24 (0.13)
Hebei 7.76 36.18 (11.78) 54.12 (8.60) 109.27 (28.56) 9.53 (3.73) 0.77 (1.11)
Hunan 7.47 31.43 (-12.4) 33.97 (17.5) 57.67 (21.86) 13.41 (-5.52) 0.22 (0.12)
Hainan 6.27 3.30 (-5.32) 1.39 (-0.10) 2.21 (-0.26) 0.76 (-0.34) 0.01 (-0.00)
Jiangxi 6.11 11.95 (-13.11) 21.72 (-8.50) 31.86 (15.23) 5.51 (-1.97) 0.44 (0.31)
Guangxi 6.10 56.85 (27.14) 36.82 (25.00) 66.91 (28.02) 9.37 (2.89) 0.20 (0.19)
Henan 5.02 45.06 (-5.76) 52.33 (27.70) 71.50 (53.55) 10.10 (2.23) 0.33 (0.29)
Sichuan 4.82 49.32 (7.29) 73.23 (20.50) 153.40 (6.25) 17.90 (0.32) 0.49 (0.31)
Heilongjiang 4.14 19.56 (-15.23) 43.63 (-11.9) 26.41 (-2.48) 6.04 (-3.22) 0.31 (-0.06)
Anhui 3.69 22.15 (-25.8) 23.74 (-3.5) 38.74 (1.82) 7.30 (-3.32) 0.29 (0.12)
Jilin 3.16 20.69 (-14.13) 29.63 (-3.3) 22.32 (-1.87) 3.94 (-1.18) 0.16 (0.05)
Shaanxi 3.03 11.03 (6.68) 35.21 (-2.9) 63.57 (3.79) 3.40 (-0.14) 0.23 (0.22)
Shanxi 1.82 16.98 (-21.67) 64.72 (49.4) 94.27 (35.05) 3.76 (-0.91) 0.61 (0.62)
Neimenggu 1.26 17.04 (5.24) 40.40 (-48.40) 66.78 (29.61) 2.46 (-0.41) 0.27 (0.26)
Yunan 1.06 19.56 (-7.35) 17.93 (-1.20) 31.31 (15.07) 3.97 (-0.56) 0.26 (0.22)
Xinjiang 0.75 12.46 (5.83) 12.80 (0.10) 23.01 (7.95) 1.73 (-0.09) 0.07 (0.07)
Guizhou 0.69 5.26 (-2.99) 27.37 (-5.70) 66.04 (-11.50) 2.40 (-1.28) 0.22 (0.32)
Gansu 0.61 5.06 (-2.40) 14.57 (-1.30) 36.21 (8.35) 2.98 (-1.92) 0.15 (0.09)
Qinghai 0.52 0.40 (-0.34) 4.60 (2.10) 2.87 (4.30) 0.45 (-0.18) 0.03 (0.02)
Ningxia 0.25 6.57 (2.33) 9.93 (-2.40) 20.63 (4.23) 0.92 (0.16) 0.04 (0.02)
Note: We list the mean value of each indicator during 1992–2004, and the values in 
parentheses are the emission levels in 2004 minus those in 1992 for each pollutant—measuring 
the change in pollution emissions. water is industrial polluted water; solid is industrial solid 
wastes; cod is chemical oxygen demand in industrial water pollution; gas is sulphur dioxide 
emissions; smoke is industrial smoke. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations, using pollution emissions data from various issues of 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), various years. China Environment 
Yearbook, China Environment Yearbook Press; and FDI data from National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), various years. China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Press, Beijing.
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effects respectively; εit  is a normally distributed error term. What should be 
mentioned here is that we include fdiit and fdiit
2 in our estimation model: if the 
coefficient of fdiit
2 is estimated as zero, α2=0, then only a linear relationship 
exists between foreign investment and pollution emissions. If α2<0, it implies 
that there is an inverted-U curve relationship between fdi  and pollution 
emissions, while a positive α2 indicates a U-shape relationship. In the meantime, 
we can further calculate the turning-point along the inverted-U curve by taking 
the first-order differentiation of the empirical model as: 
fdi* = –   (2)
Similar to Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Antweiler et al. (2001), the 
indicators scale, comp and tech measure the scale effect, composition effect 
and technique effect respectively, while CV represents other variables that 
could affect the level of pollution emissions.
We choose the indicators and provide our data description as follows.
Five pollutant indicators are chosen in this study to measure different 
pollution emissions—two water pollutants (industrial polluted water emissions 
and chemical oxygen demand in industrial water pollution), two air pollutants 
(industrial smoke emissions and sulphur dioxide emissions) and one solid 
pollutant (industrial solid wastes)—from 1992 to 2004 in 29 of China’s provinces 
and municipalities. Table 11.3 lists the description of all the pollutant variables 
and our data sources. We chose five different pollutant indicators because 
we could not compare only the impacts of foreign investment on different 
α1____
2α2
Table 11.3 Five indicators of pollution emissions in China
Pollutant  Unit Symbol
1 Industrial polluted water emissions 100 billion kg water
2 Chemical oxygen demand in industrial water pollution 10 million kg cod
3 Sulphur dioxide emissions 10 million kg gas
4 Industrial smoke emissions 10 million kg smoke
5 Industrial solid wastes 100 billion kg solid
Sources: State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), 1993–2005. China 
Environment Yearbook, China Environment Yearbook Press, Beijing.
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pollutants; rather, we needed to also ensure the robustness of our estimated 
inverted-U curve. Our original pollutant data from 1992–97 were collected 
by dividing all industries into 18 sectors, while the data for 1998–2004 were 
calculated based on 43 industrial sectors, due to changes in environmental 
pollution measurement methods in China.
It was Grossman and Krueger (1995) who first introduced three effects 
on environmental quality change. The first is the scale effect, in which a 
larger economic scale means more production activity and therefore higher 
requirements for natural resources, resulting in more pollution emissions. The 
second is the composition effect, which reflects the impact of adjustments 
in industrial composition and changes in factor-input combinations on 
environmental pollution. The last is the technique effect, in which technological 
progress and the use of environmentally friendly technology helps to decrease 
pollution emissions. 
Like Copeland and Taylor (2003), our empirical model also considers the 
three effects on pollution emissions. The scale effect is measured using regional 
gross domestic product (gdpit ), which is the real gross domestic product (GDP) 
after removing the effect of inflation. The composition effect is identified as 
the combination of factor inputs—namely, physical capital per capita, which 
is the ratio of physical capital (kit ) to labour inputs (lit ). It is found that capital-
intensive industries can generally cause more pollution emissions than other 
industries; therefore, the coefficient of physical capital per capita is expected to 
be positive. Zhang et al. (2004) estimated the physical capital stock for China’s 
30 provinces by using a long period of sample data from 1952 to 2000; here 
we follow their method in obtaining the capital stock data. The role of human 
capital accumulation is also considered. As in Barro and Lee (2001), we use the 
average educational attainment to measure the level of human capital stock 
among different regions, which is the ratio of total educational attainment to 
the total population. Specifically, the educational attainment is specified as six 
years for primary school graduates, and nine, 12 and 16 years for junior middle 
school graduates, senior middle school graduates and university graduates 
respectively. The unit of human capital stock (hc) is therefore educational years 
per capita, and we expect its coefficient to be negative, as higher human capital 
accumulation attracts cleaner industries to invest. Finally, similar to Antweiler 
et al. (2001), we use the lagged term of China’s gross national product (GNP) 
per capita to capture the role of the technique effect, since it is acknowledged 
widely that a higher GNP per capita reflects a higher level of technology use. 




A number of pollution control variables are also included. The first is 
population density (densityit ), which is the population per square kilometre; 
and, as Antweiler et al. (2001) point out, its coefficient could be negative since 
a higher population density causes greater marginal pollution damage. The 
second is environmentally related research and development expenditure (rdit ), 
which is used to measure pollution abatement endeavours, and the ratio of rdit 
to GDP is used. Another indicator is the number of environmentally related 
institutions (agencyit ). We expect that the coefficients of rdit and agencyit 
will be negative, to reflect the role of environmental regulation and pollution 
abatement efforts in reducing industrial emissions.
The data for the five pollutant emissions, as well as the other two control 
variables, rdit and agencyit, are collected from various issues of the China 
Environment Yearbook (SEPA, various years). Data for other indicators were 
collected from the China Statistical Yearbook (NBS various years). Except for rdit, 
the logarithm value of all other variables is used. For our panel data estimation 
method, the usual Hausman test was employed to choose fixed-effect (FE) or 
random-effect (RE) models. If the value of the Hausman test statistic is larger 
than the critical value, the null hypothesis can be rejected and fixed effects 
are preferred to random effects. The White cross-section method is derived by 
treating the panel regression as a multi-variance regression (with an equation 
for each cross-section), and by computing White-type robust standard errors 
for the system of equations. This estimator is robust for cross-equation 
(contemporaneous) correlations as well as different error variances in each 
cross-section (Wooldridge 2002). The basic statistical information is shown in 
Table 11.4.6 It can be seen that significant regional disparity exists in terms not 
only of various pollution emissions, but in attracting foreign investment. We 
therefore estimate the inverted-U cure not only for our national sample data, 
but for controlling different regions in the next section.
Estimation results
The total sample estimation result
We first estimate the impact of foreign investment on China’s pollution emissions 
for the total sample of 29 provinces and the results are shown in Table 11.5.
Among the five pollutant indicators we have chosen, the inverted-U curve 
relationship between FDI and pollution emissions is generally supported. 
The coefficients of fdiit
2 are estimated to be significantly negative, while 
the coefficients of fdiit are positive. Such results demonstrate that foreign 
investment has a non-linear impact on environmental pollution, rather than 
the linear one assumed in most studies. We can further calculate the threshold 
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Table 11.5 Total sample estimation results
 water cod gas smoke solid
fdiit 0.538*** 0.511** 0.192*** 0.319*** 0.098** 
 (6.983)  (4.575) (2.691) (3.539) (2.484)
fdiit
2 -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.009** -0.018*** -0.005***
 (-7.340) (-5.248)  (-2.481) (-3.742) (-2.297)
gdpit 0.450*** 0.816*** 0.538*** -0.819*** 0.408***
 (9.261) (12.46) (3.366) (-4.059) (4.426)
(k / l)it -0.792*** -0.367*** 0.023 0.826*** 0.221***
 (-16.01) (-6.169) (0.214) (6.129) (3.911)
hcit -0.011 -0.061* 0.042 0.001 0.079***
 (-0.352) (-1.823) (0.908) (0.016) (3.172)
techit 0.509*** -0.233*** -0.295*** 0.004 -0.148***
 (11.96) (-3.622) (-4.323) (0.051) (-3.471)
densityit 0.277*** 0.157*** -2.257*** -2.007*** -0.881***
 (9.009) (4.248) (-4.221) (-2.973) (-2.608)
rdit -0.087** -0.406* -0.250*** -0.224**  0.003
 (-2.521) (-2.984) (-3.072) (-2.186) (0.059)
agencyit 0.194*** 0.054 0.061 -0.059 -0.011
 (4.177) (0.984) (0.826) (-0.643) (-0.262)
adj – R2 0.876 0.731 0.958 0.923 0.964
χ2 216.58 253.05 188.74 207.60 192.23
Hausman 31.57 33.97 40.45 38.86 44.29
observations 377 377 377 377 377
*** statistically significant at 1 per cent level 
** statistically significant at 5 per cent level 
* statistically significant at 10 per cent level  
Note: t-statistic values are in parentheses; χ2–statistic is used to test whether the specific 
cross-section and period effects are both significant at the same time; and Hausman–test is 
used to specify the estimation panel model. 
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
Table 11.4 Basic statistical information on pollution and FDI
 Total sample Coastal region Non-coastal region
water 7.21 (5.57) 9.24 (5.91) 5.78 (4.85)
cod 22.29 (18.81) 27.02 (22.45) 18.96 (14.91)
gas 56.38 (43.28) 64.91 (50.18) 50.36 (36.58)
smoke 29.62 (22.04) 27.35 (21.64) 31.22 (22.21)
solid 0.27 (0.22) 0.28 (0.27) 0.26 (0.17)
FDI (US$100 million) 14.92 (23.91) 31.47 (30.55) 3.24 (2.91)
Note: We list the mean value for each indictor, and the values in parentheses are the standard 
deviations.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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value of foreign investment according to the estimation results. Let us take 
industrial polluted water emissions as an example. Table 11.5 shows that the 
coefficients of fdiit
2 and fdiit are -0.025 and 0.538 respectively, which implies 
that the turning-point along its inverted-U curve is fdi*=7.68, meaning that if 
the real foreign investment for a certain region is lower than US$768 million, 
increases in foreign investment will cause local pollution emissions to rise. 
On the other hand, if the real foreign investment is larger than this threshold 
value, environmental pollution will fall as new foreign firms enter the area. 
Comparing the real foreign investment for China’s 29 provinces with such 
threshold value fdi*, we can reach a rough conclusion about the impact of 
foreign investment on local industrial polluted water emissions. The mean value 
of foreign investment for 18 provinces is lower than US$768 million, among 
which the foreign investment in Hunan Province is US$747 million, which is very 
near the turning-point along the inverted-U curve. It demonstrates that foreign 
investment generally causes local pollution emissions in the 18 provinces to go 
up, and therefore has a negative effect on local environmental quality. For the 
remaining 11 provinces, industrial polluted water emissions will decline with 
the entry of foreign investors; foreign investment in Hubei (US$776 million) is 
a little larger than the threshold value.
We can further observe that even though an inverted-U curve is generally 
estimated, the shape of inverted-U curves for different pollutant indicators 
varies significantly, especially for their turning-points (fdi* ).7 Let us compare 
the two water pollutants, water and cod. For the estimation result for cod, the 
coefficients of fdiit
2 and fdiit are -0.025 and 0.511 respectively, and we can 
calculate the turning-point along its inverted-U curve, which is fdi*=US$334 
million—much lower than the threshold value in the industrial polluted water 
emission estimation. For the other three indicators, we obtain their threshold 
values as US$669 million (gas), US$122 million (smoke) and US$2.683 billion 
(solid). The threshold values for different pollutant indicators determine how 
foreign investment affects local environmental pollution among different 
regions. For example, since the turning-point for the estimation of industrial solid 
wastes is as high as US$2.683 billion, only five provinces have a larger mean 
value of foreign investment than the threshold value: Guangdong (US$11.376 
billion), Jiangsu (US$6.173 billion), Shanghai (US$3.778 billion), Shandong 
(US$3.473 billion) and Fujian (US$3.425 billion). These five provinces are in 
coastal eastern China. In comparison, as the turning-point for industrial smoke 
emissions is only US$122 million, the value of foreign investment for most 
provinces is larger, implying that although an inverted-U curve relationship 
has been estimated, most provinces have been in the right part along the 
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inverted-U curve. Table 11.6 compares our estimated threshold value of FDI 
for five pollutants with the mean of real utilised FDI among 29 provinces. It is 
easy to see that five provinces—Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Shandong 
and Fujian—are located in the right part of the inverted-U curve for all five 
pollutants, while seven provinces from the western region are still located in 
the left part of the curve, which implies that more foreign investment in those 
provinces could cause pollution emissions to rise.
The effects of other pollution control variables are also shown in Table 11.5. 
According to Antweiler et al. (2003), scale effect and composition effect can 
cause pollution emissions to rise, while the technique effect leads pollution 
emissions to fall. Our estimations, however, demonstrate that it is not 
straightforward to obtain a clear-cut conclusion concerning the three effects, 
since the estimated coefficients of the three effects vary significantly for 
different pollutant indicators (Table 11.7). For instance, since capital-intensive 
goods can cause a higher level of pollution emissions, the coefficient of physical 
capital per capita is supposed to be positive, which implies that the increase 
in the capital/labour ratio will cause more pollution emissions. According to 
Table 11.5, however, while the coefficients of gas, smoke and solid are estimated 
to be positive, they are significantly negative for the other two indicators, water 
and cod. For the other control variables, environmentally related research and 
development expenditure shows a significantly negative effect on pollution 
Table 11.6 The threshold effect of FDI for five pollutants (US$ billion)
solid (2.683)




Hainan (0.627), Jiangxi (0.612), Guangxi (0.610), Henan (0.503), Sichuan (0.482), Heilongjiang 
(0.414), Anhui (0.369)
cod (0.334)
Jilin (0.316), Shaanxi (0.303), Shanxi (0.182)
smoke (0.122)
Neimenggu (0.121), Yunan (0.107), Xinjiang (0.075), Guizhou (0.070), Gansu (0.061), Qinghai 
(0.053), Ningxia (0.026)
Note: The numbers in parentheses refer to our calculated threshold values of FDI for different 
pollutants, or the mean of utilised FDI among different provinces during the sample period. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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emissions, which verifies the role of the adoption of environmentally friendly new 
technology and technological progress. The effects are, however, estimated to 
be ambiguous for the two indicators—namely, the number of environmentally 
related institutions and population density.
Sub-sample regression results
As mentioned already, since significant regional development disparity exists 
among different regions in China, we further estimate the impacts of foreign 
investment on local pollution emissions by dividing our total sample into two 
sub-samples: the coastal eastern region, and the inland region. By doing this, we 
can compare not only the effects of foreign investment on local environmental 
pollution for different regions, we can examine whether the inverted-U curve 
still holds robustly for our sub-sample estimation. 
The estimation results for the coastal eastern regions are shown in Table 11.8. 
First, similar to our total sample estimation results, the coefficient of fdiit
2 is 
estimated to be significantly negative, which means that the inverted-U curve 
relationship between FDI and pollution emissions holds true if considering 
only the coastal eastern regions in the model estimation. Meanwhile, the 
three effects (scale, composition and technique) are also estimated to be 
ambiguous. Take the composition effect measured by the ratio of physical 
capital to labour as an example. Although its coefficient is negative for the 
five pollutant indicators, it doesn’t show statistically significant estimates for 
industrial smoke pollution and solid wastes. Furthermore, it is found that the 
negative composition effect is larger for cod than for industrial polluted water 
emissions and gas. Finally, the role of the other control variables also differs 
from that in the total sample estimation. Take environmentally related research 
and development expenditure as an example. Similar to the results reported in 
Table 11.5, the coefficient of rd is significantly negative, as reported in Table 11.8. 
This finding supports the role of technological progress in reducing pollution 
emissions. It is also found, however, that the estimated role of research and 
development expenditure is generally larger than that obtained using the total 
sample. Since most research and development activities are taking place in 
the coastal eastern regions, we can conclude that research and development 
activities play a more significant role in improving environmental quality in 
coastal regions than in inland regions.
We also estimate whether the effects of foreign investment on local pollution 
emissions for the 17 inland provinces are non-linear, and the results are shown 
in Table 11.9. As for the relationship between foreign investment and pollution 
emissions, the inverted-U curve still holds true for two indicators: industrial 
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Table 11.8 Estimation results for coastal eastern regions
 water cod gas smoke solid
fdiit 1.264**  0.694***  0.717** 0.998***  0.326* 
 (2.054) (2.678)  (2.492) (3.562) (1.719)
fdiit
2 -0.054**  -0.037*** -0.033***  -0.052***  -0.016*
 (-2.209)  (-3.695) (-2.681) (-4.471)  (-1.670)
gdpit -0.306  0.613 0.398*  -0.050 0.831***
 (-1.174)  (3.896) (1.924)  (-0.204)  (7.516)
(k / l)it -0.097**  -0.174** -0.093*** -0.032 -0.003
 (-1.997)  (-2.401)  (-2.749)  (-0.926)  (0.828)
hcit 0.029  -0.142* -0.005 0.056 0.103***
 (0.314)  (-1.782)  (-0.089) (0.786)  (2.926)
techit 0.267**  -0.512** -0.165* 0.279* -0.148*** 
 (2.144)  (-3.718)  (-1.843)  (1.947) (-2.884)
densityit -6.289***  0.385*** -1.242*** -3.770***  -2.052***
 (-7.204)  (3.363)  (-2.947) (-5.313)  (-5.280)
rdit -0.313**  -0.504** -0.270***  -0.493*** -0.075
 (-2.032)  (-2.076) (-2.801)  (-5.402)  (-0.883)
agencyit 0.454***  0.401*** 0.201** 0.102 -0.007 
 (3.092)  (2.675)  (1.993)  (1.381) (-0.138)
χ2  201.78 168.24 159.91 179.57 213.07
Hausman  36.76 27.40 31.19 40.77 35.54
adj – R2  0.936 0.782 0.932 0.959 0.921
observations 156 156 156 156 156
*** statistically significant at 1 per cent level 
** statistically significant at 5 per cent level 
* statistically significant at 10 per cent level  
Note: t-statistic values are in parentheses; χ2 is used to test whether the specific cross-section 
and period effects are both significant at the same time; and Hausman is used to specify the 
estimation panel model. 
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
Table 11.7 Estimation results of the three effects 
 water cod gas smoke solid
Scale effect +*** +*** +*** +*** +***
Composition effect –*** +*** + +*** +***
Technique effect +*** –*** –*** + –***
Note: The composition effect is measured as the ratio of physical capital to labour. ***, **, * 
mean that the estimated co-efficient of various effects is statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 
per cent level respectively. 
Source: Authors’ own summary, based on the estimation results reported in Table 11.5.
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polluted water emissions and industrial smoke emissions. The estimation results 
demonstrate, however, a U-curve for the other three indicators. This finding could 
imply that in the initial stage, foreign investment helps to reduce environmental 
pollution and, once certain turning-points are passed, further increases in foreign 
investment cause a deterioration in local environmental quality. Furthermore, 
the role of other variables also varies in comparison with the results reported in 
Tables 5 and 8. Again, take the effect of environmentally related research and 
development expenditure as an example. It is found that more environmentally 
related research and development expenditure significantly decreases the level 
of pollution emissions; however, its coefficient is estimated to be insignificant 
for the inland provinces, while it is positive for the pollutant cod.
Comparisons of estimation results among different regions
The regional disparity on the FDI–pollution nexus can be determined by 
comparing the estimation results for different provinces, and the results are 
shown in Table 11.10. 
By comparing the estimation results for the total sample and the coastal 
eastern regions, we find that although an inverted-U curve relationship is 
generally estimated to hold for all five pollutant indicators, the shape and 
especially the levels of the turning-point of different inverted-U curves for the 
two samples vary significantly. Generally speaking, although the threshold 
value of the industrial solid wastes curve is obviously larger in the total sample 
(US$2.683 billion) than in the coastal regions (US$1.598 billion), the threshold 
values in coastal regions are larger than in the total sample for the other four 
pollutant indicators. According to Bao et al. (2007), the threshold value of 
foreign investment is possibly determined by the following factors: the first is 
the industrial structure of foreign investment—that is, the sector into which 
foreign investment flows. Specifically, if more foreign firms enter the pollution-
intensive sectors in the host country, the threshold value of foreign investment 
is expected to be higher; in other words, there is a positive relationship between 
the pollution intensity of foreign investment and the threshold value of fdi*. 
The second factor is how FDI affects the marginal pollution damage in host 
countries, which depends essentially on the income levels of local residents. 
Generally speaking, a higher income level leads to a higher requirement for 
a clean environment, and hence the marginal damage caused by pollution 
emissions will be accordingly more severe. The third factor is the contribution 
of foreign investment to local economic development. Generally, with the 
accumulation of foreign investment, the marginal contribution of foreign firms 
to the local economy will fall accordingly. Therefore, to compare the threshold 
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values of foreign investments among different regions, we need to know how 
foreign investments affect local environmental pollution through the above 
three effects. Since the income level in coastal regions is generally much 
higher than in the inland provinces, it holds true that the marginal pollution 
damage must be larger for coastal provinces. Combining the other two effects, 
however, our estimation results show that the threshold values for coastal 
provinces are unexpectedly higher. Due to data limitation, we cannot measure 
the industrial composition effect of foreign investment without the industrial 
location data for foreign investment for different provinces, which could be a 
topic for future research. 
Table 11.9 Estimation results for inland provinces
 water cod gas smoke solid
fdiit 1.170***  -0.156* -0.085* 0.247** -0.087**
 (8.085)  (-1.633)  (-1.701)  (2.120)  (-1.949)
fdiit
2 -0.056***  0.009* 0.008** -0.012**  0.006** 
 (-7.356)  (1.654)  (2.251) (-1.980) (2.331)
gdpit -0.014  -0.912*** 0.874*** -0.056 0.410***
 (-0.150)  (-3.843)  (3.307)  (-0.576)  (5.619)
(k / l)it -0.160**  0.140*** -0.061** -0.067  0.055*** 
 (-2.064)  (2.936)  (-2.127) (-1.011) (3.343)
hcit -0.073  -0.097 0.033 0.303*** -0.009
 (-1.321)  (-0.974)  (0.329)  (5.067)  (-0.266)
techit -0.038 0.136 -0.505*** -0.499***  -0.124***
  (-0.605) (1.364)  (-4.444) (-9.239)  (-3.184)
densityit 0.253***  4.389***  -1.728**  -0.009  3.895***
 (5.934) (2.534) (-2.409) (-0.215)  (5.591)
rdit -0.248  0.004 -0.080 -0.165 -0.010
 (-1.286)  (0.027)  (-0.744)  (-0.791)  (-0.139)
agencyit 0.742***  0.077 0.072 0.737*** -0.064
 (6.776)  (0.516)  (0.689)  (7.259)  (-0.943)
χ2  239.03 188.37 173.69 214.06 226.51
Hausman  34.65 37.21 29.06 32.78 37.93
adj – R2  0.781 0.901 0.908 0.916 0.928
observations 221 221 221 221 221
*** statistically significant at 1 per cent level 
** statistically significant at 5 per cent level 
* statistically significant at 10 per cent level  
Note: t-statistic values are in parentheses; χ2 is used to test whether the specific cross-section 
and period effects are both significant at the same time; and Hausman is used to specify the 
estimation panel model. 
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
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We can also compare the estimation results for inland provinces with those 
obtained using the total sample. Specifically, although it is found that the 
threshold value for the inverted-U curve among inland provinces is generally 
smaller, most inland provinces are still located along the left side of the 
inverted U-curve—that is, foreign investment in those regions is still causing 
increased pollution emissions. Take industrial polluted water emissions as an 
example: the threshold value for the inland provinces is estimated to be US$344 
million—much smaller than the value for our total sample (US$1.211 billion). 
We find, however, that 10 of 17 inland provinces have a mean value of foreign 
investment lower than the threshold value. This suggests that a significant 
regional disparity exists in terms of their ability to attract foreign investment. 
While the mean value of foreign investment for the coastal provinces is US$3.147 
billion, the mean value for the 17 inland provinces is much smaller (US$324 
million). Since most inland provinces are still in the initial stage of attracting 
foreign investment, a positive relationship generally occurs between foreign 
investment and local pollution emissions, suggesting that foreign investment 
has a negative effect on local environmental quality in those inland regions.
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we investigate the possible non-linear impact of foreign 
investment on local pollution emissions in China. The hypothesis that an 
inverted-U curve relationship exists between foreign investment and pollution 
is supported empirically using the panel data for 29 Chinese provinces. The 
fact that an inverted U-curve exists between foreign investment and pollution 
Table 11.10 Comparisons of the FDI–pollution nexus among different 
regions (US$ million)
 water cod gas smoke solid
Total sample Inverted-U  Inverted-U Inverted-U Inverted-U Inverted-U
 (768) (334)  (669) (122) (2,683)
Coastal regions Inverted-U  Inverted-U Inverted-U Inverted-U Inverted-U
 (1,211) (3,966) (1,105) (181)  (1,598)
Inland regions Inverted-U U curve U curve Inverted-U U curve
 (344) (58) (20)  (295) (14)
Note: The figures in parentheses are the estimated threshold values for the turning-point for 
different shapes of the estimated curves. 
Source: Authors’ own summary.
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emissions suggests that foreign investment helps, in general, to reduce pollution 
emissions in China. The empirical results also show that there are significant 
regional disparities with respect to the impact of foreign investment on local 
pollution levels. More specifically, those threshold values for most of the 
pollutants are much higher in some of the most developed coastal regions than 
in those relatively less developed inland regions in China. This implies that for 
those more developed regions, more foreign investment inflows will contribute to 
further reduction of pollution levels, while further increases in foreign investment 
in inland provinces will continue to a worsening of their environment. 
These findings do not, however, imply that the only effective way to alleviate 
environmental protection pressure in the early stages of development—
especially in those less developed inland regions—is to attract more foreign 
investment, until a certain threshold value along the inverted-U curve is passed. 
In other words, it is misleading to conclude that the environmental damage 
caused by the entry of foreign firms in the initial stage can be remedied naturally 
by the continual accumulation of foreign investment. This is mainly because, 
as the empirical results show, most Chinese provinces have a long way to go 
in attracting foreign investment before they reach the turning-point along the 
inverted-U curve, as the real value of foreign investment in these regions is 
much lower than the estimated threshold value—namely, their FDI–pollution 
relationship is still located along the left side of the inverted-U curve. In other 
words, they have to continue to pay a significantly high cost of environmental 
degradation as a result of attracting foreign investment and economic growth. 
Given that China has set a target of reducing overall pollution emissions, whether 
these inland provinces can achieve their objectives in reducing emissions along 
the path of growth and development will be crucial for China to meet its targets. 
These inland provinces will need financial and technological support to enable 
them to comply with toughened government emissions regulations, similar to 
the way developing countries are treated in fulfilling their obligations to reduce 
emissions. Firms in the more developed regions in China and foreign investment 
can help inland provinces to fulfil their obligations.
It is also in the interest of inland regions to reduce emissions by improving 
environmental standards, even though pollution abatement endeavours will 
involve additional costs, which usually increase with pollution emissions. 
The costs associated with pollution damage, however, could be much higher, 
especially in cases where environmental damage cannot be remedied in the 
short term. Land erosion, deforestation, radiation pollution, the loss of species 
diversity and even the extinction of certain species are a few examples. These 
considerations require that governments regulate and monitor environmental 
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pollution even in the early phase of industrialisation when environmental 
qualities are most compromised. Furthermore, the shape and threshold value 
of the turning-point of the inverted-U curve depend essentially on the industrial 
composition of foreign investment (Bao et al. 2007). Therefore, in order to avoid 
the trap of a race to the bottom, more attention should be paid to the industrial 
structure of foreign investment rather than to the scale of those investments. 
Finally, since the role of pollution control variables is incorporated in this study, 
the results suggest that the combination of complementary policies should 
also be considered in order for China to better deal with the trade-off between 
economic growth and environmental pollution—by implementing policies aimed 
at alleviating environmental pressures, such as increases in environmentally 
related research and development and provision of technical support.
Notes
1 For example, in 2006, the share of FDI in secondary industry was as large as 63.59 per cent; 
it was 2.03 per cent for electricity, gas and water production, 1.09 per cent for the building 
industry and 0.73 per cent for the mining industry. All four industries are commonly regarded 
as being pollution intensive.
2 For a review of the literature on empirical studies of the pollution haven hypothesis, see Dean 
et al. (2004) and Copeland and Taylor (2004).
3 For example, in their empirical studies of the relationship between foreign investment and 
environmental regulation and pollution emissions, the estimation results remain puzzling. 
While some authors—such as List and Co (2000), Keller and Levinson (2002) and Fredriksson 
et al. (2003)—empirically support the pollution haven hypothesis, others deny the effect of 
the stringency of environmental policies on the location choice of foreign firms, or the PHH 
exists only under certain conditions (for example, Levinson 1996; List et al. 2004; Henderson 
and Millimet 2007). A review of the literature on the PHH tests can be found in Copeland and 
Taylor (2004).
4 It was Grossman and Krueger (1991) who first proposed the existence of such an inverted-U 
curve in their study of the environmental consequences of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). For a review of the literature on EKC studies, see Stern (1998) and Dinda 
(2004).
5 In one of our recent working papers (Bao et al. 2007), by introducing international capital flows 
into the original framework of Copeland and Taylor (2003), we provide mathematical proof of 
such an inverted-U curve relationship between foreign investment and pollution emissions 
in host countries. Additionally, as long as the environment is regarded as a normal good, this 
inverted-U shape conclusion is very robust—whether foreign firms invest in pollution-intensive 
or clean sectors. 
6 As usual, the coastal region includes 12 provinces and municipalities, such as Beijing, Tianjin 
and Hebei. The remaining 17 provinces all belong to the inland regions, while Chongqing is 
combined with Sichuan’s provincial data.
7 Some authors, such as Wang and Jin (2002) and Liang (2006), empirically find a negative effect 
of foreign investment on pollution emissions in China. Similarly, we also estimate the linear 
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effect of foreign investment on the five pollutants, and our estimation results are consistent 
with those authors’ findings—except that the coefficient of foreign investment is insignificant 
for industrial solid wastes; it is significantly negative for the other four pollutants: -0.018 (water), 
-0.049 (cod), -0.168 (gas), -0.008 (smoke).
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The impact of global warming on 
Chinese wheat productivity
Liangzhi You, Mark W. Rosegrant, Cheng Fang and  
Stanley Wood
The adoption of modern varieties and the increased use of irrigation and 
fertilisers during the ‘Green Revolution’ dramatically increased crop yields 
all over the world (Evenson and Gollin 2003b; Rosegrant and Cline 2003). The 
Green Revolution enabled food production in developing countries to keep 
pace with population growth (Conway and Toenniessen 1999). Crop yield 
growth has slowed since the 1990s (Evenson and Gollin 2003b; Rosegrant and 
Cline 2003), but continued crop yield increases are required to feed the world 
in the twenty-first century (Rosegrant and Cline 2003; Cassman 1999) given 
the continuing decline in the amount of land suitable for grain production due 
to urbanisation and industrialisation. Food security, in particular in developing 
countries, remains a challenge. This challenge is made worse by the adverse 
effects of predicted climate change in most food-insecure developing countries 
(Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). 
Given the large body of research that has been done to quantify the 
contributions of crop productivity (Evenson and Gollin 2003a; Evenson and 
Gollin 2003b), we know factors such as modern varieties, increasing input 
use and better farm management contribute greatly to crop yield growth. Our 
knowledge on the impact of climate on crop productivity, however, remains 
quite uncertain. While many researchers have evaluated the possible impact 
of global warming on crop yields using mainly indirect crop-simulation models 
(for example, Rosenzweig and Parry 1994; Brown and Rosenberg 1997; Reilly 
et al. 2003), there have been relatively few direct assessments of the impact 
of observed climate change on past crop yields and growth, except for a few 
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studies (Nichalls 1997; Carter and Zhang 1998; Naylor et al. 2002; Lobell and 
Asner 2003; Peng et al. 2004). In a recent study, Peng et al. (2004) reported 
that rice yields declined with higher night-time temperatures. Lobell and Asner 
(2003) showed that corn and soybean yields in the United States could drop 
by as much as 17 per cent for each degree of increase in the growing-season 
temperature. Although climate is the major uncontrollable factor that influences 
crop development, it is difficult to separate this influence from other factors 
such as the increased use of modern inputs and intensified crop management, 
which were introduced during the Green Revolution. In fact, one major concern 
with the above-mentioned studies is the simplification of approximating such 
non-climate contributions as a linear trend (Gu 2003; Godden et al. 1998).
In this paper, we use crop-specific panel data to investigate the climate 
contribution to Chinese wheat-yield growth. We find that global warming has 
a significantly negative impact on wheat yields in China, but the magnitude of 
impact is less than that reported by previous studies in other regions.
Data and method
We use time series and cross-section data from 1979 to 2000 for 22 major 
wheat-producing provinces in China and the corresponding climate data such 
as temperature, rainfall and solar radiation during this period. Wheat input and 
output data are from China’s State Statistical Yearbook and the Rural Statistical 
Yearbook (NBS 1979–2002a, 1979–2002b), and China Agricultural Cost and Return 
Yearbook (State Price Bureau 1979–2002). Climate data are from the Climatic 
Research Unit at the University of East Anglia. The data-set used is CRU TS 
2.0 (Mitchell et al. 2004). The provincial climate parameters are calculated by 
averaging all the values of those pixels within the provinces. China grows winter 
wheat and spring wheat. The majority of wheat production in China, about 80–90 
per cent, is winter wheat. Winter wheat is grown throughout most of eastern and 
southern China, while spring wheat is grown in northeast and western China. 
Winter and spring wheat are grown in northern China. The growing season for 
wheat varies from province to province. The annual climate data are monthly 
averages during the wheat-growing seasons, taking account of the changing 
growing seasons by province. 
The analytical challenge is to separate the non-climate effects on crop 
yields from the climate change effects. We hypothesise the crop yield as a 
function of crop inputs, technology, management, land quality and climate 
factors. The initial explanatory variables for the yield equation include inputs 
such as land, labour, chemical fertiliser, seeds, pesticide, machinery, irrigation 
and other physical inputs; regional production specialisation; climate variables 
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such as temperature, precipitation and solar radiation; a set of regional dummy 
variables; and two institutional change dummy variables. In this study, the 
labour input is measured in terms of working days from the survey data. The 
previous study (Stavis 1991) found the marginal return to labour input was 
negligible due to the huge labour surplus in agriculture in China. Our own 
estimation confirms this finding: labour and draft animals have a negative sign 
for the wheat-yield equation, indicating that the impact of these two variables 
on yield was negligible. The inputs of labour and draft animals are therefore not 
included in the model. The physical inputs are measured in expenses per unit 
of harvested area, and are selected based on the sign and level of statistical 
significance. We included chemical fertiliser, seeds, pesticide and machinery 
individually, and combined the rest of the inputs into an aggregated category 
of ‘other inputs’. The regional production specialisation variable is represented 
by the share of wheat in the total crop area in that province. This variable is 
created to reflect the other factors such as soil quality and other regional 
government supports to wheat production. It is expected that the regions with a 
high share of crop production have more suitable land and a better environment 
for wheat production and therefore higher wheat yields than other regions. 
Admittedly, this variable could potentially be an endogenous variable, as the 
trade-off between the amount of area to sow with a grain crop and the amount 
of area to sow with a cash crop depends on trade-offs that involve yields and 
relative productivity and profitability. The Hausman–Wu procedure (Wu 1973; 
Hausman 1978) was used to test the exogeneity of the share of area planted 
with wheat. Predicted wheat areas are not significant in the test equation, 
indicating that it is exogenous for the yield equation. A set of regional dummy 
variables is used to represent time-persistent, regional differences in social, 
economic and natural endowments not accounted for by the other variables. 
During our study period (1979–2000), China undertook major policy reforms: the 
Household Responsibility System in the early 1980s and the new development in 
agricultural policy in the late 1990s. We used time-specific dummy variables to 
reflect these two major policy changes. Finally, a time trend is used to represent 
the factor due to technological change during this period. 
Finally, a Cobb-Douglas form of wheat-yield function is specified as follows
InYieldit = (α0 + α1t) + Σj βj In Xjit + γ InSit + w InClimateit 






rI DI + εit (1)
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in which ln is natural log, t = 1, 2…22 denotes observations from the years 
from 1979 to 2000. Yieldit refers to the wheat yield for Chinese province i at 
time t (the time trend from 1979–2000); X represents the conventional inputs 
per hectare of sown wheat area including seeds, fertiliser, pesticide, machinery 
and other inputs such as irrigation, manure and animal power; S  denotes 
the share of area under wheat in the total sown area, reflecting the regional 
specialisation (including land quality) in wheat production; Climate is the 
climate variables including temperature, rainfall and solar radiation during 
the wheat-growing season. We approximate solar radiation with cloud cover 
expressed in percentages. Therefore, the higher the cloud cover, the weaker 
is the sun’s radiation. We include a set of regional dummy variables, Dr, to 
represent time-persistent, regional differences in social, economic and natural 
endowments not accounted for by other variables.1 Time-specific dummy 
variables, DI , capture the effects of two major policy reforms in agriculture 
from 1979 to 1985, and from 1995 to 2000. α, β, γ, w, δ and r are parameters to 
be estimated and ε is the error term. 
Estimation and results
We f irst perform an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test to test the 
stationarity of dependent and independent variables. No problems are found. 
The model is estimated by an SAS package. Since the ordinary linear square 
(OLS) estimation has auto-correlation problems, we also estimate Equation 1 
using an auto-regressive error model with a one-year lag (AR1). The constant 
variance error (no heteroscedasticity) assumptions are examined by plots 
between the predicted values and residuals using the AR1 estimation. The plot 
(not reported here) shows that the assumptions for Equation 1 are reasonably 
held. We also examined another plot between the predicted value and the time 
trend and found no auto-correlation problem. Another potential problem could 
be an omitted-variable bias, where some temperature-related variables (such 
as diseases or pests) that affect wheat yield have been left out of Equation 1. 
We perform the Ramsey (1969) regression specification error test (RESET) for 
omitted variables. The test is passed (P > 28 per cent). The assumptions of 
normal distribution for errors, outliers and linearity are also diagnosed and these 
assumptions are found to still hold. In addition, we estimated the equation with 
fixed effects and random effects but found little difference. 
The estimated results are reported in Table 12.1. The OLS estimates for all 
parameters for physical inputs are significant at the 10 per cent level or below 
with the expected signs.
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The AR1 estimates differ slightly from OLS with some improvements, and all 
parameters are still significant at or below the 10 per cent level. We will therefore 
refer only to the AR1 results in the rest of the paper. As expected, the regional 
specialisation is correlated positively with wheat productivity. The regional 
dummies in northeast, northwest, central and southwest China are statistically 
significant. While the institutional dummy between 1979 and 1985 has a positive 
sign—meaning that the policy reforms during this period did contribute to wheat 
productivity growth—it is not significant. On the other hand, the changes in 
agricultural policy after 1995 had a negative impact on wheat productivity, which 
was measurable at the 10 per cent level of statistical significance. We find no 
significant relationships between wheat yield and rainfall or solar radiation. 
Table 12.1 Estimated wheat-yield function in China, 1979–2000
Explanatory variables OLS AR1
Constant 7.534 (32.12)*** 7.482 (33.22)***
Ln fertiliser 0.127 (1.60)*** 0.136 (4.47)***
Ln seeds 0.180 (4.64)*** 0.153 (4.19)***
Ln pesticide 0.056 (4.71)*** 0.051 (4.66)***
Ln machinery 0.024 (1.95)** 0.027 (2.29)**
Ln other inputs 0.043 (1.60)* 0.042 (1.76)*
Ln share of wheat 0.065 (2.32)** 0.057 (2.41)**
Ln temperature –0.269 (–10.01)*** –0.268 (–11.97)***
Ln precipitation –0.043 (–1.34) –0.039 (–1.26)
Ln cloud cover 0.083 (0.96) 0.067 (0.78)
Time  0.021 (4.96)*** 0.021 (4.15)***
Regional dummy (Northeast) –0.141 (–2.29)** –0.193 (–3.44)***
Regional dummy (North) –0.113 (–0.29) –0.120 (–0.35)
Regional dummy (Northwest) –0.414 (–9.88)*** –0.407 (–9.47)***
Regional dummy (Central)  –0.119 (–2.49)*** –0.107 (–2.63)***
Regional dummy (Southeast) –0.011 (–0.27) –0.015 (–0.43)
Regional dummy (Southwest) –0.387 (–7.74)*** –0.403 (–9.16)***
Institutional dummy (1979–85) 0.051 (1.40) 0.048 (1.03)
Institutional dummy (1995–2000) –0.093 (–2.54)*** –0.098 (–2.11)*
  
Degree of freedom 462 461
Adjusted R2 0.801 0.835
* 0.10 level of statistical significance 
** 0.05 level of statistical significance 
*** 0.01 level of statistical significance 
Note: The dependent variable is Ln (wheat yield). Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
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The temperature has, however, a significantly negative effect on wheat yield. 
Because we use a double-log functional form, the estimated coefficients are 
elasticities in the above equation. The coefficient for temperature, –0.27, means 
a 1 per cent increase in the growing-season temperature could reduce wheat 
yield by 0.27 per cent. 
Since our major focus is to measure the contribution of growing-season 
temperatures on wheat yields, it is convenient to treat other terms in Equation 
1 as ‘residual’ effects. By subtracting the non-climate terms from the wheat 
yield, we single out the wheat-yield change due to climate change. We define 
YieldClimate as
InYieldClimate = InYieldit – (α0 + α1t) –  Σ
5
j=1
βj In Xjit – γ InSit 
                                         – Σ
7
r=2
δγ Dγ – Σ
2
I =1
rI DI  (2)
Figure 12.1 shows the relationship between this net wheat-yield change and 
the relative change in wheat growing-season temperatures. The downward 
slope of the trend line shows clearly the negative impact of rising temperatures 
on wheat yields in China.
Figure 12.1 Correlation between growing-season temperatures and 

















Note: The slope for the regression line is –0.268, R2=0.84, n=461.
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Across wheat-growing provinces in China, the growing-season temperatures 
vary from 5ºC to 18ºC. A one-degree increase in temperature is therefore 
equivalent to 5.6–20 per cent of relative change. Since our result shows that a 
1 per cent increase in growing-season temperature could reduce wheat yield 
by 0.27 per cent, this means a 1.5 to 5.4 per cent decline in wheat yield for each 
1ºC increase in temperature in China. This estimated effect of temperature on 
wheat yield is smaller than that found in the previous three studies of: rice in 
the Philippines (Peng et al. 2004), wheat in Australia (Nichalls 1997) and corn 
and soybean in the United States (Lobell and Asner 2003). Table 12.2 shows 
a comparison of these studies. The reasons for this difference are twofold: it 
could reflect the non-linear effect of physical inputs and crop management on 
crop yields (Gu 2003; Godden et al. 1998), or it could imply that the temperature 
effect on crop yields varies from one region to another, or from crop to crop.
To assess the relative contribution of rising growing-season temperatures 
on the wheat yield, we take the first derivative of Equation 1 with respect to t 
(Lin 1992; Fan and Pardey 1997).
∂InYieldit = α1  +  Σj βj  
∂InXjit + γ ∂ InSit  + w ∂ InClimateit +











  + 
∂εit
 ∂t ∂t ∂t (3)
Table 12.3 reports the growth accounting based on the estimate of the 
wheat-yield function in column 1 of Table 12.1. The total wheat-yield growth 
from 1979 to 2000 was 85.41 per cent. From the accounting in Table 12.3, it 
 — — — — 
 — — —
Table 12.2 Comparison: impact of 1ºC increase in growing-season 
temperature
Study Crop Location Impact (%)
Nichalls (1997) Wheat Australia +30~+50
Lobell and Asner (2003) Corn, soybean United States –17
Peng et al. (2004) Rice Philippines –10
Our study Wheat China –2~–5
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appears that 75.23 per cent of this yield growth comes from the increased use 
of physical inputs. Rising temperatures attributed to 2.37 per cent of the decline 
in wheat yield. This negative contribution is relatively small compared with that 
of physical inputs, which underlines the necessity of including physical inputs 
in the regression analysis of crop yield–climate interactions.2
Conclusion
Since the introduction of rural reforms in China in the late 1970s, agricultural 
production of and productivity for wheat have increased significantly. While the 
majority of wheat productivity increase is due to the increased use of physical 
inputs and institutional change, the gradual increase in growing-season 
temperatures in the past few decades has had a measurable effect on wheat 
productivity. In this paper, we have evaluated the impacts of climate and non-
climate factors on wheat-yield growth in China, and found that a 1 per cent 
increase in wheat growing-season temperatures reduced the yield by about 0.3 
per cent. The rising temperatures from 1979 to 2000 cut wheat-yield growth by 
2.4 per cent. There is a deficiency in the current literature about how to measure 
Table 12.3 Accounting for wheat-yield growth
 1979–2000
Explanatory  Estimated  Change in Contribution
variable coefficient explanatory variable to growth (%)
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)X(2)
Inputs   64.25 (75.23)
Chemical fertiliser 0.136 255.00 34.68 (40.60)
Pesticide 0.051 220.33 11.13 (13.03)
Machinery 0.027 324.62 8.70 (10.19)
Seeds 0.153 64.39 9.85 (11.53)
Other inputs 0.043 –2.43 –0.10 (–0.12)
Specialisation 0.057 –7.80  0.44 (–0.52)
Temperature –0.268 7.57 –2.03 (–2.37)
Residual*   23.63 (27.67)
Total growth   85.41 (100)
* an accounting residual derived by netting out the effects of inputs, specialisation and 
temperature. Here it reflects mainly the impact of agricultural research and development and 
institutional change. 
Note: The estimated coefficients are taken from Table 12.1, and the change in explanatory 
variable refers to percentage growth of that variable from 1979–81 to 1998–2000 (three-year 
averages are taken to avoid atypical years). The numbers in parentheses are the percentage 
shares of contribution to total wheat-yield growth, with total yield growth set at 100.
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the influence of climate on productivity. Authors fail frequently to distinguish 
between climate factors and the influence of modern inputs and management 
practices on productivity. We emphasise the necessity of including such major 
influencing factors as physical inputs into crop yield–climate functions in 
order to have an accurate estimation of climate impact on crop yields. With so 
much uncertainty about the potential impacts of climate change, it is essential 
to first evaluate the impacts past climate changes have had on agricultural 
productivity. Our study demonstrates a clear need to synthesise climate and 
crop-specific management and inputs data in order to investigate the impact 
of climate change. 
In China, providing enough food to feed more than 1.3 billion people is always 
a challenge. There is increasing concern about the impacts of climate change 
on Chinese food security. Our study shows that climate change does have a 
measurable negative impact on wheat productivity. This negative impact will 
probably become worse with accelerating climate change in the future. Our 
study demonstrates the need to consider climate change and its effects on 
crop productivity in order to meet the food-security goals in China as well as 
in other developing countries. There is also a need to extend such studies to 
other regions—in particular, to food-insecure countries where climate change 
will have the most severe adverse impacts on crop productivity. 
Notes
1 The seven regions in China are: Northeast (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin), North (Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi), Northwest (Nei Menggu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu), Central (Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei), Southeast (Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui), Southwest (Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan), South (Guangxi, Fujian, Hainan, 
Guangdong).
2 Simple de-trending of wheat yields and temperature while ignoring the physical inputs finds 
no significant relationship between wheat yield and temperature (R2 < 0.001).
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Understanding the water  
crisis in northern China
How do farmers and the government respond?
Jinxia Wang, Jikun Huang, Scott Rozelle, Qiuqiong Huang 
and Lijuan Zhang
Increasing evidence indicates that China is facing serious water shortages, 
especially in the north of the country. These shortages are a result not only of 
falling water supplies, but of rising water demand. There is evidence of falling 
supplies of surface-water resources and the related closure of rivers. Because 
of climate change and human activity, in the past two decades, run-off in some 
major river basins in northern China has declined significantly, resulting in the 
decrease of available surface-water resources. For example, run-off in the Hai 
River Basin has decreased by 41 per cent (Ministry of Water Resources 2007). 
Run-off in other river basins has also decreased—from 9–15 per cent in the 
Liao, Yellow and Huai River Basins. Because of declining surface-water supplies 
and increasing competition for water among regions, the water in some river 
basins (such as those of the Yellow and Hai Rivers) in northern China cannot 
flow to the lower regions (Wang and Huang 2004). 
With declining surface-water resources, farmers in northern China have 
begun to explore ground-water resources and ground water has become the 
dominant source of water for irrigation in northern China. In the early 1950s, 
ground-water irrigation was almost non-existent in northern China (Wang et 
al. 2007a); in the 1970s, it rose to 30 per cent of the total irrigation water. After 
the economic reforms in the late 1970s, ground-water irrigation continued to 
expand, reaching 58 per cent in 1995. In 2004, most irrigation in northern China 
came from ground-water resources, and the share of ground-water irrigated 
areas increased to nearly 70 per cent.
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Unfortunately, the development of the use of ground water has resulted in 
an overdraft of these resources and many environmental problems. According 
to a comprehensive survey completed by the Ministry of Water Resources in 
1996, the overdraft of ground water was one of China’s most serious resource 
problems (Ministry of Water Resources and Nanjing Water Institute 2004). In 
the late 1990s, the annual rate of overdraft exceeded 9 billion cubic metres. 
More than one-third of the volume of overdraft is from deep wells, many of 
which might not be renewable. Ground-water overdraft also causes many 
environmental problems. The most obvious effect of ground-water overdraft is 
the falling water table. For example, based on our research in Hebei Province, 
the shallow water table has dropped about 1 metre per annum (Wang and Huang 
2004); the deep water table has also dropped quickly as a result. The drop rate of 
the deep water table was more than 2 metres per annum. Overdraft of ground-
water resources can also cause other environmental problems, such as land 
subsidence, the intrusion of seawater into freshwater aquifers, desertification 
and the depletion of stream flows previously supplied by natural ground-water 
discharge (Wang et al. 2007a).
The rapidly growing industrial sector, an expanding farming sector and an 
increasingly wealthy urban population also compete for China’s limited water 
resources. Between 1949 and 2004, total water use in China increased by 430 
per cent, which was similar to the global average increase of 400 per cent, but 
greater than the average for developing countries (Wang et al. 2005a). Rising 
industrial and urban growth rates have caused China’s water allocations to be 
directed increasingly to non-agricultural uses. From 1949 to 2004, the share of 
water use for irrigation declined from 97 per cent to 65 per cent of total water 
use (Ministry of Water Resources 2004). At the same time, the share of industrial 
water use increased from 2 to 22 per cent; the share of domestic water use 
increased from 1 to 13 per cent.
Faced with the decline of water availability and increased water demand, 
many people think China has a water crisis—at least, this is the perception of 
some scholars and policymakers within and outside China. For example, even 
back in 1999, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao warned of the dire water 
situation in China and of looming water shortages (McAlister 2005). Senior 
officials from the Ministry of Water Resources pointed out that China was 
fighting for every drop of water, and the water crisis was threatening national 
grain production. Brown (2000) predicted that falling water tables in China might 
soon raise food prices everywhere. Nankivell (2004) demonstrated that China 
was now at a point where critical decisions must be made to resolve water 
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issues. Although some other observers have made more moderate predictions, 
they also suggest that many agricultural producers will have to forgo irrigation 
(Crook and Diao 2000). 
Despite many existing discussions and dire predictions, some researchers 
(including ourselves) are not sure whether China is facing a water crisis. The 
major problem is that most discussions about water are based on observations 
of producers or users in a single location, not on large-scale field-level data. 
It is difficult to judge, based only on these observations, the seriousness of 
water shortages and it is also difficult to conclude whether China is facing a 
water crisis. In addition, relying only on some observations does not allow us 
an overall picture of water-shortage issues, especially regional differences. 
The overall goal of our research is to establish the facts about whether there 
is a water crisis in China, especially in the north of the country. In order to realise 
our overall goal, we will pursue the following objectives. First, we will identify 
the status and trend of water shortages. Second, we want to understand the 
response of government and its effectiveness in addressing the water crisis. 
Third, we want to understand the responses of farmers and whether their role 
is helping or hurting.
This chapter  is organised as follows. In the next section, based on our 
large field survey in northern China, we provide some facts about the water 
crisis by measuring several indicators relevant to water shortages. In the 
following section, we discuss the response of government to the water crisis, 
including ground-water policy and irrigation management reform of surface-
water resources. In section four, we will further discuss farmers’ responses to 
increasing water scarcity, focusing on the following issues: the digging and 
privatisation of tube-wells, developing ground-water markets, behavioural 
change to increasing water charges and the adoption of water-saving 
technologies. 
Data
Our analysis is based on the data we collected as part of two recent surveys 
designed specifically to address irrigation practices and agricultural water 
management. The first, the China Water Institutions and Management (CWIM) 
survey, was conducted in September 2004. Enumerators conducted surveys of 
community leaders, ground-water managers, surface-water irrigation managers 
and households in 80 villages in Hebei, Henan and Ningxia Provinces. The 
villages were chosen according to geographic location (which, in the Hai River 
Basin, often correlated with water-scarcity levels). In Hebei, villages were 
chosen from counties near the coast, near the mountains and in the central 
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region between the mountains and the coast. In Henan and Ningxia Provinces, 
villages were chosen from counties bordering the Yellow River and from counties 
in irrigation districts varying distances from the Yellow River. The 2004 CWIM 
survey was the second round of a panel survey, the first phase of which was 
conducted in 2001.
We conducted a second survey, the North China Water Resource (NCWR) 
survey, in December 2004 and January 2005. This survey of village leaders from 
400 villages in Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Henan, Liaoning, Shaanxi and Shanxi 
Provinces used an extended version of the community-level village instruments 
of the CWIM survey. Using a stratified random sampling strategy for the pur-
pose of generating a sample representative of northern China, we first sorted 
counties in each of our regionally representative sample provinces into one 
of four water-scarcity categories: very scarce, somewhat scarce, normal and 
mountain/desert. We randomly selected two townships within each county and 
four villages within each township. Combining the CWIM and NCWR surveys, we 
visited a total of six provinces, 60 counties, 126 townships and 448 villages. 
The scope of the surveys was quite broad. Each of the survey questionnaires 
included more than 10 sections. Among the sections, there were those that 
focused on the nature of rural China’s water resources, the common types of 
wells and pumping technology. There were several sections that examined the 
most important water problems, government water policies and regulations 
and a number of institutional responses (for example, tube-well privatisation). 
Although sections of the survey asked about surface and ground-water 
resources, we will focus mostly on those villages that have ground-water 
resources (in some cases, whether they are using them or not). The survey 
collected data on many variables for two years: 2004 and 1995. By weighting 
our descriptive and multivariate analysis with a set of population weights, we 
are able to generate point estimates for all of northern China. 
Facts about water shortages
The water-shortage situation can be gauged by examining some relevant 
indicators, in addition to the assessment of farmers, who are directly influenced 
by water. In this section, we will examine the water situation in northern China 
from the following three aspects. First, we will examine the overall situation of 
water shortages through farmers’ judgements based on their intuition. Second, 
we will examine this issue by checking the status and changes of the supply 
reliability of surface and ground-water resources. Finally, we will analyse 
changes in the water table over time.
280
China’s Dilemma
Farmers’ judgements of water shortages
During our field survey, enumerators asked village leaders to characterise the 
nature of water resources in their village in 1995 and 2004. The leaders chose 
one of three answers: water is not short (at least currently); water is short but the 
shortage is not severe; and water is short and frequently constrains agricultural 
production (or water scarcity is very severe). Based on the responses of village 
leaders, we can make a preliminary judgement of the situation and trend of 
water shortages in northern China. 
Based on farmers’ judgements, most villages in northern China are facing 
water shortages, and the outlook is not positive. Survey results show that in 
2005, 70 per cent of villages in our samples reported that they were facing water 
shortages—at least, farmers in these villages felt there were problems with 
water availability (Table 13.1). Only 30 per cent of villages did not have water-
supply problems. In addition, among those villages where farmers reported 
water shortages, 16 per cent of villages were facing severe water shortages. 
More importantly, water shortages have become more serious in the past 
decade. Survey results show that from 1995 to 2004, the degree of water shortage 
continued to increase, and the share of villages short of water increased by 
5 per cent. The share of villages with severe water shortages also increased, 
by 2 per cent. Therefore, based on the farmers’ judgements, water shortages 
were very serious. Though not all villages are facing such problems, most are. 
In some villages, the water shortage is so serious it has become one of the 
important constraining factors on agricultural production.
Changes in surface and ground-water supply reliability
The reliability of the water supply is another indicator that can measure the 
degree of water shortages in rural areas. If the surface-water supply is reliable, 
water will not be a constraining factor on agricultural production in the short 
term. 
Survey results show that surface-water reliability is very low in northern 
China. Presently, most villages in northern China do not have a reliable surface-
water supply (Table 13.2). During the period 2001–04, 61 per cent of villages did 
not have reliable surface-water resources. 
In the past 10 years, water reliability has declined remarkably. From 1991 
to 1995, surface-water supplies in most villages were very reliable; 64 per cent 
of villages reported that they could access a reliable water supply at that time 
(Table 13.2). From 2001 to 2004, however, the share of villages with a reliable 
supply of surface water declined to 39 per cent—a decrease of 25 per cent. 
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At the same time, the share of villages without a reliable supply of water also 
increased significantly—from 36 to 61 per cent. The decline of surface-water 
reliability represents an increase in the degree of water shortage.
The reliability of ground-water supplies has also declined (Table 13.2). Unlike 
surface-water resources, ground water has always been considered a reliable 
water resource. Ground water has, however, become a less reliable resource 
for farmers. For example, from 1991 to 1995, 91 per cent of villages reported that 
their ground-water supplies were very reliable, and only 9 per cent indicated that 
there were problems with the reliability of their ground-water supply. From 2001 
to 2004, however, villages with a reliable ground-water supply declined by 5 per 
cent. The villages without a reliable ground-water supply increased—from 9 to 
15 per cent. The reliability of supply has therefore worsened—for surface and 
ground-water resources—which indicates that there is an increasing shortage 
of water in northern China.
Table 13.1 Farmers’ judgements of water shortages in villages in 
northern China
Water-shortage situation Share of sample villages (%)
 1995 2004
No shortage 35 30
Shortage 65 70
When short, severly short 14 16
Source: Authors’ survey in 2004 (NCWR survey data set).
Table 13.2 Water-supply reliability in villages in northern China
Water-supply reliability Share of sample villages (%)
 Surface-water reliability Ground-water reliability
 1991–95 2001–04 1991–95 2001–04
Reliable 64 39 91 85
Not reliable 36 61 9 15
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors’ survey in 2004 (NCWR survey data set).
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Decline of the water table
Field surveys reveal that not all regions in northern China are experiencing 
falling water tables (Wang et al. 2007a). According to our data, there was no 
fall in the water table in 25–33 per cent of the villages in northern China using 
ground water in 1995 and 2004.1 In 8.5–16 per cent of villages (one-third to 
one-half of villages reporting no fall in the water table), respondents told the 
enumerators that the water table was higher in 2004 than in 1995. In another 
10–17 per cent of villages, the average annual fall in the water table was less 
than 0.25 metres. In other words, in more than one-third to one-half of northern 
China’s villages using ground water in the past decade, ground-water resources 
have shown little or no decline since the mid 1990s. 
Although, based on our data, most villages are in, or are nearly in, balance, 
we are not arguing that ground-water problems do not exist. In fact, there are still 
a large number of villages in which the water table is falling. Before classifying 
these villages as inappropriate ground-water resource exploiters (although some 
of them might be), it is important to remember that a village’s water resources 
might not be overexploited, even if the water table is falling. Even under the 
most rationally planned ground-water utilisation strategy, therefore, there will 
be a share of villages in China in which we can expect the water table to be 
falling. In addition, if we follow the Ministry of Water Resources’ definition of 
serious overdraft, only 10 per cent of villages using ground water in the past 
decade had water tables falling at a rate greater than 1.5 metres per annum. 
Of course, such a rate of decline is not just serious; it is a crisis. 
In summary, then, the point we want to make is that in many places—indeed, 
in most places in northern China—it is possible that water resources are not 
being misused. We do not, however, want to minimise the problems that are 
occurring in some places. There are a large number of rural areas in which 
the water table appears to be falling at a dangerously fast pace. Where the 
resource is being misused, steps will eventually be required to protect the 
long-term value and use of the resource. It is, however, important to realise 
that many of the required measures (discussed in the next section) will have 
a number of associated costs in their adoption, affecting productivity and 
perhaps reducing incomes. Because measures to counter overdraft are not 
needed in all villages, leaders should not take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach; 
doing so could inflict unnecessary costs on producers in communities where 
overdraft conditions do not exist.
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Government responses
Faced with increasing water shortages, the Chinese government has taken many 
steps to improve the management of surface and ground-water resources. It 
has responded not only by issuing many laws, regulations and policies, it has 
tried to encourage local regions to reform their water management. In this 
section, we will focus on two major responses that the government has made: 
its ground-water policies, and reform of the management of surface-water 
resources for irrigation. We will also try to examine the effectiveness of the 
implementation of these responses in resolving water-shortage problems in 
northern China.
Issuing ground-water policies
Government officials in China have put some effort into issuing laws, regulations 
and policies to manage ground-water resources, although they have been 
limited (Wang et al. 2007b). For example, according to China’s National Water 
Law, which was revised in 2002, all property rights to ground-water resources 
belong to the State. This means that the right to use, sell and/or charge for water 
rests ultimately with the government. The law does not allow ground-water 
extraction if pumping is going to be harmful to the long-term sustainability of 
ground-water use. Beyond the formal laws, a number of policy measures (such 
as regulations controlling the right to drill tube-wells, the spacing of tube-wells 
and the collection of water-resource fees) have been set up, in part to rationally 
manage use of the nation’s ground-water resources. Compared with regulations 
concerning other issues, however, such as flood control, the construction of 
water-related infrastructure projects and surface-water management initiatives, 
the number of regulations relevant to ground-water management is very small. 
More importantly, at the national level, there is not one water regulation that is 
focused specifically on ground-water management issues.
Even more important than the lack of official laws and policy measures 
for ground-water management has been the insuff icient effort put into 
implementing existing laws (Wang et al. 2007a). Certainly, part of the problem 
is a history of neglect. In fact, at the ministerial level, the division of ground-
water management is still relatively small. There are far fewer officials working 
in this division than in other divisions, such as flood control, surface-water 
system management and water transfer. Moreover, unlike the case of surface-
water management (Lohmar et al. 2003), there has been no effort to bring 
management of aquifers that span jurisdictional boundaries under the ultimate 
control of an authority covering government and private entities that use water 
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extracted from different parts of the aquifer. According to Negri (1989), without 
a single body controlling the entire resource, it becomes difficult to implement 
policies that attempt to manage the resource in a manner that is sustainable, 
or optimal, in the long term.
Whether due to lack of personnel or other implementation-related difficulties, 
few regulations have had any affect within China’s villages (Wang et al. 2007b). 
For example, according to our survey data, less than 10 per cent of well owners 
obtained a permit before drilling, despite the nearly universal regulation 
requiring a permit. Only 5 per cent of village respondents believed that well-
drilling decisions required consideration of the spacing between wells. Even 
more tellingly, water-extraction charges were not charged in any village, and 
there were no quantity limits put on well owners. In fact, in most villages in 
China, ground-water resources are all but completely unregulated. This does 
not mean, however, that policy and governance do not have an impact, at least 
indirectly, on agricultural ground-water use.
Reforming management of surface-water resources for irrigation
Since the early 1990s, faced with increasing water shortages, Chinese leaders 
have begun to consider community-level irrigation management reform as a 
key part of their strategy to combat China’s water problems. According to our 
survey in Ningxia Province, since the early 1990s and especially after 1995, 
reform has successively established Water User Associations (WUAs) and 
contracting systems in place of collective management (Figure 13.1) (Wang et 
al. 2007c).2 The share of communities that manage water by collective. declined 
from 91 per cent in 1990 to 23 per cent in 2004. Contracting has developed more 
rapidly than WUAs. By 2004, 57 per cent of villages managed their water under 
contract and 19 per cent managed theirs through WUAs. Our survey in six 
provinces also found a similar reform trend for irrigation management (Figure 
13.2) (Huang et al. 2007). From 1995 to 2004, collective management declined 
from 90 to 73 per cent, while at the same time, WUAs increased from 3 to 10 
per cent and contracting management increased from 5 to 13 per cent. 
Although reforming the institution in name might be important, the nature of 
incentives within the institution might be more important (Wang et al. 2005c).3
According to our data, not all reformed management institutions (WUAs or 
contracting management) can establish incentive mechanisms. For example, 
in 2001, on average, leaders in only 41 per cent of villages offered WUA and 
contracting (or non-collective) managers with incentives that could be expected 
to induce them to save water in order to earn excess profit. In the remaining 
villages, although there was a nominal shift in the institution type (that is, lead-
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ers claimed that they were implementing WUAs or contracting), in fact, from 
an incentive point of view, the WUA and contracting managers were operating 
without imposed incentives. In these villages, managers are similar to leaders 
in a collectively managed village in that they do not have a financial incentive 
to save water. 
Research results show that nominally reforming irrigation management has 
no significant impact on water use; however, when irrigation managers face 
effective incentives, they are able to reduce water use (Wang et al. 2005c). Our 
results, based either on descriptive statistics or econometric analysis, show that 
there is no significant relationship between water use and nominal irrigation 
management reform. We found, however, that in villages that provided water 
managers with strong incentives, water use fell sharply. The incentives must 
also have improved the efficiency of the irrigation systems since the output of 
major crops, such as rice and maize, did not fall, and rural incomes and poverty 
remained unchanged statistically. Although our study needs to be undertaken 
in other areas before the results can be generalised to the rest of China, at 
least in the sample sites that provided their managers with incentives, water 
management reform has been a win-win policy in resolving water shortage 
problems.
Farmers’ responses
Although the government response has not been very effective in resolving 
water shortages, this does not mean that farmers will not respond on their 
own. In fact, farmers have already begun to act. In this subsection, we will 
examine farmers’ responses to increasing water shortages. These include 
digging tube-wells, privatisation of tube-wells, the emergence of ground-water 
markets, behavioural changes to increasing water prices and the adoption of 
water-saving technologies.
Digging tube-wells. The most obvious response by farmers to increasing 
water shortages is to dig tube-wells. According to national statistics, the 
installation of tube-wells began in the late 1950s (Wang et al. 2007a). Since the 
mid 1960s, the installation and expansion of tube-wells across China has been 
nothing less than phenomenal. In 1965, there were only 150,000 tube-wells in 
all of China (Shi 2000). Since then, the number has grown steadily. By the late 
1970s, there were more than 2.3 million tube-wells. After stagnating during the 
early 1980s, a period when the area of land under irrigation—especially that 
serviced by surface water—fell, the number of tube-wells continued to rise. By 
























Note: ‘Other institutions’ includes the four types of mixed institutions: 1) Water User 
Association combined with collective management; 2) Water User Association combined with 
contracting; 3) contracting combined with collective management; 4) Water User Association, 
contracting and collective management. 
Source: Authors’ surveys in 2001 and 2004 (CWIM and NCWR surveys data sets).




















Source: Authors’ survey in 2001 and 2004 (CWIM survey data set).
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While the growth of the use of tube-wells reported by the official statistical 
system is impressive, we have reason to believe that the numbers are 
significantly understated (Wang et al. 2007a). According to the NCWR survey, on 
average, each village in northern China had 35 wells in 1995. When extrapolated 
regionally, this means that there were more than 3.5 million tube-wells in the 14 
provinces in northern China by 1995. According to our data, the rate of increase 
in the number of wells has also grown rapidly. By 2004, the average village in 
northern China had 70 wells, suggesting that the rise in tube-well construction 
since the mid 1990s has risen even faster than indicated in the official statistics. 
We estimate that, by 2004, there were more than 7.6 million tube-wells in 
northern China. At least in our sample villages, the number of tube-wells grew 
by more than 12 per cent annually between 1995 and 2004. According to our 
data, a significant share of the new wells are located in areas that are making 
allowances for the expansion of cropping area, increased intensity of cropping 
and rising yields. While the rise in tube-wells will not necessarily result in 
increased consumption of water in all areas, in some cases it will. The digging 
of new tube-wells is therefore one reason for increasing water shortages.
Privatisation of tube-wells. Faced with increasing water shortages, farmers 
respond not only by digging new tube-wells that can sustain their production, 
they demand changes to institutions that can improve their water management. 
Among all the institutional responses, the privatisation of tube-wells is perhaps 
the most prominent response by farmers in more than two decades. According 
to our survey, since the early 1980s, the ownership of tube-wells in northern 
China began to shift sharply. For example, in Hebei Province, collective 
ownership of tube-wells diminished from 93 per cent in the early 1980s to 
56 per cent in the late 1990s (Wang et al. 2006). At the same time, the share 
of private tube-wells in the total increased from 7 to 64 per cent. Data from 
the NCWR survey largely support these findings (Wang et al. 2006). In 1995, 
collective ownership accounted for 58 per cent of tube-wells in the average 
ground-water-using village. From 1995 to 2004, however, collective ownership 
of tube-wells diminished and accounted for only 30 per cent of wells in 2004. 
In contrast, during the same period, the share of private tube-wells in the total 
increased from 42 to 70 per cent.
Our findings also demonstrate that the privatisation of tube-wells has 
promoted the adjustment of cropping patterns while having no adverse impacts 
on crop yields; more importantly, privatisation has not accelerated the drop 
of water tables. Econometric results show that, after privatisation, farmers 
expanded the area of land sown with water-sensitive and high-value crops, 
such as wheat and non-cotton cash crops (which are mainly horticultural crops) 
288
China’s Dilemma
(Wang et al. 2006). It is perhaps because of the rising demand for horticultural 
crops that some individuals have become interested in investing in tube-wells. 
Such results are consistent with the hypothesis that when tube-well ownership 
shifts from collective to private and water is managed more efficiently (as 
shown in Wang and Huang 2002), producers are able to cultivate relatively 
high-value crops, which in some cases demands greater attention from tube-
well owners. In addition, our research indicates that the shift from collective 
to private tube-well management does not accelerate the drop in water tables. 
With the expansion of private ownership of tube-wells, however, and ground-
water markets, water table levels will continue to decline. How farmers choose 
to respond can, therefore, contribute to the water crisis. Effective management 
of ground-water resources is needed urgently. 
The growing importance of ground-water markets. In response to demand 
for water in an environment increasingly dominated by private and privatised 
wells, ground-water markets have begun to emerge in recent years as a way for 
many producers in rural China to access water (Zhang et al. 2008a). While this 
is new in China, it appears to be following a pattern similar to that observed in 
parts of South Asia (Shah 1993). In the 1980s, ground-water markets were all 
but non-existent in China and, even by the mid 1990s, according to the NCWR 
survey data, only a small share of villages (21 per cent) had ground-water 
markets. By 2004, however, tube-well operators in 44 per cent of villages were 
selling water. Across all villages, about 15 per cent of private tube-well owners 
sold water. Although ground-water markets exist in less than half of northern 
China’s villages, the numbers are still significant: we estimate that farmers in 
more than 100,000 villages are accessing water through ground-water markets. 
Moreover, in villages that have them, these markets play an important role in 
transferring large volumes of water to a large share of households.
Our research further indicates that ground-water markets have not only 
improved the equity of water use, they have improved the efficiency of water 
use in northern China. According to the survey data, ground-water markets 
have provided poorer farmers with opportunities to access water and have 
therefore reduced potential income gaps (Zhang et al. 2008b). Specifically, 
households in the sample that buy water from ground-water markets are poorer 
than water-selling households (Figure 13.3). In addition, when farmers buy 
water from ground-water markets, they use less water than those who have 
their own tube-wells or those who use collective wells (Zhang et al. 2008b). 
Crop yields, however, do not fall because of this. In addition, our results show 
that ground-water markets in the North China Plain do not have a negative 
effect on incomes.
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In summary, ground-water markets help farmers access water (that is, they 
do not need to invest in their own well) and, when they do so, their water use 
is reduced, but crop yields and income are not negatively influenced. With 
increasing water scarcity, increasing water-use efficiency is a very important 
issue and has been addressed by policymakers. The emergence of water 
markets is therefore an effective way to provide irrigation services. 
Farmers’ responses to increasing water prices. As the water table falls, prices 
in the ground-water market increase. For instance, according to the CWIM 
survey data, when the level of the water table in our Hebei villages declined 
from 4.4 metres below the surface to 77.5 metres, the price of ground water 
for wheat-producing households increased from 0.08 to 0.56 yuan per cubic 
metre (Wang et al. 2007b). Since pumping costs rise as the water table falls, this 
indicates that, to some extent, ground-water prices reflect the scarcity value of 
water resources. Across our CWIM survey sample of Hebei wheat producers, 
we estimated that pumping costs rose by 0.005 yuan per cubic metre of ground 
water extracted for each additional metre of pumping depth.
Figure 13.3 Differences of per capita cropping income and total income 















Per capita cropping income Per capita total income
Water-selling households
Water-buying households
Source: Authors’ surveys in 2001 and 2004 (CWIM survey data set).
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More importantly, as ground-water prices rise and water becomes scarce, 
farmers respond by reducing their water use and changing their cropping 
patterns. Analysis of the behaviour of Hebei wheat farmers in the CWIM 
survey data set indicates that, when ground-water prices increased from 0.08 
to 0.56 yuan/cubic metre, water use per hectare decreased from 6,433 cubic 
metres to 2,154 cubic metres (Wang et al. 2007b). In addition, we found that, 
as water tables fell, there was an increase in the share of cash crops (such as 
horticultural crops, cotton and peanuts). That is, when the depth of the water 
table increases from 4.7 to 79 metres below the surface, the area’s share of 
cash crops increases from 13 to 41 per cent. Our results therefore imply that 
as the water table falls, water becomes increasingly scarce and the costs of 
acquisition rise, farmers consider not only how much water to use, but how 
much value can be produced by that water use.
Despite potential resource conservation benefits, the rise of water prices (or 
costs to farmers for acquisition of self-pumped water) will have an inevitable 
negative impact on farmers (Wang et al. 2007b). In other work that we have 
undertaken using the same data set, we estimate that doubling the price of 
ground water in Hebei Province causes 75 per cent of wheat-producing farmers 
to lose money on cropping activities and has a negative effect on agricultural 
output (Huang et al. 2006). Given the government’s interest in maintaining rural 
incomes, any use of a pricing policy must be accompanied by complementary 
policies that can offset the negative effect of price increases. 
Adopting water-saving technologies. Another possible response to water 
shortages is the adoption of water-saving technologies (Blanke et al. 2007). The 
NCWRS survey covered three sets of water-saving technologies: traditional, 
household based and community based. Traditional technologies—such 
as border, furrow and levelling technologies—are agronomy based, highly 
divisible and have generally been used by farmers in China even before the 
establishment of the communist State. Household-based technologies—such 
as surface piping, plastic film, conservation tillage and drought-resistant plant 
varieties—are highly divisible, require low fixed costs and little collective 
action. Community-based technologies—such as ground pipes and lined 
canals—require not only collective action for adoption and maintenance, they 
require high fixed costs.
Results show that although water-saving technologies for agriculture have 
been emphasised by many policymakers and researchers, the adoption rate 
is still very low. Despite a relatively high initial level of adoption (35 per cent in 
the 1950s), in 2004, only 52 per cent of villages adopted traditional water-saving 
technologies (Table 13.3). Household-based and community-based water-
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saving technologies have been adopted mainly since the 1980s. In 2004, half 
of all villages adopted household-based water-saving technologies and only 
24 per cent of villages adopted community-based water-saving technologies. 
Comparing the adoption rate with the share of sown areas, the adoption rate 
of these three kinds of water-saving technologies is even lower. For example, 
the share of sown areas adopting community-based water-saving technologies 
was only 7 per cent; even traditional water-saving technologies reached only 25 
per cent. The low adoption rate of water-saving technologies also indicates that 
in China, there is still much policy space in which to promote such technology 
uptake. How to effectively promote the adoption of water-saving technologies 
is one of the important challenges for policymakers.
The increase in the rate of adoption of household-based water-saving 
technologies is much higher than for the other two types of technologies. 
Since the 1980s, the share of villages adopting household-based water-saving 
technologies increased 669 per cent (Table 13.3). Although not very low, the 
increase in the rate of adoption of community-based water-saving technologies 
was only 64 per cent of household-based water-saving technologies. During the 
reform period, the adoption of traditional technologies grew slowly compared 
with the other two technologies—only 16 per cent. The low increase in the rate 
of adoption of traditional water-saving technologies was possibly due to their 
already high adoption rate in the pre-reform and early reform eras. The high 
increase in the rate of adoption of household-based water-saving technologies 
implies that, faced with increasing water scarcity, farmers are more responsive 
than communities in general and government in China. 
Based on these descriptive contours, it is unclear what is driving the path 
of adoption of community-based technologies; however, work by Blanke et al. 
(2006) suggests that it is likely that there are two sets of forces that are both 
encouraging and holding back adoption (Wang et al. 2007b). On the one hand, 
the increased scarcity of water resources is almost certainly pushing up demand 
for community-based technologies. On the other hand, the predominance of 
household farming in China (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004) and the weakening 
of the collective’s financial resources and management authority (Lin 1991) 
has made it more difficult to gather the resources and coordinate the effort 
needed to adopt technologies that have high fixed costs and that involve many 
households in the community. In contrast, household-based technologies might 
be adopted more widely because of their relatively low fixed costs, divisibility 




The primary goal of this chapter was to sketch a general picture of China’s water-
shortage situation, and to establish the facts, especially for northern China. Our 
findings show that, based on farmers’ judgements, 70 per cent of villages are 
facing increasing water shortages. Among the villages short of water, 16 per 
cent find their agricultural production severely constrained by the shortage. 
Supplies of surface and ground water have become less reliable than before. 
In more than one-third to one-half of China’s villages using ground water in 
the past decade, ground-water resources have shown little or no decline since 
the mid 1990s. Though most villages are in, or are nearly in, balance, there is 
still a large number of villages in which the water table is falling. If we follow 
the Ministry of Water Resources’ definition of serious water overdraft, 10 per 
cent of villages using ground water in the past decade have water tables that 
are falling at a rate greater than 1.5 metres per annum. 
There is, therefore, a water crisis in northern China; however, the crisis does 
not affect all areas. There are many parts of China in which water resources 
Table 13.3 Adoption rate of water-saving technologies over time in 
northern China’s villages
 Traditional Community-based Household-based
  water-saving  water-saving water-saving
 technologies technologies technologies
Adoption rate (%)   
Share of villages   
 1950  35  0  4 
 1980  45  5  7 
 1995  49  15  27 
 2004  52  24  50 
Share of sown areas   
 1995  20 3 8
 2004  25 7 21
Increase in rate of adoption (%)   
Share of villages 
 (2004/1980) 16  433  669 
Share of sown areas
 (2004/1995) 25  133  163 
Source: Authors’ survey in 2004 (NCWR survey data set).
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have not deteriorated, but half of northern China is suffering from rapidly falling 
water tables. Policies to address water-shortage problems should therefore be 
targeted carefully.
Faced with a water crisis, the Chinese government has begun to make a 
number of policy responses, but implementation has not been very effective. It 
has responded to the issue with many laws, regulations and policies, and has 
also tried to encourage local regions to reform water management. Whether 
due to a lack of personnel or other implementation-related difficulties, few 
regulations have had any effect within China’s villages. Although there has 
been some progress in the reform of surface-water irrigation management in 
northern China, much of this has been nominal. Nominal reform cannot realise 
the policy goal of increasing water-use efficiency. Only those reforms that 
provide managers with incentives can reduce crop water use. Unfortunately, 
only a small percentage of reform can establish effective incentive mechanisms. 
In the future, the water crisis will continue to grow, especially as competition 
among water users increases, and if there is no effective implementation of 
water policies and management reform.
Where water is becoming scarce, farmers and community leaders have been 
responding. The most obvious response from farmers is the digging of new 
tube-wells. In addition, farmers have taken control of most of the well and pump 
assets; and farmers are increasingly taking on responsibility for transferring 
water from those who have wells to those who demand water. Farmers also 
are increasingly figuring out ways to conserve this scarce resource. Farmers 
do not, however, always respond in a manner that conserves water. Why? The 
major reason is that farmers do not always face good incentives. Our research 
shows that when they are given good incentives, they do save water. The 
government therefore cannot ignore the response of farmers; in fact, it needs 
to use this responsiveness to reduce the adverse effects of the water crisis and 
encourage conservation. 
Finally, we think most of the blame for the water crisis should be put on 
the government, because its response has been largely ineffective. It has not 
created the institutions and infrastructure that will provide the incentives to 
make farmers save water. We believe a sustainable environment needs to be 
built on effective water pricing and water rights policies; to make these work, 
a huge commitment is needed to set up the institutions and infrastructure to 
implement them. Although this is a huge job, we believe it will be more effective 




1 In our survey, we asked village leaders about the average ground-water depth during the year 
and the ‘static’ ground-water level. We told village leaders that the static level of the water table 
was the level that existed at a time immediately before the irrigation season (for example, in 
the North China Plain this would be about March). According to our respondents, there were 
differences in the statistics for the changes in the water table when using average or static 
ground-water levels. According to our data, the static level produced numbers that suggested 
there were fewer villages in which the water table was falling. 
2 ‘Collective management’ implies that the village leadership takes responsibility directly 
through the village committee for water allocation, canal operation and maintenance and 
fee collection; WUAs are theoretically a farmer-based, participatory organisational system 
that is set up to manage the village’s irrigation water; ‘contracting’ is a system in which the 
village leadership establishes a contract with an individual to manage the village’s water.
3 When managers have partial or full claim on the earnings of the water management activities 
(for example, on the value of the water saved by water management reform), we say that they 
face strong incentives (or that the manager is managing ‘with incentives’). If the income from 
their water management duties is not linked to water savings, they are said to manage ‘without 
incentives’.
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The impact of air pollution on 
mortality in Shanghai
Health and Mortality Transition in Shanghai Project  
Research Team
Climate change, air pollution and improving public health are some of the 
most serious challenges facing humankind at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. While considerable effort has been made to understand the impact 
of changing climatic conditions and air quality on population health, our 
knowledge of their relationship is still rather limited, and this is especially the 
case in developing countries, where detailed and reliable data for environmental 
conditions and population health are often difficult to find.
To further improve our knowledge of declining mortality rates in the past 
half-century, the major characteristics of current mortality patterns and their 
future changes in China, researchers from The Australian National University, 
Fudan University, Shanghai Municipality Centre for Diseases Control and 
Prevention and the University of Cambridge have been conducting a detailed 
study of health and mortality transition in Shanghai. This project, which has 
been funded by a research grant from the Wellcome Trust, aims to achieve the 
following objectives: to provide detailed information about changes in causes 
of death and mortality levels in Shanghai in recent decades, to gain a better 
understanding of changing mortality patterns and their relationship with major 
socioeconomic and environmental factors, and to further examine the process 
of China’s epidemiological transition and some proposed mortality patterns 
and their changes.
The project has collected and digitalised detailed population and mortality 
data collected from seven urban districts in Shanghai from the late 1950s to 
the beginning of the twenty-first century. In addition, it has gathered detailed 
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information on weather for the past four decades and air-quality data for recent 
years. These data are used in this study to explore the relationship between air 
pollution, weather and mortality in Shanghai.
Shanghai, like many large cities in developing countries, has been exper- 
iencing a rapid transition. Fast economic growth and urban expansion have 
led to considerable changes in people’s living environments, which in turn 
could greatly influence improvements in population health and socioeconomic 
development. The impact of changing air quality and climate on population 
health is an issue that has attracted great attention in recent years. Compared 
with some other Chinese cities, Shanghai’s air quality has been reasonably 
good; however, in comparison with industrialised countries and the air-quality 
guidelines recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), there is 
still a long way to go to control air pollution in Shanghai (Brajer and Mead 2004; 
Kan et al. 2007; WHO 2005). For example, out of 3,149 days between 1998 and 
2007, when the data were available, the level of particulate matter less than 
10 micrometres (μm) in aerodynamic diameter (PM10) reached the standard 
recommended by the WHO air-quality guidelines on only 29.1 per cent of days; 
the levels of nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide reached their standards on 
50 per cent and 10 per cent of the days, respectively. The situation was worse 
in cool seasons when the proportion of days when these pollutants were lower 
than or reached the level recommended by the WHO guidelines fell to 23.9 per 
cent (for PM10), 39.2 per cent (for nitrogen dioxide) and 6.8 per cent (for sulphur 
dioxide). The proportion of days when the levels of these three pollutants all 
reached the WHO guidelines was even lower: about 5 per cent.
An increasing number of studies exploring the link between air pollution and 
population health have been conducted in recent years, and they have shown 
that air pollution has considerable effects on morbidity and mortality in most 
of the populations being investigated (Kenney and Ozkaynak 1991; Xu et al. 
1994, 2000; Ostro et al. 1996; Touloumi et al. 1997; Lee et al. 1999; Wong et al. 
2001; Kan et al. 2003, 2007). Despite this, there is still considerable uncertainty 
about the nature and the strength of such effects, which is partly attributable to 
the following facts. First, the number of studies, particularly those conducted 
in developing countries, is still limited. Second, most available single-city 
studies use different statistical models. Because real time-series data such as 
air quality and mortality often have greater complexity than many commonly 
used models allow, conclusions drawn from these studies tend to be sensitive 
to model specification (Erbas and Hyndman 2005).
To improve our knowledge about the relationship between air quality and 
population health, especially in the context of rapid urban development in 
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developing countries, this study systematically analyses the impact of air 
pollution on mortality in Shanghai. On the basis of this analysis, it also compares 
the impact of air pollution on daily mortality between Shanghai and Hong 
Kong—two major cities in Asia.
Data and methods
Mortality data collected by Shanghai Municipality Centre for Diseases Control 
and Prevention are used in this study. With financial support provided by the 
Wellcome Trust, the Health and Mortality Transition in Shanghai Project has 
digitalised nearly 300,000 death certificates issued between 1956 and 2001 in 
seven urban districts: Nanshi, Luwan, Xuhui, Changning, Zhabei, Hongkou 
and Yangpu. These death certificates record the following information for each 
deceased: name, sex, date of birth, date of death, race, personal ID number, 
home address, educational level, occupation, marital status, age at death, the 
principle cause of death and place of death (although there are variations in 
the amount of information included over time). They also record the level of the 
hospital (provincial, county or township) that certified the death, major methods 
of diagnosis (autopsy, biopsy, laboratory test, clinical diagnosis or inference 
on the basis of available evidence) and other useful information. In this study, 
deaths are classified into groups according to the International Classification 
of Diseases Revision Nine (ICD-9). Since information on the date of death is 
available, daily mortality patterns can be examined.
The meteorological data for Shanghai between 1956 and 2001 are extracted 
from a data set made available by China’s Meteorological Bureau. They 
provide information on daily average air temperature, relative humidity and 
atmospheric pressure for most years. The collection of air-quality data started 
late in Shanghai. Detailed information of levels of major pollutants such as PM10, 
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, which can be accessed directly from the 
web site of the Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau, became available 
only from the late 1990s. For this reason, our analysis of the relationship between 
air quality and mortality has to be restricted to the years 2000 and 2001 when 
detailed data for mortality, weather and air quality were all available.
Since one of the objectives of this chapter is to compare the impact of 
air pollution on daily mortality between Shanghai and Hong Kong, we have 
chosen to use the method used in Wong et al. (2001). In the analysis, Poisson 
regression was used with daily mortality counts as the dependent variable. To 
obtain the core model for the mortality outcomes in which we are interested, 
smoothed (through the use of the Loess smoothing function) terms for trends 
on days, seasonality, temperature, humidity and dummy variables for days 
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of the weeks were fitted as the independent variables. Like Wong et al., we 
considered lag effects of temperature and humidity, but other factors such as 
the effects of holidays and influenza epidemics (measured by a large number 
of hospital admissions for influenza) were not included in our estimation. A 
detailed discussion of the method can be found in Wong et al. (2001).
The analysis was conducted in the following steps. After obtaining expected 
mortality counts (ξ) from the core model, Poisson regression was fitted on 
pollutant concentrations in the form of
log[E(Yt)] – log(ξt) = α + βxτ (1)
to obtain the log relative risk (β) estimated with offset on log (ξ). In examining 
the impact of each pollutant on mortality, we estimated the effect of pollutant 
concentration for the current and previous days, and identified the best lagged 
day by ‘Akaike’s information criterion’ (AIC). (We also examined the effect of 
the average level of pollutant concentration on the current and previous days; 
these results correlate highly with those estimated from the pollutant level for 
a single day and are not reported here.) The effect of each pollutant was then 
adjusted for auto-correlation using general least square regression and for the 
co-pollutant, which was determined using linear regression. 
We then further estimated the effect of pollutant concentration on mortality 
in warm and cold seasons and the effect of the interaction between the season 
and the pollutant being examined. To make the division of seasons consistent 
with those used in Wong et al. (2001), we included the six months from October 
to March in the cold season, and those from April to September in the warm 
season. Because Shanghai’s climatic conditions differ from those in Hong 
Kong, it might be more appropriate to divide the seasons in different ways; this 
has been examined in our analysis, but the results are not reported here. When 
estimating the effect of a single pollutant, we used the same model as that 
described above but with two additional independent variables: a dummy variable 
for the season (1 for the warm season and 0 for the cold season) and a variable 
representing the interaction between the season and the pollutant. We then add 
two more variables—the concentration of the co-pollutant identified earlier and 
the interaction of the co-pollutant and the season—into the model to estimate 
the effect of the major pollutant adjusting for the effect of the co-pollutant. In the 
analysis, we have further examined the exposure–response relationship between 
the concentration level of the pollutant and mortality outcomes in warm and 
cold seasons, although detailed results will not be discussed in this chapter. 
All analyses were conducted using the statistical software R.
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Results
Table 14.1 presents summarised statistics of mortality counts, weather and 
major pollutants for the study period, by the two seasons specified earlier. 
While this seasonal division might not be the best way to group months, it has 
been adopted to make the analysis consistent with that used in the Hong Kong 
study. Alternative ways of dividing seasons have been considered in the data 
analysis, but their influence on the results is relatively small.
Table 14.1 Summary statistics of mortality outcome, air pollution levels 
and meteorological measures by season
 No. (days) Mean Standard Minimum P10 Median P90 Maximum
   deviation
Mortality counts       
Non-accidental
Cool 365 110.2 18.5 62 86 109 134 164
Warm 366 85.3 11.2 58 72 84 101 119
Cardiovascular disease        
Cool 365 40.1 9.3 16 28 39 53 65
Warm 366 28.6 5.9 14 21 28.5 36 50
Respiratory disease        
Cool 365 13.9 5.5 3 7 13 21 32
Warm 366 8.5 3.4 2 4 8 13 22
Air pollution concentrations (μg/m3)      
Nitrogen dioxide        
Cool 365 61.9 36.1 20 32 48 100 222
Warm  366 43.6 29.5 13 20 34 82 190
Sulphur dioxide        
Cool 365 44.8 16.2 12 24 45 67 98
Warm  366 37.6 13.2 10 20 38 55 74
PM10        
Cool 365 73.9 45.7 9 33 62 131 358
Warm 366 65.1 30.5 16 38 59.5 95 338
Meteorological measurements:       
Temperature (ºC)        
Cool 365 10.6 5.9 -2.1 3.6 9.8 20.1 24.4
Warm 366 23.8 5.1 9.8 16.3 24.2 30 33.2
Humidity (%)        
Cool 365 74.5 12.9 36 57 76 92 99
Warm  366 77.5 10.9 46 62 79 90 98
Sources: Authors’ calculations. 
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Shanghai is located on China’s east coast and has a subtropical monsoon 
climate. As shown in Table 14.1, Shanghai’s average air temperature was 23.8 
degrees Celsius (ºC) in the warm months and 10.6 ºC in the cold months in 2000 
and 2001—about 3 ºC and 8 ºC lower than the average temperatures recorded 
in Hong Kong in the two respective seasons over the period from 1995 to 1997. 
Shanghai has a greater seasonal difference in air temperature than Hong Kong. 
In Shanghai, the average relative humidity for the cold months was close to that 
for the warm months. These levels and their seasonal difference are similar to 
those observed in Hong Kong.
Statistics for pollutant concentrations are presented in the middle panel of 
Table 14.1. In comparison with warm seasons, in cold seasons, higher levels 
of concentration of all three listed pollutants were found. The average levels of 
air pollution in the cold and warm seasons are 61.9 and 43.6 micrograms (μg) 
per cubic metre for nitrogen dioxide, 44.8 and 37.6 μg/cubic metre for sulphur 
dioxide and 73.9 and 65.1 μg/cubic metre for PM10, respectively. The comparison 
between these results and those recorded in Hong Kong between 1995 and 
1997 suggests that, in Shanghai, the level of nitrogen dioxide was slightly lower 
than in Hong Kong, but the level of sulphur dioxide was much higher, and their 
seasonal difference was greater than that observed in Hong Kong. In Shanghai, 
the level of PM10 was also markedly higher than in Hong Kong, especially in 
the warm months. Another notable difference found between the two cities is 
that Shanghai’s maximum levels of nitrogen dioxide and PM10 are much higher 
than those recorded in Hong Kong.
In Shanghai, a larger number of non-accidental deaths took place in cold 
seasons than in warm seasons; this is particularly true for deaths caused by 
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. The ratios of cold-month to warm-
month deaths for the three mortality groups specified in Table 14.1 were 1.29 
(non-accidental deaths), 1.40 (cardiovascular disease) and 1.64 (respiratory 
disease). These ratios were higher than those recorded in Hong Kong between 
1995 and 1997, which were 1.17 (non-accidental deaths), 1.34 (cardiovascular 
disease) and 1.15 (respiratory disease).
Table 14.2 presents statistical results showing the effect of listed pollutants 
on the number of all non-accidental deaths and the number of deaths due to 
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. These pollutants and the three types 
of deaths are listed in the first column of the table. The second column of the 
table presents the lag day, which is the day on which the level of the given 
pollutant has the strongest association with the number of deaths recorded 
on the day of observation. We compared the lag effects for up to three days, 
and the best single lagged day was identified by the AIC.
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The effect of the given pollutant on mortality outcomes, in the form of 
relative risks (RRs) and their 95 per cent confidence interval (CI), is shown in 
column three and its significant level is shown in column four. These results 
show that the concentration of sulphur dioxide on the best single lagged 
day is significantly associated with all three mortality outcomes on the day 
of observation, and the levels of PM10 are significantly related to the deaths 
caused by respiratory diseases. These results are not, however, adjusted for 
auto-correlation and co-pollutants. After adjusting for auto-correlation (using 
the general least square method made available by the statistical software R), 
some changes were observed in the results—shown in columns five and six of 
the table. These changes are generally small, indicating that the influence of 
auto-correlation on the results is moderate or weak. We then further adjusted 
the model to take into account the impact of co-pollutants (listed in column 
seven), which were identified through the use of linear regression. These results 
are presented in columns eight and nine. After the model has been adjusted for 
auto-correlation and co-pollutants, the effects of nitrogen dioxide and PM10 on 
mortality outcomes are statistically insignificant. The concentration of sulphur 
dioxide is, however, still associated significantly with the number of all non-
accidental deaths and those caused by respiratory diseases. These results are 
broadly similar to those in Wong et al. (2001).
Table 14.3 presents statistical results for the effects of specified pollutants on 
mortality outcomes in the warm and cold seasons, which have been estimated 
using a model similar to that described above. To estimate the impact of a 
single pollutant without taking into account the effect of the co-pollutant, two 
additional variables—a dummy season variable and the interaction between 
the given pollutant and the season—were added into the model. When the 
impact of the co-pollutant was adjusted, two further variables—the co-
pollutant and the interaction of the co-pollutant and the season—were also 
included in the model. These results show that, in the warm season, the effect 
of all listed pollutants on mortality outcomes is not statistically significant, 
regardless of whether the effect of the co-pollutant is adjusted. In the cold 
season, however, the concentration of nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide is 
related significantly to all mortality outcomes if the effect of the co-pollutant 
is not adjusted. After the impact of the co-pollutant was taken into account, 
most of these significant associations remained except that between the 
concentration of nitrogen dioxide (after being adjusted for the co-pollutant 
sulphur dioxide) and the number of deaths caused by respiratory diseases. 
There is no significant association between the concentration of PM10 and 
specified mortality outcomes, regardless of whether the model was adjusted 
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for co-pollutants. As indicated by the statistics shown in the last column of 
Table 14.3, the between-season differences are statistically significant in estim-
ating the effect of nitrogen dioxide on all non-accidental deaths and deaths 
caused by respiratory diseases if the impact of the co-pollutant is not adjusted. 
The between-season difference is also significant when the effect of PM10 on 
deaths due to cardiovascular diseases is estimated with no adjustment for the 
co-pollutant.
Discussion
The results reported in the previous section show that air pollution in Shanghai 
has a notable impact on population health and mortality. This is particularly the 
case for sulphur dioxide, which, after adjusting for auto-correlation and for co-
pollutants, still significantly affects the relative risk for all non-accidental deaths 
and those caused by respiratory diseases. The health impact of air pollution is 
more observable in cold months, when the level of pollution concentration is 
markedly higher, than in warm months. As indicated by the results, in the cold 
season, the positive exposure–response relationships between sulphur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxide and specified mortality outcomes are much stronger than in 
the warm season. These results are supported by evidence presented by other 
researchers, despite the variation in the reported magnitude of such effects 
between different studies (Kan et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2007). Epidemiological 
and medical research have also found that lower temperatures are associated 
with an increase in hospital admissions for congestive heart failure. ‘Both lower 
temperatures and high air pollutant concentrations were related to increased 
blood viscosity. Changes in blood rheology may be caused by an inflammatory 
process in the lung induced by air pollution or by thermoregulatory adjustment 
to mild surface cooling in cold weather’ (Wong et al. 2001:338; see also Keatinge 
et al. 1984; Peters et al. 1997; Tsai et al. 2003).
Shanghai’s municipal government has made some progress in controlling 
air pollution. Our analysis of air quality in Shanghai between 1998 and 2007 
shows that the concentration of PM10 reached its peak in 2003 and started to 
decline thereafter. The level of nitrogen dioxide also displayed a trend of slow 
decrease despite a rapid increase in the number of motor vehicles. The level 
of sulphur dioxide, however, seems to have increased slightly in recent years; 
this is particularly noteworthy given the adverse health impacts of sulphur 
dioxide. Further improving its air quality will not only make Shanghai a clean 
city, it will contribute greatly to improvements in the health of its population. 
Brajer and Mead (2004) recently estimated the number of deaths that could be 
averted through controlling air pollution in Chinese cities, including Shanghai. 
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While their estimation procedures are questionable, the issues addressed in 
their paper certainly deserve some attention.
While the conclusions drawn from this study are broadly similar to those 
reported by the study conducted in Hong Kong by Wong et al. (2001), there 
are a few differences in the results. For example, while the concentrations 
of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide (after controlling for auto-regression 
and co-pollutants) in both cities have a marked impact on major mortality 
outcomes, especially in the cold season, the best lag days of such impact are 
not the same. The impact of sulphur dioxide on major mortality outcomes 
is readily observable in both cities, but the level of its concentration is more 
closely related to deaths caused by respiratory diseases in Shanghai, while it 
shows a stronger association with deaths due to cardiovascular disease in Hong 
Kong. Furthermore, the health impact of the concentration of nitrogen dioxide 
is similar in the two cities in the cold season, but it has a stronger association 
with deaths caused by cardiovascular diseases in Hong Kong if the impact of the 
season is not taken into consideration in the model. Some of these differences 
can be explained by variations in the levels of air pollution between Shanghai 
and Hong Kong; others might be related to the different interaction between 
various climatic and environmental factors in the two cities—or the selection 
and specification of statistical models. These possibilities will be examined in 
our future investigations.
The results reported in this chapter were obtained from our preliminary 
data analysis of death records and weather and air-quality data gathered in 
Shanghai in 2000 and 2001. To make the results comparable with those reported 
by Wong et al. (2001) in their study conducted in Hong Kong, we have applied 
a method similar to the one they used. This approach has some advantages 
in facilitating comparative research, but it might have introduced or imposed 
some restrictions and limitations, especially in the selection and application 
of the most appropriate statistical methods that could be used effectively to 
examine the questions under investigation and to analyse the large amount 
of data collected from Shanghai. We are now exploring the possibility of 
using more effective statistical methods to analyse the data, and hope this 
will lead to a more comprehensive examination and contribute to a better 
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Energy and environment in China
Kejun Jiang and Xiulian Hu 
Energy use in China
Due to rapid economic growth, China’s total primary energy consumption 
increased from 400 mega-tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 1978 to nearly 1,820 
Mtoe in 2007, with an annual average rate of increase of 5.3 per cent (Figure 15.1) 
(NBS 2006a, 2006b, 2007a). Coal is the major energy source, providing 70.7 per 
cent of total primary energy use in 1978 and 71 per cent in 2006 (Figure 15.2). 
There has been a dramatic surge in recent years in the rate of increase of energy 
use in China, as well as widespread energy shortages.
China’s energy development strategy gives high priority to conservation and 
improvements in energy efficiency, as well as to the efficient and clean use of 
coal and other fossil-fuel energy sources. The objective of developing clean-coal 
technology is to improve the efficiency of coal utilisation, reduce environmental 
pollution and promote economic development. High efficiency and clean tech- 
nology will be crucial for China to achieve a low-emission development path. 
Energy-efficiency improvements in the steel-making industry have been 
driven by the diffusion of advanced technology (Figure 15.3). Despite these 
improvements, steel making in China remains about 20 per cent less efficient 
than in Japan. 
To realise China’s sustainable development, the national energy development 
strategy includes a policy of energy conservation prioritisation, as well as 
vigorously developing renewable energy and new energies in China.
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Figure 15.3 Introduction of energy-efficiency improvements in 
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Energy and environment in China
China has implemented a series of economic and technological policies 
for energy conservation and has also established a three-tier system of 
energy saving within the central government, local governments and industry 
and enterprises since the 1980s. The 1998 Energy Conservation Law further 
established the energy-management system. China has implemented a series 
of energy-saving technological policies, including starting a national ‘Energy 
Conservation Propaganda Week’, energy-efficiency standards, a marking and 
authentication system, and is effectively advancing energy-saving practices 
and improving energy efficiency.
To promote the application of new and renewable energies in the long term, 
China has given financial subsidies and support to technical development. 
It also provides discount loans for the development and use of small hydro-
power and wind-power plants, in addition to implementing tax preferences 
and protective price policies. With the implementation of these measures, the 
energy-consumption structure is being constantly optimised and the quality of 
energy supply has improved. The rapid development of clean energies and the 
growth of the proportion of high-quality energy in the total play an important 
role in enhancing energy efficiency and improving atmospheric quality.
As a result, energy efficiency improved significantly after 1980. From 1980 to 
2000, the annual average energy improvement rate was 5.4 per cent (Figure 15.4). 
Due to the rapid development of industry in China after 2000, however, especially 
of energy-intensive products, improvements in energy efficiency with regard 
to gross domestic product (GDP) were negative.
Energy supply in China
Since the period of reform and ‘opening-up’, the energy industry has achieved 
rapid growth, contributing to the sustainable development of the national 
economy. China has set up an energy-supply framework that gives priority to 
coal and focuses on electricity generation and the development of renewable 
energy. It has built an integrated energy-supply system; there are many 
large coal-mines with an output capacity of more then 10 million tonnes and 
petroleum-producing bases have been set up in Daqing, Shengli, Liaohe and 
Talimu. At the same time, gas production has increased rapidly, the proportion 
of commercialised renewable resources in the primary energy structure has 
improved, and remarkable progress has been made in electricity generation.   
In 2004, China replaced Russia as the second-biggest energy producing 
country in the world. In 2006, primary energy output was 2,201.56 mega-tonnes 
of coal equivalent (Mtce)—an increase of 251 per cent from 1978. Coal output 
was up to 2,373 Mt, maintaining China’s first-place ranking in the world; gas 
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output reached 58.55 billion cubic metres; and oil output was 185 Mt, while 
power generation was 2,865.7 terrawatt hours (TWh)—both of which ranked 
second in the world.
Due to the nature of China’s energy-resource reserves, coal has long 
accounted for a large proportion of primary energy—up to 70 per cent—and, 
since 2001, the proportion has increased steadily, to 76.7 per cent in 2006. The 
elasticity coefficient for electric power became more than 1 after 2000.
Tables 15.1 and 15.2 show energy output by fuel from 1990 to 2006, the 
rank of Chinese energy output, and the gross and structure of Chinese energy 
production from 1978 to 2006. 
After 2003, China became a net importer of oil, and, by 2007, a net importer 
of energy. At present, China is the third-largest oil importer in the world. In 2006, 
China imported 145.18 Mt of crude oil and 46.01 Mt of petroleum products, while 
it exported 6.34 Mt of crude oil and 15.51 Mt of petroleum products; therefore, 
net crude oil imports were 138.84 Mt and net imports of petroleum products 
were 30.5 Mt. In 2006, the volume of imports of crude oil and oil products was 
worth US$68 billion, accounting for 7.02 per cent of China’s total volume of 
Table 15.1 Chinese energy output by fuel, 1990–2006
Year Raw coal  Crude oil Gas (hundred Electric power Hydro-power
 (Mt) (Mt)  million m3)  (TWh) (TWh)
1990 1,080 138.3 153.0 621.2 126.7
1991 1,087 141.0 160.7 677.5 124.7
1992 1,116 142.1 157.9 753.9 130.7
1993 1,150 145.2 167.7 839.5 151.8
1994 1,240 146.1 175.6 928.1 167.4
1995 1,361 150.1 179.5 1,007.0 190.6
1996 1,397 157.3 201.1 1,081.3 188.0
1997 1,373 160.7 227.0 1,135.6 196.0
1998 1,250 161.0 232.8 1,167.0 198.9
1999 1,280 160.0 252.0 1,239.3 196.6
2000 1,299 163.0 272.0 1,355.6 222.4
2001 1,381 164.0 303.3 1,480.8 277.4
2002 1,455 167.0 326.6 1,654.0 288.0
2003 1,722 169.6 350.2 1,910.6 283.7
2004 1,992 175.87 414.6 2,203.3 353.5
2005 2,205 181.35 493.2 2,500.3 397.0
2006 2,373 184.77 585.5 2,865.7 435.8
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2007b. China Statistical Yearbook 2007, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing. 
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imports, while the volume of exports of crude oil and oil products was worth 
US$17.48  billion, accounting for 2.21 per cent of China’s total volume of exports. 
Since 2001, China has imported much more coal than ever before—up to 38.25 
Mt in 2006, which was 20 times more than in 2000. 
Energy and environmental development 
Coal is the main energy source in China, and the coal-based energy structure will 
be difficult to change in the long term. The relatively backward modes of coal 
production and consumption have increased the pressure for environmental 
protection. Coal consumption is the main reason for China’s air pollution and is 
the main source of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions. With the constant 
increase of motor vehicles in China, air pollution in some cities has become a 
combination of soot and vehicle exhausts. 
The main pollutant emissions 
Pollution emissions from energy production in China. The impact of energy 
production on the environment is manifested in the dust pollution and gas 
emissions from coal-mining and processing, and atmospheric pollution from 
the spontaneous combustion of coal gangue. According to data from the China 
Table 15.2 Gross and structure of Chinese energy production, 1978–2006
Year Gross output  Proportion of energy production (%)
 (10,000 tonnes  Raw coal Crude oil Gas Hydro-power, nuclear
 of standard coal)    power, wind power
1978 62,770 70.3 23.7 2.9 3.1
1980 63,735 69.4 23.8 3.0 3.8
1990 103,922 74.2 19.0 2.0 4.8
1995 129,034 75.3 16.6 1.9 6.2
2000 128,978 72.0 18.1 2.8 7.2
2001 137,445 71.8 17.0 2.9 8.2
2002 143,810 72.3 16.6 3.0 8.1
2003 163,842 75.1 14.8 2.8 7.3
2004 187,341 76.0 13.4 2.9 7.7
2005 206,068 76.5 12.6 3.2 7.7
2006 221,056 76.7 11.9 3.5 7.9




Statistical Yearbook 2007 (NBS 2007b), China’s coal-mining and washing industry 
in 2006 emitted 145,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide, 122,000 tonnes of smoke and 
176,000 tonnes of industrial dust, with removal rates of 38 per cent (sulphur 
dioxide), 88 per cent (smoke) and 40 per cent (industrial dust). In addition, in 
2006, coal-mining and processing emitted 5 billion cubic metres of methane 
and 2.3 billion cubic metres of mine water, with mine-water utilisation of less 
than 40 per cent. In 2006, there were more than 1,600 waste dumps containing 
4,200 Mt of coal gangue, covering 17,000 hectares. More than 700,000 hectares 
have been lost to land collapse caused by mining.
The other major atmospheric pollutants in the energy-production process 
are sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and soot from thermal power plants. 
Because of the rapid increase in coal consumption in recent years, China’s 
thermal power industry uses mostly unwashed steam coal, making the power 
industry the main source of air pollution. According to the China Environmental 
Yearbook 2007 (SEPA 2007), in 2006, the thermal power industry emitted 12.041 
Mt of sulphur dioxide (59 per cent of the total for China), 3.467 Mt of soot and 
14,000 tonnes of industrial dust. 
Pollutant emissions from energy consumption in China. The high growth 
of energy consumption in the industrial sector is still the main source of 
emissions of sulphur dioxide. In 2006, the industrial sector emitted 10.18 Mt of 
sulphur dioxide, 18 per cent of which came from the production of non-metallic 
mineral products, 15 per cent from ferrous and non-ferrous metal smelting and 
processing and 11 per cent from the chemical industry.
The main coal-consuming provinces are Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi and 
Jiangsu, and other high-sulphur coal-consuming provinces are Guizhou, 
Sichuan and Chongqing in the southwest, which are the leading provinces for 
sulphur dioxide emissions.
China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) monitored 
522 cities in 2005: 77.4 per cent of the cities had an average annual concentration 
of sulphur dioxide at ‘Standard II’ (0.06 milligrams per cubic metre), while 6.5 
per cent were above Standard III (0.10 milligrams per cubic metre). The cities 
with the highest levels of sulphur dioxide pollution were distributed mainly 
in the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of Shanxi, Hebei, 
Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, Guangxi, Hubei, Shaanxi, Henan, Hunan, 
Sichuan, Liaoning and Chongqing. In addition, based on comparisons of coal 
consumption and urban air quality in key cities, the cities with the lowest sulphur 
dioxide concentrations and best urban environmental quality were Haikou, 
Sanya, Zhaoqing, Beihai, Zhanjiang and Zhuhai—all of which had low levels 
of coal consumption and a good-quality energy structure.
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Emissions of nitrogen oxides and energy activities are closely related. The 
main sources for the emission of these gases are power-generation boilers, 
industrial boilers and kilns using natural gas, coal and heavy oil as their main fuel 
source, as well as the production of nitric acid, nitrogen fertiliser and explosives 
and vehicle exhausts. As there are a variety of factors related to nitrogen oxides 
emission and combustion processes, such as the technological level of the 
production process, it is difficult for SEPA to monitor these emissions, and there 
are no accurate data among the environmental statistics for the emissions of 
nitrogen oxides. According to a preliminary estimate, in 2006, China emitted a 
total of about 14 Mt of nitrogen oxides—an increase of 8.5 per cent compared 
with 2000. In the total amount of nitrogen oxides, thermal power accounted 
for 40 per cent and industrial boilers and kilns, chemical production processes 
and vehicle exhausts made up the remainder.
In 2006, the main sources of industrial dust emissions in China were as 
follows: thermal power, 45 per cent; non-metallic mineral production, 18 per 
cent; ferrous and non-ferrous metals smelting and pressing, 15 per cent; 
chemical raw materials and chemical production, 10 per cent. 
In 2005, monitoring of acid rain was carried out in 696 Chinese cities. Acid 
rain was recorded in 357 cities, with the average annual rainfall pH value in 
the range of 3.87–8.35, accounting for 51.3 per cent of city statistics. The cities 
with an average annual rainfall pH value of less than 5.6 accounted for 38.4 per 
cent, with an increase of 1.8 per cent compared with 2004. The proportion of 
cities with an average annual rainfall pH value of 5.6 or less increased by 0.7 per 
cent, while the proportion of cities with a pH value of less than 4.5 increased 
by 1.9 per cent. The cities with frequency of acid rain over 80 per cent have 
increased by 2.8 per cent. The cities with low pH value of the average annual 
precipitation and a higher frequency of acid rain than that of 2004 shows that 
China’s acid rain pollution became more serious in 2005. Table 15.3 shows the 
major pollution emissions in China from 1995 to 2006. 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
The rapid increase of energy use in China has caused large quantities of carbon 
dioxide emissions. Figure 15.5 presents recent carbon dioxide emissions in 
China. China is now the world’s second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, 
after the United States. It is believed that, if there is no change in the trend of 
increasing energy use, China’s carbon dioxide emissions will overtake those 




Table 15.3 Major pollution emissions in China, 1995–2006
Year Sulphur  Dust (Mt) Industrial Waste  Chemical Industrial
 dioxide (Mt)   dust (Mt) water (100 oxygen solid waste
    million m3) demand (Mt)   (Mt)
1995 23.70 17.44 17.31 415.3 .. 22.27
2000 19.95 11.65 10.92 415.2 14.45 31.86
2001 19.48 10.70  9.91 432.9 14.05 28.94
2002 19.27 10.13  9.41 439.5 13.67 26.35
2003 21.59 10.48 10.21 460.0 13.34 19.41
2004 22.55 10.95 9.05 482.4 13.39 17.62
2005 25.49 11.82 9.11 523.0 14.14 16.55
2006 25.89 10.89 8.08 536.8 14.28 13.02
Source: State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), 2007. China Environmental 
Year Book 2007, China Environmental Yearbook Press, Beijing.
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Energy and environment in China
China’s massive exploitation of fossil fuels has resulted in a rapid increase in 
emissions of methane, which is the second most important greenhouse gas after 
carbon dioxide. Natural processes and human activities can generate methane 
emissions. The main human-made sources of methane include rice cultivation, 
cattle and sheep breeding, decomposing garbage in landfill, and coal-mining, 
gas and oil extraction, processing and transportation. Global annual methane 
emissions caused by animal intestinal fermentation are 60–100 Mt, accounting 
for 22 per cent of the anthropogenic total; methane emissions from animal dung 
amount to 20–30 Mt, accounting for 5.5–8 per cent of the anthropogenic total. 
China is the leading country for animal breeding, and animal enteric fermentation 
and animal dung are China’s largest sources of methane emissions. China’s rice 
plantations account for about 21 per cent of the global total, and rice growing is 
one of the main sources of methane emissions. 
China is the world’s largest coal-mining country, most of which is under-
ground mining, accounting for 95 per cent of the total coal production. Coal-
mining is the key source of energy production-related methane emissions. 
According to the China Climate Change Initial National Communication 
submitted in 2004 by the Chinese government to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change conference, in l994, China’s methane emissions were about 
34.29 Mt—9.37 Mt (27 per cent) of which were caused by energy-generation 
activities. With the rapid increase in China’s coal and natural gas production 
in recent years, methane emissions caused by energy activity have also been 
increasing greatly. It is estimated that gas produced in the coal-mining process 
(the main component of which is methane) in China increased from about 
9.6 billion cubic metres in 2000 to about 12 billion cubic metres in 2004—an 
increase of 25 per cent. The large volume of coal-mine gas emissions is not 
only a waste of a valuable clean-energy resource, it has caused a rapid rise in 
methane gas emissions in China. 
Policy measures for environmental and energy development
The Chinese Government attaches great importance to environmental protection, 
and strengthening environmental protection has become a basic national policy. 
Community awareness of environmental protection has generally improved. 
After the UN Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992, China 
formulated the China Agenda 21, and took comprehensive measures in the fields 
of law and economics and applied other means to strengthen environmental 
protection, achieving positive progress. The main components of China’s energy 
policy are the reduction and effective management of environmental damage 
and pollution in the process of energy development and utilisation. 
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Adhering to the strategy of economical, clean and safe development
China’s energy development adheres to a policy of economical, clean and 
safe development and solves problems through development and reform. The 
government implemented the scientific development concept, adheres to the 
people-centred policy or strategy, changes the concept of development to give 
priority to human development, innovates the mode of development, improves 
the quality of growth and development. The government insists that energy 
development follow a path of high technology, low resource consumption, less 
environmental pollution, good economic returns and public safety in order to 
achieve comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development.
China’s energy development adheres to the basic principles of relying on 
the domestic market and opening up to the global economy, while ensuring a 
steady supply of energy and promoting global energy development along with 
the steady growth of domestic energy. China’s energy development will bring 
more development opportunities to other countries in the world, open space 
for development in the international market and make a positive contribution 
to the security and stability of the world’s energy supplies. 
The basic contents of China’s energy strategy are: to give priority to conservation; 
to rely on the domestic market; to attach importance to diversified development 
and environmental protection; to rely on science and technology; to strengthen 
international cooperation; and to make efforts to build a stable, economical, 
clean and safe energy-supply system to support sustainable economic and social 
development. 
Giving priority to conservation. Resource conservation is a basic national 
policy in China, combining energy development and conservation. Priority is 
given to conservation, changing the mould of economic development, adjusting 
the industrial structure and encouraging research and development of energy-
saving technology. Priority is also given to the implementation of energy-saving 
products, improved energy management and energy-saving regulations and 
continuing improvements in energy efficiency. 
Domestic supply. China will rely mainly on domestic energy supplies to meet 
its growing demand for energy by steadily improving the security and capacity 
of the domestic supply. 
Diversif ied development. China will ensure a steady supply of energy 
through an orderly development of coal-generated electricity, accelerating the 
development of energy generation from oil and natural gas and encouraging the 
development of coal-bed methane production. It will also develop renewable 
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energy sources such as hydro-power, and promote nuclear power development, 
the scientific development of alternative energy sources, the optimisation of 
energy structures and the implementation of multi-source energy.
Science and technology. China relies on the scientif ic and technological 
progress of energy development, while strengthening the capacity for 
independent innovation, improving the absorption of imported technology 
and re-innovation capabilities, achieving breakthroughs in the development 
of new energy technology, improving key technology and major equipment 
manufacturing, creating new methods of energy development and enhancing 
its development potential. 
Environmental protection. China has a goal of building a resource-saving and 
environmentally friendly society. It actively promotes coordination between 
energy and environmental development, providing protection in the course of 
development and striving for sustainable development. 
Mutually beneficial cooperation. China adheres to a principle of equality 
and mutual benefit. It has strengthened its energy cooperation with the 
International Energy Agency and the international community. It is working 
actively to improve the mechanisms for global cooperation to achieve and 
maintain international energy security and stability. 
The seventeenth National People’s Congress of the Communist Party of 
China, held in October 2007, identified a need to speed up the transformation of 
development, to quadruple per capita GDP from 2000 levels by 2020 by optimising 
the industrial structure, improving efficiency and lowering consumption while 
protecting the environment. Guidelines for the eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–10) 
for National Economic and Social Development clearly propose that, by 2010, 
the unit of energy use of GDP be reduced by 20 per cent from 2005 levels, and 
the emission of major pollutants should be reduced by 10 per cent. 
To achieve the goals of economic and social development, the energy 
development objectives in the eleventh Five-Year Plan are: by the end of the Five-
Year Plan, the energy supply will meet the basic needs of the national economy 
and social development; progress will be made in energy conservation; energy 
efficiency will be increased; industrial structures will be further optimised; 
technological progress, economic efficiency and market competitiveness will 
be enhanced significantly; macroeconomic regulation and control of the energy 
sector, market supervision, laws and regulations, and the emergency warning 
system adapted for the socialist market economy will gradually be perfected; 
and coordination between energy, economic, social and environmental 
development will be achieved. 
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Promotion of energy conservation 
China is a developing country with a large population and a relative shortage 
of resources. To achieve sustainable economic and social development, China 
must take the road of resource conservation. China planned and carried out 
energy-conservation efforts in the early 1980s, through the implementation 
of the policy of ‘development and conservation simultaneously, conservation 
first’, and, by the end of last century, it had achieved its goal of a doubling of 
economic and energy-consumption growth. To continue to promote energy 
conservation, the Chinese government has further proposed to adopt resource 
conservation as a basic national policy and it has issued a decision called ‘work 
of the State Council on strengthening energy saving’. The Chinese government 
has always regarded energy conservation as the main component of macro-
regulation and control, to change the development mould and optimise the 
industrial structure. In the course of promoting energy savings, the government 
emphasises relying on restructuring, on scientific and technological progress, 
strengthening management and the legal system, deepening reforms and the 
participation of all citizens. The government formulated and implemented a 
‘special long-term plan for energy saving’, set goals to reduce energy consumption 
during the eleventh Five-Year Plan and to implement energy-saving tasks in the 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, as well as in key enterprises. 
China is improving its system of GDP and energy-consumption indicators, and 
energy consumption will be included in comprehensive evaluations and annual 
assessments of economic and social development. China will implement a 
bulletin of units of GDP energy consumption indexes, implement energy-saving 
responsibilities and accountability, construct an energy-efficient industrial system 
and promote fundamental changes in economic development. China’s measures 
for full implementation of energy conservation measures include the following. 
• Promote structural readjustment. For a long time, the main reason for 
China’s low-energy efficiency has been that the mode of economic growth 
is extensive and high-energy industries takes too large a part. China 
insists on changing the mode of development, adjusting the industrial 
structure and the internal structure of industry as the strategic focus for 
energy conservation, and creating an economic development mould with 
low input, low consumption, low emissions and high efficiency. China 
will accelerate the optimisation and upgrading of the industrial structure, 
actively developing hi-tech and service industries, strictly limiting 
the development of high-energy and high water use industries, and 
eliminating backward production capacity. It will promote fundamental 
changes in economic development to speed up construction of an energy-
efficient industrial system. 
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• Strengthen industrial energy conservation. Industry is the key area 
of China’s energy consumption. China has decided to take the road 
to high scientific and technological content, good economic returns, 
low resource consumption, less environmental pollution, less human 
resources, faster development of high-tech industries, and the use of 
new and advanced applicable technologies to transform traditional 
industries and improve the overall level of industrial development. 
The government will focus on strengthening energy savings in the 
production of iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, coal, electricity, oil, 
petrochemicals, chemicals and construction materials. Energy savings 
will be implemented in 1,000 enterprises, with a focus on improving the 
management of energy savings in industrial enterprises that consume 
more than 10,000 tonnes of standard coal. Their product structure will 
be adjusted, accelerating technological transformation and improving 
their management, to reduce energy consumption. The government 
supports a number of major energy-saving demonstration projects, 
promoting industrial energy-efficiency levels and eliminating backward, 
high-energy products, as well as improving access to an eff icient 
energy market. 
• Implementation of energy-saving projects. China is implementing 
10 key energy-saving projects, such as oil conservation, cogeneration 
and waste-heat utilisation; demonstration projects focused on energy-
saving construction; and encouraging the use of energy-saving products. 
The government will push for transformation of the existing energy-
conservation measures in construction, and promote the extensive use 
of new building materials. It will implement measures for conservation 
and alternative petroleum engineering and scientific development of 
alternative fuels. It will speed up the phasing out of old automobiles 
and ships, while actively developing public transport, restricting high 
fuel use vehicles and developing energy-saving and environmentally 
friendly vehicles. China will speed up the transformation of coal-fired 
industrial boilers and furnaces and regional cogeneration and waste-
heat capture programs to increase the efficiency of energy use. The 
government will promote ‘green’ lighting projects and the use of efficient 
electrical appliances, high-efficiency coal stoves and energy-saving 
housing technology. In rural areas, old high-energy farm machinery 
and fishing boats will be phased out, and agricultural and rural energy-
saving measures will be promoted. The government and the community 




• Strengthening of energy management. The Chinese government has 
established a system of compulsory purchases of energy-saving products, 
and actively promotes the prioritised procurement of energy-conservation 
products (included water-related products). Government procurement 
will play an active role in guiding these policies, leading the society 
towards the use of energy-saving products. It will study and formulate 
fiscal and taxation policies to encourage energy conservation, implement 
preferential taxation policies for comprehensive utilisation of resources 
and establish a multi-channel energy financing mechanism. China will 
deepen the reform of energy prices, create a situation favourable to the 
energy price formation mechanism, implement fixed-asset investment 
project assessment and verif ication of energy-saving systems, and 
restrict the source of energy-consumption growth. The government will 
establish new mechanisms for energy-saving enterprises, labelling of 
energy-efficient products, and promote energy management and energy-
saving voluntary agreements. It will establish sound energy-saving laws 
and regulations, and step up law enforcement. 
• Creating an energy-saving society. China publicises the importance 
of energy conservation in a variety of forms, continuously improving 
people’s awareness of resource conservation. It promotes a culture of 
energy conservation, and works hard to create healthy, civilised and 
economical consumption patterns. Energy conservation is an integral 
part of basic education, vocational education, higher education and 
the technical training system. The government uses newspaper, radio, 
television and other media to promote knowledge of energy conservation; 
it holds an energy conservation publicity week, and mobilises the 
community to participate in establishing long-term energy-saving 
mechanisms throughout society.
Recent increases in energy demand have caused shortages and environmental 
problems. Recognising this, the Chinese government has made efforts to soften 
energy pressure, by introducing various policies and instructions. Energy has 
become one of the government’s top concerns, especially since 2004. Recent 
energy policies include the Medium and Long-Term Energy Conservation Plan, 
the eleventh Five-Year Energy Plan, the Renewable Energy Law and the Fuel 
Efficiency Standard for Passenger Vehicles. 
In 2005, the government set a target of reducing energy intensity by 20 per 
cent between 2005 and 2010. In order to reach the target, several programs were 
introduced, including 10 key energy-conservation projects (Table 15.4) and a 
monitoring program for 1,000 large energy users. The government regulates 
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subsidies for renewable energy and a fuel tax and an energy tax are under disc- 
ussion. The fuel tax will be implemented as part of the eleventh Five-Year 
Plan.
Promoting coordination of energy development with environmental 
protection 
Climate change is a major global problem concerning the international comm- 
unity. It is not, however, just an environmental problem; ultimately, it is a develop- 
ment problem. The increasing development and utilisation of energy are the 
main causes of environmental pollution and climate change. All countries must 
find ways to correctly handle the relationship between the development and 
utilisation of energy, environmental protection and climate change.
China is a developing country in the early stages of industrialisation. China’s 
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels represent only 9.3 per cent of global 
Table 15.4 Energy-conservation projects approved by the Chinese 
government in 2005
Program Potential annual energy savings
Coal-fired industrial boiler conversion and  70 Mtce (conversion) 
increases in energy efficiency 35 Mtce (efficiency)
Heat–power cogeneration 5 Mtce
Residual heat and pressure usage 2.66 Mtce (steel industry)
 3 Mtce (cement industry)
 1.35 Mtce (coal-mining industry)
Oil conservation and substitution 35 Mt oil 
Electrical machinery system energy 20 billion kilowatt hours of electricity
conservation
Energy system optimisation Strive to achieve international benchmarks for  
 energy efficiency in steel, petrochemical and  
 chemical industries
Energy conservation in construction 50 Mtce
Green lighting 29 billion kilowatt hours of electricity
Energy conservation by government Reduce energy consumption per capita and  
organisations per area of office space by 20 per cent 
 between 2002 and 2010
Energy conservation monitoring and  Implementation began in 2006
technology services system construction
Source: National Development Research Commission.
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emissions, while its per capita carbon dioxide emissions put it at number 92 in 
the world; its unit of GDP carbon dioxide emission elasticity coefficient is also 
very small. As a responsible developing country, China has paid great attention 
to environmental protection and global climate change.
Treating environmental protection as a basic national policy, the Chinese 
government has signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, has 
set up a national body to coordinate climate change measures, submitted a 
‘national communication of information on initial climate change’, established the 
‘clean development mechanism management approach’, developed a national 
program to cope with the effects of climate change, and has implemented a 
series of policies and measures related to environmental protection and climate 
change.
Goals for the period of the eleventh Five-Year Plan include containing the 
basic trend of ecological deterioration, reducing the total discharge of major pollu-
tants by 10 per cent and effectively controlling greenhouse gas emissions.
China is actively adjusting its economic and energy structure, comprehensively 
promoting energy conservation, focusing on the prevention and control of envir-
onmental pollution, and effectively controlling pollution emissions, to promote 
the coordinated development of energy and protection of the environment.
Climate change policies
On 4 June 2007, the National Program for Climate Change (NPCC) was relea-
sed—the first such program in the developing world. This document specified 
China’s objectives, basic principles, key activities and projects, as well as 
policies and measures for the country as a response to climate change up to 
the year 2010. China will commit to completing all the tasks set out in NPCC, 
while constructing a resource-conservative and environmentally friendly 
society, building national capacity to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate 
change, and contributing further to the protection and understanding of the 
global climate system.
The NPCC includes the following
• China’s current and future efforts to deal with climate change 
• the impacts and challenges of climate change in China
• guidelines, principles and objectives for China to respond to climate 
change 
• policies and measures to address climate change 
• China’s position on key climate change issues and the need for 
international cooperation. 
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In the short term, emission-mitigation policies will be implemented mainly 
through domestic energy-efficiency policies, renewable energy development, 
nuclear energy development, domestic sustainable development and energy 
security. In the long term, China’s climate change policies will focus on further 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and policies such as a carbon tax, carbon 
pricing and so on. China will work together with other countries by joining an 
international emissions-reduction regime.
Energy and emission scenarios
According to the IPAC-Emission model, the primary energy demand in the 
baseline scenario will reach 4.5 billion tce in 2020 and 5.36 billion tce in 2030, 
with an annual growth rate of 3.6 per cent and an energy demand elasticity of 
0.58. Coal still accounts for the major part of China’s energy consumption (2.2 
billion tce in 2030, or 58 per cent of the total primary energy demand) and the 
need for natural gas will have a rapid increase, from 4 per cent to 12.3 per cent 
of the total energy demand from 2000 to 2030 (Table 15.4). 
By assuming the adoption of energy and environmental policy measures, 
the primary energy demand in policy scenario results is described in table 5. 
Compared to the baseline scenario, there is 385 million tce energy demand by 
2020, 4280 mtce in by 2030. There are 668 million tce reduction in 2020 and 1082 
million tce in 2030. There are pressures to apply these policy options in order 
to reach the lower energy demand scenario, and these should be introduced 
at the earliest opportunity to take advantage of the long lifespan of energy 
technologies.
Energy demands in the baseline and policy scenarios are given in Table 15.6 
and Table 15.7. Coal use in final energy keep going up due to energy intensive 
products’ increase, such as steelmaking, and demand for space heating in the 
service and residential sector. Natural gas and electricity increased quickly with 
a share 9.2 per cent and 23.9 per cent in 2030, increasing from 2.7 per cent and 17 
per cent in 2005. Industry is major sector for energy consumption. The increase 
for energy demand in industry up to 2020 continues due to increasing of energy 
intensive sector, but the growth rate is smaller than between 2000–2005.
CO2 emissions in 2020 and 2030 will reach 2.72 billion tons and 3.08 billion 
tons respectively. In the policy scenario, the CO2 emission will be lowered by 
28.3 per cent during the same period.
A package of policy options could be adopted now to reduce the growth 
rate of energy demand. Policies that would help China move to a low-energy 
demand scenario include promotion of the penetration of high energy-efficiency 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Energy and environment in China
subsidies for renewable energy; emission taxes; resource taxes; promotion of 
public involvement (Table 15.8).
A package of policy options could be adopted now to reduce the growth 
rate of energy demand. Policies that would help China move to a low-energy 
demand scenario include promotion of the penetration of high energy-efficiency 
technologies; f iscal energy and environment policies, vehicle fuel taxes; 
subsidies for renewable energy; emission taxes; resource taxes; promotion of 
public involvement (Table 15.8).
Conclusion 
China’s energy demand is increasing rapidly as a result of rapid economic 
development. This trend is expected to continue for several decades.
The Chinese government has announced a package of energy-efficiency 
policies, renewable energy policies and environmental emission-control 
policies to reach its environmental targets. There is, however, still significant 
pressure to provide energy security and to control environmental pollution. The 
increase in energy demand means China will have to work hard to maintain 
its energy supply and energy imports. The increase in demand also increases 
the emissions of pollutants.
Table 15.7 Final energy demand in baseline scenario
 Coal Coke Coal gas Oil N.Gas Heat Electricity Total
2000 421.6  81.2  12.8  265.2  22.2  59.5  148.7  1011.2 
2005 670.5  196.8  26.7  405.5  44.9  90.5  269.8  1704.7 
2010 934.1  224.8  31.2  614.3  77.8  158.8  407.3  2448.3 
2020 1087.6  211.3  33.0  1039.2  145.9  273.1  566.4  3356.6 
2030 1136.6  164.7  23.8  1504.5  246.0  400.3  720.4  4196.3 
Source: Authors’ projections.
Table 15.8 Final energy demand in policy scenario
 Coal Coke Coal gas Oil N.Gas Heat Electricity Total
2000 394.8  82.9  12.8  271.3  22.2  54.0  153.3  991.4 
2005 616.7  192.1  26.7  405.1  45.0  83.4  280.2  1649.2 
2010 684.8  212.8  26.3  501.6  67.0  110.7  411.2  2014.4 
2020 801.9  187.8  29.7  823.7  178.0  174.4  588.1  2783.6 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Energy and environment in China
China is paying great attention to climate change issues. Domestic action on 
energy efficiency and renewable energies has contributed to China’s mitigation 
of greenhouse gas emissions.
Analysis of various scenarios for the future shows that such a high level of 
energy demand and imports will put heavy pressure on China’s energy-supply 
system. A well-designed strategy for the energy system and energy-industry 
development should therefore be prepared. That strategy should consider the 
following options.
• Because technological progress is key to reducing energy demand and 
ensuring a clean future, much more emphasis should be placed on 
new-generation technologies. In the simulations, technological progress 
contributes much of the energy savings while having no negative effects 
on public welfare. 
• Export taxes are imposed on energy-intensive products. Energy, resource 
and similar taxes have significant effects on energy saving and optimisation 
of the economic structure. They should be given much more attention.
• Like other developing countries with high levels of energy imports, China 
should establish an energy security system. The size of strategic storage 
should be determined based on a global oil market situation.
• If there is no strong control of emissions, pollution will increase quickly in 
the short term. In the longer term, some pollutant emissions could 
be controlled by implementing various measures adopted by the 
government.
• Clean-coal technology should be emphasised to mitigate emissions from 
coal combustion. Only a few countries in the world are using coal on a 
large scale; development of clean-coal technologies therefore depends 
on them. China is the largest user of coal in the world, and its use of coal 
will increase in the future (by 2020, China could account for more than 40 
per cent of global coal consumption). Therefore, clean-coal technology 
is crucial. China should have a clear development plan to promote clean-
coal technology, working closely with other countries to develop a new 
generation of clean-coal technologies.
Because of its low production costs, China is likely to become a major 
manufacturing centre, producing energy and resource-intensive products. 
China must ensure it does not become excessively reliant on raw materials, the 
extraction of which causes damage to the environment. External costs should be 
included in production costs. Planning for energy and resource-intensive products 
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Chinese urban household energy 
requirements and CO2 emissions
 
Jane Golley, Dominic Meagher and Xin Meng
Much of the literature on Chinese energy focuses on the insatiable demand of 
China’s rapidly growing industrial sector. Given that in 2005 industry accounted 
for close to 70 per cent of China’s energy demand that was consumed directly 
by the various sectors of the economy, this focus is not unwarranted. Likewise, 
given that residential consumption accounted for only 11 per cent of this direct 
energy demand in 2005, perhaps it is not surprising that there has been so 
little research on this aspect of China’s total energy demand.1 What tends to 
be overlooked, however, is that whatever is produced within China is ultimately 
used for household or government consumption, investment or exports. This 
gives rise to a number of interesting questions regarding the end users of 
energy. This paper focuses on one of those end users, urban households, and 
considers the consequences of different household consumption patterns 
for energy requirements and carbon dioxide emissions (henceforth carbon 
emissions). 
Drawing on national-level energy and output data for all production sectors 
and on the Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey (National Bureau 
of Statistics 2005), we address three related issues. First, using national-level 
data, we extend the notion of household energy consumption to include 
‘indirect’ energy requirements, defined in terms of the energy inputs used in 
the production of goods consumed ultimately by households. Adding this to 
direct energy consumption yields considerably higher total energy requirements 
and, therefore, higher contributions to aggregate emissions, than accounting 
for direct energy requirements alone, supporting the findings of many others 
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(Wei et al. 2007; Pachauri and Spreng 2002; Cohen et al. 2005). This suggests 
that understanding household consumption patterns could be more important 
for understanding China’s future energy demand than has been recognised 
previously. 
Second, using the urban household survey data, we examine the extent of 
variation in total energy requirements and emissions across households with 
different income levels. It seems obvious that richer households should generate 
more emissions, simply because they have more money to spend and virtually 
no expenditure is emission free. More crucially though, we are concerned with 
household variations in energy requirements and emissions per yuan—that is, 
energy and emission intensities. Given that households with different levels 
of per capita income are likely to have different consumption bundles, and 
that different goods clearly require different quantities of energy in order to 
produce one yuan of output, variations are highly likely. A simple examination 
of how expenditure and emission shares of each sector vary across income 
brackets enables us to identify that while richer households do indeed emit 
more per capita, poorer households tend to be more emissions intensive—that 
is, generating higher emissions per yuan spent. Their heavy reliance on coal 
as a source of direct energy also makes poorer households significantly less 
‘energy efficient’, as reflected in higher emissions/energy ratios.
Third, econometric analysis provides estimates of the extent of variations 
in energy requirements and emissions that can be attributed to household 
variations in per capita income and a variety of other household-specific 
characteristics. Beyond per capita income, other variables of interest include 
household size and the level of education. Smaller households might be expected 
to emit more per capita based on economies of scale in the direct use of energy: 
electricity, fuel for cooking and so on. It is possible—although perhaps overly 
optimistic—that higher levels of education could result in successful efforts 
to reduce per capita emissions. Other factors that might cause variations in 
household energy requirements include dwelling size, the age of household 
members and the province in which households are located. The combined 
findings that emerge give rise to some critical policy implications. 
Background
First, it is necessary to clarify some key terms. ‘Direct’ energy requirements of 
households are defined as the consumption of energy carriers (coal, petroleum, 
natural gas and electricity) purchased by households in order to cater for energy 
services, such as space heating, heating tap water, lighting, appliances, cooking 
and motor fuel. ‘Indirect’ energy requirements refer to the consumption of 
336
China’s Dilemma
energy that occurs during the production process of a good or service before 
its use (Weber and Perrels 2000; Wei et al. 2007). Direct energy requirements 
are relatively easy to calculate. As long as physical quantities consumed of, say, 
petroleum, can be observed (which they can in the survey data used below), it 
is possible to convert those quantities into tonnes or grams of ‘coal equivalent’ 
using the appropriate conversion factors. The carbon emissions associated with 
each form of energy can be derived readily using ‘carbon coefficients’, which 
are constants that vary across different energy forms (and across countries and 
over time as well).2 Multiplying the petroleum quantity—expressed in tonnes 
of coal equivalent (tce)—by the appropriate carbon coefficient provides a 
measure of the total amount of carbon emissions associated with that quantity 
of petroleum consumption. 
Calculating indirect energy requirements and their associated carbon emiss- 
ions is more complex. Kok et al. (2006) survey the relevant literature and note the 
obvious but important point that different methods, all based on input–output 
(IO) analysis but using different data sources and different levels of aggregation, 
produce different results. They identify three basic methods: first, basic IO 
energy analysis draws on monetary data based entirely on national accounts. 
The indirect energy requirements of households are calculated by multiplying 
‘sectoral cumulative energy intensities’ with monetary data on the final demand 
of households, which are available from the IO table. Energy intensities do not 
include direct energy deliveries to households, which are calculated separately 
using physical energy data from energy statistics at the national level. Second, 
‘IO plus household expenditure’ differs from the basic method in that it relies on 
expenditure surveys rather than IO tables to determine household expenditure. 
Expenditure on each consumption item is multiplied with the corresponding 
value of energy intensity for that item. The direct energy requirements of 
households are also calculated separately, but here they are based on energy-
use data collected at the household level. This is essentially the methodology 
adopted below, and has been used by many others (Weber and Perrels 2000; 
Pachauri 2004; Cohen et al. 2005; Bin and Dowlatabadi 2005). The third method 
is called ‘hybrid energy analysis’, which involves a combination of process 
and IO analysis. In process analysis, the life cycle of a product is described in 
physical terms, delving in great detail into the various stages of the production 
process, such as distribution, storage, transport, waste and recycling, and so 
on. It is the most accurate and time-consuming method and, as a consequence, 
appears to have been used only for European analysis where such detailed data 
are available (see, for example, Reinders et al. 2003). This method is simply out 
of the question at this stage for a China-focused analysis. 
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This variety of methods (often referred to by different names) has been 
applied to address a range of issues in single-country and cross-country analy-
ses.3 Weber and Perrels (2000) assess the energy and emissions consequences 
of consumer activities in West Germany, the Netherlands and France, consider-
ing how alternative lifestyles—such as slower economic growth or the adoption 
of cleaner technologies—impact on projected household consumption pat-
terns. Pachauri and Spreng (2002) use a 115-sector classification of IO tables 
for India in three different years, enabling them to conduct cross-sectional 
and time-series analyses. They find that total energy consumption by Indian 
households is divided evenly between direct and indirect energy requirements 
and accounts for 75 per cent of total energy consumption in India. Their time-
series analysis enables them to identify the main drivers of increasing energy 
requirements in total and per capita terms—namely, growing expenditure per 
capita and increasing energy intensity in the food and agricultural sectors. 
Pachauri (2004) builds on this to consider cross-sectional variations in house-
hold energy requirements in 1993–94, finding that the size of the household 
dwelling, the number of members in the household and the literacy level of 
the head of the household all effect household energy requirements—the 
first two positively, the last one negatively. Cohen et al. (2005) investigate the 
picture of equity that emerges within a developing country, using expenditure 
data on different income levels across 11 cities in Brazil. They show that 61 
per cent of household energy is consumed indirectly and find that there are 
fairly constant energy intensities across income classes. Reinders et al. (2003) 
conduct a detailed examination of household energy intensities for a range 
of consumer goods in 11 European Union countries, showing that the direct 
energy share varies across countries, ranging from 34 to 64 per cent. 
The analysis of China by Wei et al. (2007) is closest in spirit to this paper. 
They first quantify the direct and indirect energy requirements and related 
carbon emissions of urban and rural residents between 1999 and 2002. They 
find that 26 per cent of China’s total energy consumption and 30 per cent of its 
emissions are the ‘consequence of residents’ lifestyles and economic activities 
to support these demands’ (Wei et al. 2007:247). Using the IO plus expenditure 
approach, they find that for urban residents, the indirect contribution of energy 
consumption is 2.44 times greater than the direct contribution (accounting for 
71 per cent of the total), while for rural residents it is smaller (accounting for 
35 per cent of the total). The sectors covered are food, clothing, residence, 
household facilities and services, medicine and medical services, transport 
and communication services, education, cultural and recreation services 
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and miscellaneous commodities and services. While these sectors dif fer 
significantly from the ones used below, and the methodology is not identical, 
this chapter provides a useful benchmark for comparison.
Before turning to a detailed description of the methodology adopted in this 
chapter, a few caveats should be noted. One regards the problem of using ex-
penditure as the key variable for calculating energy and emission intensities. 
As noted by Weber and Perrels (2000), calculating an average energy require-
ment per dollar spent on ‘food’ does not allow a distinction between high and 
low-quality product choices within that category. They argue that high quality 
usually comes at a high price, while the embodied energy increase is not com-
mensurate, resulting in a lower energy intensity per monetary unit spent on 
high-quality products. Regardless, to improve on this would require a much 
more detailed treatment that is very difficult to combine with a dynamic de-
scription of consumption and production in a society (Weber and Perrels 2000). 
Aside from the quality issue, high levels of aggregation are also problematic. 
If we had data on the energy inputs for, say, rice, pork and tofu, it would be 
(relatively) reasonable to assume that each of these is a homogeneous group 
and that price is also homogeneous within each group. Given that instead all 
we can do is aggregate these into ‘food’, because that is the extent of energy 
data available, it is true that we could overestimate or underestimate the energy 
and emission intensities associated with each sub-group: rice, pork and tofu. 
Given data constraints, there is little to be done about this problem other than 
to emphasise that the discussion is necessarily about average intensities, and 
to concede the shortcomings of this approach.4 
Other problems raised in the literature include the high level of uncertainty 
for countries that rely heavily on imports, where imports are assumed to be 
produced using the same technology and structure as domestic industries, 
and also the incompleteness of sectoral environmental statistics (for example, 
small and medium enterprises might be registered only in part and fail to be 
recorded accurately) (Suh et al. 2004). Hondo et al. (2002) identify numerous 
sources of uncertainty in carbon intensity calculations using IO tables, including 
data errors, multiple goods in one sector, multiple prices of one good, multiple 
technologies of one good and multiple producers of one good, presumably 
using different technologies. The household survey data used below do not 
indicate the share of imports in household expenditure and, likewise, it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to assess just how important these various sources 
of uncertainty might be. Instead, we simply acknowledge these issues and 
concede that the analysis is necessarily approximate rather than precise.
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National-level energy requirements and carbon emissions
China’s direct energy consumption was 2.14 billion tonnes of coal equivalent 
(tce) in 2005 ( Table 16.1).  Industr y (including mining and quarr ying, 
manufacturing and the production and supply of electric power, heat power 
and water) accounted for the lion’s share of this consumption, at 69.8 per cent. 
Residential consumption accounted for the next highest share, at 10.9 per cent, 
with urban and rural residents accounting for 6.6 and 4.3 per cent respectively. 
This places aggregate residential direct energy consumption above transport, 
storage, postal and telecommunication services, agriculture, construction 
and wholesale, retail trade and catering services. The dominance of industry 
in terms of direct energy consumption explains why much of the literature has 
focused on the relationship between China’s rapid industrial development and 
energy demand.5 This, however, overlooks a critical point, which is that China’s 
households ultimately consume a large share of industrial output, and indeed 
the output of other sectors as well. This is where the notion of ‘indirect’ energy 
consumption comes into play. 
Input–output tables provide the value of each productive sector used 
(either as a final product or in the production of another product) by the 
various sectors of the economy, which are: each of those productive sectors 
(agriculture, mining and quarrying, foodstuff, and so on); rural, urban and 
government consumption expenditure; gross fixed-capital formation and 
changes in inventories; and net exports. The sum of these values is equal to the 
total output value for each productive sector. The shares of each sector’s total 
output consumed by rural and urban households are listed in Table 16.2. Our 
notion of indirect energy consumption follows from observing these shares, 
which are as high as 49.5 per cent of the total output in the case of foodstuffs 
and average 16.8 per cent across all sectors. Given that the foodstuff sector, for 
example, used 43.3 million tce as direct energy inputs in the production process, 
households indirectly consumed 21.4 million tce through their consumption 
of foodstuffs. In terms of total energy requirements, then, in addition to the 
10.9 per cent of total energy consumed directly by urban and rural households 
(as shown in Table 16.1), another 16.8 per cent of China’s total energy—or 
360 million tce—was consumed through their expenditure on other products 
(Table 16.3). This implies that 27.7 per cent of China’s total energy can be traced 
to household consumption (very close to Wei et al.’s [2007] figure of 26 per cent). 
For urban households, indirect energy requirements of close to 248 million 
tce are 1.75 times higher than their direct energy requirements (accounting 
for 64 per cent of total urban household energy consumption), while for rural 
households indirect requirements are 1.2 times higher (accounting for 55 per 
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cent of the total). As urbanisation progresses in China, this is indicative of the 
fact that indirect energy demand will become an increasingly dominant source 
of China’s consumer-driven emissions trends.
In order to look more closely at the energy requirements and carbon emis-
sions of households in China in the next section, it is first necessary to calculate 
the ‘energy intensity’, defined as the energy requirements per yuan of output 
in each sector, and the ‘carbon intensity’, defined as the carbon emissions per 
yuan of output in each sector. Dividing the total energy consumed in each sector 
by the gross value of output in that sector gives sector-level energy intensities, 
which are provided in Table 16.4 in terms of grams of coal equivalent (gce) per 
yuan for each of the sectors for which data are available for 2005.6 One point 
that is immediately clear is that energy intensities vary substantially across 
sectors, ranging from 1,178 gce per yuan in the ‘mining of other ores’, to just 5.47 
Table 16.1 China’s direct energy consumption in 2005
 ‘000 tonnes of coal Share
 equivalent (tce) (per cent)
Total  2,144,794  100.0
Agriculture  79,783  3.7
Industry  1,496,389  69.8
Mining and quarrying  118,283  5.5
Foodstuff  43,277  2.0
Textile, sewing, leather and fur products  58,416  2.7
Other manufacturing  58,500  2.7
Production and supply of electric power, heat power and water  109,278  5.1
Coking, gas and petroleum refining  104,715  4.9
Chemical industry  244,744  11.4
Building materials and non-metal mineral products  215,151  10.0
Metal products  462,770  21.6
Machinery and equipment  81,255  3.8
Construction  34,111  1.6
Transport, postal and telecommunication services  162,793  7.6
Wholesale and retail trades, hotels and catering services   50,311  2.3
Other services  86,912  4.1
Residential consumption  234,495  10.9
Urban  142,205  6.6
Rural 92,290 4.3
Note: ‘Other services’ combines real estate, leasing and business services, banking and 
insurance and other services. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2006. China Energy Statistical Yearbook, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing.
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Table 16.3  Indirect energy requirements for rural and urban households 
(‘000 tonnes of coal equivalent)
 Rural Urban All
Total  111,347   248,397   359,744 
Agriculture  13,771   15,441   29,212 
Mining and quarrying  893   2,377   3,269 
Foodstuff  7,440   13,998   21,439 
Textile, sewing, leather and fur products  2,428   9,643   12,071 
Other manufacturing  1,037   4,551   5,588 
Production and supply of electric power, heat and water  2,952   13,471   16,423 
Coking, gas and petroleum refining  674   4,066   4,741 
Chemical industry  5,653   10,774   16,427 
Building materials and non-metal mineral products  3,689   17,061   20,750 
Metal products  1,640   6,875   8,514 
Machinery and equipment  1,128   4,272   5,399 
Transport, postal and telecommunication services  5,220   14,516   19,736 
Wholesale and retail, hotels and catering services   2,931   10,054   12,985 
Other services 6,952 16,773 23,726
Note: ‘Other services’ combines real estate, leasing, business, banking, insurance and other 
services. 
Source: Tables 16.1 and 16.2 and authors’ calculations.
Table 16.2  Shares of household consumption expenditure in total 
output (per cent)
 Rural Urban Subtotal
Total 5.2 11.6 16.8
Agriculture 17.3 19.4 36.6
Mining and quarrying 0.8 2.0 2.8
Foodstuff 17.2 32.3 49.5
Textile, sewing, leather and fur products 4.2 16.5 20.7
Other manufacturing 1.8 7.8 9.6
Production and supply of electric power, heat power and water 2.7 12.3 15.0
Coking, gas and petroleum refining 0.6 3.9 4.5
Chemical industry 2.3 4.4 6.7
Building materials and non-metal mineral products 1.7 7.9 9.6
Metal products 0.4 1.5 1.8
Machinery and equipment 1.4 5.3 6.6
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transport, postal and telecommunication services 3.2 8.9 12.1
Wholesale and retail trades, hotels and catering services  5.8 20.0 25.8
Real estate, leasing and business services 12.8 18.9 31.7
Banking and insurance 7.3 12.9 20.2
Other services 5.4 21.1 26.5




gce per yuan in the ‘manufacturing of communication, computers and other 
electronic equipment’. In aggregate, the construction sector has the lowest 
energy requirements per yuan of output at 9.87 gce, compared with 20.22 gce 
in agriculture, 58.25 gce in manufacturing and 79.36 gce in mining.7
Calculating the carbon intensities is a little more involved because not all 
forms of energy are associated with the same carbon emissions. To resolve this, 
we first need to know how much of each type of energy is used by each produc-
tion sector. These data are available from the China Energy Statistical Yearbook 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2006) and provide the energy requirements (that 
is, direct energy inputs) for production in 48 sectors. Eighteen different fuels are 
specified, which we then aggregate into six categories: coal, coking products, 
petroleum products, natural gas, heat and electricity.8
Since the data are measured in consistent units, it is possible to calculate 
the share of energy from each category used in production in each of the 48 
sectors.9 For example, agriculture consumed 79.8 million tce in 2005. Of that, 30.1 
per cent was coal, 1.5 per cent was coking products, 50.4 per cent was petroleum 
products, 0 per cent was natural gas, 0.05 per cent was heat and 17.9 per cent 
was electricity. Based on data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA 
2008) of the US Department of Energy, Table 16.5 provides the carbon emission 
coefficients for China in 2005, measured in tonnes of carbon equivalent (tcae).10 
It is then straightforward to calculate the carbon intensity for each sector by 
multiplying each emission coefficient by the proportion of each fuel used in 
production and summing over all fuels, giving the emissions intensities in 
grams of carbon per yuan reported in Table 16.4. Given that different sectors 
use different types of energy in different proportions, there is not a perfect 
correlation between energy intensity and emissions intensity. Although the 
correlation at this sectoral level is extremely high, at 0.999, a closer look at 
the household data below reveals important differences in across-income 
deciles. 
Urban household energy requirements and carbon emissions
The data used in this section are drawn from the Urban Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (National Bureau of Statistics 2005). Although the 
survey covered all 31 provinces in China, we have access only to the data 
for 16 provinces. In the survey, household expenditure is divided into seven 
categories: current-period consumption; expenditure on housing building 
or purchasing; transfer expenditure (including tax, donations, buying lottery 
tickets, paying for expenditure of non-coresiding family members [parents or 
children], expenditure on non-saving insurance, and other transfer expenditure); 
interest-only mortgage repayments; social welfare savings; saving and 
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mortgage repayments (principles only); and end-of-period cash in hand. The 
part of household expenditure that we are able to convert into direct and indirect 
energy consumption and carbon emissions is the first category: current-period 
consumption, which, on average, accounts for 75 per cent of total household 
expenditure (see column 5 in Appendix Table A16.1). To the extent that any of 
the other categories require energy inputs and therefore generate emissions, 
the calculations below will underestimate households’ indirect contributions 
to China’s energy demand. The survey provides details of household current-
period consumption on a range of highly disaggregated goods. We aggregate 
these according to the sectors in Table 16.4, and are therefore able to calculate 
the urban household energy requirements and carbon emissions that occur 
indirectly via each household’s consumption bundle.11 This is the notion 
of indirect energy introduced above, but now applied to household-level 
expenditure data. In addition to these indirect energy requirements, each 
household also consumes energy directly, in the form of coal, gas, petroleum 
and electricity. The survey data provide the quantities of each of these 
consumed by each household, which are readily converted into tonnes of coal 
equivalent (tce), from which the carbon emissions can be obtained. We also 
have expenditure data for each of these forms of direct energy consumption, 
from which energy and emission intensities can be obtained. 
Three important assumptions are made in calculating household energy 
consumption and carbon emissions. First, a sizeable amount of household 
food consumption comes from eating out. We assume that one-third of the 
cost of eating out is due to food consumption, while the remainder is service 
cost.12 We further assume that half of the cost of food eaten out stems from 
food processed from agricultural products, while the other half stems from 
manufactured food. Second, we assume that 25 per cent of total expenditure 
on public transportation fees, such as expenditure on taxi, bus, air and train 
tickets, is related to petrol consumption, while the rest is attributed to services. 





Source: Authors’ calculations and Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2008. International 
Energy Annual. Available from www.eia.doe.gov.iea (accessed 15 January 2008).
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Third, all service fees are assumed to be energy free, due to data limitations. 
Excluding service costs, the proportion of current-period consumption that is 
counted for as direct and indirect energy consumption is about 73 per cent 
of current-period consumption and 55 per cent of per capita total household 
expenditure (see Table A16.1). As with the above excluded categories in total 
household expenditure, omitting services from the analysis will mean that we 
underestimate households’ indirect contributions to China’s energy demand. 
Table 16.6 presents summary statistics by income deciles for urban house- 
holds’ total energy consumption, carbon emissions, direct and indirect 
emissions, per capita energy consumption and carbon emissions, and direct 
emissions by different energy sources. The table shows that the urban Chinese 
households surveyed consume an average of 1.71 tce per annum, which in 
turn generates an average of 0.9 tonnes of carbon emissions (tcae). Average 
per capita energy consumption across all households is 0.61 tce per annum, 
which generates 0.32 tcae. Energy consumption and carbon emissions are 
much higher for richer households than for poorer ones. Households in the 
top-10 percentile income group (the tenth decile) consume an average of 2.48 
tce, some 86 per cent more than the amount consumed by households in the 
poorest group (the first decile), at 1.34 tce. Similarly, the richest decile emits, 
on average, 66 per cent more carbon than the poorest.
By separating total energy consumption into direct and indirect sources, 
it is revealed that only 32 per cent of household energy consumption is from 
direct sources.13 Nevertheless, with regard to carbon emissions, indirect sources 
account for a larger proportion, especially for the richest decile, in which close 
to 40 per cent of carbon emissions are from indirect sources.14 This compares 
with just 20 per cent for the poorest decile (see Table A16.3). Why does indirect 
energy demand account for a higher proportion of total emissions generated 
by richer households than by poorer ones? When comparing carbon emissions 
across income groups, it is clear that rich households emit more per capita than 
poor households; however, if comparing direct emissions, the poor generate 
only slightly less carbon than the rich. Further investigation shows that the high 
direct emissions for poor households are due mainly to their relatively high 
levels of coal consumption—the most emission-intensive form of energy. The 
poorest income decile’s carbon emissions from coal consumption are about 
seven times as high as the richest decile’s. This, in turn, is due to the fact that the 
price of coal is one-third of the price of gas, one-ninth of the price of electricity 
and one-tenth of the price of petrol, as shown in Table 16.7. 
A closer look at the data reveals some interesting points regarding variations 
in the level of carbon emissions per unit of energy consumed across households. 
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This emissions/energy ratio provides a measure of the extent of the carbon 
intensity of energy, or energy efficiency, with lower levels implying that energy 
use is relatively energy efficient. To sum up the discussion of Table 16.6 and 
further examine this energy efficiency, we present a group of graphs that provide 
visual relationships between energy and emissions on the one hand, and 
income on the other. Figure 16.1 presents per capita total energy consumption, 
carbon emissions and the ratio of carbon emissions over energy consumption, 
by income percentile. The figure shows that while rich households consume 
more energy and produce more carbon emissions per capita, their emissions/
energy ratio is lower than poor households’. That is, richer households are 
relatively energy efficient.
We then plot separately direct and indirect energy, emissions and their 
ratio in Figures 16.2 and 16.3a. The two figures indicate that the major source 
of lower energy efficiency for the poor is direct energy consumption, which 
generates substantially more emissions for the poor than for the rich. For indi-
rect energy consumption and emissions, there is almost no difference across 
income groups.
The data presented in Table 16.6 indicate that the main reason for high 
levels of direct energy consumption and carbon emissions for people in poor 
households is their high level of coal consumption. We therefore exclude 
coal from direct energy consumption and consequent emissions and plot the 
remaining direct energy and emissions by income group again (Figure 16.3b). 
The new figure shows almost the same level of energy efficiency for poor and 
rich households. In fact, there is a slightly higher emissions/energy ratio for 
the top income decile compared with the other income groups. 
The next question of interest is whether there is any variation in rich and poor 
households’ per yuan carbon emissions. Figure 16.4 plots average emissions 
Table 16.7 Price per tonne of coal equivalent





Source: Derived from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2005. Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey, China Statistics Press, Beijing.
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Figure 16.3b Direct energy, carbon emission and energy efficiency 
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divided by total expenditure per household. The top solid line in Figure 16.4 
is total emissions per yuan. The figure indicates that every yuan spent by the 
poorest household generates 120 grams of carbon equivalent (gcae), while one 
yuan spent by the richest household generates only 20 gcae. Almost the entire 
difference in these emissions intensities is due to direct energy consumption, 
as can be seen by the fact that the curve for direct emissions per yuan follows 
the total emissions curve closely while the curve for indirect emissions per yuan 
is almost flat. This, in turn, is due to the high level of coal consumption by the 
poor (as seen by the curve for direct emissions excluding coal, which is also 
very flat). In other words, the most important discrepancy between rich and 
poor households lies in the different shares of expenditure allocated to direct 
coal consumption and the emissions generated as a result. 
This is not to say that the sources of indirect emissions do not vary across 
income brackets. For example, food (processed from agriculture, manufactured 
and eating out combined) accounts for 75 per cent of the poorest decile’s 
emissions, compared with just 48 per cent for the richest decile, while 10 per 
cent of the richest decile’s indirect emissions stem from the manufacturing of 
raw chemicals and chemical materials, compared with 5 per cent for the poorest 
decile. These differences do not, however, amount to significant differences 
in emissions per yuan spent for each of these income groups. Instead, it is all 
Figure 16.4 Yuan carbon emissions by income percentile (kg)
Per yuan total emissions
Per yuan indirect emissions
Per yuan direct emissions

























about direct emission shares, and those generated from coal consumption in 
particular: 58 per cent of the poorest households’ direct emissions stem from 
coal consumption compared with just 6.5 per cent for the richest households.15 
While rich households therefore consume more energy and produce more 
carbon emissions than poor households, poor households produce more 
emissions per unit of energy consumption and more emissions per yuan spent 
than rich households.
An econometric analysis
The above analysis is based entirely on simple averages by income group. 
Energy consumption and emissions can also be affected by other factors, such 
as household composition and dwelling size. Further, households’ residential 
location can also have a significant effect due to weather conditions and 
regional energy price variations. In this section, we estimate simple energy and 
emissions determination equations, which allows us to tease out other factors 
and to identify the pure income effect of urban household energy requirements 
and emissions.
In our econometric model, in addition to per capita income and its squared 
term, we control for household size, the gender, age and years of schooling of 
the household head, a group of household composition variables relating to 
gender and age, dwelling size, and dummy variables for each of the 15 provinces 
other than Beijing, which is the benchmark province and therefore the omitted 
dummy variable.
Tables 16.8 and 16.9 present the results for the determinants of per capita 
energy consumption and per capita emissions respectively. We observe almost 
the same pattern of determinants in both and therefore focus the remaining 
discussion on the energy consumption results in Table 16.8. On average, larger 
households consume less energy per capita, verifying an economy-of-scale 
effect. Cooking for five people should consume less energy than cooking for one 
person five times. Similarly, five people watching TV requires the same amount 
of energy as one person watching TV. Our results also show that males and 
older household heads are associated with higher energy consumption, while 
households with more educated heads consume less energy. This last effect 
is, however, applicable only to total energy and direct energy consumption.16 
This lends some support to the optimistic claim that people with higher levels 
of education are more aware of the impact of their energy consumption on total 
emissions and account for this in their consumption decisions. The household 
composition variables indicate that relative to the omitted category (male and 
female adults aged 20–65), children in most age groups consume less energy, 
while older people (male and female above 65) consume more energy. This could 
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be related to the fact that old people spend more time at home. Further, the 
larger the size of the house, the more energy consumed. On average, every 100 
square metres requires 44.3 kg of coal equivalent energy. This is due mainly to 
direct energy consumption and, in particular, coal consumption; however, larger 
housing is associated with higher indirect energy consumption as well.
The final part of Table 16.8 presents results for the provincial dummy variables. 
Relative to Beijing, the following provinces (cities) consume more energy (in 
descending order): Shanxi, Shanghai, Chongqing, Sichuan, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Liaoning and Anhui. This order is almost the same for direct energy 
consumption. For non-coal direct energy consumption, there is a slight difference 
in consumption orders. For example, Shanghai ranks first, while Shanxi ranks 
second. In terms of indirect energy consumption, only Guangdong and Shanghai 
exceed Beijing, while the remaining provinces all consume less direct energy 
than Beijing. These energy consumption differences across provinces could be 
related to the differences in energy price levels and resource reserves across 
regions. For example, it is understandable that households in Shanxi would 
consume more energy, especially coal, given its abundance in Shanxi. Richer 
regions appear to be the largest consumers of indirect energy, as evidenced by 
the positive coefficients on Shanghai and Guangdong in the final column. This 
compounds the earlier claim that as Chinese households and regions become 
richer, indirect energy patterns become increasingly important. 
To capture potential diminishing marginal energy requirements and carbon 
emissions as income increases, we include a squared term for the latter in 
the regressions. The results indicate that the relationship between energy 
consumption/carbon emissions and income for urban Chinese households is 
essentially linear across the income range of our sample. For example, with 
regard to total per capita energy consumption, every additional yuan of income 
increases energy consumption by 20 gde, but the rate of increase falls by just 
0.00006 gce. For indirect energy consumption, the diminishing point is not 
reached until 158,000 yuan per capita, which is more than five times the current 
average per capita income level. For total energy consumption, the points of 
diminishing marginal energy requirements and carbon emissions are reached 
at income levels of 174,000 and 363,000 yuan respectively. To visualise the 
estimated relationship between energy consumption/carbon emissions and 
income, Figures 16.5 and 16.6 plot the predicted relationship for 99 per cent of 
the range of income levels in our sample (100–42,100 yuan). The figures show 
that within our sample income range, the relationship between income and 
all types of energy/emissions is almost linear. One of the interesting results 
is that income has a stronger effect on non-coal direct energy consumption 
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and carbon emissions than on total direct energy consumption and carbon 
emissions, confirming yet again that coal is mainly a poor peoples’ energy. 
Conclusions
This chapter focused on three interrelated issues. First, we drew on national-
level data to establish the notion that the total energy requirements of 
households are substantially higher when their indirect energy requirements 
are added to their direct energy consumption. Indeed, the calculations showed 
that this allocated an additional 16.8 per cent of China’s total energy demand 
to households, 11.2 per cent of which was attributed to urban households. If 
the eleventh Five-Year Plan succeeds in its objective of shifting the Chinese 
economy towards consumption-led growth, indirect energy shares are likely to 
rise in the future, thereby becoming increasingly important for understanding 
future energy demand and consumer-driven emissions trends.
Second, using urban household survey data, we examined the extent of 
variation in total energy requirements and emissions across households with 
different income levels. While there were clear differences in the shares of 
indirect emissions attributable to the different consumption bundles of rich 
and poor households, these were overshadowed by overwhelming evidence 
that the share of emissions attributed to direct energy consumption matters 
most: poorer households are more emissions intensive because of their 
heavy dependence on coal. The most critical implication is, therefore, that 
poor households are given the opportunity to reduce this coal dependence. 
This could occur as a consequence of income growth, given our observation 
that richer households consume less coal; therefore, policies targeting poor 
household income growth remain crucial. It is equally important, however, 
to ensure that adequate investment is directed towards cleaner energy 
alternatives in the near future so that the switch away from coal is a feasible 
option.
The survey-based analysis produced a share of indirect energy for urban 
households of 32 per cent, just half the share that we found using national-
level aggregate data. This discrepancy stemmed from a number of issues, 
including the need to use per capita consumption rather than expenditure and 
the exclusion of services from the survey-based analysis. Moreover, throughout 
the chapter, we overlooked the processes that deliver final goods to household 
doorsteps, including the storage and distribution of goods—all of which require 
considerable energy inputs. These inadequacies only strengthen the claim 
that the indirect energy requirements of Chinese households matter more 
to the future of China’s contributions to global environmental pressures than 
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Figure 16.5 Predicted relationship between household energy 
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Figure 16.6  Predicted relationship between household carbon emissions 
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many people realise, and that more detailed research in this area is therefore 
warranted. 
Third, the econometric analysis focused on the determinants of variation in 
per capita energy requirements and emissions. The virtually linear relationship 
between per capita income and energy demand is indicative of the dilemma 
China is facing as per capita incomes continue to grow, since there is no 
indication of diminishing marginal energy requirements happening over 
the wide range of current income levels. This finding stresses the need for 
policymakers to promote ways to reduce the emissions intensities of all of the 
goods consumed by Chinese households and, for that matter, used by the other 
end users as well. The higher energy requirements of richer provinces even 
after controlling for per capita income further compound this need, as poorer 
provinces continue to grow and strive towards living standards comparable 
with their richer neighbours. While there is some evidence that households 
with higher levels of education consume less energy per capita, this result 
does not hold up in the regression using indirect energy only. Whether or not 
education has a role to play in promoting cleaner consumption patterns in the 
future therefore remains an open question, although it is hard to think that such 
efforts would prove detrimental. This point extends to thoughts about whether 
‘green’ consumption policies stand any chance of reducing China’s emissions 
path below current trajectories.
To end on a bright note, assuming that services are relatively energy efficient 
(which is certainly the case compared with direct coal consumption) and noting 
the above evidence that richer Chinese households spend a higher share of their 
income on services, the future for China could well look cleaner if incomes can 
be raised across the board to the point at which services dominate consumption 
patterns. That future cannot arrive quickly enough.
Notes
1 Wei et al. (2007) and Liang et al. (2007) are the only English-language papers we have found, 
after an extensive literature search, that focus explicitly on Chinese household energy 
consumption.
2 By focusing on carbon intensities only, we overlook other greenhouse gases, such as methane, 
nitrous oxide and chlorofluorocarbons. While these other greenhouse gases could be equally, 
or even more, important for certain environmental problems, data restrictions prevent a more 
holistic analysis at this stage.
3 For example, Kok et al.’s IO plus household expenditure approach is referred to by Bin and 
Dowlatabadi (2005) as ‘environmental IO life-cycle analysis’, while Weber and Perrels (2000) 
refer to the same method as the ‘mixed monetary energetic approach’.
4 See Suh et al. (2004) for further discussion of this point.
5 See, for example, Liao et al. (2007) and Fisher-Vanden et al. (2006).
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6 Unfortunately, this precludes ‘transport, postal and telecommunication services’, ‘wholesale 
and retail trades, hotels and catering services’ and ‘other services’, as the gross value of 
output for these sectors is not available. Expenditure on transport will be accounted for in 
the direct energy calculations, discussed further below. Services are, however, omitted from 
the analysis as there is no alternative given data availability at this stage.
7 As mentioned earlier, the sectors are not comparable directly with those used by Wei et al 
(2007). Note, however, that they calculate energy and carbon intensities in their ‘food’ sector 
of 28 grams and 23 grams per yuan respectively. This sector incorporates the food processing, 
manufacturing and beverages sectors used above and, taking simple averages across these 
sectors, reassuringly puts our calculations in the same ballpark as theirs.
8 Coal includes raw coal, clean coal and other washed coal. Coking products include coke, coke 
oven gas, other gas and other coke products. Petroleum products include crude oil, gasoline, 
kerosene, diesel oil, fuel oil, petroleum liquid gas, refinery gas and other petroleum products. 
Natural gas, heat and electricity stand alone.
9 To complicate matters slightly, the relevant table in the China Energy Statistical Yearbook (NBS 
2006) reports total final energy consumption in each sector in two consistent forms: coal 
equivalent calculation and calorific value calculation. It provides, however, only the breakdown 
of energy sources in terms of calorific value calculations, so we use these to calculate the 
shares of each source. In terms of shares, the results are equivalent whichever measure is 
used.
10 The electricity coefficient is a weighted sum of the coal, oil and gas coefficients, based on 
the shares of coal, oil and gas used in China’s electricity generation being 78 per cent, 2.4 
per cent and 1 per cent respectively (IEA 2007). The remainder of China’s electricity is fuelled 
by hydro-power (16 per cent), nuclear (2.1 per cent) and wind, biomass and other renewables 
(0.5 per cent). These are all assumed to have zero carbon coefficients. Coking products and 
heat are assumed to have the same carbon coefficient as coal.
11 See Table A16.2 in the Appendix for details. Due to the data limitations discussed in previous 
footnotes, not all sectors in Table 16.4 are included in the analysis in this section. 
12 Although the nutrition literature normally assumes a 50 per cent premium to reflect processing 
margins, studies also find that this assumption is not sensitive to the estimated income 
elasticity of nutrition intake (see, for example, Subramanian and Deaton 1996 and Gibson 
and Rozelle 2002).
13 This is quite a departure from the aggregate figures in the preceding section, which show that 
direct energy demand accounts for only 36 per cent of urban households’ total energy demand. 
Two obvious reasons why we understate indirect energy demand are that we do not incorporate 
all sectors or all expenditure in our analysis. The figure also differs significantly from Wei et 
al. (2007), who find that direct energy accounts for just 29 per cent of urban household energy 
requirements. Their figure is at the lowest end of the literature surveyed in the previous section, 
while ours here is towards the high end. One reason for the discrepancy could be the different 
consumption categories that we assess, particularly as we divide consumption into more 
than 20 categories compared with Wei et al.’s eight. Another clear difference is that in Wei et 
al. (2007), the ‘residence’ category dominates urban indirect energy demand, accounting for 
more than 60 per cent of it. Included in this category are the production and supply of electric 
power, steam, hot water and gas, all of which are assumed to be direct energy demand in our 
analysis.   
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14 In addition, given that richer households spend a higher proportion of their income on services 
than poorer households, and these are largely excluded from our story here, the share of 
energy and emissions that can be attributed to indirect sources is likely to be understated 
more for rich than for poor. Our sample households spend, on average, 2,243 yuan per capita 
on services, which accounts for 27 per cent of per capita current-period consumption. For the 
poorest group, service expenditure is 727 yuan per capita, accounting for 23 per cent of the total 
current-period consumption, while for the richest group this figure is 5,592 yuan, accounting 
for 30 per cent of the current-period consumption (see columns 3 and 6 in Appendix Table 
A16.1).
15 See Appendix Table A16.3 for details.
16 When, however, only non-coal direct energies are included, the effect of the household head’s 
education switches sign and becomes positive and statistically significant. These contradictory 
results are puzzling, but are perhaps related to high correlations between per capita income 
and education levels in combination with the high coal content of poorer households’ direct 
energy consumption.
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Table A16.2 Aggregation of survey sectors into Table 16.4 sectors
Table 16.4 sector Survey sectors included
Processing of food from agricultural products Grain, starch, meat, poultry, eggs, seafood,  
 vegetables, fruits
Manufacture of foods Manufacture of grain, beans, meat, poultry,  
 eggs, seafood, sugar, vegetables, fruits, milk,  
 cake, canned food and semi-cooked food plus  
 one-third of eating-out expenses
Manufacture of beverages Alcohol and drinks
Manufacture of tobacco Tobacco
Manufacture of textiles Clothing materials
Manufacture of textile apparel, footwear  Clothes, shoes, bedclothes, textile decoration
and caps
Processing of timber and wood products Furniture materials
Manufacture of furniture Furniture
Manufacture of paper and paper products Paper and stationery 
Printing, reproduction of recording media Newspapers, magazines, books, textbooks,  
 education software
Manufacture of articles for culture, education  Sports equipment, electronic dictionaries, audio
and sports  and video products, culture decorations
Manufacture of raw chemical materials and  Detergent and cosmetic goods for hairdressing 
chemical products  and bathing 
Manufacture of medicines Medicine, nutriments
 
Manufacture of metal products Lighting, cutlery, tea sets, small tools
Manufacture of transport equipment Cars, bikes, motors and their components
Manufacture of electrical machinery  Electrical, medical and health equipment
and equipment
Manufacture of measuring instruments and  Pianos, other musical instruments, body-
office machinery  building equipment, watches
Manufacture of artwork and other Jewellery and other miscellaneous items
manufacturing
Production and distribution of water Water
Construction  Housing decoration and building materials
Services Services: sewing, housekeeping, medical  
 treatment, communication fees, recreation fees,  
 education fees, rent, imputed rent, housing  
 management fees; transportation fees * 0.75;  




Table A16.3 Emission shares of consumption goods by income decile
 Share of total Share of indirect 
 emissions emissions 
 First Tenth First Tenth
Indirect emissions    
Processing of food from agricultural products 0.045 0.046 0.223 0.117
Manufacture of foods 0.104 0.123 0.513 0.312
One-third of eating out 0.003 0.019 0.015 0.048
Manufacture of beverages 0.004 0.011 0.021 0.027
Manufacture of tobacco 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.007
Manufacture of textiles 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
Manufacture of textile apparel, footwear, caps 0.007 0.026 0.036 0.065
Processing of wood products 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Manufacture of furniture 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.009
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.006
Printing and recording media 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.009
Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sports 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.009
Manufacture of raw chemical materials and products 0.011 0.041 0.052 0.103
Manufacture of medicines 0.001 0.014 0.005 0.036
Manufacture of metal products 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.008
Manufacture of transport equipment 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.059
Manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.012
Manufacture of communication, computers and electronics 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.011
Manufacture of instruments, cultural and office machinery 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing 0.009 0.038 0.045 0.097
Production and distribution of water 0.010 0.015 0.050 0.039
Construction  0.001 0.009 0.003 0.024
    
Direct emissions Share of direct  
 emissions
Coal 0.459 0.040 0.576 0.065
Petrol 0.029 0.144 0.036 0.237
Gas 0.222 0.295 0.279 0.487
Electricity 0.087 0.128 0.109 0.211
    
Share of direct emissions in total 0.797 0.606
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Can China’s coal industry be 
reconciled with the environment?
Xunpeng Shi
Coal provides 70 per cent of China’s primary energy, therefore it is no surprise 
that China’s air pollution is caused mainly by coal use. It has been reported 
that 85 per cent of the sulphur dioxide, 70 per cent of the smoke and 60 per 
cent of the nitrogen oxides emitted into the atmosphere in China come from 
the burning of coal (Wang and Feng 2003). The correlation between increased 
sulphur dioxide levels and coal consumption is above 95 per cent (He et al. 2002). 
Emerging concerns about climate change add further pressure to the use of 
fossil-fuel energy in general and coal in particular. As the world’s second-largest 
consumer of energy, China’s demand for energy will increase due to its growing 
population and the rapid increase in living standards. Given that China is the 
world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, this issue is of great concern 
and importance to the global community. 
To mitigate the environmental impacts of rapid economic growth, proposals 
to reduce waste-gas emissions (WGEs) usually include changing the economic 
structure, reducing energy intensity and enforcing waste-gas treatment (Liang 
and Zhou 2008). These measures often lead to reductions in use of energy, 
particularly coal. Globally and in China—a country with serious environmental 
pollution, a growing demand for a clean environment, serious concerns about 
climate change and coal-dominated air pollution—many people think that the 
coal industry has no future; in China, the coal industry is sometimes called 
xiyang gongye (‘the sunset industry’) (Coal Enterprise Management 2001). 
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Many others are, however, arguing that there is a promising future for the 
coal industry in general and the Chinese industry in particular (Coal Enterprise 
Management 2001; Li 2003; Shi 2003, 2006; Wang 1999; Huang 2001). A key 
argument for this is that there is a decreasing trend of pollution emissions 
per unit of coal, or emission intensity, and therefore the coal industry can 
harmonise with the environment (Shi 2003, 2006). The argument suggests that 
environmental pressure will induce innovations in clean-coal technologies. The 
ultimate level of cleanliness will be decided by technical progress and socio-
economic conditions. Many coal experts are also arguing that coal can be a 
truly clean energy;1 however, no empirical evidence has been provided with 
which to examine this issue. 
This study will test the evolving pattern of coal emissions intensity using 
industry WGE data for the period 1996–2006. The focus on industrial WGEs 
only is appropriate because industrial pollution plays a dominant role in total 
emissions (Table 17.1): for example, 86 per cent of total sulphur dioxide emissions 
and 79 per cent of total smoke emissions came from industrial sources in 2005 
(SEPA various years). The study will focus on three air pollutants: sulphur dioxide 
emissions (SO2), industrial smoke emissions (Smoke) and dust emissions (Dust). 
Carbon dioxide emissions, although a popular topic and probably significant, 
are not included because there are no current data for them. Furthermore, 
although greenhouse gas emissions are a major concern, the most immediate 
environmental phenomenon is local ambient air pollution, which is predicted 
to cause health damage worth 13 per cent of China’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) by 2020 (OECD 2007, cited in IEA 2007). The literature (Ang and Pandiyan 
1997; Ang et al. 1998; Wang et al. 2005; Wu et al. 2006) often infers carbon dioxide 
emissions by assuming a constant emission intensity for each fuel, including 
coal—something that will be challenged in this study. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The second section provides 
a general background of China’s environmental regulations for air pollution. The 
third section introduces the two study methods, followed by a section describing 
the data. The fifth section presents the empirical results and the sixth section 
discusses some technical issues. The last section concludes the chapter.
Environmental regulations and the coal industry
The Chinese government attaches great importance to environmental protec-
tion. The first national conference on environmental protection in 1973 set up 
the Environmental Protection Office under the State Council and stipulated 
the ‘three synchronisations’ system.2 The 1978 Chinese Constitution stated the 
central government’s intention to protect and improve the environment, and to 
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prevent and control pollution. Environmental protection was declared one of 
two Chinese ‘national fundamental policies’ in 1983.3 The Environmental Pro-
tection Law (Trial Implementation) was promulgated in 1979, which proposed 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) System and the polluter-pays 
principle. It was revised and enacted officially in 1989. Between 1949 and 2005, 
China legislated nine environmental laws and 15 resource-protection laws, it 
formulated and promulgated more than 50 administrative regulations and 660 
ministerial and local environmental rules and regulations related to environ-
mental protection (State News Office 2006). 
With the development of environmental protection, the control of WGEs is 
evolving. The National Ambient Air Quality Standards were published in 1982, 
specifying standards for air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, total suspended 
particulate matter (TSP), nitrogen oxides and carbon (SEPA 1982). In 1998, 
the Chinese government (State Council 1998) approved the delimiting of two 
‘control areas’ (the ‘sulphur dioxide control area’ and the ‘acid rain control 
area’), which led to a significant improvement in environmental quality (State 
News Office 2006). In June 2007, China’s State Council approved a national 
plan to address the challenges of climate change, symbolising that climate 
change was becoming increasingly important on China’s national policy agenda 
(NDRC 2007a). 
Some financial incentive mechanisms for reducing air pollution are already 
in place. Tax reductions or exemptions are given to enterprises engaged in en-
vironmental protection (State News Office 2006). A pollution levy system based 
on the polluter-pays principle was implemented nationally in 1982. Between 
1995 and 2005, the collection of sulphur dioxide discharge fees was expanded 
to include all related enterprises and the rate was raised from 0.2 to 0.63 yuan 
per kilogram (State News Office 2006). The rate has been increased further in 
some provinces.4 
Massive pollution control measures have also been implemented: 84,000 
small enterprises that caused serious waste and pollution were closed during 
the ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000); eight resource pollution-intensive in-
dustries, including iron and steel, cement, electrolytic aluminium and coking, 
were restructured; and the construction of more than 1,900 projects was either 
stopped or postponed (State News Office 2006).
With these efforts in place, the control of air pollution has been considerable. 
The volume of removed industrial sulphur dioxide reached 10.9 million tonnes 
in 2005, up from 2.34 million tonnes in 1998, while the volumes for smoke and 
dust reached 205.87 million tonnes and 64.54 million tonnes respectively in 
2005, compared with 86.70 million tonnes and 30.98 million tonnes in 1998. The 
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amount of industrial sulphur dioxide, industrial smoke and dust discharged 
in the generation of one unit of GDP in China in 2004 dropped by 42 per cent, 
55 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively, from the levels in 1995 (State News 
Office 2006).
With increasing implementation of environmental regulations in China, the 
future of coal is under suspicion as it is the most polluting of the fossil fuels 
and the key source of pollution in China. After 1998, Chinese coal production 
experienced a three-year depression5 and state-owned coal mines (SOCMs) 
suffered heavy deficits, which led to increasingly widespread pessimism about 
the industry’s future (Shi 2003, 2006; Coal Enterprise Management 2001). Amid 
the concerns and dire predictions about the future of the coal industry, coal 
production and consumption increased dramatically after 2000.
Although coal consumption has been soaring in recent years, dust and 
smoke emissions are declining. There has been a slight increase in sulphur 
dioxide emissions, but the speed of the increase is far slower than that of coal 
consumption. Coal consumption increased nearly 92 per cent between 1997 
and 2006, yet emissions of sulphur dioxide increased only slightly, by 10.35 per 
cent, during the same period. 
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Emission intensity trends
Most studies of emission intensity focus on carbon dioxide emissions (see 
Ang and Zhang 2000 for a review). Only a few studies address sulphur dioxide 
emissions (Lin and Chang 1996; Shrestha and Timilsina 1997; Viguier 1999); 
among these, two (Shrestha and Timilsina 1997; Viguier 1999) address the 
emission intensity of individual energy sources, including coal, as a constant 
over time and focus only on changes in the energy mix—that is, the inter-energy 
composition of oil, gas, coal and non-fossil fuel energies. Lin and Chang (1996), 
however, find a continuous decrease in pollution intensity and attribute it to 
substitution for imported low-sulphur coal and ‘desulphurisaton’ of fuel oil, in 
the case of Taiwan. No study has, however, been done from the perspective of 
a clean future for fossil-fuel energy, and coal in particular. Emission intensities 
for smoke and dust have also not been addressed. 
In this section, two alternative methodologies are presented to test the 
hypothesis that coal emission intensity is declining. The econometric tech-
nique is used to test the emission intensity of coal with a focus on a long-term 
dynamic aspect of this intensity. The index decomposition (ID) approach is 
used to identify various factors that determinate the final emissions and their 
individual contributions. 
The fixed-effects panel data model
The first method to be used is a fixed-effects panel data model, which, together 
with econometric data, will test the general trend of emission intensity—that 
is, at time t, in province i, the jth WGE, is 
WGEitj = β0+(β1+β2T)FuelCit+(β3+β4T )MatCit+β5 Xit+αij+uitj (1)
in which WGE  denotes pollutant emissions; FuelC  and MatC  denote 
consumption of fuel coal and material coal, respectively; T is a general time 
trend; αij is the province-specific effect in the case of the jth pollutant; uitj is a 
normally distributed error term; j = 1,2,3 is sulphur dioxide (SO2), smoke and 
dust respectively. Of particular interest are the signs of β1and β4. If β2 or β4 were 
significantly negative, we would find evidence of decreasing emission intensity. 
Due to different characteristics between fuel and material coal in different 
cases of air pollution, β2 and β1 are expected to be different. 
X is a vector of exogenous variables such as population (POP), average GDP 
and environmental regulation and implementation variables, to investigate the 
impact of various exogenous variables on the emissions function. The more 
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stringent the environmental regulation and enforcement, the less are the 
WGEs because polluters are more likely to be punished or charged. Several 
variables have been used to test the impacts of legislation and enforcement. 
Bao and Peng (2006) used the number of cumulative environmental standards 
issued by provincial governments to measure the effect of environmental 
policy on emissions, but they failed to find a positive role for such policies 
on air pollution. The compliance cost was used as a proxy for enforcement 
based on the assumption that the two had a positive correlation (Gray 1987). 
Gray (1987) uses the number of penalties (fines) to study safety regulations. 
In this study, the cumulative number of environmental standards (Standard) 
is used to approximate the effect of legislation; the operating cost of waste-
gas treatment equipment (Cost) is used to approximate the stringency of 
enforcement. Environmentally related research and development expenditure 
(R&D) is included to measure the technology progress effect, as in Bao and 
Peng (2006). The GDP deflator is used on all monetary value terms to the 1996 
constant price of 10,000 yuan. 
Decomposed factors determining emissions
Since most WGEs in China come from the consumption of fuel, they are affected 
by factors such as economic structure, energy intensity, economic development 
and population growth. It would be helpful if the WGE changes were broken down 
into various factors. Index decomposition has been a popular tool in the past 40 
years to assess quantitatively various factors affecting WGEs and energy demand. 
Ang and Zhang (2000) found that it had been applied in at least 124 studies by 
2000. This approach has advantages over econometric estimations in that it can 
apply to small samples and does not need any assumptions about distribution. 
This method is applied initially to studies of industrial energy decomposition and 
energy demand. Torvanger (1991) was the first to apply the index-decomposition 
methodology to study energy-related gas emissions, and was followed by many 
other studies (Ang and Zhang 2000). The types of gas emissions studied included 
carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Compared with energy-
demand decomposition, the emission decomposition includes more factors, 
including sectoral fuel share and fuel emissions (Ang and Zhang 2000).
The Laspeyres method and the Divisia index (LMDI) are the most frequently 
used and preferred decomposition methods in energy-induced gas emission 
studies (Ang and Zhang 2000). In this study, the LMDI approach is applied 
because it has the time-reversal property of an ideal index and can perform a 
perfect decomposition and accommodate zero values in the data set, which is 
preferable to the refined Laspeyres method (Ang and Zhang 2000). 
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Two kinds of indicators are often used in the index-decomposition studies 
of energy and environmental issues. The first is a quantity indicator such as 
total energy consumption or total gas emissions; the other is a ratio or index 
indicator, including aggregate energy intensity and aggregate gas emissions 
intensity (Ang and Zhang 2000). In this study, we chose the first, with total 
WGE as the indicator. Total consumption of coal (TC), fossil-fuel energy (FE) 
and energy consumption (TE) are evaluated at 10,000 tonnes of standard coal 
equivalent (SCE), which will avoid heterogeneity of different coal qualities. Y is 
GDP and P is population. The explicit introduction of coal into the emissions 
function is an extension of the previous literature. 
Similar to Wang et al. (2005), the WGE is expressed as an extended Kaya 
Identity (IPCC 2001; Kaya 1990)—that is
WGEi = 
WGE TC FE TE Y P = ECFIGP (2)
 
– – – – –TC FE TE Y P 
in which i is the type of emission, including sulphur dioxide, smoke and dust; 
E is the mean WGE emission intensity of coal (which is the core interest 
of this study); C is the share of coal in total fossil-fuel energy, or the fossil-
fuel composition factor; F is the share of fossil-fuel energy in total energy 
consumption, or the energy component factor; I is energy intensity; and G is 
GDP per capita.
As shown by Wang et al. (2005), using the LMDI (Ang et al. 1998), the 
difference in WGEs between two periods, t and T, can be expressed as
ΔWGEtT = WGEiT – WGEit = EiTCiT FiT IiTGiT PiT – EitCit Fit IitGit Pit
= ΣK ΔWGEK–effect , K = E, C, F, I, G, P (3)
In which, the K-effect on emission reduction is
ΔWGEK–effect = L(WGEit ,WGEiT)In(KT  / Kt ) (4)
in which 
L(x ,y) = (x – y) / In(x / y) (5)
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We also define the case of no change in emission intensity (Non–CEI) as the 
basis for comparison with the current study. Following Equation 3, the Non–CEI 
of WGEs can be derived by dropping the emission intensity effect as 
Non - CEI = ΣK ΔWGEK–effect , K = C, F, I, G, P (6)
Data description
We study the time trend and determinants of WGEs from coal consumption 
using China’s provincial panel data from 1996–2006. We chose this period 
because data for coal consumption broken down to combusting and material 
inputs were available only from 1996. Data for three kinds of air pollutants, 
consumption of two kinds of coal and various environmental variables were 
drawn from the various issues of the China Environmental Yearbook (SEPA 
various years). Table 17.1 provides a summary.
The data for national total coal production (in physical quantity and in 
standard coal equivalent), energy consumption and its mix, GDP and its defla-
tors and population are drawn from the various issues of the China Statistical 
Yearbook (NBS various years). The national GDP data are deflated to 1996 
constant prices. When there is more than one set of data, we prefer the most 
up-to-date one because China’s State Statistical Bureau significantly adjusted 
energy-use data in 2006. A history of the evolution of these aggregate data is 
shown in Figure 17.2. 
Empirical estimation and analysis of results
Econometric results: evidence from the industrial sector
As in the literature (Shadbegian and Gray 2006), the ‘seemingly unrelated 
regressions’ (SUR) model is employed to allow for correlations in the residuals 
across equations for the three air pollutants. SUR is used because factors such 
as environmental legislation, environmental policy and changes in enforcement 
will affect the outcomes for all air pollutants simultaneously. To accompany 
both the fixed-effects, or unobserved regional heterogeneity and SUR, we use 
a dummy variable version of the SUR model—that is, we create 31 dummy 
variables for 31 provinces and include 30 of them into the regression functions 
to accompany the fixed effect, or unobserved regional heterogeneity. Estimation 
results of the SUR model are shown in Table 17.2. 
The results demonstrate that there is a significant (at the 1 per cent level) 
decline in emission intensity in the case of material coal. For fuel coal, there is 
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also a significant (at the 1 per cent level) decline in emission intensity, except in 
the case of dust. We can calculate the emission intensity of these two kinds of 
coal by taking the partial derivative of WGE with respect to coal consumption. 
To test the robustness of this conclusion, in the second specification, we 
remove regulatory and economic variables and find the conclusion unchanged 
(Table 17.2).
We can also calculate the time when overall emission intensity will decline 
to zero, which is called the ‘zero emissions point’ (Table 17.3). 
The decline in emission intensity is unlikely to be linear in time, as assumed 
here, because that would lead to negative emission intensity. The actual decline 
is likely in a non-linear pace with diminishing rate. This hypothetical zero 
emissions point, however, provides a relative comparison among different cases 
in terms of the two kinds of coal and the three types of air pollution emissions. 
It can be seen that in the case of sulphur dioxide, the zero emissions point for 
material coal will be reached more quickly than that for fuel coal. The reasons 
for this could be: 1) economic, as material-coal users can reduce WGEs with a 
Figure 17.2 Historical changes in the five factors in the index-











































Coal/fossil fuels (C), per cent Fossil fuels/energy (F), per cent
Energy intensity (I), kg coal equivelant/yuan GDP per capita (G), yuan
Population (P), billion
Note: Units are rescaled to fit into the same frame. 
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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lower marginal cost than fuel-coal users; or 2) technical, as material-coal users, 
usually chemical producers, can produce by-products, such as sulphur, from 
WGEs. The second reason could also explain why sulphur dioxide has the 
shortest zero emissions point for material coal among the six cases. 
Legislation, approximated by cumulative environmental standards, has a 
significant impact on reducing sulphur dioxide emissions, while increased use 
of WGE-treatment machines can lead to a reduction of all three air pollutants. 
The variable of cumulative environmental standards is significant only at the 
1 per cent level in the case of sulphur dioxide. Implementation, approximated 
by the operating costs of WGE-treatment machines, is significant for smoke 
and dust at the 5 per cent level and for sulphur dioxide at the 10 per cent level. 
The significance of the effect of regulations on the removal of sulphur dioxide 
could be the reason why environmental regulations have led to the increased 
application of desulphurisation equipment. It could also be due to the fact that 
environmental regulations have spurred a demand for low-sulphur coal, as noted 
by Darmstadter (1999) in the US case. Whatever the reason, we can conclude 
that implementation is more important than legislation alone. The insignificant 
effect of legislation could also be due to the fact that much environmental 
legislation is not related to air pollution and this variable is therefore not a 
good proxy for this study. 
The technological effect, approximated by environmentally related research 
inputs, is, however, negative and significant at the 5 per cent level in all 
three emissions cases, which is consistent with the literature (Bao and Peng 
2006). This demonstrates that technical change has played a role in reducing 
emissions; therefore, investment in environmentally related research in general, 
and in clean-coal technology in particular, is one way to reduce air pollution.
Our findings about the pollution–income relationship are not consistent with 
the literature. Bao and Peng (2006) found that all three air pollutants—sulphur 
dioxide, smoke and dust—had an inverted-U shaped relationship with economic 
growth. Grossman and Krueger (1991) found that two pollutants—sulphur 
dioxide and smoke—exhibited an inverted-U shaped relationship. We found 
an inverted-U shaped relationship only between economic growth and sulphur 
dioxide emissions—a finding made also by Kaufmanna et al. (1998) and 
Markandya et al. (2006). The reason for this could be that we have controlled 
the consumption of coal, which captures a majority effect of economic growth 
on air pollution emissions. 
The variable POPULATION is estimated to have opposite signs between the 
case of sulphur dioxide and smoke. The reason for this could be that population 
is not itself a decisive factor in air pollution emissions when we control the 
use of coal. 
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Table 17.4 Estimated results of the provincial dummy of the SUR model*
 SO2 Smoke Indust
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Tianjin -74,712.42 0.23 -20,084.44 0.65 -71,001.17 0.32
Hebei 247,410.00 0.12 218,990.70 0.05 400,382.70 0.03
Shanxi 278,565.60 0.08 -75,897.98 0.50 -318,093.00 0.08
Neimeng 441,203.70 0.00 -28,164.28 0.79 -156,646.80 0.35
Liaoning -10,285.15 0.93 239,425.30 0.00 257,120.80 0.05
Jilin -15,106.05 0.91 49,665.25 0.59 -158,403.50 0.28
Heilongjiang -218,583.70 0.07 189,376.10 0.03 -90,686.61 0.51
Shanghai 160,503.90 0.03 -76,023.68 0.15 -57,286.46 0.50
Jiangsu -14,575.92 0.93 219,807.00 0.05 340,339.90 0.05
Zhejiang -36,566.59 0.72 139,597.00 0.05 357,680.80 0.00
Anhui 50,817.54 0.76 50,837.26 0.66 52,659.95 0.78
Fujian -41,882.53 0.67 4,805.48 0.95 48,122.38 0.67
Jiangxi 238,842.00 0.12 -463.16 1.00 -57,798.59 0.74
Shandong 227,807.40 0.23 280,067.40 0.04 473,812.70 0.03
Henan -49,629.20 0.81 441,930.90 0.00 489,336.40 0.04
Hubei 141,033.80 0.33 114,727.10 0.27 106,951.40 0.52
Hunan 285,509.20 0.07 250,142.70 0.03 338,133.90 0.06
Guangdong -12,313.66 0.94 293,509.10 0.01 580,014.50 0.00
Guanxi 607,458.40 0.00 249,493.20 0.02 117,233.20 0.51
Hainan 174,040.40 0.22 -175,703.70 0.08 -346,651.30 0.03
Chongqing 563,091.50 0.00 -80,074.48 0.44 -138,723.30 0.40
Sichuan 417,942.00 0.03 530,490.10 0.00 213,966.10 0.34
Guizhou 725,534.20 0.00 -61,527.27 0.63 -244,188.10 0.24
Yunnan 232,539.60 0.13 -40,925.44 0.71 -220,664.40 0.21
Xizang 359,338.70 0.06 -285,079.70 0.03 -481,698.40 0.03
Shaanxi 528,531.30 0.00 43,023.70 0.69 -91,783.74 0.59
Guansu 448,379.10 0.01 -134,572.20 0.26 -272,718.80 0.16
Qinghai 293,903.00 0.08 -220,338.80 0.06 -383,854.40 0.04
Ningxia 383,930.10 0.02 -203,961.60 0.08 -339,471.70 0.07
Xinjiang 181,035.40 0.15 -71,052.97 0.42 -162,888.40 0.25
* based on estimation results from specification 1. 
Source: Author’s own estimations.
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In term of regional diversity, several provinces achieve the same results as 
Beijing in all three emissions cases: Tianjin, Jilin, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei, 
Yunnan and Xinjiang. No province differs from Beijing for all three emissions.
In the case of sulphur dioxide emissions, the level in Inner Mongolia, 
Shanghai, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia 
are estimated significantly higher than Beijing, while only Helongjiang is 
estimated lower than Beijing (at 10 per cent significant level). It can be seen 
that western China performs worse than Beijing for sulphur dioxide emissions. 
This could be because Beijing started to promote the use of low-sulphur coal 
in 1998 (Cao 1998). In the case of smoke, Xizang (significant at the 5 per cent 
level), Qinghai, Ningxia and Henan (significant at the 10 per cent level) were all 
less polluted than Beijing. The majority of the remaining provinces were more 
polluted than Beijing. A similar pattern exists in the case of dust. 
Index decomposition results
These results show that emission intensity has the biggest impact on emissions 
changes among all six factors during the period 1996–2006. As theory predicts, 
economic development and population growth are key factors driving the 
increase in emissions. 
The decrease in smoke and dust emissions from 1996 to 2006 was due 
primarily to the decrease in emission intensities. In the case of sulphur dioxide 
emissions, even though overall emissions are increasing, emission intensity is 
decreasing and this has the most significant impact. The changing structure 
of coal among fossil-fuel energy and the energy mix also contributes to the 
decrease in emissions. 
The fossil-fuel composition effect and the energy composition effect were 
mostly negative and were small for the entire period, except for a few years. 
The positive sign means that coal has recaptured some of its share of fossil-
fuel energy, which is due to the high demand for energy in recent years. The 
negative sign reflects the improvement in the atmospheric environment due 
to the switch from coal to other fossil-fuel energies and from fossil-fuel energy 
to non-fossil fuel energy; this impact is usually desirable. In contrast, however, 
the small value reveals a relatively weak impact on WGE changes from the 
change of fuel composition and the use of renewable energy, mainly because 
the composition of energy consumption is stable.
It is noteworthy that China’s energy intensity increased from 0.37 kg of coal 
equivalent per renminbi (RMB) at the 1990 price (kgce/RMB) in 1997 to 0.55 
kgce/RMB in 2006—an increase of 48.65 per cent for the period. As a result, 
the contribution of energy intensity to emissions increases is higher than that 
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of traditional contributors such as economic development and population 
growth. The energy intensity effect results in increases in emissions of 947.65 
Mt of sulphur dioxide, 512.16 Mt of smoke and 438 Mt of dust. The major reason 
for high and increasing energy intensity could be rapid industrialisation, which 
increases not only total energy consumption, but energy intensity. The big-
gest decrease in emission intensities occurred between 1998 and 1999, which 
might have been due to improvements in average coal quality when there was 
an oversupply of coal and consumers would not accept coal with high sulphur 
and ash content. 
Compared with industrialised countries, where decreases in the aggregate 
energy intensity and aggregate carbon dioxide intensity are explained mainly 
by declines in energy intensity (Ang and Zhang 2000; Torvanger 1991), China’s 
changes in industrial WGEs are to a large extent the result of the decline in 
coal emissions intensity. 
To simplify the discussion, the results for the three WGEs are normalised 
to the year 1997. The cumulative change of emissions between 1997 and 2006 
is decomposed to change each factor. 
In all three cases, it is clear that the non-CEI increase of emissions is much 
higher than the real emissions, which demonstrates that the decreasing 
emission intensity is a significant contributor to emissions reduction. Energy 
intensity is next to emission intensity in terms of scale, but in the opposite 
direction. Differing from the findings in the literature (Shalizi 2007; Lin and 
Chang 1996), this study shows that energy intensity replaces economic growth 
as the major driver of increased emissions. 
This result demonstrates that the real contribution of decreased emission 
intensity has been covered by the popular idea that emissions will be reduced 
by the decrease in energy intensity (Lin and Chang 1996; Shalizi 2007). This 
finding is significant because it shows another way of reducing emissions. If 
Table 17.5 Summary of factors that affect the changes in sulphur 
dioxide, smoke and dust emissions, 1997–2006
 ΔWGE ΔWGEE-effect ΔWGEC-effect ΔWGEF-effect ΔWGEI-effect ΔWGEG-effect ΔWGEP-effect
SO2 322.80 -1,005.54 -53.83 -25.98 947.65 311.02 148.70
Smoke -495.00 -1,212.90 -29.09 -14.04 512.15 168.09 80.37
Dust -697.50 -1,311.46 -24.88 -12.01 438.00 143.75 68.73
Source: Author’s own summary.
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Effect of energy intensity Effect of GDP per capita
Effect of population Non-CEI emission
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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energy intensity could be reduced, as has happened in industrialised countries 
or as it was in China before 1998 (Figure 17.1), the decrease in China’s WGEs 
could occur at double speed with the co-movement of these two drivers. 
Reduced emission intensity is, however, found to be insignificant in China 
in the case of carbon dioxide in the decade after 1980, but has increasing 
significance in India in the 1990s, as reported by Shalizi (2007). 
Discussion: the role of technology 
It should be noted that the decrease in emission intensity of coal would not 
occur automatically. In some cases, this could be due to the switch from high-
sulphur to low-sulphur coal; however, the major contributor is technical change, 
which is stimulated more or less by environmental regulations.  
The decrease in coal pollution has been achieved significantly through three 
basic methods: coal cleaning or washing, a pre-combustion method that can 
reduce sulphur content by as much as 30 per cent; post-combustion treatments, 
such as flue-gas desulphurisation (FGD) systems; and the use of electrostatic 
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precipitators to remove airborne ash (National Energy Foundation 2007). The 
flue-gas clean-up systems that are available commercially and that have long 
been used in power plants can remove 99.95 per cent of particulates, 95 per 
cent of sulphur dioxide and 90 per cent of nitrogen oxides (Energy Committee 
of the ASME Council of Engineering 2005). Some of these methods, although 
straightforward now, seemed unrealistic in the 1970s when the US government 
started to introduce air-quality standards and regulations (EPA 1971).
Declining carbon dioxide emission intensity of coal is also technically 
possible, even though it has not yet been commercialised. Zero or near-zero 
emissions from coal-fired power plants are technologically feasible (Energy 
Committee of the ASME Council of Engineering 2005; Keay 2003; Shimkus 2005). 
Many international cooperation programs and some experimental projects 
have been initiated (IEA 2007). Carbon capture is thought most promising for 
integrated gasification combined-cycle (IGCC) coal-fired plants, even though the 
cost and reliability of IGCC have not been proved (Sachs, 2008). The ‘FutureGen’ 
project, which is dedicated to building near-zero emissions coal-fired power 
plants, is ready to demonstrate carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) 
technology on a commercial scale; integrated gasification combined-cycle 
(IGCC) coal power plants, which will be the cleanest coal-fired plants in the 
world, are expected to be operational in 2015 (DOE 2008). Rio Tinto and BP are 
working together on decarbonised energy projects, which can generate almost 
carbon-free electricity from coal (Macalister 2007). Further progress might mean 
that such techniques could be applied commercially. Carbon dioxide can also 
be separated and stored or put into other commercial use in the process of coal 
liquefaction. The Shenhua Group is cooperating with some oil companies to 
separate carbon dioxide and inject it into oil fields to increase the oil-recovery 
rate, which will be a double win: carbon dioxide will not be released into the 
atmosphere and more oil will be extracted from fields.  
The Chinese government treats CCS technology seriously; it is documented 
in China’s eleventh Five-Year Plan under the National High Technologies 
Program and in the National Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology 
Plan Towards 2020. The first ‘green’ power project, a 250-megawatt (MW) IGCC 
power station, located in Tianjin, is due to start operating by the end of 2009 
(GreenGen 2008). 
Since technology improvements provide ways for the coal industry to har-
monise with the environment, it is important to popularise and utilise clean-
coal technology to make coal use cleaner; it is also important to study and test 
CCS technology. 
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One particular problem for China is not a shortage of feasible technology, 
but a lack of application—the result of insufficient incentives and external 
pressures. For example, most of China’s electricity is produced from coal 
and most coal-fired plants are far dirtier than those found in Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (IEA 2007). Although 
China has regulations for the installation of FGD requirements in power plants, 
in 2005, only 45 of 389 gigawatts (GW) of installed thermal capacity had an FGD 
unit installed, which helps explain why the target of the nation’s tenth Five-Year 
Plan for a 10 per cent reduction in sulphur dioxide in 2005 compared with 2000 
levels has not been achieved (IEA 2007). 
As a cheaper alternative to FGD, coal washing has not been used well. 
Washed coal accounted for only 32 per cent of total coal consumption in 2005 
(NDRC 2007b). Furthermore, coal-washing efficiency in China has achieved a 
removal rate of only 45 per cent (Watson et al. 2000). Since the use of washed 
coal depends on demand, it is necessary to create an institutional environment 
that stimulates and forces coal users—particularly large-scale users such as 
steel makers and power generators—to use washed coal. 
Among conversion technologies, coal gasification has been used for the 
production of town gas and its increasing use is helping to reduce local air 
pollution in cities. This process is further extended to coal liquefaction, which 
provides a clean way to use coal. The technology is available and economical 
energy use has found increasing favour in recent years due to surging oil prices. 
Many Chinese companies are working to produce coal from oil, during the 
process of which polluting elements are separated and utilised and emissions 
are minimised. The Shenhua Group, the largest coal producer in China, with 
the best safety record, is building the first direct coal-to-oil plant. The plant 
aims to discharge zero pollution, other than carbon dioxide, and is dedicated to 
researching the technology of carbon dioxide capture and storage. The Shenhua 
Group and Southern African Sasol Energy Company Construction are planning 
to construct several indirect coal liquefaction plants for Shaanxi and Ningxia. 
The Shenhua Group plans to produce 100 million tonnes of coal to oil per annum 
by 2020. Other liquefying technologies are also being tested. Furthermore, coal 
gasification will reduce a large amount of pollution from coal combustion. The 
Shenhua Group has launched the world’s first coal-to-olefin plant in Baotou 
City, in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Administration Region. 
Improvements in combustion efficiency for large numbers of industrial 
boilers in China—where emissions reduction efficiency is just 65 per cent 
compared with 80 per cent in Europe (Watson et al. 2000)—could produce even 
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Conclusion
Relying on current technology, the continuing use of coal will create increased 
waste-gas and carbon dioxide emissions. The key factor in resolving the 
contradiction between environmental protection and coal industry development is 
to use coal in a clean way. This could take a long time; however, if it is possible, we 
must see a decline in WGE intensity from coal during the transitional process. 
This research clarifies the misunderstanding that the same unit of coal 
will always cause the same amount of environmental pollution. The empirical 
analysis using the data for Chinese coal consumption and WGEs shows that 
there is a trend of declining WGE intensity, which is demonstrated by using two 
alternative methods. The index-decomposition method further demonstrated 
that declining emission intensity was the most important factor affecting overall 
WGEs. This study reveals that energy intensity in China has been increased 
and thus, besides of economic and population growth, has led to an increase 
in final emissions. With a fall in emission intensity, the coal industry can be 
developed while improvements are made to the environment—providing that 
emission intensity continues to fall without limit. Declining emission intensity, 
which is the key factor that alleviates the tension between the use of coal and 
the environment, has often been omitted from previous studies. 
This finding sheds light on the future of the coal industry. In China’s case, 
environmental regulations are needed and are welcome, even though they 
seem to impose some constraints on the coal industry’s development initially. 
A harmonised future for the coal industry relies on the application of clean-coal 
technologies. The current coal-dominant pollution in China is due in part to 
insufficient use of available clean-coal technologies, such as coal washing and 
dust precipitation. With proper environmental regulations, China’s environment 
can be improved because more clean-coal technologies will be applied. The 
confidence about the future of coal industry also comes from the fact that 
non-fossil alternatives have not been available in a necessary scale in the 
foreseeable future (Shi 2006).
The coal industry is not necessarily incompatible even with the worst-case 
scenario for the future: a carbon-constrained world. The biggest challenge 
for the future development of the coal industry is how to deal with carbon 
dioxide emissions and climate change. The technical possibilities have been 
explored. Energy and carbon prices can further accelerate the pace of technical 
application. If energy prices rise due to the scarcity of fossil-fuel resources, or a 
price is put on carbon emissions, these carbon dioxide reduction technologies 





1 This opinion is held by coal experts such as Yin Wu, director-general of the Energy Bureau at 
China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Michael Han at Rio Tinto’s Beijing 
representative office, and Weier Pan at the State Administration of Work Safety. 
2 This system entailed: 1) designing anti-pollution measures; 2) constructing anti-pollution 
equipment simultaneously with the construction of industrial plants; and 3) operating anti-
pollution equipment simultaneously with the operation of industrial plants.
3 The other national fundamental policy is aimed at controlling population growth.
4 In 2007, Jiangsu Province doubled its pollution discharge fees to 1.26 yuan/kg for sulphur 
dioxide and to 1.2 yuan/kg for other WGEs (Jiangsu EPA 2007).
5 Total coal production dropped dramatically, which was magnif ied by the deliberate 
underreporting of production as a countermeasure against the national policy that caps output 
for each province. The initial reported output for 2000 was 998 Mt, which was corrected in 
2006 to 1,299 Mt. 
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Emissions and economic development
Must China choose?
Peter Sheehan and Fiona Sun
China’s energy use has surged since the turn of the century, almost doubling 
between 2000 and 2007. The rate of growth in energy use during this period (9.2 
per cent per annum) has been more than twice that of the previous two decades 
(4.5 per cent), in spite of similar rates of economic growth. Many factors were 
undoubtedly responsible for this sharp change in trend. One was the post-2001 
development pattern, with a focus on heavy industry, exports and fixed-asset 
investment. Another was the fundamental change in the structure, ownership 
and operation of the energy industry that took place during the 1990s, which 
rendered the controls of the planned economy no longer applicable. These and 
other factors on the demand side were supported by a massive expansion of 
energy supply, with electricity-generation capacity, for example, more than 
doubling in the period. 
The scale of this energy use, and of the industrial and infrastructure 
investment associated with it, is now such as to have major ramifications 
within China and globally. Internally, the environmental and social costs of 
heavy industry, construction and fossil-fuel use have become onerous, and 
a major concern of the Chinese people. As a result, a central priority in the 
eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–10) is to change the pattern of development and 
to reduce energy use per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 20 per cent. 
Greenhouse gas emissions from China are also now of major significance 
for the global climate: in spite of its low per capita emissions, China has now 
passed the United States as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, and these 
393
Emissions and economic development
emissions continue to rise rapidly. If present trends continue, China’s annual 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 could be comparable with total global 
emissions in 2000. 
There can be no dispute that the current atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases is due mainly to the past activities of the industrialised 
countries, and that they have the prime responsibility for addressing this 
problem. The scale of China’s fossil-fuel use, however, and of its emissions, is 
now such that no solution to global warming can be found without the active 
involvement of China. More specifically, it is now clear that, if rapid global 
warming imposing severe damage on many communities is to be avoided, 
global emissions must peak within the next one to two decades at least, and 
then decline. The scale of China’s activities now means that, even given an 
urgent response by the industrialised world, China’s emissions must also peak 
and then begin to fall within the foreseeable future. 
Here the issue that China faces, along with other developing countries, is 
often put in terms of a choice between economic development and emissions. 
In spite of rapid growth, the bulk of China’s population remains poor, with 
average GDP per capita in China still at only 15 per cent of Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) levels in 2005, according to 
the new International Comparison Program estimates at purchasing power 
parity prices (World Bank 2007). With increasing energy use seen as essential 
to growth, and with coal forming the majority of China’s energy resources, it 
is argued that China can stabilise emissions within, say, 25–30 years only at 
the cost of sharply slowing growth, and hence giving up on its historical goal 
of lifting its people out of poverty. 
This chapter addresses the question: does China have to choose between 
rapid economic growth and stabilising emissions? This question is posed with 
regard to the priority being given in the eleventh Five-Year Plan to the reduction 
of energy use per unit of output, and more generally to the Chinese government’s 
strong enunciation of the need to move to a new development model—one that 
is socially and environmentally sustainable and that contributes to maintaining 
a harmonious society. Could such a new model, with the many policy initiatives 
that it contains, be consistent with continued rapid growth and a stabilisation 
of greenhouse gas emissions?
To build a basis for providing a tentative answer to this question, we 
undertake three tasks in the next three sections: we review China’s energy 
use and emissions in recent decades, with special reference to the break in 
the trend about 2001; we discuss the new development model and some of its 
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implications; and we outline the scoping model that will be used to project and 
analyse China’s future emissions. We then use this simple model to estimate 
the potential impact on energy use and carbon dioxide emissions to 2030 from 
interventions in six policy areas consistent with the new development model, 
with conclusions presented in the final section.
China’s energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, 1979–2007
As noted above, the explosive growth in energy use after 2001 was in sharp 
contrast with earlier trends. From the ‘opening to the market’ in 1979 to 2001, 
energy use grew at a much lower rate than GDP, with average rates of growth 
of 4.1 per cent and 9.7 per cent for energy use and GDP, respectively, implying 
that the energy intensity of China’s GDP fell continuously through to 2001 and 
the elasticity of energy use with respect to GDP was less than 0.5 on average 
for the period (Figure 18.1). This decline in reported energy intensity was 
especially marked in the second half of the 1990s, so that the shift to rates of 
growth in energy use in excess of GDP growth after 2001 had profound and 
unexpected implications in energy markets, and led to severe shortages in 2003 
and subsequent years. This apparent structural shift in the relationship between 
GDP growth and energy use in China raises serious questions in several areas. 
For example, is this a temporary aberration or a fundamental structural shift 
and, if so, what caused it? What basis should we use to interpret China’s likely 
future energy demand on existing policies? What policies are likely to be most 
effective in reducing the rate of growth of China’s demand for energy, in the 
light of this shift? 
There is an extensive literature on the reasons for the low income elasticity 
of energy use in China during 1979–2001, and hence the rapidly declining overall 
energy intensity. This literature is reviewed in Sheehan and Sun (2007). Much of 
the debate has been about the relative roles of structural change in the pattern 
of output and energy demand and of changes in energy intensity within sectors 
in explaining China’s energy use. Although some earlier studies emphasised 
structural change, all of the empirical studies from Huang (1993) onwards found 
a major role for reduced energy intensities at the sectoral level. In terms of 
structural effects, the results are much more mixed, with some studies finding 
negative effects of structural change on overall energy intensity but others 
(such as Lin and Polenske 1995; Garbaccio et al. 1999) finding positive effects. 
Overall, it seems clear that widespread declines in energy intensity rather than 
a shift in the pattern of growth to less-intensive sectors was the main factor 
driving the fall in overall energy intensity during 1979–2001.
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The reasons for the increased energy efficiency within sectors in China in this 
period are another matter. Three main reasons have been given in the literature 
for these sectoral effects: the impact of rationing and energy conservation 
programs in a planned economy with an initially high level of energy use and 
limited growth in energy supplies; the impact of technology, broadly defined, on 
energy use; and the impact of higher energy prices on the demand for energy 
(Sinton and Levine 1994; Sinton et al. 1998; Andrews-Speed 2004; Lin 2005). 
Our interpretation of the literature therefore is that, during the 1980s, the fall in 
sectoral intensities is to be ascribed to a combination of energy conservation 
programs and technological change being driven by a planned economy with 
energy rationing (Sheehan and Sun 2007). In the 1990s, those factors continued 
to be of importance, while rising relative energy prices also began to play a 
significant role as the economy was freed up. The literature does not give an 
unequivocal answer to the question about the role played by structural change 
in reinforcing or partially offsetting these declining sectoral intensities. 
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It is likely therefore that several interrelated factors are responsible for the 
widespread fall in sectoral energy intensities in the first two decades of rapid 
economic growth in China: a combination of energy rationing and strong energy 
conservation programs in a planned economy with limited energy supplies; 
continuing technological upgrading, in part spurred by these circumstances; 
and, in the 1990s, the impact of rising relative prices for energy. By the end 
of the 1990s, however, fundamental changes in the structure, ownership and 
operation of Chinese industry, including in the energy sector, had taken place, so 
that the mechanisms of the planned economy were no longer relevant. Energy 
use per unit of GDP reduced by two-thirds between 1980 and 2000, and much 
technological upgrading took place. Without the control mechanisms of the 
planned economy, however, further major reductions in energy intensity could 
be achieved only by market forces and by strong policy initiatives. There are 
many reasons why, in developing countries, energy is normally a superior good,1 
as the development process shifts the pattern of production and of lifestyles 
towards more energy-intensive activities and products. Beyond the command 
economy, strong market and policy effects would be needed in China to offset 
this development effect.
In the aftermath of China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001, demand for China’s products was very strong, the supply of energy 
increased rapidly and the policy focus on energy efficiency was limited. With 
structural effects contributing to rising energy use and the command-economy 
mechanisms generating falling sectoral intensities no longer operational, it 
is not surprising that an aggregate energy intensity of 1 or more re-emerged. 
This analysis implies that, going ahead, there is no reason to expect a return 
to an aggregate energy elasticity of 0.5–0.6 to occur ‘naturally’; achieving an 
aggregate elasticity well below 1 will be hard won by sustained policy initiatives, 
especially while structural change continues to contribute to increased energy 
use.
The development strategy in the eleventh Five-Year Plan
While fully recognising the remarkable achievements of nearly three decades 
of rapid growth, it is acknowledged widely within China that some adjustment 
of the current development strategy is necessary. In his March 2006 Report 
on the Work of the Government, Premier Wen Jiabao said of the issues arising 
from the tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–05):
The main problems were an unbalanced economic structure, weak capacity 
for independent innovation, slow change in the pattern of economic growth, 
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excessive consumption of energy and resources, worsening environmental 
pollution, serious unemployment, imbalance between investment and 
consumption, widening gaps in development between urban and rural areas 
and between regions, growing disparities between certain income groups, 
and inadequate development of social programs. We need to work hard to 
solve all these problems. (Wen 2006)
The eleventh Five-Year Plan outlined a vision of development that was 
socially and environmentally sustainable and that contributed to maintaining 
a harmonious society, and outlined programs to be implemented to address 
these issues and to achieve such a form of development. As one observer 
(Naughton 2006) wrote, the proposals in China’s eleventh Five-Year Plan for 
the period 2006–10 were striking:
There emerges from this Plan document a rich and comprehensive vision 
of a sustainable development process in China, and a glimpse of the kind of 
government role that would be required by this development process. The 
vision is of a society that is more creative, more focused on human resource 
development, and treads with a lighter and more environmentally benign 
step. 
It is one thing to outline a vision of a sustainable economy and a harmonious 
society and quite another to define and implement a detailed set of programs 
to give effect to this vision. This is especially so in such a diverse, vibrant and 
internationally engaged society as contemporary China. The forces shaping 
the current growth pattern—from the role of local governments and the limited 
power of the central government, the strong influence of foreign companies and 
investors and the level of the exchange rate to the popular desire for a strong 
China and a better life—are complex and interrelated, and it will take a major 
effort to realign them. 
Achieving this vision will require sustained and effective delivery of new 
policies in many different areas, especially given the momentum that has built 
up behind the current development strategy since China’s entry into the WTO. 
For example, four important objectives of current government policy are:
•	 to make growth more sustainable and environmentally benign, to reduce 
the rate of energy and water use and reduce pollution
•	 to increase innovation within all sectors, including industry, and to shift 
the pattern of activity from low value-added output based on low labour 
costs towards higher value-added activities based on knowledge
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•	 to change the structure of growth towards the service sector, and to 
accelerate the growth of particular service sectors that contribute directly 
to individual welfare
•	 to improve the position of people in the countryside, and to build struc-
tures to ensure that the benefits of growth also flow to people in rural 
areas and those regions that are lagging. 
Achievement of each of these objectives would contribute, directly or in-
directly, to reduced energy use and to environmental sustainability. This is 
particularly true of the intention to shift the pattern of economic activity from 
energy-intensive areas (such as specific forms of heavy industry) to industry 
and service sectors that are knowledge intensive and rely less on energy and 
other resource inputs; and to stimulate the adoption of advanced technologies, 
processes and practices that are energy efficient and more environmentally 
benign.
The attempt to change substantially the structure and technological base 
of a large, rapidly growing economy is without precedent and is likely to prove 
difficult, especially in a country still dealing with the transition from a planned 
to a market economy. Our question here is whether there are implementation 
paths within this general approach that could enable China to continue rapid 
growth while also stabilising emissions within 25–30 years.
A scoping model for China’s energy use and carbon dioxide 
emissions
The analysis here is based on what we refer to as a scoping model: a simple 
modelling framework in which the key relationships and assumptions are 
spelled out so that the results are highly transparent. There is a wide range 
of global energy or integrated assessment models that now include China, as 
well as a number of models applied specifically to China. These more complex 
models have many theoretical advantages over such simple models, but 
require estimation of, or assumptions about, a large number of parameters, 
such as price and income elasticities of demand, elasticities of substitution, 
supply curves and the rate and structure of economic growth. The evidence 
available for many of these parameters is very limited in China, not only 
because of limited data but because of the sharp changes that have taken 
place in economic institutions and in the structure of the energy sector in the 
past decade. For example, for much of the period since the opening to the 
market in 1979, energy use was supply constrained; this means that there are 
difficulties in obtaining reasonable estimates of various demand elasticities. 
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The swings in the aggregate income elasticity of energy use discussed above 
also illustrate the level of uncertainty that prevails in this area, as well as the 
need to incorporate recent trends.
In such a situation, the use of a large, complex model might require heroic 
assumptions and disguise the key uncertainties, leading to either misleading 
or non-transparent results. Complex models also require more detailed data, 
which are often assembled only with long time lags. Sheehan (forthcoming) 
reviews the base cases in simulations with a wide range of integrated 
assessment models: those participating in the Energy Modelling Forum (EMF 
21) modelling comparison project (Weyant et al. 2006) and the three models 
used in the Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1a of the US Climate Change 
Science Program (CCSP) (Clarke et al. 2007). Sheehan found that none of the 
10 models in the EMF 21 exercise that provided data on China and India or the 
three models used in the CCSP report provided a realistic assessment of recent 
and emerging trends in these two countries. 
For the April 2008 edition of the World Economic Outlook, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) used the G-cubed model to analyse global emission 
trends and policy responses (IMF 2008), with surprising results. The baseline 
scenario shows global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions stagnating 
between 2002 and 2010 (a growth of only 0.5 per cent per annum), but then 
growing rapidly between 2010 and 2030 (3.1 per cent per annum). For China, the 
annual growth rates of emissions for these two periods are 1.8 per cent and 6 
per cent, while for Non-Annex 1 countries as a whole the growth rates are 0.2 
per cent and 5.1 per cent (IMF 2008:Table 4.4). In fact, we know that emissions 
in developing countries have surged since about 2001, especially in China, 
where the growth in energy use and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
for 2002–10 will be about 10 per cent per annum. The IMF figure for China in 
2010 (3.8 giga-tonnes of carbon dioxide) is therefore less than half the likely 
outcome, given trends through to 2008. If global and Chinese emissions had 
stabilised since 2002, rather than surged, the international climate debate now 
would be much different. On the other hand, if the IMF’s predicted baseline 
growth for 2010–30 is added to the real experience of this decade, the global 
problem will be dire indeed. These issues again illustrate the problems involved 
in using large models to analyse complex, rapidly changing situations about 
which there is limited knowledge.
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A simple scoping model
Studies of the demand for energy frequently use a standard framework such as:
Eit = f (Yit , Pit , Zit), (1)
in which Eit is the demand for energy in industry sector i in period t, Yit is an 
income or output variable relevant to sector i, Pit is the relative price of energy 
in sector i in period t, and Zit is a vector of other variables affecting energy 
demand in sector i, such as technological change and government policy 
initiatives related to energy conservation. Assuming that from 2006 onwards 
supply constraints on energy demand in China have been removed, so that 
real energy use can be treated as demand determined, we use this framework 
to construct the projection model for China, applying it to 11 sectors. In a log-
linear specification, Equation 1 becomes
Ln (Eit) = αit ln Yit + βit ln Pit + γit ln Zi  (2)
in which αit, βit and γit are the elasticities of energy use with respect to Y, P 
and Z, respectively. Partial differentiation of Equation 2 with respect to time 
and rearrangement gives
δEit = αit δYit + βit δPit + γit δZit (3)
in which in the projection model the change variables (δE and so on) represent 
rates of change with respect to time. 
To enable examination of issues concerning the impact of the pattern 
of growth on energy use, we define two new elasticities relating the rate of 
growth of value added in sector i in period t to the growth rate of a higher-level 
variable, Ait; the ratio of the growth rate of value added in aggregate sector i 
in period t to growth in total GDP in that period; and Iit, the ratio of the growth 
rate of value added in industry sector i in period t to growth in total industry 
value added in that period (for the six sectors within industry). Therefore, Ait 
defines the pattern of growth across six aggregate sectors (in which industry 
is a single sector) for a given rate of growth of aggregate GDP, and Iit defines 
the pattern of growth across the six industry sectors for a given rate of growth 
of industry value added. That is
δYit = δYt Ait Iit (4)
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in which Ait takes a value of 1 if i is a disaggregated industry sector and Iit takes 
a value of 1 if i is an aggregate sector. 
Substituting Equation 4 into Equation 3 and converting growth rates into 
levels, gives the following expression for total energy use in China in sector i 
in period t
Eit = Eit-1 (1 + αit δYt Ait Iit + βit δPit + γit δZit) (5)
Energy use involves different types of fuels (coal, oil, natural gas and 
various types of non-fossil and renewable fuels), and each of the fossil fuels 
has a different propensity to generate carbon dioxide emissions. The share 
of fuel type j in total energy use in sector i (sij ) will vary over time, depending 
on availability, relative prices, investment patterns, policy initiatives and other 
factors. The energy use met by fuel j in year t in sector i can be denoted by Eijt 
= Eit. sijt, and total use of fuel j will be given by
Ejt = ∑ sijt Eit-1 (1 + αit δYt Ait Iit + βit δPit + γit δZit) (6)
Finally, carbon dioxide emissions per unit of use of fuel j (mjt) in China will 
also vary over time, depending, for example, on the quality of fuel used and the 
technological processes involved. Total carbon dioxide emissions from the use 
of fuel j in year t will then be given by
Mjt = mjt Ejt = mjt Ejt  (7)
with total emissions given by summing over fossil-fuel types. This simple model 
is used below to analyse and project China’s future energy use and carbon 
dioxide emissions from energy use, given suitable projections or assumptions 
for the many parameters involved. 
Data and the industrial structure of China’s energy use
The data for the analysis are drawn from official Chinese statistics (from 
successive editions of the China Statistical Yearbook; NBS various years) and 
from the International Energy Agency (IEA) database and from the World Energy 
Outlook 2007 (IEA 2007). Data for energy use and value added are taken from, or 
derived from, the China Statistical Yearbook (NBS various years), while data for 
fuel use by industry and emissions intensity are sourced from the IEA. Some 
issues arise in integrating the two data sources: for example, in terms of the 
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different treatment of renewable energy sources. Further information on the 
issues involved in assembling and using these data can be found in Sheehan 
and Sun (2007).
As noted above, issues concerning the structure of energy demand are at 
the heart of the Chinese debate, and Table 18.1 provides some key statistics 
on China’s energy use. Energy use is concentrated heavily in five industries: 
petroleum processing, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, ferrous metals and 
non-ferrous metals. These industries together have energy use per unit of value 
added more than four times the national average, and nearly six times that of all 
other industries. In 2006, these industries accounted for 44 per cent of national 
energy use but only 10 per cent of GDP. During 2001–06, real value added in this 
group grew by 15.2 per cent per annum, compared with the national rate of 10.2 
per cent, and energy use grew by 15.7 per cent per annum, given an elasticity 
of 1.04. The five energy-intensive industries accounted for 54.8 per cent of the 
increase in total energy use, while providing only 13.6 per cent of the increase 
in China’s GDP during this period. 
Given the concentration of energy use in these industries, they are critical 
to the analysis, and reducing the rate of growth of these industries and their 
energy intensity is a key priority for government policy. On the other hand, the 
role of the services sector cannot be neglected. As Table 18.1 also shows, total 
energy use in services grew by 10.2 per cent during 2001–06—in line with the 
growth in value added—while the energy intensity of the transport sector was 
high and its energy use grew rapidly.
Policy intervention areas and simulation cases
The analysis undertaken below makes use of a base or unchanged policy case, 
and three alternative policy cases. In view of the adoption of the target of a 
20 per cent reduction in aggregate energy intensity in the eleventh Five-Year 
Plan, the policy environment in China has been in flux in 2006 and 2007; new 
initiatives implemented in these years are included in the policy options cases. 
The policy stance in 2005 is interpreted as one of continued but modest efforts 
to contain energy use and carbon dioxide emissions from fuel use, through the 
introduction of market mechanisms, increased energy prices and programs to 
encourage energy conservation and the use of advanced technologies. These 
policies are incorporated in the base case.
In shaping these cases, six policy intervention areas are employed, and are 
included in the model
•	 the rate of growth in value added in industry relative to that of overall GDP
•	 the industry composition of the growth in industrial output 
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•	 the rate of growth of energy prices relative to general output prices 
•	 the reduction in energy use from programs to promote energy 
conservation and the adoption of new technologies
•	 the composition of energy supply by fuel 
•	 the emissions intensity of the use of various fossil fuels.
We distinguish these policy intervention areas from the specific policy 
instruments (such as export tariffs, energy taxes, research and development 
subsidies or changes in relative prices) that might be used to achieve a given 
policy objective in a given area. Policy instruments are not addressed here, 
but the Chinese government is currently taking some action in each of these 
areas, some examples of which are provided below. 
In taking action to achieve the eleventh Five-Year Plan’s goal of reduced 
energy intensity, the government has relied mainly on ‘command and control’ 
measures, rather than price or tax measures, and has in part reverted to tried 
and true methods that were successful in very different circumstances before 
1995. A number of measures have been taken to curtail the growth of energy-
intensive industries, and the ‘Top-1,000 Energy Consumers Enterprise’ program 
has been established to reduce energy use in large firms. In terms of structural 
change, initiatives have centred on the imposition of export tariffs, on the 
removal of support at all levels of government for energy-intensive industries, 
and on closing down inefficient capacity and on expanding service industries. 
Since 2004, the government has progressively removed its export incentives 
for energy and resource-intensive exports, and replaced them with export 
tariffs. Export tariffs on 142 such products were increased from 1 June 2007, 
with some moving from a 5 per cent to a 10 per cent tariff and others moving 
from 10 per cent to 15 per cent (MOF 2007). The central government has also 
issued a serious warning to local governments that all policies that encourage 
energy-intensive developments must cease (NDRC 2007), and it is entering into 
agreements with provincial governments to phase out inefficient capacity in 
energy-intensive industries. For iron and steel, for example, the objective is to 
close 100 million tonnes of inefficient iron production capacity by 2010 and 50 
million tonnes of steel capacity; in mid 2007, an agreement with 10 provinces to 
close 40 million tonnes of iron capacity and 42 million tonnes of steel capacity 
was announced (Central Government Portal 2007). Finally, the State Council has 
announced plans to accelerate the development of the service sector, and to 
increase its share of GDP by 3 percentage points, and its share of employment 
by 4 percentage points, by 2010. 
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Specification of the base and alternative policy cases
The three alternative policy cases, which are cumulative in the sense that 
additional policy objectives are added in the second and third cases, are as 
follows. 
•	 The new industrial structure case, in which the relative role of industry 
in total output and the role of energy-intensive industries in industrial 
output are reduced rapidly. 
•	 The price and command measures case, in which, in addition to the 
structural changes, there is a more rapid increase in relative energy 
prices and more aggressive action to promote energy conservation and 
the use of new technologies.
•	 The additional measures case, in which further measures are taken 
to reduce energy use in transport and other services and to reduce the 
level of emissions per unit of fossil-fuel use.
The full set of assumptions and parameter specifications is provided in Table 
18.2 and is described briefly below.
GDP growth rate. A common rapid growth path for GDP is used in all of the 
cases. GDP growth is assumed to moderate progressively from the current high 
levels to 8 per cent per annum by 2010 and to 7 per cent per annum by 2020, 
maintaining that level until 2030. 
Underlying elasticities of energy use with respect to value added. For the 
critical issue of elasticities of energy use with respect to value added by industry, 
we specify a pattern of underlying elasticities that remains unchanged during 
the projection period, even though the real elasticities of energy use change 
as a result of the policies that are in force—in all cases. Consistent with the 
argument above, for the eleven industries we use the average elasticity value 
for the industry for 2001–06 as the underlying rate, with an upper bound of 
1.2. The upper bound is used to ensure that unusually high elasticity values in 
particular cases during 2001–06 do not distort the long-run picture. Even using 
this specification, the overall projected elasticities of energy use with respect 
to GDP are much less than 1 in the longer term, falling to below 0.8 by 2030 in 
the base case and to 0.5 in the fullest policy case.
Relative prices for energy. While information on overall energy prices in 
China is limited, there seems to have been a significant increase in weighted 
average energy prices relative to the general price level in the 1990s and again 
in recent years, as higher global prices have flowed through to some extent to 
Chinese producers and consumers. On the basis of limited historical data, we 
assume an increase in average relative energy prices of 6 per cent per annum 
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for each of the three years from 2006 to 2008 in all cases, with a further 3 per 
cent per annum in all subsequent years in the base case. For the second and 
third policy cases, we assume that a much more aggressive pricing stance 
is adopted in the longer term, with the 6 per cent increase in relative energy 
prices being continued to 2030. 
Price elasticity of energy demand. The question of the price elasticity of 
energy demand is an important and a vexed one. Estimating the price elasticity 
of demand is especially difficult when, as in China during much of the period 
from 1980 to 2005, real energy use was supply constrained and prices were 
partly responsive to the underlying supply–demand gap arising from supply 
constraints. In view of this fact, estimates of the price elasticity in China derived 
in the literature from demand equations estimated on historical data must be 
treated with caution for our purposes.  
There is an extensive international literature on the estimation of energy 
price elasticities across countries. For example, Gately and Huntington (2002) 
found that the long-run price elasticity for the OECD region for 1971–97 was 
–0.24, and –0.08 for 14 developing countries (not including China) with above-
average per capita income growth, with evidence in both cases of asymmetrical 
responses to rising and falling prices. Pesaran et al. (1998) found that the long-
run elasticity was about –0.3 for 10 Asian countries (again, excluding China). 
For China, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) find an elasticity of –0.368 from their 
cross-sectional analysis of manufacturing firms in 1997–99; Shi and Polenske 
(2006) find a long-run price elasticity for the industrial sector of –0.78 for 
1980–2002; Hang and Tu (2007) find an elasticity of –0.54 for 1985–95 and of 
–0.65 for 1995–2005; while Chen et al. (2007) use a range of elasticities from 
–0.1 to –0.5 in their MARKAL model analysis. In the light of the international 
literature and concerns about estimating demand elasticities for China in a 
supply-constrained market, we use an elasticity of –0.4 for the energy-intensive 
industries and –0.2 for other industries. 
Sectoral growth elasticities. At the aggregate level, the key variable is the 
rate of growth of industry value added (excluding construction) relative to the 
overall GDP growth rate. In 2006, and during 2001–06, growth in industry value 
added was 16 per cent greater than in GDP (elasticity of 1.16). It is assumed, in 
the base case, that the elasticity of the growth of industry relative to GDP falls 
to 1.05 by 2015 and then declines gradually to 1 by 2030. Growth in agricultural 
value added is set at 40 per cent of GDP growth, and tertiary-sector growth is 
the residual. These assumptions imply a gradual retreat from industry-driven 
growth, with the growth in the tertiary sector exceeding that of industry after 
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2015. The new industrial structure option involves a much more rapid move to a 
service-oriented economy, with the elasticity of industrial growth with respect 
to GDP being reduced rapidly to 0.9 by 2015 and to 0.8 by 2030.
The sectoral growth elasticities relate to relative rates of growth within the 
industrial sector (excluding construction). For 2001–06, real value added in 
the five energy-intensive industries taken as a whole grew by 15.2 per cent in 
comparison with overall industrial growth of 11.7 per cent—implying a growth 
elasticity of 1.30. Growth patterns were, however, variable across the industries. 
For individual energy-intensive industries, the elasticities of growth relative to 
all industry are set initially at the average for 2001–06, bounded at 1.5 where 
the historical figure exceeds that level. In the base case, these elasticities are 
assumed to decline gradually to 1.1 by 2015, and then to 1 by 2030. In the new 
industrial structure case, the pattern of change is more rapid, with the growth 
elasticities of these industries being reduced rapidly to 0.9 by 2015 and to 0.8 
by 2030. The combination of these two sets of assumptions is that, in this case, 
the structure of the Chinese economy changes profoundly in the next decade 
or so; by 2020, the growth rate of the energy-intensive industries is only about 
5 per cent in comparison with the assumed GDP growth rate of 7 per cent per 
annum at that time.
Technology and energy conservation policies. While there is clear evidence 
that, during the period of limited energy supplies and a command economy 
in the 1980s and 1990s, technology and energy conservation policies had a 
substantial impact on energy use, no quantitative measure of that impact is 
available. Some of the command and control measures that have recently 
been implemented in this area have been noted above. In the absence of more 
precise information, we assume that the more limited policies included in the 
base reduce energy use by 0.5 percentage points per annum in energy-intensive 
industries and by 0.25 points in other industries; and, in the price and command 
measures strategy, these effects are doubled in both industry types. Clearly, 
this is only a preliminary specification, and requires further work. 
Fuel use by type and emissions intensities of fuel types. The values for 
China for the projection period of sijt, the industry-specific shares of various 
fuel types in total energy use, and of mjt, the emissions intensity of different 
fuel types, are based on the values used in IEA (2007)—varying from those 
estimates only for fuel use by type, where later information and increased 
knowledge of the emerging energy-use path is available. Massive expansion of 
coal production and of coal-fired power stations has been under way in China 
in recent years, while there is clear evidence of fuel substitution away from oil 
and considerable attention being given to renewable energies and to nuclear 
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energy. As the industry-specific fuel-use shares are held fixed but the pattern 
of value added shifts across different cases, the overall fuel-use shares also 
vary across the cases. 
The IEA’s projections of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of fuel type used 
are adopted in full, and held fixed for all scenarios, other than for the additional 
measures case. Here it is assumed that new technologies, such as advanced 
clean-coal generation methods and carbon geosequestration, are introduced 
gradually after 2010 and with increasing effect after 2020. 
Reducing energy use and emissions with continued rapid 
development
The results of the model simulations with the four cases are summarised in 
Table 18.3 and Figure 18.2. In the base case, energy use is projected to increase 
by 6.5 per cent per annum during 2005–30 and emissions rise by 6.1 per cent 
to 6.8 giga-tonnes of carbon (GtC) by 2030. The main growth is in the period 
to 2015—with energy use growing by 7.7 per cent per annum and emissions 
by 7.6 per cent per annum during 2005–15—with annual emissions growth 
slowing to 5.1 per cent during 2015–30. Nevertheless, the scale of energy use 
and emissions implied in this projection is such as to have major implications 
for the environment within China, for the global climate and for world resource 
markets.
In the new industrial structure case, the growth of energy use and emissions 
slows, but only by about 0.5 per cent per annum. This is somewhat surprising 
in the light of the significant change in industrial structure that is assumed, 
but reflects the assumed continuing reductions in energy intensity in high 
energy-using industries (in the base case) and the importance of transport and 
the services sector (including households) in the longer term. The additional 
measures in the second alternative case—higher continuing increases in 
relative energy prices and more effective measures to increase efficiency and 
to support the use of new technologies—have more effect, reducing the rate 
of growth of emissions during 2015–30 to 3.3 per cent. Even these assumptions 
are not sufficient to approach stabilisation of emissions, because in this case 
the use of fossil fuels in the services sector is still growing strongly.
As a result, further measures to reduce energy use in transport and other 
services, together with gains from technologies that reduce the level of 
emissions per unit of fossil-fuel use, are necessary to make stabilisation of 
emissions achievable. In the additional measures case, emissions are held to 
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per cent during 2015–30, with the annual growth rate approaching zero towards 
the end of the period. This is indeed a scenario in which emissions stabilise at 
less than 4 GtC not long after 2030.
Conclusion
There are many uncertainties about China’s future energy use, and about the 
effectiveness of the policies currently being discussed and implemented to 
curtail it. What is not uncertain is that it is in China’s interest to curtail the 
rapid growth in energy use, and hence curtail the human and environmental 
costs that it creates, and such an outcome is highly desirable in terms of global 
climate outcomes. Can this be achieved while continuing rapid economic 
development, or must China choose between rapid growth and acceptable 
environmental outcomes?
This scoping study offers only limited evidence about the answer to this 
question, but it does point to several tentative conclusions. First, there might 
be realistic options in which China does not have to choose; these forms of 
Figure 18.2 Carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in China, 
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implementation of the alternative development path sketched in the eleventh 
Five-Year Plan certainly deserve further study. Second, such a task will be 
difficult, and will require extensive and sustained policy initiatives in each of the 
six policy areas discussed here. Finally, achieving such an outcome seems clearly 
to be in the interests of the Chinese people and the international community, 
so that strong measures by governments of industrialised countries to support 
this policy implementation process in China would be well justified.
Notes
1 For example, for eight countries in South East Asia (excluding China), the unweighted mean 
elasticity of energy use with respect to GDP for the period 1971–2002 was 1.12, while for another 
61 developing countries for which data were available the unweighted mean elasticity during 
this period was 1.45 (IEA 2006b). These figures exclude traditional biomass energy, as do the 
figures used for China. 
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